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This dissertation examines whether China, Brazil and India will form a challenge to the Western-
made neoliberal norm of the free movement of capital across borders. From a neo-Gramscian 
perspective, it is argued that capital account liberalization has been a crucial element of the 
neoliberal project. By allowing the transnationalization of productive and financial capital, it has 
transformed the power relations between labour and capital to the advantage of the latter. As such, 
a study on the policies and perspectives of China, Brazil and India with regard to capital account 
policies, can shed light on the broader debate whether these rising powers will challenge the US-led, 
Western-made neoliberal world order. An in-depth analysis of these countries’ respective capital 
control policies, in connection with their domestic constellation of social forces and prevailing 
accumulation regime, leads to the following conclusions. First, these countries do not seem to form a 
challenge to the norm of the free flow of capital. All three the countries have liberalized to a 
considerable extent, they all see the full free movement of capital as a final objective, and the 
dominant social forces in their social formation are not in favour of a substantial closure of the 
capital account. Second, however, these countries are more pragmatic and flexible with regard to 
cross-border capital flows, and do not want to give up on their autonomy to hold on to or 
reintroduce capital controls. They have therefore also contested the institutionalization of the norm 
of the free movement of capital at the International Monetary Fund. If the issue of capital account 
policies is indeed representative of the position of China, Brazil and India regarding the neoliberal 
world order, then this dissertation indicates that although these rising powers might be able to 
obtain more policy space and allow for more diversity within a global neoliberal context, they do not 
form a fundamental challenge to this world order. In the absence of major domestic transformations 
in China, Brazil and India, and/or similar transformations in the West, the neoliberal world order is 
therefore likely to survive the ongoing power shift to the Global South. 
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 1.1 The crisis and rising powers 
These are exciting times for academics in the field of International Political Economy (IPE), and this is 
especially true for Marxist scholars. In a strange way, Marxists have a weak spot for crises, and we’ve 
had plenty of that since the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2007. There is an old joke that 
says that Marxists have correctly predicted ten out of the last five crises.i What is more, in a 
determinist version of historical materialism, economic crises are supposed to automatically lead to 
revolutionary upheaval, which generates even more enthusiasm within some orthodox Marxist 
circles. But the largest crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, as well as its aftermath, 
implications and consequences have also dominated the IPE literature in general. There has been a 
widespread assertion that some kind of change is imminent. 
In the past, global crises often had large repercussions for the workings of the global political 
economy. When the contradictions of the established world order come to the forefront, several 
different (and alternative) strategies are considered (Bieler, 2001, p. 98; Macartney, 2008a, p. 432). 
Systemic crises offer an opportunity to challenge previous common sense. Therefore, the question 
many academics are posing is: “Does the crisis of 2008 look like its predecessors? Should we expect 
transformation of political-economic rules similar to those that occurred after 1929 and 1973?” 
(Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 332; also Wade, 2009, p. 540; on economic science Fine & Milonakis, 
2011, p. 9). Some academics are at least suggesting that we should. As the Brazilian economist 
Bresser-Pereira (2010, p. 499) states: “The banking crisis that began in 2007 and became a global 
crisis in 2008 will probably represent a turning point in the history of capitalism.” This is in line with 
the feeling that many progressive commentators had that the crisis opened up opportunities for 
progressive change (as noted by Konings, 2012, p. 609). 
This feeling was probably confirmed by the numerous references to Karl Marx after the crisis, many 
of them coming from unsuspected sources.  In March 2014, the New York Times had a symposium on 
its website under the heading “Was Marx right?” (The New York Times, 2014). This question had 
earlier been answered affirmatively by both “Dr. Doom” Nouriel Roubini, economist at New York 
University (Roubini, 2011), and the American magazine Rolling Stone (McElwee, 2014), who both 
stated that Marx had been (partly) right all along.ii The American weekly Time has written about 
“Marx’s revenge” (Schuman, 2013), and UBS economist George Magnus has asked to “give Karl Marx 
a chance to save the world economy” in an op-ed on Bloomberg, the site for business and financial 
market news (Magnus, 2011). While these commentators may probably not agree with all of Marx’s 
(political) conclusions – they may not even comprehend him properly – the comeback of the father 
of communism may indicate that the “end of history”, to borrow Fukuyama’s title, has ended with 
the crisis that started in 2007. 
Besides the financial and political turmoil after the crisis, Marxists had a second reason to be bursting 
with excitement. The economic disaster clearly started in the heartland of global capitalism, the 
United States, often still considered as the bulwark of imperialism. It thus demonstrated and 
underpinned the fragile economic foundations of US power. Although some observers question the 
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reality or magnitude of the US decline (e.g. Panitch, 2014; Saull, 2012, p. 324, p. 327), it is generally 
accepted that US power is not at the same level as it was in the 1940s (during and after the Second 
World War) or in the 1990s (after the fall of the Soviet Union). Even if the US remains the dominant 
state, it does not have the same capacity to lead the world as it once did (Helleiner, 2010, p. 622; Li, 
2010, p. 296; Wade, 2008, p. 51). Seen in a longer-term perspective, this is supposed to represent the 
end of an era: “We are, in short, witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth 
and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of Euro-Atlantic states” (Golub, 2013, 
p. 1002; also van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, pp. 471-472). 
Moreover, China, a country which is still ruled by a Party which calls itself Communist, is expected to 
overtake the United States before 2020 as the world’s largest economy.iii In its slipstream, countries 
such as Brazil and India are also seen to become more autonomous from the West thanks to strong 
economic growth. In the period 2000-2012, the annual growth of China, Brazil and India was 
between double (Brazil) and almost six times (China) as large as the average annual growth within 
the G7-countries (see Figure 1.1). The share of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) 
in general – and Brazil, India and China (the BICs) in particular – in the world economy had thus 
already been growing before the crisis. 
 
Figure 1.1: Average annual growth, 2000-2012 (annual %) (own calculations, data from  IMF, 2014c) 
 
In the early aftermath of the crisis, they EMDCs emerged largely unscathed in comparison to the 
West (Cammack, 2012, p. 6). In 2013, for instance, developing countries accounted for about two 
thirds of global growth (UNCTAD, 2013b). Countries such as Brazil, India and China did especially well 
thanks to state-led efforts to sustain economic growth (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, 
p. 472). Several studies expect that the economic weight of China, Brazil and India will grow further 
in the coming decades (e.g. Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011; World Bank, 2013a). Although 
predictions should of course be taken with a grain of salt, both GDP and GDP per capita growth are 
projected to be markedly stronger in the BICs than in the G7 in the coming decades, as can be seen in 














Figure 1.2: Projected average annual growth, 2010-2050 (annual %) (own calculations, data from  
Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Projected average annual growth per capita, 2010-2050 (annual %) (own calculations, 
data from  Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011) 
 
There is thus a transition going on from a Western-based, and essentially US-made global order, 
towards a multipolar order (Golub, 2013, pp. 1001-1002; de Graaff, 2012, p. 542). Rising powers have 
already become significant players at the global (governance) table (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & 
Overbeek, 2012, p. 482; Cammack, 2012, p. 2; Wade, 2008, pp. 51-52). It is expected that as these 
rising powers’ economic weight grows, they will become even  more important for the organization 
and the rules of the global economy: “The significance of the large emerging economies – Brazil, 
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In sum, the crisis has highlighted and reinforced the changing power relations that had already been 
going on for some time before the crisis, namely, the relative decline of the United States and 
Western Europe, and the rise of emerging markets,  specifically the BICs. As John Ikenberry (2010, p. 
520) argues, “the post-war liberal order has been an American-centred and Western-oriented 
hegemonic order. The great drama of the next few decades will involve the choices and strategies of 
rising states, such as India, China, Brazil, as they confront this old order.” A new international balance 
of power is thus emerging, in which power is no longer concentrated in the hands of the G7-states 
(Germain, 2009, p. 683). This “great drama” of changing power relations has concurred with, and 
been reflected and reinforced by the global economic crisis of which the US has been the epicentre 
(van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 472). The emergence of the G20 as the main 
international forum is supposed to reflect this power shift (Cammack, 2012, p. 1). Moreover, the 
recent deal on the launch of the so-called New Development Bank by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) has been seen as the definitive “end of western hegemony” , giving rise to a 
“multiplex world” (Acharya, 2014; see also Chen D., 2014; Sader, 2014). 
Because of the combination of the crisis and the unfolding power shift, it appears that the world is 
somehow in a period of transition, in which “the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci 
in Bruff, 2010, p. 423). The question then becomes: what is this “new” that we are heading towards? 
Some argue that not only US power but also the US-made global order is in a deep crisis (Ikenberry, 
2010, p. 509). Because the crisis originated in the US, “the crisis has posed the greatest challenge to 
the Anglo-American liberal market system” (Öniş & Güven, 2011, p. 475). For some progressives, this 
means that “the crisis has a silver lining” (Wade, 2008, p. 51), as it opens up possibilities for a more 
progressive global economy. The question then becomes whether the crisis of the Western-based 
and US-made liberal order also marks a transition away from this (neo)liberal order. In this regard, 
the position of the BICs and other emerging markets might be of great importance. Since power 
transitions have often resulted in tensions, changes, and different views, the visions of these rising 
powers are more and more considered to be essential for the future global world order. In other 
words: Does the challenge that the BICs (and the “Global South” more general) pose to US and 
Western power also imply a challenge to the underlying design, principles and ideas of the Western-
centred (neoliberal) order? 
 
 1.2 The B(R)ICs as a challenge to the Western (neo-)liberal order? 
Discussions on rising powers often focus on the BRICs, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China. The 
term BRICs was launched in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, then chief economist at Golden Sachs (O’Neill, 
2001). Since then, the term has been increasingly used in both the academic and public debate.  As 
demonstrated by Figure 1.4, which traces the use of the term as a percentage of all the terms that 
Google Books has indexed, the amount of studies on the BRICs has risen strongly after 2001.iv While 
the results only go as far as 2008, it is not unlikely that the rise has been even greater after the global 
economic crisis. Moreover, in June 2009, the first BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg in Russia. 
The concept has thus been a sort of “self-fulfilling prophecy”. Since 2009, the BRICS – with South 





Figure 1.4: Use of the term BRICs (figure from Google Ngram) 
 
As could be expected, there is no agreement on the question of whether the BRICs’ political economy 
is fundamentally “different” from the West, and whether they are a “threat” to the Western-centred 
order. While the amount of literature is too large to present an all-encompassing overview, two 
extreme positions – that cut through different theoretical frameworks – can be discerned. On the 
one hand, there are those that consider the rise of the BRICs to form a substantial challenge to the 
US-led Western-based political-economic world order. It is stated that while the B(R)ICs are not a 
coherent grouping, they do embody scepticism with both the US-led liberal world order and the 
global institutions that date from the 1940s (Roett, 2010, p. 14). Moreover, they represent at least a 
more statist (and neo-developmentalist) growth model than is commonly accepted in the West 
(Gallagher, 2011b). As Schmalz and Ebenau (2012, p. 490) state: “None of the BICs has ever come 
close to resembling neoliberalism’s ‘heartlands’, or the peripheral countries subjected to ‘shock 
therapies’ with regard to the depth of neoliberalisation.” In the first place, China is said to represent 
“something different” (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, pp. 480-481). Therefore, the rise 
of the BRICs is seen to form a challenge to liberal globalization and liberal capitalism (Bremmer, 
2009, p. 41; Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 6). During the next decades, contestation over global influence 
will sharpen (Gills, 2010, p. 181). The deal on the New Development Bank by the BRICs has been seen 
as a case in point, challenging the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and more 
general, the Western-based world order (e.g. Campbell, 2014; Gallagher, 2014a; Sader, 2014). 
On the other hand, there are those that expect the BRICs, China in particular, to be socialized and 
integrated into the US-led (neo)liberal world order (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 24; Snyder, 2013, p. 209). One 
of the reasons is that the “liberal order” constructed by the US offers these rising states both 
advantages and the possibility to influence the rules within this liberal order (Ikenberry, 2010, p. 515; 
Snyder, 2013, p. 220). As Eric Helleiner (2010, p. 633) puts it: “Emerging powers such as China today 
perceive considerable benefits from participating in the global economic system and their demands 
have focused on managing the system more effectively.” While the BRICs might represent a more 
statist variety of capitalism, their statist growth is also deeply embedded in the American-led world 
economy, and it does not deviate fundamentally from the neoliberal rules of the game (van 
Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 483; Gamble, 2010, p. 12; Ikenberry, 2010, p. 515; 
Parisot, 2013, p. 1171). To the contrary, the rising powers have strongly internalized neoliberal policy 
commitments themselves (Cammack, 2012, p. 2). The emergence of the BRICs and emerging markets 
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does thus not seem to lead to a profound transformation (Chandhoke, 2013, p. 309; Golub, 2013, p. 
1013; Kahler, 2013, p. 726; van der Westhuizen, 2012, p. 332). A good example is the New 
Development Bank, which does not deviate from Western (neoliberal) principles (Bond, 2014; 
Panitch, 2014). Therefore, in this view: “Overall, neoliberal globalization looks set to survive, but in a 
more heterodox and multipolar fashion” (Öniş & Güven, 2011, p. 469). 
In the end, “it is still an open question whether in the final instance the rise of rival centers of 
accumulation constitutes a challenge to the foundations of the neoliberal global order” (van 
Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 483). This is all the more so because the global political 
economy is always in flux, especially in a period of transition in which there is no stable global 
regime. The question whether China, India and Brazil will challenge the current world order can 
hence only be answered by empirically examining their domestic political economies and preferences 
on international regulations: 
“Deciding between these competing images – nascent supporters of existing global 
governance and rising challengers promoting a disruptive agenda of change – requires a 
careful empirical examination of the causal links that would support either view. (…) The 
preferences of the emerging powers in respect of global governance are a crucial starting 
point: if they do not diverge substantially from the current institutional and normative status 
quo, then the potential for conflict and bargaining deadlock is diminished.” (Kahler, 2013, pp. 
711-712) 
This dissertation aims to provide a cautious answer to this crucial question: Will Brazil, India and 
China challenge the Western-promoted neoliberal world order? It will try to shed light on this 
difficult topic by examining the issue of capital controls and capital account liberalization. Therefore, 
the main research question of this dissertation is as follows: 
Will Brazil, India and China challenge the Western-promoted neoliberal norm of the free 
movement of capital across borders? 
 
 1.3 A note on capital controls and the BICs 
  1.3.1 Capital mobility and capital controls 
Before the choices of the specific topic (capital controls) and the countries (the BICs) are clarified , it 
will briefly be explained what the free movement of capital on the one hand, and controls on this 
movement on the other hand, exactly imply. In general, capital account policies are policies that have 
an impact on whether individuals, corporations and banks are permitted to move capital from one 
country to another. A completely open capital account implies that all these actors are allowed to 
move capital across borders; a completely closed account implies that no actor is permitted to move 
capital across borders. Capital account liberalization then means going from a completely closed 
capital account towards a more open capital account. Capital controls are limitations on the ability of 
capital to cross borders, or as Bloomfield (1946, p. 688) defines them, “all official measures, direct or 
indirect and national or international, specifically designed to influence the volume, direction, 
character, or timing of short- and long-term capital transfers.” They have also been called, 
7 
 
sometimes with small differences in the connotation, capital management techniques (e.g. Epstein, 
2009), capital flow management measures (CFMs) (e.g. IMF, 2012e) or capital account regulations 
(CAR’s) (e.g. Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2011). 
It is important to note that just because agents are allowed to move capital this doesn’t necessarily 
mean they will do so. In other words, “it is essential to recognize that this capacity of capital to cross 
international boundaries may not manifest itself at any given moment, due to the (relative) absence 
of profit incentives deriving from differential rates of expected return in different states” (Andrews, 
1994, p. 195, original emphasis). Capital mobility refers to the capacity of capital to flow across 
borders, which does not always result in actual capital flows. 
Capital controls can be categorized according to different criteria (see Table 1.1). First, with regard to 
the direction of the flows, a country can install controls on capital inflows and/or controls on capital 
outflows. With regard to a second criterion, capital flows can come in many different forms, each of 
which can be controlled. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally considered as productive 
investment. Portfolio equity flows are flows that go together with the purchase/sale of domestic 
shares by foreign investors, or the purchase/sale of foreign shares by domestic investors; portfolio 
bond flows are analogous, but with regard to bonds instead of shares. Controls on loans are 
restrictions on loans by domestic agents to foreign agents or vice versa, while there can also be 
limitations on foreign currency exposure. While this dissertation also considers FDI in general, the 
focus will especially be on the financial component of capital account liberalization, namely the three 
categories non-FDI (short-term) flows and FDI with regard to the banking sector.v A third criterion 
relates to the intensity of the restrictions. Direct or quantitative controls put a quantitative limit to 
the capital that is allowed to flow in or flow out. Indirect or qualitative controls (also called market- 
or price-based controls) are taxes on certain inflows or outflows, which do not prohibit transactions 
but only increase transaction costs. The fourth criterion is the time period during which controls are 
supposed to be in place: they can be temporary or (semi-)permanent. 
Direction of 
capital flows 
Form of capital 
flows 
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Finally, and crucially, capital controls can serve different purposes (see also Chapter 2). The most 
common goal is financial stability, namely to avoid financial crises. According to Ilene Grabel (2003), 
financial integration leads to five distinct, but interrelated risks: (1) currency risk (a precipitous fall in 
the value of the currency), (2) flight risk (owners massively selling liquid assets, with declining asset 
prices and banking distress as a consequence); (3) fragility risk (public and private borrowers being 
unable to meet their obligations, arising due to currency and/or maturity mismatch, or volatile short-
term capital); (4) contagion risk (when a country becomes a victim of instability elsewhere); and (5) 
sovereignty risk (the danger that a government loses its ability to autonomously define its policies 
when it faces a crisis). Many of the capital controls related to financial stability have recently been re-
baptized as macro-prudential measures (MPMs). 
The second goal of capital controls is monetary autonomy. This is because of the “monetary 
trilemma” (also called “inconsistent trinity”): the incompatibility of fixed exchange rates, 
international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy (Eichengreen, Tobin & Wyplosz, 
1995, p. 162; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998, pp. 354-355; Tobin, 1999, p. 163). This implies that when 
capital is able to move freely across borders, a country has to choose between managing its 
exchange rate and pursuing independent monetary policy (Andrews, 1994, pp. 194-195; Epstein, 
2009). In other words, countries that want to simultaneously preserve independent monetary policy 
and manage their exchange rates must restrain capital mobility. 
A third objective that capital controls can pursue is macroeconomic management. This especially 
concerns the effects of capital flows on the exchange rate. A surge in capital inflows can lead to 
exchange rate overvaluation, which decreases the competitiveness of the domestic industrial sector, 
and results in current account deficits and ultimately balance-of-payments crises (Akyüz, 2012, p. 77; 
Bibow, 2011; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009, pp. 114-115; Subramanian, 2007; UNCTAD, 2013b). To 
counter the appreciation, monetary policy could be eased. However, when domestic inflation is 
already a concern, this can be problematic. In this situation, capital controls could offer an answer. 
More generally, capital controls could also be used as a counter-cyclical instrument to create a more 
stable economy: tightening controls on inflows (or loosen controls on outflows) during a boom, and 
relaxing controls on inflows (or tightening controls on outflows) during a downturn. 
Finally, capital controls could also serve a transformative purpose. It is this transformative purpose 
that is most interesting to this dissertation. As Epstein (2009) explains, capital controls with this goal 
can enhance national democracy and autonomy “by reducing the potential for speculators and 
external actors to exercise undue influence over domestic decision-making either directly or 
indirectly (via the threat of capital flight)”. They can thus make room for progressive economic and 
social policies (see Crotty & Epstein, 1996; Grabel, 2002). In this sense: 
“Here, capital controls accompany more profound changes in the underlying political and 
economic structure of society, often by facilitating a major shift in economic and political 
power from one group in society to another, thereby making feasible a more dramatic change 
in the overall structure of the political economy (…).” (Epstein, 2012, p. 49) 
This has also been captured in Dani Rodrik’s “political trilemma” (see Figure 1.5). By this Rodrik 
(2010) argues that “economic globalization, political democracy, and the nation-state are mutually 
irreconcilable” (see also Rodrik, 2011, pp. 184-232). In other words, if we want to maintain political 
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democracy and national sovereignty, then globalization has to be limited, and capital controls could 
play a crucial role in this regard. 
 
Figure 1.5: The political trilemma (adapted from Rodrik, 2007) 
 
  1.3.2 Why study capital controls? 
There are several reasons why the issue of capital controls entails an essential research area. First 
and fundamentally, in Chapter 4 it will be extensively argued that the cross-border movement of 
capital is strongly interrelated with neoliberalism. Consequently, countries’ positions and policies 
with regard to the capital account can be considered as a “proxy” for their integration into the 
neoliberal Western heartland more general. If the BICs challenge the norm of the free movement of 
capital through their domestic policies and position in international forums, then this implies they 
could form a challenge to the Western-centred neoliberal order in general. However, if they do not 
challenge the norm of full capital mobility, then they will probably be integrated into this Western-
centred order, and they will be able to mount at most a rather limited and inconsequential  
challenge. 
Second, the issue has also become rapidly and increasingly topical after the global economic crisis. 
Before the crisis, capital controls were seen as strongly outdated, as a strange relic from the 
interventionist past of the dark Bretton-Woods period (see 3.2). They were considered to be “an idea 
whose time is past” (Dornbusch, 1998, p. 20). But after the global economic crisis, according to many 
analysts, the tide has turned. Even traditional pro-liberalization media outlets such as the Financial 
Times (Plender, 2014a) and The Economist (2009a) now see a role for capital controls. Discussions at 
the IMF (see Chapter 8) demonstrate the still controversial character of the topic, as well as the 
different views that exist until today. 
Thirdly, capital controls are still an underdeveloped research area in the field of IPE (see Chapter 2). 
As such, the discipline of economics has been given free reign with regard to capital account policies. 
It will be argued in Chapter 2 that this economics literature neglects several issues crucial in an IPE 
perspective. Further, that capital controls are a largely bypassed research area is especially true for 
countries such as Brazil, India and China. Consequently, this dissertation is therefore probably one of 
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the first attempts to systematically map and focus on these three countries’ capital account policies 
from a political economy perspective.vi This is all the more important because, as will be outlined 
below, at first sight the BICs deviate quite strongly from the West in this domain. 
 
  1.3.3 Why study the BICs? 
Why then, study specifically China, Brazil and India? Emerging markets in general have become 
increasingly important for the regulation and future of international capital flows. On the one hand, 
they have been integrating into the global economy and have to a certain extent embraced financial 
globalization. They have increasingly abolished their capital controls. As Chwieroth (2007, pp. 443-
444 writes): “One of the most important developments in the world economy during the past three 
decades has been the willingness of governments in emerging markets to open up their economies 
to global markets. A significant element of this opening has been the liberalization of capital controls 
– a process known as capital account liberalization.” Foreign banks have also been more and more 
active in emerging markets (Domanski, 2005, p. 70, 72). 
Moreover, emerging markets have become increasingly important for global financial markets and 
the development of financial globalization (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009). The 
share of the US in total foreign ownership in the world economy has decreased from 28% in 1980 to 
18% in 2003 (Bichler & Nitzan, 2012, p. 57). Capital inflows into emerging markets amounted to 32% 
of global capital flows in 2012, compared to only 5% in 2000 (Lund et al., 2013). With regard to 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the share of developing countries in general and the BRICs in 
particular has been growing starkly after the crisis (UNCTAD, 2014a). The importance of rising powers 
and developing countries is expected to grow further in the decades ahead. According to the World 
Bank (2013a), gross capital inflows to developing countries will probably stand for between 47 and 
60 per cent of the global total by 2030, up from 23% in 2010. Another study estimates that by 2050, 
the BRICs would represent 40% of all external assets (up from 10% today), and 50% of annual gross 
capital inflows (Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011). Developing countries are projected to become 
more important both as source and destination of cross-border capital flows (World Bank, 2013a). 
On the other hand, emerging markets are still less integrated into financial markets than could be 
expected (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009). Abdelal (2007, p. 212) states that full 
capital mobility is still not a global norm; it is only a “developed-country norm”. This is of course 
fundamental, as it could indicate a different position towards the regulation of capital flows than in 
developed countries. Brazil, India and China (as well as other EMDCs) have not liberalized their 
capital accounts to the same extent as Western countries, and/or have experience with capital 
controls in the recent past (Bibow, 2011; Chowla, 2011; Gallagher, 2011b; Huang, Dang & Wang, 
2011, p. 33). On the often-used Chinn-Ito index (see Chapter 3), for instance, while all the G7-
countries had a coefficient of 2,421764 in 2012 (fully open), China and India’s coefficient stood at -
0,17503, while Brazil’s was slightly more open at -0,11731 (the lower the score, the less open) (see 





Figure 1.6: Chinn-Ito index (own calculations, data from Chinn & Ito, 2014) 
 
What is more, after the global economic crisis, some EMDCs are rediscovering capital controls 
(O’Farrell, 2011). As Helleiner (2009, p. 20) notes: “Interestingly, it is in developing countries that the 
case for capital controls is being heard more loudly in the context of the current crisis. (…) Today, 
capital controls are seen more as a way to help limit the possible effects of contagion emerging from 
the turmoil in Western financial markets.” The BICs’ (successful) experience with capital controls 
could have a direct or indirect demonstration effect for other developing countries: “The escape of 
these countries [China and India] from financial turmoil during the international economic crisis only 
enhanced the attractiveness of such [capital] controls for developing economies that have faced 
cycles of boom-and-bust capital flows” (Kahler, 2013, p. 715). Additionally, it could make a difference 
if the BICs were to play a larger role in discussions within international organizations with regard to 
capital account policies (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Grabel, 2012, p. 66). 
Why then, study the BICs instead of the BRICs? Besides time limits, Russia is clearly a distinct case. It 
is not a country coming from the “Global South” or the “Third World”, but a former superpower, 
which is also a member of the G8 and which has opened negotiations for membership of the OECD. 
After Russia’s economic decline in the 1990s, it can at most be said to be re-emerging instead of 
emerging (see e.g. Taylor, 2011). And even this can be questioned: because of its economic woes and 
weaknesses, several authors have proposed “to take the ‘R’ out of BRICs” (e.g. Aslund, 2009; 
Fernando, 2009; Loman, 2009; Wharton, 2010).vii Several authors have studied the BICs and left out 
Russia (e.g. Hopewell, 2014; Kahler, 2013; Nölke et al., 2014; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012). This 
dissertation follows these authors in this demarcation. 
 
 1.4 Research questions 
To answer the general research question whether the BICs will mount a challenge to the norm of the 



















































































































































positions are possible in this regard. If they were to resist the norm of free capital flows in the most 
fundamental way, there are three conditions: (1) they still have broad-based capital controls in place 
(2) which are supported by a fairly large and influential coalition and (3) which are defended at the 
international level. If, however, they do not really resist full capital mobility, we can expect: (1) a 
considerably liberalized capital account with not more than a few capital control measures, (2) a 
large coalition in favour of an open capital account, and (3) an acceptance that full capital mobility is 
the international norm to be pursued. Of course, in-between positions are possible as well. 
To offer an interpretation of whether we can speak of a challenge, therefore, both the domestic level 
in each of the BICs and the position of the BICs at the international level must be scrutinized. This 
dissertation therefore operates in two steps. In the first step, capital account policies will be 
examined at the domestic level for each of the BICs. Their evolution, the position of important 
groups in society, and the relation to the national growth models will be analysed. In particular, five 
research questions will be answered for the three countries at issue: 
1) How have capital account policies evolved over the past decades (in the context of their 
changing domestic political economy)? 
2) What is the current situation with regard to the BICs’ respective capital account policies 
(again in the context of the current domestic political economy)? 
3) Which coalitions are respectively  supporting/opposing capital controls, and what are their 
motivations? 
4) Is there a broadly accepted short-, medium- or long-term objective with regard to capital 
account policies? 
5) How have capital account policies impacted upon domestic power relations? 
With regard to the regulation of capital controls at the international level, one general research 
question will be answered:  Do China, Brazil and India try to influence the view that full capital 
mobility is a global norm which countries should strive to reach? As will be seen in Chapter 8, 
developed countries have not only advanced the view that the free movement of capital is a 
desirable goal for both the world economy and individual countries, but also tried to institutionalize 
the free movement of capital as a legal norm. The BICs could hence dispute the Western vision in 
two ways: (1) they could contest the content of the regulations, namely the view that full capital 
mobility is desirable, and/or (2) they could oppose the form of the regulations, namely the view that 
full capital mobility should be an institutionalized norm. 
 
 1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
Next to this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 gives an 
overview of the literature on capital account liberalization. It is divided into three parts. The first part 
gives an historical overview from the late 19th century until after the global economic crisis. A second 
part discusses the literature in the discipline of economic science. It is argued that various strands of 
economics put forward a depoliticized account of capital account policies, which is rejected in this 
dissertation. The third part sketches the various perspectives that IPE has offered on capital controls. 
The shortcomings of a large share of the IPE literature, especially the quantitative analyses, are 
described, which leads to the conclusion that an alternative approach is needed. 
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This alternative approach, a neo-Gramscian theoretical and conceptual perspective, is outlined in 
Chapter 3. In this critical theory perspective, a historicized approach is adopted which accords 
primacy to the social relations of production. It is argued that within the capitalist mode of 
production, the contradiction between capital and labour is essential. However, the neo-Gramscian 
perspective adopted here historicizes further by, amongst others, discerning different fractions 
within capital (and labour), and does not neglect the role played by ideas. Further, it will be outlined 
how the neo-Gramscian perspective that this dissertation adhered to in this dissertation, the theory 
of the state provides some autonomy for state managers. 
In Chapter 4, “neoliberalism”, capital account liberalization is placed in the context of the global 
transition from the Bretton Woods era to the “neoliberal” era, playing a crucial role in the 
transnationalization and financialization of capital, disciplining labour, and restoring capitalist class 
power and profitability. It is argued that the hegemonic neoliberal class project is variegated and the 
degree and hegemony of neoliberalization varies from country to country, being strongest in the 
Lockean heartland, the US in particular. This leads to the conclusion that the rising powers could be 
opposed to this American-centred neoliberal class project. If the issue of the cross-border movement 
of capital is representative for neoliberalism more general, as argued in this dissertation, then a 
study on the policies, practices and perspectives of the BICs with regard to capital controls can shed 
light on these countries’ positions in relation to the neoliberal world order.   
This study is executed in the next four chapters. Chapter 5 examines China’s capital account policies 
after the transition from the state-socialist era under Mao to the state-capitalist era, starting in 1978. 
Most attention is given to the capital controls that were still in place when the global economic crisis 
struck in 2007 and the forces sustaining them. Additionally, the post-crisis debate on capital account 
liberalization and the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB), the Chinese currency, is studied 
comprehensively. In Chapter 6 Brazil’s capital account policies are analysed. The focus here lies 
especially on capital account liberalization after the transition to democracy in the 1980s and 
deepening with the Real Plan of 1994, and on how the Workers’ Party under Lula (2003-2010) and 
Dilma (2011-2014) have dealt with the contradiction between an open capital account and the 
aspirations of their bases of support. Chapter 7 looks at the Indian case, and the gradual opening up 
of the capital account after 1991. The (largely depoliticized) debate, and the forces in society 
participating in this debate, are examined. In Chapter 8, the regulation of capital controls after the 
crisis at the global level, in particular at the IMF. The focus lies on the vision of the BICs (and EMDCs 
more general), and their role in the development of the IMF’s framework. 
Finally, in the closing chapter, Chapter 9, the conclusions are outlined in three parts. A first part 
summarizes the findings of the preceding chapters. The second identifies issues that deserve further 
research. Finally, the third part of Chapter 9 looks at the issue of “counter-hegemony” and the 
function that capital controls could fulfil in a more radical left-wing project. 
 
                                                          
i
 The numbers vary from version to version. 
ii
 As well as by economic consultant Anatole Kaletsky (2014). 
iii
 According to recent figures, China may even already be the world’s largest economy in 2014 (Giles, 2014). 
iv
 Note that Google Books Ngram is case-sensitive, which improves the results for term BRICs. 
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v
 The liberalization of controls on these flows and on FDI in the banking sector, and an increase in these flows 
could be called “financial internationalization” (see Haggard & Maxfield, 1996, p. 36; Pepinsky, 2013, p. 848) or 
“financial globalization”. 
vi
 Some articles have focused on the domestic political economy of individual countries, see e.g. Vermeiren & 
Dierckx, 2012 on China, and Gallagher, 2014b on Brazil. 
vii
 It could, however, be argued, that both Brazil and India (and even China) also have economic weaknesses 
which render them vulnerable (see the respective chapters). 
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 2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the academic literature on capital account liberalization and capital controls will be 
discussed. This chapter – as the literature – consists of three main parts. The first section (3.2) 
provides a historical overview of capital movements and (the thinking on) capital controls, from the 
second half of the 19th century, until after the global economic crisis that started in 2007-2008. In the 
second section (3.3), the way the discipline of economic science has studied capital controls is 
outlined, and the difference between orthodox and heterodox approaches is highlighted. The 
apolitical, depoliticized treatment that is visible in both orthodox and heterodox accounts is 
criticized. A third main section briefly reviews the IPE literature, which has focused on searching for 
“determinants”  of capital account liberalization and/or the (re-)introduction or preservation of 
capital controls (3.4). This literature will be critically assessed, and it is suggested than an alternative 
approach is better suited to study capital controls. This alternative approach, a neo-Gramscian 
perspective, is the subject of Chapter 3.  
 
 2.2 A history of capital movements and capital controlsi 
  2.2.1 From the “First Age of Globalization”... 
While authors have traced the existence of “primitive forms” of capital controls as far back as the 
sixteenth century (Modenesi & Modenesi, 2008, p. 567), this historical oversight starts in the 
nineteenth century, with the spread of the capitalist mode of production. It is generally accepted, 
despite the problems with reliable statistics, that cross-border capital flows started increasing 
strongly in the second half of the nineteenth century (Bichler & Nitzan, 2012, p. 54). Capital was 
highly mobile, especially between 1870 and 1914 (Eichengreen, 1991, p. 150; Obstfeld & Taylor, 
1998, p. 353; OECD, 2002), and international financial markets flourished (Helleiner, 1994, p. 1; 
Obstfeld, 1998, p. 11). This period is therefore referred to as the “First Age of Globalization” (Lund et 
al., 2013; Mishkin, 2009, p. 142; Straw & Glennie, 2012; World Bank, 2013). Restrictions on cross-
border flows were considered illegitimate (Abdelal, 2007, p. 2). The adoption of the gold standard 
played an important role in this period of increasing capital mobility (Kolo & Wälde, 2008, p. 155; 
Chowla, 2011). This regime based on the gold standard and free movement of capital reflected and 
was supported by the leading state Great Britain and the prevailing ideas on economic policies 
(Ruggie, 1982, pp. 390-391). 
The First World War represented a major break with this regime of high capital mobility (Chowla, 
2011; Kolo & Wälde, 2008, pp. 155-156; Mishkin, 2009, p. 142; World Bank, 2013). Many 
governments suspended capital account convertibility during the war (Abdelal, 2007, p. 5). In the 
1920s, European governments tried to recreate the pre-war system with free cross-border capital 
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flows (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 11). However, the 1929 crisis and its aftermath dealt a fatal blow to the 
attempts to restore a regime of high capital mobility and capital account convertibility (Abdelal, 
2007, p. 6; Kolo & Wälde, 2008, p. 154; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998, p. 372). The Great Depression 
reversed the globalizing trajectory of capitalism (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 54). It did not only lead to 
the collapse of international financial markets and the end of the gold standard, but also to new 
thinking on finance (Helleiner, 1994, pp. 27-28). Comprehensive and permanent capital controls were 
introduced in many countries. The Second World War demonstrated that states could enforce 
effective exchange controls (Helleiner, 1994, p. 31). By 1945, the stock of cross-border capital flows 
was at a very low level (Bichler & Nitzan, 2012, p. 54). 
 
  2.2.2 ... to the Bretton Woods regime 
After the Second World War, the Bretton-Woods regime considered capital controls to be a 
legitimate and often-used instrument of economic management. This was in line with the economic 
thinking of that time, especially the writings of the leading British economist John Maynard Keynes. 
For him, freedom of capital movements was “an essential part of the old laissez-faire system” 
(Keynes, 1942). In an essay in 1933, he had already written: “above all, let finance primarily be 
national” (Keynes, 1933).ii He was even more explicit when he wrote: “Nothing is more certain than 
that the movement of capital funds must be regulated” (Keynes cited in Cohen, 2003, p. 67). The 
experience of destructive capital flows in the 1930s had led to disillusionment with regard to 
unlimited capital flows (Bloomfield, 1946, p. 687). 
In the view of Keynes and his fellow-thinkers, international financial markets had to be subordinated 
to national economic development and stability (Underhill, 2003, p. 772). Comprehensive capital and 
exchange controls were a necessary corollary to this. Without limits on disequilibrating capital flows, 
progressive economic policies and full employment would be impossible, as Keynes argued (Best, 
2004, p. 388; Helleiner, 1994, p. 4). This “embedded liberal” framework of thought was accepted in a 
large swath of academia and bureaucracy (Abdelal, 2007, p. 6; Helleiner, 1994, p. 4; Ikenberry, 1992). 
It was also supported by many industrialists in the US and elsewhere, as well by trade union leaders 
(Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 123; Helleiner, 1994, p. 4, pp. 43-44). Arthur Bloomfield, economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, summarized the prevailing thoughts on capital controls: 
“It is now highly respectable doctrine, in academic and banking circles alike, that a 
substantial measure of direct control over private capital movements, especially of the so-
called “hot money” varieties, will be desirable for most countries not only in the years 
immediately ahead but also in the long run as well.” (Bloomfield, 1946, p. 687) 
The new consensus represented a major turnabout from the orthodoxy of the late nineteenth 
century, and would a few decades earlier “have been considered radical and anticapitalist” (Abdelal, 
2007, p. 43). This positive stance towards capital controls was institutionalized in the IMF Articles of 
Agreement of 1944. Keynes for the UK and Harry Dexter White for the US led the Bretton-Woods 
negotiations on a post-war economic order. They agreed on two things: first, substantial control over 
international capital movements would be necessary, and second, controls would be most effective if 
countries cooperated with each other in enforcing regulations (Boughton, 2002; Helleiner, 1994, p. 
38; Crotty & Epstein, 1996). They therefore recommended cooperative controls. 
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There was strong opposition to the proposals, mainly from New York bankers who had a strong 
influence in Washington, and who wanted a return to total freedom for capital movements (de 
Cecco, 1979, pp. 51-52; Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 123; Helleiner, 1994, pp. 39-48; Panitch & Gindin, 
2008; Underhill, 2003, p. 772). Eventually, financial communities succeeded in removing all 
references to potential mandatory cooperation. The burden of enforcing capital controls thus fell on 
countries facing capital outflows instead of controls “at both ends”. The final version of the IMF 
proposals therefore “contained watered-down formulae relating to capital controls” (de Cecco, 1979, 
p. 51). However, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF (1945) still sanctioned the use of extensive 
capital controls. Article VI, section 3 stated: “Members may exercise such controls as are necessary 
to regulate international capital movements (…)” (IMF, 1945). Moreover, Article VI, section 1 
prescribed: “A member may not make net use of the Fund’s resources to meet a large or sustained 
outflow of capital, and the Fund may request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of 
the resources of the Fund.” To sum up, member states were given the right to use controls, and the 
IMF could even request governments to use them as a condition for IMF financing (Chwieroth, 2008; 
Joyce & Noy, 2008). 
Some authors believe that Bretton Woods agreement already provided the foundation for a more 
laissez-faire regime of international capital movements (Konings & Panitch, 2008, pp. 230-232; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2008; Quinn & Inclán, 1997; Radice, 2009, pp. 98-99). In this respect, the position 
of the US was of great importance. Despite the New Deal regulations, the financial sector was still a 
powerful force in American society (Helleiner, 1994). Partly because of its economic and financial 
strength, capital controls were not on the table in the US (Panitch & Gindin, 2008). Moreover, large 
segments of the US state thought of capital controls in other countries as a temporary feature of the 
post-war economic order, that would disappear after a short transition period. So, it could be argued 
that “US policy all along was to dismantle currency and capital controls once adjustment and catch-
up had occurred” (Newstadt, 2008). 
However, according to Helleiner (1994, pp. 4-5), there was broad support to capital controls, even 
among US policymakers. He therefore interprets the Bretton Woods regime as “a dramatic rejection 
of the liberal financial policies that had been prominent before 1931” (Helleiner, 1994, p. 25). 
According to him, the “overriding principle” of the IMF Articles of Agreement was restriction 
(Helleiner, 1994, p. 49). This interpretation is shared by many other authors (e.g. Abdelal, 2007, p. 1; 
Bloomfield, 1946, p. 687). It is also commensurate with Keynes’ declaration in the UK House of Lords: 
“Not merely as a feature of the transition, but as a permanent arrangement, the plan accords 
to every member government the explicit right to control all capital movements. What used 
to be a heresy is now endorsed as orthodox.” (Keynes in Abdelal, 2006, p. 3) 
 
  2.2.3 Towards capital account liberalization in the “Second Age of Globalization” 
Already in the late 1950s, capital mobility started increasing again (Helleiner, 1994, p. 1; Obstfeld & 
Taylor, 1998, p. 354). The “Second Age of Globalization” was taking off in the early 1960s (Mishkin, 
2009, p. 143; World Bank, 2013), a decade described by Helleiner (1994, p. 99) as a decade of 
“transition in international finance”. Increasingly volatile capital flows were disrupting the Bretton 
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Woods system of stable exchange rates and therefore preoccupied policymakers in many countries 
(Abdelal, 2007, pp. 7-8; Best, 2004, p. 397; Helleiner, 1994, p. 101). 
The attitudes towards capital controls also slowly changed as the years passed by. This was especially 
the case in economic science: 
“In the early 1960s most economists in the profession abandoned the Keynesian claim – 
which had dominated thinking since World War II – that the volatility of financial markets 
necessitated and legitimated the permanent use of capital controls. (…) In contrast to 
Keynesians, neoclassical economists shared the view that unfettered capital mobility would 
be beneficial and desirable, at least in the long run.” (Chwieroth, 2007, p. 448) 
It could also be observed within the IMF staff (Best, 2004, pp. 399-400). As former Executive Director 
Jacques Polak (1998) writes: “The Fund’s first history, covering the period from 1945 to 1965, noted 
the resurgence of the view, dominant before the 1930s, that freedom of capital movements was 
highly desirable in itself.” Another indication comes from the European Community’s (EC) Treaty of 
Rome (1957) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements (1961).iii Both agreements made it clear that the free movement 
of capital was becoming a long-term goal for developed countries. According to a OECD report 
(2002), there was a clear consensus in Western countries that freer capital movements would be 
beneficial. 
However, both the Treaty of Rome and the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements also gave 
member states extensive rights to control (especially short-term) capital flows (Abdelal, 2006, p. 3). 
The IMF Articles had not been reformed, and the formal rules thus did not really restrict the option 
to control international capital movements during the first decades of this Second Age of 
Globalization. Moreover, many academics and policymakers were not yet in favour of the full 
freedom for capital movements. Despite the Treaty of Rome, in the years after its coming into force, 
West-European governments did not really give much attention to capital account liberalization 
(Helleiner, 1994, p. 157). The commitment to the rather restrictive Bretton Woods order remained 
(Helleiner, 1994, p. 82). 
Yet by the 1970s, more countries moved towards capital account liberalization. In the words of 
Abdelal (2006, p. 3): “Even as the legal rules of the system remained non-liberal for decades, a new 
era of global capital was in the making.” A number of developments contributed to this gradual shift 
(for the deeper causes, see Chapter 4). Among these were the growing international trade and 
investment , which also led to the growth of international financial markets and seemed to make 
unilateral capital controls less effective (Helleiner, 1994, p. 103; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998, p. 392; 
Radice, 1998, p. 274). The emergence of the Eurocurrency markets in London would prove to be 
crucial in this regard (Helleiner, 1994, p. 82; Major, 2008, p. 821). As mentioned above, the views in 
the academic and policy-making community had also changed considerably in favour of open capital 
accounts, especially among economists. Further, industrialist which used to be sympathetic towards 
controls became more and more hostile towards infringements on capital freedom (Helleiner, 1994, 
p. 120, 1995, p. 324). In the US, the intertwinement of these developments with the perception that 
an open financial order was in the US “national interest” led to a foreign economic policy position in 
favour of capital account liberalization in other countries (Helleiner, 1995, pp. 323-324). Both the US 
and UK forcefully embraced the globalization of finance (Abdelal, 2007, p. 8). 
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The abolition of capital controls was not an foregone conclusion, nor an inevitable outcome of 
uncontrollable forces. To limit speculative capital flows, governments had two option. The first was 
to introduce more comprehensive exchange controls (Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 16): “If there was to 
be any serious alternative to giving financial capital its head by the 1970s, this would have required 
going well beyond the old regulations and capital controls, and introducing qualitatively new policies 
to undermine the social power of finance.” However, in the 1970s and early 1980s, governments 
chose not to introduce these controls which were perceived to be deleterious to an increasingly 
interdependent world economy (Helleiner, 1994, p. 104, 1995, p. 335). The second option was the 
one which had already been suggested by Keynes and White in 1944, cooperative controls. Attempts 
to introduce cooperative controls in 1973 failed, amongst others because of US opposition (Helleiner, 
1994, pp. 107-109, 1995, p. 322). As both options were off the table, governments in advanced 
countries decided that they had little choice but trying to reap the benefits of international capital 
flows (Goodman & Pauly, 1993; Andrews, 1994; Helleiner, 1995, pp. 329-334). 
By the early 1980s, international capital flows had grown significantly, and the US, the UK, Germany 
and Japan had largely liberalized their capital controls (Abdelal, 2006, p. 3). Other developed 
countries followed suit in the 1980s (Helleiner, 1995, pp. 144-146). The opening up of the capital 
account became a “policy mantra” (Bibow, 2011). Moreover, in the early 1980s, the US state began 
to put strong pressure on other states to ease restrictions on cross-border flows (Crotty & Epstein, 
1996; Helleiner, 1995, p. 329). The consequences were far-reaching: “By the end of the decade, an 
almost fully liberal financial order had been created in the OECD region, giving market operators a 
degree of freedom they had not had since the 1920s” (Helleiner, 1994, p. 9). Financial flows, rather 
than trade, came to dominate international economic relations (Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, p. 
303). There had been a worldwide – although not universal nor uniform – movement towards freer 
movement of capital flows (Underhill, 2003, p. 772). While this was partly the consequence of 
“spontaneous” actions by private actors, states were far from powerless victims; on the contrary, the 
rise of capital mobility was if not a state-led at least a state-authored process, led by the United 
States and the United Kingdom (Hay, 2000, p. 525; Helleiner, 1994, p. 8; Underhill, 2003, p. 771). 
 
  2.2.4 The institutionalization of the free movement of capital 
Yet during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, while the informal norms had changed, the formal 
rules still legitimized capital controls, both for developed and developing countries. With regard to 
developed countries, this changed in the late 1980s when the formal regulations started to catch up 
with reality and with the prevailing ideas. The EC and OECD frameworks were revised in respectively 
1988 and 1989 to fully embrace the consensus in favour of the full free flow of capital (Abdelal, 2006, 
pp. 1-4, 2007, p. 10; Helleiner, 1994, p. 166).iv The Maastricht Treaty that came into force on 1 
January 1994 states that “all restrictions on the movement of capital between member states and 
between member states and third countries shall be prohibited” (see also Kolo & Wälde, 2008, pp. 
158-159). 
However, the IMF Articles of Agreement still contained the more restrictive ideas of 1944. In 1972, a 
group of experts appointed by the Committee of Twentyv had already concluded that capital controls 
should not be a permanent feature of the international monetary system, in contrast to what Keynes 
had defended thirty years earlier (Pauly, 1995, pp. 337-338). They recommended the adoption of a 
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code of conduct monitored by the IMF to govern the future use of capital controls. In the end, 
however, the Committee of Twenty could not agree on such a framework, so formally nothing 
changed. In 1976, the IMF’s Articles were amended so that the promotion of capital mobility became 
one of the essential purposes of the international monetary system (Chwieroth, 2007b; Helleiner, 
1994, p. 110). Yet they did not state that the Fund should promote capital mobility, and the formal 
rules of the Fund’s framework on capital mobility remained unchanged. 
Nonetheless, the informal social norms within the IMF clearly favoured liberalization. As Chwieroth 
(2008, pp. 130-131) explains: “In the mid-1980s, recruitment and promotion patterns brought a new 
cadre of staff members, who were inclined to view liberalization as desirable, to senior positions and 
consequently shaped the Fund’s adoption of the norm of capital freedom.” By the early 1990s, the 
staff’s internalization of capital freedom as a norm was more or less complete. This is also confirmed 
by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, which stated in an evaluation report that the 
IMF “did not hesitate to support capital account liberalization as part of the of the authorities’ overall 
policy package as expressed in program documents” (IEO, 2005). Although the IMF could not use 
conditionality to force countries to abolish capital controls, the Fund actively encouraged the 
elimination of controls (Chwieroth, 2007b, 2008; see also Joyce & Noy, 2008). 
The global move towards the full free movement of capital reached its zenith in the mid-1990s. 
Almost every mainstream economist recommended capital account liberalization (Prasad & Rajan, 
2008, p. 149). Many countries abolished long-standing capital controls. Financial globalization 
reached the same levels as in the late 19th century (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 11; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998, p. 
354). As Benjamin Cohen (2003, p. 63) states: “By the 1990s, the tide was clearly moving towards the 
consecration of free capital mobility as a universal norm.” In a way, this was a return to the beliefs 
and practices that had prevailed in the late nineteenth century (Abdelal, 2007, p. 2; Thompson, 1997, 
p. 85). 
In the mid-1990s, proponents of capital account liberalization pursued the institutionalization of the 
new policy stance in the IMF’s formal rules. According to Abdelal (2007, pp. 3-4), this happened 
under impulse of European countries and policymakers, as the US approach to globalization was 
more ad hoc than rule-based, and more unilateral or bilateral than multilateral. A first step toward 
institutionalization within the IMF emerged in October 1994, when the Interim Committeevi issued a 
statement in the “Madrid Declaration” welcoming the trend toward full capital mobility (IEO, 2005). 
In April 1997, the IMF’s Interim Committee announced its intention to revise the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. At the Hong Kong meeting in September 1997, the Interim Committee adopted a 
statement that asked the Executive Board to complete work on the modification of the Articles 
(Kenen, 1998). Two revisions were proposed (Interim Committee, 1997; Wade & Veneroso, 1998; 
Abdelal, 2007, p. 11). The first proposed revision would change Article I to include the promotion of 
the orderly liberalization of capital accounts as one of the main purposes of the Fund. A second 
proposal would give the Fund jurisdiction over the capital account of its members. In practice, the 





  2.2.5 The Asian crisis throws sand in the wheels of international finance 
The institutionalization almost succeeded, but the Asian crisis threw sand in the wheels of 
international finance (Abdelal, 2007, p. 12; Chwieroth, 2008; Gallagher, 2010).vii By 1999, the 
proposed revisions to the Articles of Agreement were off the agenda, due to resistance from 
developing countries and more progressive policymakers in Western countries (Abdelal, 2006, pp. 
18-19; Sarai, 2008). They feared that the Fund would be able to aggressively force through 
liberalization, which seemed unwise in the light of the Asian crisis. 
While the institutionalization of the free movement of capital as a global formal norm failed, it could 
be argued that the free flow of capital has remained an informal norm even after the Asian crisis. 
Surely, the events of 1997-1998 definitely made an impact. As Leo Panitch (2000, p. 20) wrote on the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis: “The case for capital controls, a few years ago voiced only by few 
‘other-worldly’ Marxists, received some surprising endorsements.” Some authors thought capital 
controls were making a “comeback” after the Asian crisis (Soederberg, 2002, p. 490). Others noted 
that economists and public and private observers began questioning the merits of capital account 
liberalization (Abdelal, 2007, p. 197; Higgott & Phillips, 2000, p. 371; Tobin, 1999, p. 167). According 
to Abdelal (2007, p. 213), the orthodoxy of the unrestrained movement of capital was very much in 
decline. 
However, capital controls did not return to their former status of mainstream policy tools. In a critical 
essay Jagdish Bhagwati stated: 
“In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the mainstream view that dominates policy 
circles, indeed the prevalent myth, is that despite the striking evidence of the inherently crisis-
prone nature of freer capital movements, a world of full capital mobility continues to be 
inevitable and immensely desirable.” (Bhagwati, 1998, p. 7) 
Capital mobility was still considered as an indicator of “developed country status” (Abdelal, 2006, p. 
4). That was one of the reasons why EMDCs were very reluctant to reinstate controls on cross-border 
capital flows. In the early 2000s they became even more integrated into the world of global finance 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008b; World Bank, 2013). Capital controls thus remained “the neglected option” 
(Cohen, 2003, p. 60). This was partly due to pressure from developed countries, who continued to 
back the free movement of capital. The US in particular were strongly opposed to a reversal of capital 
account liberalization and kept pushing countries to abolish their capital controls (Anderson, 2009; 
Cohen, 2003, pp. 68-69). 
The IMF still also considered the full free flow of capital as a final objective for the global economy, 
despite the fact that several IMF studies recognized that the empirical evidence of the beneficial 
effects of capital account liberalization is very meagre (see Chapter 8). To be sure, a more cautious 
approach on capital account liberalization became trendy, with orderly liberalization, sequencing and 
gradualism as new key words (IEO, 2005). There was more openness to the use of limited, temporary 
capital controls under certain conditions.  Nevertheless, in general there was still a broad disapproval 
of capital controls within the Fund. 
In line with Radice’s forecast, there was no reversal of financial globalization (Radice, 1998, p. 277). 
To the contrary, the cross-border capital stock increased further. While the stock of cross-border 
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assets has risen five-fold between 1980 and 2007 (HSBC Global Research, 2010), international capital 
flows increased from US$4.9 trillion in 2000 to US$11.7 trillion in 2007, much of which was short-
term cross-border lending (Group of Thirty, 2013; see also Lund et al., 2013; Turner, 2008, p. 1). This 
represents an increase of annual gross capital flows from 5% of global GDP in 2002 to 17% in 2007 
(Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011). The average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets has 
increased from $1.5 trillion in 1998 to $3.2 trillion in 2007, almost a third of annual merchandise 
trade (Chandrasekhar, 2008b). A boom in capital flows developing countries started in the early 
2000s, mostly triggered by the expansion in liquidity in the developed world (Akyüz, 2012, p. 69). Net 
financial flows to developing countries rose from $173.5bn in 2002 to $785.5bn in 2006 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008b). Just before the global economic crisis broke out, the stock of cross-border 
capital was at an all-time high (Bichler & Nitzan, 2012, p. 54). In many countries the size of gross 
capital flows reached peak levels in 2007 (Chowla, 2011). 
Although the institutionalization of the free flow of capital as a global norm had thus failed after the 
Asian crisis, on the eve of start of the global economic crisis in 2007, the informal social norms still 
considered financial globalization a good thing and capital controls a bad thing (Batista, 2012, p. 93; 
Klein, 2012; Krugman, 2013; Tett, 2011). The trend towards liberalization of the capital account was 
not reversed; to the contrary, it continued with more countries moving towards the free movement 
of capital (Turner, 2008, p. 7). 
 
  2.2.6 After the global economic crisis: a “Third Age of Globalization” or “Back to 
Bretton Woods”?  
Due to the global economic crisis, there has been a major reversal of financial globalization. Cross-
border capital flows rapidly collapsed in the second half of 2008 (Akyüz, 2012, p. 71), and in 2013 
they still were 60% below the pre-crisis level (see Figure 2.1; Lund et al., 2013). The reversal was 
larger than during the crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s (Chowla, 2011). Even FDI, which 
are supposed to be more stable, still were far below their 2007 peak in 2013, although they grew 




Figure 2.1: Global cross-border capital flows (from Lund et al., 2013) 
 
The question then is: what will happen next? There are two scenarios. In the first, capital flows pick 
up and rise to similar levels as before the crisis, or even to new heights. The World Bank’s  
projections, for instance, expects that by 2030 gross inflows to developing countries will reach 
between 6 and 11% of their GDP (while the peak in 2007 was at 9% of their GDP) (World Bank, 
2013a). In this scenario, we are in a transition towards a “Third Age of Globalization” (Straw & 
Glennie, 2012; World Bank, 2013a). An even more tightly interconnected global economy with free 
trade and free capital flows is not improbable (Öniş & Güven, 2011, p. 482). 
In the other scenario, financial globalization’s time is past, and the pre-crisis peak levels will not be 
reached again in the near or medium-term. For instance, HSBC (HSBC Global Research, 2010) writes 
in a report that the trend of increasing capital mobility “is in danger of going into reverse. Among the 
obvious threats is the re-emergence of capital controls.” The authors of the report fear that “we may 
be on the verge of seeing a major proliferation” of capital controls. 
First, the crisis and its aftermath again demonstrated that capital flows are volatile (see Figure 2.2) 
and to a high degree determined by the conditions in financial market centres – in the first place the 
US (Bibow, 2011; Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009; Woods & Gertz, 2014). 
Developing countries have experienced volatility of capital flows and its consequences before, as 
they have been disposed to a stop-go pattern with three medium term cycles since the mid-1970s 
(Ocampo, 2012, p. 14; UNCTAD, 2013b). After the crisis, many EMDCs have responded to this 
volatility with capital controls, especially to deal with the surge in inflows that started in the second 
half of 2009, caused by quantitative easing and very low interest rates in the US (Akyüz, 2012, p. 64; 
Chowla, 2011; Chwieroth & Sinclair, 2013, pp. 474-475; Prates, 2011, pp. 907-908). These countries 
experienced a rapid appreciation of their exchange rate, and were acknowledging the prospect of 
financial instability when these large capital inflows would dry up. However, volatility was not 
confined to EMDCs. Iceland was one of the main developed countries undergoing large capital 
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outflows after the crisis (after a capital inflow boom before the crisis), and had to impose stringent 
capital controls. In 2009, the euro area also saw episodes of capital flight and disruptions in capital 
flows (Bagchee, 2012; Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, 2012; Lapavitsas et 
al., 2010; Merler & Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Shin, 2011). If volatility increases further in the future, it is not 
unlikely that more countries will resort to capital controls (Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011). 
Figure 2.2: Net private capital flows to emerging markets (% of GDP) (from  UNCTAD, 2013b) 
 
Second, the thinking on capital controls seems to have turned again. The global economic crisis and 
its consequences revitalized the academic and political debate on capital account policies (Chowla, 
2011; Chwieroth & Sinclair, 2013, p. 457; Gabor, 2012, p. 714; Gallagher, 2011b; Gallagher, Griffith-
Jones & Ocampo, 2011; O’Farrell, 2011). As Fritz & Prates (2013) put it: “The debate about capital 
controls, long discarded as anachronistic, has returned to the political and scholarly agenda with a 
vengeance.” In 2011, Financial Times commentator Gillian Tett (2011) wrote:  “Is the world stealthily 
sliding towards capital controls? That is the question which is starting to hover, half-stated, on the 
edge of policy debates, as financial anxiety spreads across Europe.” Due to the many financial crises 
of the last decades, many people have started questioning the benefits of financial globalization 
(O’Farrell, 2011; Sheng, 2012, p. 463). Abdelal (2007, p. 214) states that there is now more caution 
toward full capital mobility within the international financial community. This is part of a broader 
movement away from laissez-faire (Batista, 2012, p. 101). Capital controls received support from 
prominent intellectuals, such as Paul Krugman, who wrote: “But the truth, hard as it may be for 
ideologues to accept, is that unrestricted movement of capital is looking more and more like a failed 
experiment” (Krugman, 2013). 
According to some authors, this debate has even already resulted in a renewed legitimacy for the use 
of capital controls. As a policy brief of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) states: “Since the global financial crisis, a consensus has emerged around the need to 
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regulate capital flows in order to reduce the chances of future crises and to mitigate their damage if 
they do occur” (UNCTAD, 2013b; also Spiegel, Montes & Vos, 2010; Spiegel, 2012, p. 71). In this view, 
capital controls “have found far greater acceptance in the international community than at any time 
since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system” (Reinhart, Kirkegaard & Sbrancia, 2011, p. 26), so 
that they are now the “new normal” (Grabel, 2012, p. 60), having acquired “a new aura of 
respectability” (HSBC Global Research, 2010). Krugman (2013) has written that the introduction of 
capital controls in Cyprus in 2013 may mark the beginning of the end of the era when the free 
movement of capital was seen as desirable around the world. Or, to summarize this position: “Capital 
controls were supposed to be a policy of the past. (…) They are back in fashion” (Pisani-Ferry, 2011). 
However, it is also often posed that there will be a lot of hostility of forces who have a vested 
interest in open capital accounts. Several forces opposed the spread of capital controls after the 
crisis. The International Institute of Finance (IIF), a global association of banks and financial 
institutions, said in report that capital controls are not a good solution (Beattie, 2011). A letter by 
(both industrial and financial) business organizations asked the US government to maintain 
restrictions on the use of capital controls in US trade and investment treaties (USCIB, 2011). 
Moreover, Timothy Geithner, then US Finance Minister, turned down the call by economists to leave 
restrictions on the use of capital controls out of these US treaties (Geithner, 2011b). It is reasonable 
to expect that the same forces that were in favour of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, such as 
the financial sector, wealthy individuals, globally active companies and US policymakers are still 
opposed to capital account closure (Cohen, 2003, p. 71). Some authors have in any case argued that 
there is still a stigma on the use of capital controls, and that countries are afraid to employ controls 
because they are disliked by “financial markets” (Sheng, 2012, p. 464; Spiegel, Montes & Vos, 2010; 
Turner, 2008, p. 7). Another obstacle is that the effectiveness of unilateral capital controls is often 
questioned (see below), especially when implemented by countries with less 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity. Therefore, it is regularly stated that multilateral arrangements, 
cooperative controls and supervision “at both ends” would be necessary for an effective capital 
controls regime (Abdelal & Alfaro, 2003, p. 52; Chowla, 2011; Cohen, 1996, p. 289; UNCTAD, 2013b). 
 
 2.3 Capital controls in economic science 
  2.3.1 Neoclassical versus heterodox economics 
Within the discipline of economic science, there are mainly two opposing strands of literature on the 
capital controls debate (see Chwieroth, 2010a, pp. 61-104 for an excellent summary of the debate; 
also Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009; Eichengreen, 2001, p. 341; Modenesi & 
Modenesi, 2008, pp. 561-569; de Paula, 2011, pp. 10-19). On the one hand there is the orthodox 
view that favours financial globalization and capital account liberalization, while on the other hand, 
there are Keynesian-inspired and heterodox economists that are more sceptical on the benefits of 
capital account liberalization. In this sections the two perspectives are outlined. It will become clear 
that both treat the issue of capital controls largely as a technical discussion, devoid of political 
considerations. They are thus profoundly anti-political in their orientation. 
In mainstream neoclassical economic science, capital controls are usually strongly rejected. Several 
arguments are made. First, it is argued that capital account liberalization is typically beneficial both 
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to individual countries in particular and to the global economy in general (see e.g. Eichengreen et al., 
1999; Fischer, 1998a, pp. 2-3; IMF, 2012e; Kose & Prasad, 2004; Massad, 1998, p. 35; Mishkin, 2009; 
Obstfeld, 1998). The argument is basically as follows (Speller, Thwaites & Wright 2011): 
“Capital flows that reflect economic fundamentals alone are consistent with an efficient 
allocation of capital across countries and over time – put alternatively, these flows allow 
countries to diversify optimally their portfolio of domestic and foreign assets. By directing 
global savings to their most productive use and facilitating international risk-sharing (across 
countries, states of the world and over time), these types of capital flows can raise global 
welfare. Provided that these flows do not interact with frictions (for example, in financial 
markets) they need not require a policy response.” 
The case for capital account liberalization is similar as the case for domestic financial liberalization 
from this point of view (Eichengreen, 2001, p. 341); the market is an efficient mechanism for 
resource allocation, which “channels world savings to its most productive uses” and produces a 
“first-best” equilibrium (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 10). It is expected that capital will flow to countries where 
it is most efficiently used, i.e. where the returns are highest (Cooper, 1998, p. 12; Obstfeld & Taylor, 
1998, p. 356). In general this will be from developed countries to developing countries with little 
capital, which may thereby experience higher investment and economic growth (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 
10; also Fischer, 1998a, pp. 2-3; Kose et al., 2009; Mishkin, 2009, p. 155; Prasad et al., 2003; World 
Bank, 2013; Williamson, 1999). Another advantage of financial integration would be a reduced 
consumption volatility relative to income volatility, as capital flows allow countries (and firms and 
households in these countries) to smooth consumption over time (Eichengreen et al., 1999; Kose et 
al., 2009; Prasad et al., 2003; Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011). 
These assertions are firmly grounded within neoclassical theory with perfect markets, perfect 
information and perfect competition, built on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (see Eatwell, 
1996; de Paula, 2011, p. 10; Stiglitz, 2004). They are thus, as Epstein (2009) writes, based on a “basic 
faith in the efficiency of the market and the inefficiency and/or inefficacy of government 
regulation”.viii The policy implication is that countries, regardless of development level and country-
specific characteristics, should liberalize much further (and faster), move forward towards the full 
free movement of capital, and get more integrated with global financial markets (Mishkin, 2009, p. 
140). In this mainstream view: “The argument in favour of cross border capital flows is, thus, very 
powerful” (HSBC Global Research, 2010). 
While the neoclassical paradigm is certainly dominant in economic science, there is a tradition that is 
highly sceptical of its assumptions and models (Chwieroth, 2010a, p. 45). This tradition, which is here 
labelled “heterodox” to distinguish it from orthodox neoclassical macroeconomics, is often inspired 
by Keynesianism of some sort (de Paula, 2011, p. 16). The main assumption which separates them 
from orthodox economists is that markets can be and indeed often  are imperfect and thus 
inefficient. They therefore support capital controls as a tool to maintain financial stability. There are 
two lines of reasoning within this heterodox tradition (see Carvalho, 2002-2003, pp. 39-40). 
The first states that there are sometimes domestic distortions that prevent countries from reaching 
the “first-best” outcome (see Chwieroth, 2010a, p. 44; Committee on International Economic Policy 
and Reform, 2012; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009, p. 114). As one of its main proponents argues: “In 
the theory of the second best, the elimination of one imperfection (‘liberalizing capital markets’) may 
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not lead to a welfare improvement, in the presence of other market imperfections” (Stiglitz, 2004, p. 
61). Therefore, these countries could install capital controls as a “second-best” solution (Committee 
on International Economic Policy and Reform, 2012; Eichengreen, Tobin & Wyplosz, 1995, p. 171; 
Sheng, 2012, p. 464). Recently, according to Gallagher (2012c), a “new welfare economics of capital 
controls” has arisen, which is related to the literature on market imperfections and sees capital 
controls as a necessary tool to correct market failures (see Sheng, 2012, p. 472). 
While authors that follow this line of argument often make very different theoretical and normative 
assumptions than orthodox economists, it could still be argued that the outcomes are not that far 
apart. In particular, the logical implication in this reasoning is that it is still better to remove the 
domestic distortions so that a first-best outcome can be reached (see Chwieroth, 2010a, p. 44, p. 76). 
As the more orthodox Maurice Obstfeld (1998, p. 10; see also Massad, 1998, p. 34) notes, despite the 
problems associated with capital account liberalization, “there is no reason to depart from 
conventional economic wisdom. The best way to maximize net benefits is to encourage economic 
integration while attacking concomitant distortions and other unwanted side effects at, or close to, 
their sources.” Put another way, when all domestic distortions are eliminated, which should be a 
policy objective, capital controls become dead wood. As second-best solutions, they are not needed 
in a first-best world of perfect markets. Chwieroth (2010a, p. 76) therefore calls these arguments 
“decidedly non-Keynesian”. 
The second line of argument states that international capital markets are intrinsically subject to 
herding behaviour and instability (Bibow, 2011; Chwieroth, 2010a, p. 45; Cohen, 2003, p. 65; de 
Paula, 2011, p. 18). In this view, booms and busts due to speculation and excessive optimism and 
pessimism are a normal part of the working of financial markets. Capital flows are thus inherently 
pro-cyclical (Gallagher, 2011a, p. 389; Ocampo, 2012, p. 13; UNCTAD, 2013b). As Rodrik (1998, p. 57, 
original emphasis) states: “Market failures arising from asymmetric information, incompleteness of 
contingent markets, and bounded rationality (not to mention irrationality) are endemic to financial 
markets”. This results in volatility, herding behaviour, asset price bubbles, crisis and contagion 
(Rodrik, 1998, pp. 57-58; UNCTAD, 2013b). The understandings of this second strand within 
heterodox approaches imply that capital controls are more than a second-best policy tool, and that 
they could be legitimate as a permanent feature of the international monetary system. 
To sum up, while this may be a simplified account of the complex debate, there is a division between 
orthodox economists who strongly believe in efficient markets, and more heterodox economists who 
argue that many markets are in reality imperfect and thus inefficient markets (Chwieroth, 2010a, p. 
43). As Carvalho (2002-2003, p. 37) summarizes this debate: 
“As in the financial regulation debate, on the one hand, supporters of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) argue that interventions in capital markets are at best innocuous, and more 
probably, welfare reducing.  Opposing this view, a wide-ranging band of economists, from 
nonorthodox critics of neoclassical theory to more empirically minded researchers, argue that 
there are too many important sources of imperfections in capital markets and, in particular, 
in international capital markets, to warrant some kind of regulation and public intervention.” 
However, there are other reasons why heterodox economists do not support unconditional capital 
account liberalization. For these economists this includes especially the purposes of monetary 
independence and of macroeconomic management (see 1.3.1). The policy implication of these 
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heterodox arguments is that countries should be extremely cautious in liberalizing capital flows, 
especially short-term flows. As UNCTAD (2013b) states: “Countries need to be selective in terms of 
the quantity, composition and their use of foreign capital.” Capital controls should be mainstream, 
normal and permanent policy instruments, especially for developing countries and emerging markets 
(Akyüz, 2012, p. 92; Bibow, 2011; Mohan, 2012, p. 24; Wade, 2008, pp. 46-47). The management of 
capital flows can help in ensuring financial stability and avoiding volatility, averting exchange rate 
appreciation and providing independent monetary policy (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Gallagher, 
2011a, pp. 389-390; Ocampo, 2012, p. 15). Controls on both inflows and outflows are legitimate 
(Akyüz, 2012, p. 92; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2011; Ocampo, 2012, p. 15), although most 
authors seem to prefer (preventive) controls on inflows rather than (curative) controls on outflows 
(e.g. Bibow, 2011). Direct, quantitative controls or a combination of direct and indirect controls and 
macro-prudential regulations might be better than just market-based controls (Bibow, 2011; Spiegel, 
Montes & Vos, 2010; Vernengo & Rochon, 2000, p. 77). 
 
  2.3.2 Faced with the evidence 
If we make abstraction of the difficulties with measuring the effects of capital account liberalization 
(see 2.4.2 below), what does the “evidence” then tell us? The studies that have been executed are 
bad news for the proponents of liberalization: there does not seem to be clear evidence of a 
correlation (let alone causation) between opening up the capital account and economic growth 
(Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009; Eichengreen, 2001, p. 342; OECD, 2002; Prasad & 
Rajan, 2008, p. 149; Rodrik, 1998, p. 61; Went, 2002-2003, p. 485). IMF studies have confirmed this 
finding (see Chapter 8). This is despite the fact that most studies have been executed by proponents 
of the free flow of capital, who start from the assumption that liberalization brings with it large 
benefits (Carvalho, 2002-2003, p. 41). 
The pro-liberalization consensus was not created by empirical evidence, then: “The policy consensus 
of the 1980s and early 1990s did not emerge from the accumulation of evidence that capital 
liberalization promotes economic growth, or that the benefits of liberalization systematically 
outweighs its risks. Such evidence did not exist then, nor does it exist now” (Abdelal, 2007, p. 33). It 
seems that the dominant view pro liberalization is based “more on ideological prejudice than on solid 
theoretical or empirical arguments” (de Paula, Oreiro & Silva, 2003, p. 74). It is any case not 
underpinned by clear evidence, which is problematic for the supporters of the free movement of 
capital: “Given the breadth of support commanded by this synthesis, the lack of empirical 
substantiation of its fundamental tenets is worrisome indeed. If the evidence is really not there, then 
it is high time to rethink the conventional wisdom”(Eichengreen, 2001, p. 360). 
Recently, as the empirical evidence has demonstrated that these expected positive effects are not 
materializing, a number of other arguments have been put forward by proponents of controls. First, 
faced with the evidence, neoclassical economists have claimed that financial globalization brings 
other positive effects (see Mishkin, 2009; Prasad & Rajan, 2008; Rogoff, 2002). As Prasad and Rajan 
(2008, p. 150) observe: “The debate is refocusing on a different set of benefits, primarily the indirect 
or ‘collateral’ benefits that accrue to a country’s governance and institutions when it opens up to 
cross-border capital flows.” Some of these indirect benefits would be that financial globalization 
encourages financial development and promotes better institutions (in the realm of good 
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governance, the rule of law) and better macroeconomic policies (see Kose et al., 2009; Mishkin, 
2009, pp. 154-1555; Prasad & Rajan, 2008, p. 153). Critics claim that this argument is not convincing, 
and that if it were true, it would also lead to higher growth (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009, pp. 121-
122; see also Bibow, 2011; Eichengreen, 2001, p. 353). This, as mentioned above, does not seem to 
be true. 
Another argument is that countries first need to reach certain “thresholds” before capital account 
liberalization leads to the supposed benefits (IMF, 2012e; Kose et al., 2009; Prasad et al., 2003; 
Prasad & Rajan, 2008, p. 154). These thresholds have to do with the development of domestic 
financial markets and the quality of governance and macroeconomic policies.ix A related assertion is 
that the benefits only accrue when financial globalization is “done right”, along with a number of 
other policies (Mishkin, 2009, pp. 157-158).x Finally, it is also argued that capital account 
liberalization “disciplines” governments and forces them to implement “sound” policies (Obstfeld, 
1998, p. 10; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998, p. 357; Prasad & Rajan, 2008, p. 153; World Bank, 2013).xi 
Conversely, controls could be used to delay necessary but painful policy adjustment or to substitute 
for structural reforms (Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, 2012; OECD, 2002). 
These arguments have been reviewed by Rodrik and Subramanian (2009, p. 136), who come to the 
following conclusion: “If you want to make an evidence-based case for financial globalization today, 
you are forced to resort to fairly indirect, speculative, and, in our view, ultimately unpersuasive, 
arguments.” 
Second, even if financial globalization were to be undesirable to a certain extent, as the financial 
stability risks are substantial (see e.g. Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011), it is still inevitable, orthodox 
economists argue, because capital controls are ineffective (Calvo, 2010; Carvalho & Garcia, 2005, p. 
49; Cooper, 1998, p. 12; OECD, 2002) or tend to lose effectiveness over time (Prasad & Rajan, 2008, 
p. 150; Turner, 2008, p. 7). According to Obstfeld (1998, p. 28): “Despite periodic crisis, global 
financial integration holds significant benefits and probably is, in any case, impossible to stop (…).” 
Prasad and Rajan (2008, p. 150, p. 166; also Prasad, 2009) state that policy makers may increasingly 
lose the option to decide on their economy’s openness to capital flows, as these capital flows have 
surged and as international investors have become increasingly sophisticated. The task for 
policymakers then, is to mitigate financial stability risks while preserving financial globalization 
(Speller, Thwaites & Wright, 2011). 
More heterodox economists and other supporters of capital controls have refuted this argument by 
arguing that controls at least have the potential to be effective, if properly designed. In this view, 
“there is no reason to believe that serious work could not produce a technically effective set of 
controls” (Glyn, 1986, p. 48; also Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 136). This is demonstrated with specific 
cases of (reasonably) successful controls (e.g. Abdelal & Alfaro, 2003, p. 41; Coelho & Gallager, 2013, 
pp. 396-397; Gallagher, 2011b; Helleiner, 1997; Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; Palma, 2000). 
These economists, however, do often agree that the effectiveness requires more sophisticated and 
strict controls than in the past, and that international coordination would help increase effectiveness 
(Chowla, 2011; Coelho & Gallagher, 2013, p. 386; Gallagher, 2011b; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & 
Ocampo, 2011; Subramanian, 2009). It is also noted that permanent controls, regulatory regimes, or 
monitoring may be more effective than temporary controls (Ocampo, 2012, p. 16; Spiegel, 2012, p. 
81). Recent research has claimed that there is a difference in effectiveness between countries with 
“walls”, or long-standing controls on a wide range of capital flows, and “gates”, or temporary 
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controls on a usually more limited range of capital flows (Klein, 2012). As the study concludes: “There 
is more evidence of significant effects of durable controls than there is of episodic controls.” The fact 
that controls are often implemented in a half-hearted and cautious way is arguably one of the 
reasons why their effectiveness is often questioned (Akyüz, 2012, p. 91). 
Finally, there is some agreement between different strands that certain capital flows are to be 
preferred over others. In general, FDI are better than portfolio flows, which are more beneficial than 
debt flows (Ocampo, 2012, p. 15). Therefore, countries should first liberalize FDI, then portfolio 
flows, and only in the last instance debt flows. While more critical authors warn that FDI are not 
always entirely beneficialxii, most analysts consider them to be less volatile and better for the future 
economic prospects of a country (e.g. Bhagwati, 1998, p. 10; Sheng, 2012, p. 465). While some argue 
that (complete) liberalization should be limited to FDI (Akyüz, 2012, pp. 89-90; Bibow, 2011), many 
observers are also in favour of the liberalization of portfolio flows, even though they are more 
volatile than FDI (Broner et al., 2013; Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, 2012; 
Group of Thirty, 2013). Credit flows and flows transmitted through the banking system (especially 
foreign banks), then, are seen as the most volatile and least conducive to growth and investment 
(Akyüz, 2012, p. 89; Broner et al., 2013; Bruno & Shin, 2013; Committee on International Economic 
Policy and Reform, 2012; Reinhardt & Dell’Erba, 2013). Regulation of these flows is therefore more 
broadly accepted. 
 
  2.3.3 Capital controls as a technical fix? 
While heterodox economists often provide an excellent refutation of more orthodox approaches 
(e.g. Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009), international capital mobility and capital controls are still treated 
as economic phenomena only. Both in orthodox and most heterodox accounts, if control controls are 
accepted, they are considered a technical, and not a political, choice. As Crotty and Epstein (1996, p. 
120) note: “Discussions among economists about the pros and cons of capital controls usually take 
place in a fairly narrow context. Would this or that control help country X maintain a moderately 
lower interest rate or a somewhat lower rate of unemployment?” 
This is illustrative of economics in general, which is often represented as a value-free science. By 
“depoliticizing” economic policies and disregarding issues such as power and interests, economics 
becomes a matter of making the right technical choices. As has been noted on orthodox policies, 
they are mostly presented “with a non-political, neutral and purely technical justification in economic 
theory” (Fine & Harris, 1987, p. 368). Even if Keynesians criticize orthodox economics, they still see it 
as a matter of good versus bad economic policies, not a matter of politics and power (Hossein-zadeh, 
2010). Consequently, it could be argued that economic policies should be removed from democratic 
control and decision-making.xiii Ultimately, a large segment of economic science can thus be 
considered as un- or even antidemocratic. However, economic theory can never be neutral or 
apolitical (Lebowitz, 2004, p. 14). The self-presentation of many economists as “neutral” or 
“technocratic” mystifies that they are in fact making fundamentally political statements: 
“Economists tend to present their understandings and associated standards of behavior as 
based solely on technical knowledge, evidence, and internal truth tests. Yet the information 
that economists provide is not simply technical knowledge based on evidence and internal 
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truth tests. (…) Even the most ostensibly positive models of economic behavior are saturated 
with normative and ethical implications. (…) The economics profession, like all professions, 
thus has a normative value-laden aspect as well as a technical element.” (Chwieroth, 2010a, 
pp. 41-42)xiv 
The same can be seen in discussions of capital controls. It has been explicitly argued that the use of 
controls should be depoliticized: “The discussion should be stripped of the prevalent ideological bias: 
CC are not inherent to the political leanings of the governments that adopt them but are an 
expedient used under a pragmatic justification” (Modenesi & Modenesi, 2008, p. 561). As they are 
considered not as a political choice but as a technical one, they should be designed at the right 
moment in the right place and target the right problems that arise because of market failure, 
information asymmetries and herding behaviour. While for more heterodox economists capital 
controls may be used more and more extensively, they are still a matter of technical choice, isolated 
from power relations (see Soederberg, 2002, p. 491). Typically, capital controls are the subject of a 
cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Blanchard, 2011; Modenesi & Modenesi, 2008, p. 562; Prasad & Rajan, 
2008, p. 150; Williamson, 1999; Maziad et al., 2011). They are a part of economic management 
rather than economic policy.xv 
However, a depoliticized treatment of capital controls neglects the power relations between social 
forces, which are affected by a certain capital control regime (see Chapter 4). What is represented as 
“good economic policy” can instead of mere economic logic actually be a (unconscious) commitment 
to a class-based project that benefits certain social forces (Soederberg, 2004, p. 43).xvi Hence, the 
issue of international capital mobility and capital controls is “intrinsically political” (Pauly, 1995, p. 
371). As Girvan (1999, p. 416) stated on the debates on the regulation of capital flows after the Asian 
crisis: “These are not technical questions; they are questions of political economy that are connected 
to power relations and their consequences for the distribution of the benefits from and costs of 
alternative sets of arrangements.” It is these aspects that could be emphasized in an IPE perspective. 
We therefore now turn to the IPE literature on capital account policies. 
 
 2.4 IPE and capital controls 
  2.4.1 The determinants of capital account liberalization 
More than two decades ago, Jeffry Frieden wrote: “The scholarly literature on the economics of 
international capital movements grows daily in both quantity and quality. However, (…) a political 
economy approach to the topic is only in its infancy” (Frieden, 1988, p. 266, original emphasis). To 
some extent this is still true today. The most developed, mainstream (American) approach consists of 
a range of (mostly quantitative) studies  which have tried to empirically examine the “causes” or 
“determinants” of capital account liberalization versus capital controls (for overviews see Chwieroth 
& Sinclair, 2013; Cohen, 1996; Kastner & Rector, 2003; Leblang, 1997; Li & Smith, 2002a). These 
studies – both quantitative and case-studies – have identified various determinants, which, for the 
sake of clarity, can be (somewhat artificially) grouped into four categories. Each category can be 




 International Domestic 
Structural pressures Competitive deregulation Economic health 
Interests Pressure from UK & US Interest groups 
Ideas Neoliberal ideas Neoliberal ideas 
Institutional factors IMF & IFIs Domestic institutional factors 
Table 2.1: Determinants of capital account liberalization 
 
The first range of determinants found in these studies can be put under the heading of “structural 
pressures”. With regard to international structural pressures, many have claimed that countries that 
have liberalized because they do not want to lose out in a world where other (powerful) states 
already have an open capital account (Andrews, 1994; Brooks & Kurtz, 2012; Goodman & Pauly, 
1993; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996; Helleiner, 1994, 1995; Kastner & Rector, 2003; Li & Smith, 2002a). 
There is thus a kind of “competitive deregulation” process at work. Related to this is the mechanism 
of “diffusion” whereby states follow the “example” or “model” of other states (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012, 
pp. 98-100; Quinn & Toyoda, 2007). Concerning domestic structural pressures, it has been contended 
that countries will rather liberalize when they are facing a balance-of-payments crisis (Haggard & 
Maxfield, 1996).xvii A similar argument has been made that liberalization is more likely in countries 
vulnerable to crises, seen in indicators like a higher level of foreign borrowing or higher interest rates 
(Chwieroth, 2007).xviii 
A second series of determinants is related to the interests of certain actors. It has been argued that 
pressure from abroad can be important, in the form of powerful states with open capital accounts, in 
the first place the US and the UK (Bhagwati, 1998; Helleiner, 1994, 1995; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade & 
Veneroso, 1998). With regard to domestic interests, research has focused on the advocacy by 
sectoral interests (Frieden, 1988, 1991) such as the financial sector (Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002), 
the industrial sector in combination with the financial community (Helleiner, 1994, 1995), the 
capitalist class in general (Frieden, 1991), or domestic interest groups in general (Brooks & Kurtz, 
2012, pp. 100-102; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996; Li & Smith, 2002a, 2002b). 
The third number of studies analyses the importance of ideas (and the bearers of these ideas). In this 
regard, neoliberal ideology and neoliberal economists have been considered to be crucial as a 
determinant for liberalization (Chwieroth 2007, 2010a; Helleiner, 1994, 1995; Stiglitz, 2002). It is of 
course hard to ascertain, and it depends from country to country, to what degree these ideas 
originated domestically or spread from abroad. Besides neoliberal ideology, others have highlighted 
the contribution of pro-capitalist ideas (Quinn & Toyoda, 2007), right-wing governments (Kastner & 
Rector, 2003) and collectively shared beliefs in general (Chwieroth & Sinclair, 2013, p. 479). 
Fourth and finally, institutions and institutional factors have also played a role according to the 
literature. Regarding international institutions, some have pointed to the role played by the 
international financial institutions (IFIs), the IMF in particular (e.g. Stiglitz, 2004). One paper found 
evidence of “IMF-led” capital account liberalization (Joyce & Noy, 2008). With regard to domestic 
institutions, research has pointed at the number of veto-players (Kastner & Rector, 2003), partisan 
factors (Quinn & Inclãn, 1997) and the commitment to central bank independence (Alesina, Grilli & 
33 
 
Milesi-Ferretti, 1993). It has also been argued that countries with fixed exchange rates (Alesina, Grilli 
& Milesi-Ferretti, 1993; Leblang, 1997), systematic financial repression (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012; 
Leblang, 1997) or a low level of foreign exchange reserves (Leblang, 1997) are more inclined to hold 
on to or reintroduce capital controls. 
 
  2.4.2 The limitations of quantitative studies 
While some of these studies definitely shed light on the issue of capital account liberalization, several 
shortcomings can be discerned in the quantitative accounts. A first major problem with this literature 
is the measurement of capital controls, which also haunts the econometric analyses of the economic 
consequences of capital account liberalization. To give an example, the Chinn-Ito measure, often 
used in econometric analysis, has remained unchanged for India between 1970 and 2007 (see Chinn 
& Ito, 2014), which does not seem correct (see Chapter 7). Another example is that in 2000 the 
indicator for Brazil and India had the same value, even though Brazil was already far more open, as 
Chapters 6 and 7 will demonstrate. 
This measurement problem has been recognized by several authors (Jayadev, 2007, p. 426; Magud, 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; Obstfeld, 1998, p. 10; Prasad, 2009). As Barry Eichengreen notes in a survey 
of the literature: “Developing adequate measures of capital account restrictions is a particular 
problem for the literature on the causes and effects of capital controls” (Eichengreen, 2001, p. 347). 
Recent research, which has criticized the Chinn-Ito measure, replicated two earlier studies with a 
different measure, which resulted in different findings (Karcher & Steinberg, 2013). Moreover, not 
everything can be measured in quantitative terms; how, for instance, do you adequately 
operationalize pressure from the US? All these measurement problems imply that the quantitative 
studies  on capital controls have inherent problems which cannot easily be solved. 
Second, the difference between various categories of capital controls (controls on inflows versus 
controls on outflows; direct versus indirect controls) and capital flows (FDI, equity flows, debt flows) 
is  mostly not or insufficiently made. It is either liberalization or not. In a way, this is of course a 
logical consequence of the drive to quantify capital controls and capital account liberalization into a 
single measure. This is especially a problem for the economic literature on the consequences of 
liberalization/controls: various controls or various capital flows might have dissimilar effects. For 
instance, it is widely assumed that FDI are more beneficial than short-term flows. But it is also a 
problem for the IPE literature on the causes of liberalization. The causes of liberalization of capital 
inflows could for instance be different from the causes of liberalization of outflows. 
Third, these quantitative studies are, in line with positivist research, looking for general “laws”. 
However, as will be explained in Chapter 3, this dissertation does not go along with his search for 
transhistorically valid truths. With respect to the literature discussed above, three things can be 
noted in this regard. First, correlation of course does not imply causality. Second, even if the studies 
would indicate causality, that doesn’t mean that this causality is universally valid across space and 
time.  Finally, while these studies may be able to highlight some indicators, this of course does not 
necessarily clarifies the motivations behind liberalization/controls, as well as about the respective 
coalitions opposing liberalization/controls. In sum, the quantitative method and the literature that 
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has made use of this method are inadequate to thoroughly examine policies and policy perspectives 
in individual countries, such as China, Brazil and India. 
 
  2.4.3 Historical accounts and country studies 
Besides the quantitative studies, there have been many valuable perspectives examining the 
historical evolution of capital account policies, international regulations and norms, especially the 
transition from the more restrictive Bretton Woods order to the liberalization in the neoliberal era  
(e.g. Abdelal, 2006, 2007; Chwieroth, 2008, 2010a, 2014; Helleiner, 1994, 1995; Goodman & Pauly, 
1993; Howarth & Sadeh, 2011; Leiteritz, 2005; Leiteritz & Moschella, 2010; Moschella, 2009, 2010, 
2012, 2014). The focus of these studies has mostly been on international organizations such as the 
IMF and the OECD. When they have also examined individual countries, the emphasis has largely 
been on the developed world. On the political economy of capital account liberalization and capital 
controls in EMDCs, there have been a range of case-studies (see Chwieroth, 2010b on Indonesia; 
Doraisami, 2005 on Malaysia; Gallagher, 2014b on Brazil and South Korea; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996 
on Chile, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea; Pepinsky, 2013 on Indonesia and Mexico; Soederberg, 
2002 on Chile; Vermeiren & Dierckx , 2012 on China). 
This dissertation is related to these case-studies, but goes beyond most of them in several ways. 
First, it examines the cases of China, Brazil and India, countries whose capital controls have up to 
now only scarcely been scrutinized from an IPE perspective. There is a certain bias in country studies, 
with the focus largely been on the causes and/or timing of liberalization or re-adoption of controls. 
As especially China and India are relatively less free than many other countries and have held on to 
more comprehensive controls (see 1.3.3), this dissertation also looks at counter-examples of strong 
and swift capital account liberalization. It also looks into the policies and policy positions after the 
global economic crisis, and as such includes any transformations that the crisis may or may not have 
caused. 
Second, the purpose of the case-studies is not just to understand and explain the capital controls and 
liberalizing measures that the BICs have implemented, but also to assess whether the BICs will 
challenge the Western norm of the full free movement of capital. In this sense, again, this 
dissertation goes beyond most existing studies. It will therefore examine capital account policies in 
relation to several other factors, such as the evolution of the capitalist world economy, the domestic 
growth models of the BICs, and the relations between different groups in society. In particular, the 
role of capital controls versus liberalization in the relations between capital and labour, as well as 
within capital, will be analysed. Labour, in the form of trade unions, social movements and 
disorganized workers, has been largely absent from most IPE approaches on capital controls (e.g. 
Cohen, 2003, p. 72). It could be argued that this neglect is strange, as “over the long run, 
international financial integration tends to favor capital over labor” (Frieden, 1991, p. 426). In this 
light, a neo-Gramscian theoretical and conceptual perspective can shed light on capital account 





 2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an overview of the existing literature on capital account policies. The first 
part (3.2) outlined the history of capital movements and capital controls from the late 19th century up 
until after the global economic crisis that started in 2007. This history will be useful in examining and 
understanding both the relationship between capital account liberalization and neoliberalism (see 
Chapter 4), and the capital account policies of the BICs (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The second section (3.3) 
of this chapter has summarized the way the discipline of economic science studies capital controls. It 
was argued that, although there are a lot of differences between orthodox and heterodox 
perspectives, both strands treat capital controls in a depoliticized manner, devoid of (unequal) power 
relations and different interests in society. 
Finally, the third section (3.4) reviewed briefly the IPE literature on capital account policies. It was 
asserted that the quantitative IPE literature is seriously flawed, and that the quantitative method is 
inadequate to study capital liberalization and controls. This dissertation is therefore more related to 
individual (and comparative) case-studies on EMDCs. To analyse the capital controls in China, Brazil 
and India, and their position on international regulation of capital controls, a neo-Gramscian 
perspective is adopted. It is to the principles of this theoretical framework that this dissertation now 
turns, in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                          
i
 For other accounts of the history of capital flows and/or capital account policies, see Committee on the Global 
Financial System, 2009; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998; OECD, 2002; Quinn, 2003; Thompson, 1997. 
ii
 He also wrote: “Advisable domestic policies might often be easier to compass, if the phenomenon known as 
‘the flight of capital’ could be ruled out.” 
iii
 According to Helleiner (1994, pp. 94-95), with regard to the OECD, this was mainly due to the neoliberal 
orientation of officials in international organizations, and it did not reflect a change of heart on the part of the 
advanced countries’ governments. The officials in the OECD’s Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible 
Transactions (CMIT) also promoted capital account liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s against the 
preferences of many member states (Howarth & Sadeh, 2011, pp. 639-640). 
iv
 This happened largely under the impulse of French policymakers. These had fully embraced capital account 
liberalization after the U-turn of Mitterrand. For the French left, the rich were able to evade capital controls, 
and so capital controls only restrained the middle class, the left’s constituency (Abdelal, 2006, pp. 6-8; 2007, p. 
4). Therefore, they decided that controls were no longer in their interest. After that internalization of the norm 
of the free movement of capital, they tried to institutionalize this norm at the international level. 
v
 In full: “Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Matters”, a committee  
composed out of officials from national finance ministries and central banks established to study the  
monetary system after the collapse of the Bretton Woods-system in 1971. 
vi
 Now the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), a body which is composed of central bank 
governors or (finance) ministers, and which reflects the composition of the Executive Board. 
vii
 A similar– but less relevant for this dissertation – story can be told on the failed institutionalization of rules 
on the treatment of foreign investment in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the OECD 
countries (see Kolo & Wälde, 2008, p. 158). 
viii
 Another, more philosophical, argument, based on the sanctity of private property rights, is that individuals 
should be free to use their income and wealth as they want (Cooper, 1998, p. 12). A critical perspective on this 
idea is provided by Williamson (1999). 
ix
 Note the paradox: capital account liberalization may promote financial sector development, good governance 
and good macroeconomic policies, but before the capital account may be liberalized, the financial sector must 
be developed and good governance and macroeconomic policies must be in place. 
x
 For a critical view, see Rodrik and Subramanian (2009, p. 125). 
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xi
 That the free movement of capital constrains governments is often not denied by more heterodox authors, 
but they express doubts whether this is beneficial (Eatwell, 1996). 
xii
 First, FDI can also be volatile (Broner et al., 2013; Singh, 2005, p. 108). Second, the difference between FDI 
and portfolio flows is “more notional than real”, because investment by an investor in more than 10% of the 
equity of a firm is defined as direct investment according to the IMF definition (Chandrasekhar, 2008b; see also 
Akyüz, 2012, p. 78; Singh, 2005, p. 108). Third, FDI does not always expand the productive capacity of a 
country, for instance because it can be mainly cross-border acquisitions instead of greenfield investments 
(Griffiths, 2014; UNCTAD, 2012). Bibow (2011) therefore argues: “Ideally, only foreign direct investment inflows 
that match the recipient countries’ development goals should be allowed in. Selection may be stricter still in 
focusing on Greenfield investment only.” 
xiii
 Some authors have made similar arguments with regard to neoclassical or “neoliberal” economics (Centeno 
& Cohen, 2012, p. 329; Chang, 2002, pp. 550-551). However, the same could be said with regard to many more 
heterodox perspectives. 
xiv
 It should also be noted that the efficient allocation of resources in general is understood as an allocation to 
where capital can reap the highest profit rates. This focus on profitability neglects the consequences for labour 
and nature (see also chapter 2). 
xv
 As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, the IMF’s treatment of capital controls is an exemplary case. 
xvi
 Sometimes this can even be a conscious commitment (see Green & Huey, 2005, pp. 639, 642). 
xvii
 Pepinsky (2012) argues the opposite, namely that crises lead to capital account closure. 
xviii
 On the other hand, authors have argued that countries are more inclined to liberalize in a situation of 
economic strength. For instance, it is claimed that liberalization is more likely for a country with a higher level 
of economic development (Eichengreen, 2001, p. 347; Leblang, 1997) or a current account surplus (Li & Smith, 
2002a). Goodman and Pauly (1993) note that countries are more eager to abolish capital controls when they 
are experiencing capital inflows than when they are facing capital outflows. 
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3. Theoretical and conceptual framework: a             
neo-Gramscian perspective 
 
 3.1 Neo-Gramscian perspectives in IPE 
  3.1.1 Thinking in a Gramscian way 
In this chapter, the theoretical and conceptual framework that forms the basis of this dissertation 
will be outlined. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a dogmatic theoretical framework 
which will be meticulously used in the next chapters of this dissertation. It will also not touch upon all 
theoretical debates between various neo-Gramscian perspectives, or more broadly, between 
different Marxist strands. Rather, the intention is to present some general theoretical thoughts, 
which will make it easier to understand the following chapters. Before this outline, it should be made 
clear that this theoretical and conceptual view is not presented as the “correct” neo-Gramscian 
interpretation. Rather, within a plurality of neo-Gramscian approaches (Morton, 2001, p. 27), the 
framework applied here is only one potential approach. 
The neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy 
(IPE) are mostly based on the ground-breaking work by Robert W. Cox and Stephen Gill. In the 1980s, 
the Canadian scholar Robert Cox developed a conceptual framework using the writings of the Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci, which is often considered the beginning of the neo-Gramscian legacy 
(Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 469; Worth, 2008, p. 635).i This framework was then further developed, 
used, and adapted in various ways by a range of scholars. 
In my interpretation of the neo-Gramscian perspectives, there are five central principles. A first tenet 
is that a neo-Gramscian perspective does not require a meticulous or dogmatic reading of Gramsci’s 
writings. As Stephen Gill (2008, p. xxi) notes, the purpose is not to simply apply Gramsci’s concepts 
and hypotheses to today’s world orderii. Rather, it entails “thinking in a Gramscian way” (see Bieler & 
Morton, 2001, pp. 7-13; Bruff, 2011a, pp. 88-89; Morton, 1999, p. 5)iii. This implies adopting and 
transforming Gramsci’s tools and insights to make them useful to analyse the contemporary 
situation, in a very different context than Gramsci’s age. The same goes for Marx’s writings (see 
Judis, 2014). Such a “absolute historicist” approach thus admits that while every analyst is a product 
of his times, he or she can also produce ideas that still have a relevance in other contexts and later 
periods (Morton, 2003a, pp. 128-132)iv. 
 
  3.1.2 Critical theory 
A second feature is that a neo-Gramscian perspective can be considered a “critical theory” 
perspective. This goes back to Robert Cox’s statement that “theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128, original stress). According to Cox (1981, pp. 128-129; see also 
Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 86), a distinction can be made between problem-solving theory and critical 
theoryv. In general, the former is preoccupied with solving issues within the prevailing world order 
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without questioning this order. It is thus a rather conservative approach, as it is – whether 
consciously or unconsciously – preoccupied with sustaining the sustaining the existing order (Cox, 
1981, p. 130; Gill, 2008, p. 19; Knafo, 2008). Critical theory, on the other hand, does question the 
origin, foundations and fairness of the prevailing world order. Through analysing this order critical 
theory also looks at ways to go beyond it (Cox, 1981, p. 130; Gill, 2008, p. 19; Worth, 2011, p. 359). 
As Gill (2008, p. xx) states: “The aim is to develop a transnational historical materialist perspective 
that is useful not only for the analysis of the new or emerging world order but also to identify 
potentials for progressive change.” 
Critical theory is thus by definition also concerned with a normative choice. It rejects the claim that 
social scientific research should be “neutral” or “objective” (Morton, 2003b, p. 172). Moreover, it can 
be argued that problem-solving theory is not value-free either: in (implicitly or explicitly) accepting 
the existing order, it serves the interests of those who are comfortable with this order (Cox, 1981, pp. 
129-130). Thus, in a way, social scientific research can never be neutral; all research is underpinned 
by a certain perspective on the world (see also Bruff, 2011a, pp. 81-82). As historian Howard Zinn 
(1990, p. 7) has written: “It is impossible to be neutral. In a world already moving in certain 
directions, where wealth and power are already distributed in certain ways, neutrality means 
accepting the way things are now.” The only difference is that critical theory is more explicit about 
this normative choice. 
 
  3.1.3 Historicizing the global political economy 
The third and very much related principle is that a neo-Gramscian perspective adopts a historicist 
approach to study the global political economy (van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 145; Gill, 2008, p. 17). This 
implies that the current world order is not a “natural” order. It has not always been like this and is 
not an “unavoidable” consequence of particular laws or phenomenavi. Moreover, as until now no 
world order has lasted forever, it is unlikely that any world order will ever be eternal (Gill, 2008, p. 
24).vii Historicist theories thus reject, in line with Marx, the “eternalization” of orders and phenomena 
which are in fact not universally valid but historically specific, and the “naturalization” of specific 
historical structures as “arising not through historical processes but, as it were, from Nature itself” 
(Hall, 1986, p. 34; see also Knafo, 2008). 
This awareness of the socially constructed and historically limited character of prevailing structures 
again distinguishes critical theory from problem-solving theory. To quote Robert Cox: 
“Critical theory is theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but 
with a continuing process of historical change. Problem-solving theory is non-historical or 
ahistorical, since it, in effect, posts a continuing present (the permanence of the institutions 
and power relations which constitute its parameters).” (Cox, 1981, p. 129) 
A fundamental consequent preposition is therefore that there are no transhistorical “laws” which are 
valid in every context and time. This is contrary to mainstream positivist IPE (and orthodox 
economics) which, based on an ahistorical vision and the illusion of an objective researcher, tries to 
empirically map “observable” phenomena into universally valid, transhistorical causal mechanisms or 
“formulas” (Belfrage, 2011, p. 386; Gill, 2008, p. 12, 21; Knafo, 2008). Hence, historical materialism 
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rejects the positivist approach to social scientific research: “Clearly the possibility of speaking about 
universally valid ‘laws’ based on natural science criteria of ‘objectivity’ or some fixed standard or 
‘truth’ is rejected” (Morton, 2003a, p. 133; see also Gill, 2008, p. 17; Sinclair, 1996, pp. 6-7). 
Instead, critical theory pays attention to how the current world order was constructed in the past, to 
understand the world order today. What was created historically can be modified or even 
transformed, which of course also applies to capitalism (Judis, 2014; see below). A determinist, 
mechanical perspective is rejected in favour of an approach that emphasizes the open-ended future 
wherein multiple (although not unlimited, because they are shaped by the past and present) 
alternatives remain open. Through historicizing the global political economy, the potential for change 
and transformation is thus recognized (Amin & Palan, 1996, p. 212). To sum up, the purpose of 
historicist, critical research is not to search for mechanical causality, but to understand and explain 
the world in order to change it (Bieler & Morton, 2001, p. 29; Gill, 2008, p. xxiii, 21). 
The epistemological consequence of this historicized thinking is an emphasis on “the contextuality 
and historicity of all claims to knowledge” (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1157).viii Critical theory 
thus calls for reflexivity on the part of the academic about their background, practices and objectives, 
and about how their social context conditions them (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1157; Knafo, 
2008). It rejects the separation between the subjective and the objective world, and the 
independence of the researcher from his/her research object.ix 
 
 3.2 Social forces, ideas, institutions  
  3.2.1 The social relations of production under capitalism 
The fourth principle is that the basis of society, and the starting point for analysis, is not the state, as 
in (neo-)realist theories, nor the individual, as in (neo-)liberal theories, but the production process 
(Cox, 1981, p. 134; Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 475; Overbeek, 2004a). The reason for this starting 
point is quite simple: production is the basis of any society because for humanity to survive 
necessitates the production of certain goods, in the first place food, water, shelter and other basic 
goods (Bruff, 2009, p. 345, 2011b, p. 393, 2011c, 487-488). As Overbeek (2004a) puts it: “From the 
standpoint of historical materialism, any analysis of the world we live in must be grounded in an 
understanding of the way in which human beings have organized the production and reproduction of 
their material life.” 
However, this transhistorical necessity of production as a precondition for survival needs to be 
historicized: “In other words, the need to produce is essential to our existence; the way in which such 
production is organized is not” (Bruff, 2009, p. 347). Hence, while the production of basic goods is a 
transhistorical feature, the way this production is organized varies historically and contextually. In 
general, the production of goods and services implies “a power relationship between those who 
control and those who execute the tasks for production” (Cox, 1981, p. 135). This leads to the 
concept of the “social relations of production” which are based on the way production is organized 
(van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 153; Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008b, p. 5; Bieler & Morton, 2001, p. 24; 
Harvey, 2006, p. 22; Soederberg, 2010, p. 69)x. As Bieler and Morton describe the basis of Cox’s 
theory: “To examine the reciprocal relationship between production and power there is, then, a 
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focus on how social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how these social 
forces may become the bases of power in forms of state and how this might shape world order” 
(Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 476, original emphasis). 
Acknowledging the central importance of production leads to a focus on the historical specificities of 
the capitalist mode of production, in line with the historicized approached as outline above. These 
historical specificities of capitalism are often overlooked in mainstream International Relations (IR), 
as in orthodox economics, which threat capitalism and its tendencies, systemic properties, relations 
and structures as transhistorical phenomena (Amin & Palan, 1996, p. 210; Belfrage, 2011, p. 386). As 
van der Pijl writes:  
“Let us first establish that, contrary to capitalist ideology and standard economics textbooks, 
capitalism is not a universal, eternal, transhistorical system which has always existed at least 
in embryo or in the depths of human nature. (...) But the subjection of society to the 
disciplines of the market, to the imperatives of competition, capital accumulation, and 
increasing labor-productivity, is historically specific, relatively recent, and has required 
profound and painful social transformations.” (van der Pijl, 1997, p. 29) 
What then are the specificities of capitalism in abstract? Within the capitalist mode of production, 
the fundamental conflict is between the capitalist class who controls the production process on the 
one hand, and the working class who executes production on the other hand: “The domination 
exercised by the capitalist class over the working class, both in the factories and in political life, is the 
fundamental social relationship underlying the capitalist system” (Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, 
p. 12; also Harvey, 2006, p. 22).xi 
Crucial in this relationship is that production within capitalism is not just geared at fulfilling the needs 
of society, but at endless accumulation of capital through profit maximization (Armstrong, Glyn & 
Harrison, 1991, p. 11; Wallerstein, 2011, p. 32).xii What is more, capital’s profits are based on the 
exploitation of labour: workers have to produce surplus value for the capitalist to make a profit, or, in 
other words, they must produce goods which are worth more than their wages (Armstrong, Glyn & 
Harrison, 1991, p. 11). Since capital thrives on the exploitation of labour, the relations between 
capital and labour are inherently antagonistic and fraught with conflicts (see Anievas, 2011, p. 606; 
van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 154; Soederberg, 2010, p. 69; Winters, 1994, p. 420). Hence the neo-
Gramscian attention given to the role of class struggle. 
However, capitalist social relations are not only antagonistic, they are also highly unequal. Capital as 
a social force is in general more powerful because it owns and/or controls the means of production 
(physical and financial assets) (van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 154, 2011, p. 166; Bruff, 2011c, p. 489; Gill, 
2008, p. 104, 192; Soederberg, 2010, p. 69). The remainder of society, among which the working 
class, does not have this substantial ownership and concomitant power. While both classes are 
mutually dependent on each other, this dependency is uneven:  “Dependence on the market for 
survival [for labour] is considerably more visceral and compelling an experience than dependence on 
the market for profit [for capital]” (Bruff, 2011c, p. 489). Moreover, as Gill (2008, p. 105; also van 
Apeldoorn, 2011, pp. 166-167; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996, p. 41) notes: “Whereas an ‘investment 
strike’ by business may occur spontaneously if the business climate deteriorates, labour, in order to 
exert corresponding influence, would have to directly organize a wide-ranging or even general 
strike.” While concessions to labour and other social forces are of course possible within capitalism, 
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the capitalist mode of production based on profit will always be tendentially favourable to capital 
(Bruff, 2011c, p. 490). As van der Pijl (1998, p. 37) states, “the imposition of the discipline of capital 
inevitably serves the interests of those who are its owners or controllers”. In other words, under 
capitalism, the interests and discipline of capital must count first, and the interests of labour and 
other social forces are subordinate to these principles (Hall, 1982, p. 10). These unequal power 
relations are often visible within state organs and, consequently, in state policies (see below). 
An important observation is that “capital” and “labour” are not homogenous social forces; there are 
also divisions within each class (Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008b, pp. 5-6). Many historical materialists 
therefore use the concept of “class fractions” (van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 144; Gill, 2008, p. 104; 
Harvey, 2006, p. 74; Overbeek, 2004b, p. 118; Macartney, 2009b, pp. 460-462). This concept is 
especially used for capital fractions (although it can certainly also be used to analyse divisions within 
the working class). Various fractions of capital can be discerned, based on the role in the production 
process. For the purpose of this dissertation, productive or industrial capital on the hand and money 
or financial capital on the other hand are the most important (see Harvey, 2006, p. 70; Sablowski, 
2008, pp. 136-138)xiii. In simple terms, productive capital is capital that makes profit from being 
engaged in the production of goods and services; financial capital makes it profits from financial 
activities that are supposed to support this production of goods and services. Importantly, financial 
capital is more mobile and fluid than productive capital, and is in general able to flee faster and 
easier (Winters, 1994, p. 421). Based on their respective needs, these two fractions tend to have a 
different viewpoint on some aspects: whereas productive capital tends to have a longer-term vision 
and is more concerned with long-term stability (the “productive capital concept”), financial capital is 
inclined to take on a more short-term view (the “money capital concept”) (Gill, 2008, p. 192; 
Macartney, 2009b, p. 460; Overbeek, 2004b, p. 119). 
In particular places and times, the dominant class fraction (as well as the dominant historic bloc, see 
below) can vary. The concept of capital fractions is thus useful to further historicize the capitalist 
social relations of production without neglecting “the universalist tendencies in capitalism” (Amin & 
Palan, 1996, p. 215). It is helpful in a periodization of capitalism in different epochs or eras, or 
historical structures in the conceptualization of Robert Cox. Without this periodization: 
“The question left begging is whether this results in an ahistorical conception of capitalism so 
that capitalism, is capitalism, is capitalism, without due regard for changing modalities of 
capitalist exploitation and social organisation.” (Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 474; see also van 
der Pijl, 1998, p. 51) 
The concept of a historical structure highlights that within the capitalist mode of production (as 
within other modes of production) there can be coherent patterns of social relations that are 
changing over time (as well as geographically): 
“This method highlights the overarching persistence of the capitalist mode of production 
while drawing attention to the changing processes of capital accumulation between historical 
structures and the potential for change through the agency of social forces.” (Bieler & 
Morton, 2001, p. 25) 
The concept of historical structures also points to the non-determinist neo-Gramscian perspective, 
because it points to variability within a mode of production. Even within a historical structure 
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variation is possible. While this theoretical outline does not want to provide a solution to the debate 
between “the Scylla of voluntarism and the Charibdis of structuralism” (Overbeek, 2004b, p. 119), 
the neo-Gramscian perspective adopted here recognizes the role of agency (in line with e.g. van 
Apeldoorn, 2004, pp. 154-155; Bieler & Morton, 2001, p. 25; Martin, 1997, p. 49; van der Pijl, 1998, p. 
31). Capitalism can only continue to exist if the agency of social forces produces and reproduces the 
discipline of capital. In addition, while the interests and identities of social forces are shaped by 
production relations and historical structures, they are not determined by them (Bieler & Morton, 
2001, p. 25). Social forces always have several different options at their disposal in a given historical 
structure. 
Every historical structure is supported by and serves the interests of a “historic bloc”. This concept 
refers to an organic and relatively durable alliance of various social forces, “that represents more 
than just a political alliance but indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests” 
(Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 484; see also Gill, 1990, p. 305; Simon, 1990, pp. 31-36). The formation of 
an historic bloc happens primarily within the national context, from which it can projected outwards 
(Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 87, p. 102). By forming a historic bloc the leading social forces try to 
establish an order that serves their interests (Bieler, 2001, p. 97). They do this by transcending their 
“narrowly based economist or corporate perspectives” and transforming them into what is perceived 
as a universal position which serves the “general interests” (Gill, 2008, p. 34). In short, the leading 
social forces try to achieve “hegemony”, which points to the crucial role played by ideas. 
 
  3.2.2 Ideas matter 
An important role in the choices social forces make is played by ideas, which brings us to the fifth 
feature of the neo-Gramscian perspective adopted in this dissertation: ideas matter. While this 
theoretical chapter is not the place to give a definitive answer in the debate on the “ever debatable 
primacy” of ideas versus material properties (Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 328), this dissertation 
assumes that they are in a dialectical relationship with each other (Bieler, 2001, p. 98; Bieler & 
Morton, 2008, p. 105; Macartney, 2008a, pp. 433-434; McCarthy, 2011, p. 1217). As Martin (1997, p. 
53) writes: “The novelty of Gramsci’s argument lies in recasting the base-superstructure model – with 
its emphasis on the causal primacy of one over the other – in favour of seeing them as mutually 
interdependent spheres.” In other words: 
“From this perspective, ideology and socio-economic structure (or class interests) are not 
conceived as ‘independent’ or ‘autonomous’ causal factors relating to separate and discrete 
ideational and material spheres in explaining policymaking processes. Rather, they are 
conceptualised in their internal relations within a single social totality.” (Anievas, 2011, p. 
605) 
There is then no simple determination from the material reality to ideas (van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 
153; Bieler, 2001, p. 99; Hall, 1986, pp. 41-43). Ruling classes do not just “define” the dominant ideas 
within a society. Nor is there a simple causal link from a certain class to certain ideas, or to a form of 
class consciousness (Hall, 1982, p. 2). Rather than automatically deriving from a certain class position, 
class consciousness often (but not mechanically) arises out of the experience of concrete class 
struggles (Morton, 2006, p. 66). In other words, there is no guarantee that a class-in-itself will 
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inevitably also develop in a class-for-itself. Besides, it cannot be predicted which ideas will prevail in 
society, and the outcome of an ideological clash is open-ended (Hall, 1986, p. 43). 
On the other hand, ideas are not just totally independent from material circumstances (Bieler, 2001, 
p. 99; Hall, 1986, p. 40; Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1160; Macartney, 2008a, pp. 433-434; 
Morton, 2006, p. 68). They do not appear out of nowhere, and fundamentally, they must appeal to 
certain social forces to become important ideas. One most ask the question why some ideas are 
successful and others are not, which points to the underlying power structure of ideas (Bieler & 
Morton, 2008, p. 105). In that sense, “ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with 
a particular constellation of social forces” (Hall, 1986, p. 42, original emphasis). It thus matters who 
the bearers of ideas are (Bieler, 2001, p. 97); ideas can only be understood if one looks at the 
position of their carriers in the social relations, and at the social structure that these agents are 
defending or opposing (Anievas, 2011, p. 605). Moreover, “the material structure of ideas” is 
emphasized (Bieler, 2001, pp. 94, 98; Bieler & Morton, 2008, p. 118), which relates to the 
dissemination of ideas through publishing houses, political newspapers, periodicals, etc. In sum, 
while the material does not determine the prevailing ideas, it does set the limits of the possible and 
puts constraints on which ideas are important (Hall, 1986, pp. 42-43). What is more, to have an 
impact, ideas have to be compatible with individuals’ experience of the everyday life. The role of 
ideas can then only be considered in an historicized perspective, and in relation to the material 
circumstances (Hall, 1986, p. 40). 
How then, do ideas matter? For one, they are decisive in the course of action that is chosen by a 
particular social force. They also play a role in cementing various social forces into a durable historic 
bloc (see above). Finally, ideas are an important instrument of and element in class struggles 
between various social forces (Bieler, 2001, p. 98; Hall, 1986, pp. 40, 42; Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, 
p. 1160; Morton, 2006, p. 67; Simon, 1990, p. 68). They are crucial in determining which strategy  is 
generally accepted in society as the best, and thus in building a “hegemonic project”xiv. Adam Harmes 
provides a comprehensive definition of hegemony: 
“A hegemonic order has classically been defined as one in which ‘consent rather than 
coercion’ characterizes the relations between classes, and between the state and civil society; 
one in which there is a ‘fit’ between institutional structures, material conditions and the 
dominant ideology. In positive terms, a hegemonic social force must be able both to project 
its own interests as being for the universal good, and also to provide – or appear to provide – 
real material benefits to those consenting to its rule. In negative terms, it will try to deny or 
preclude the existence of any alternatives; here, ideological dominance can be reinforced by 
cultural / patterns that help to ‘embed’ the outlook of a particular order by naturalizing it in 
everyday life and depoliticizing it.” (Harmes, 2001, pp. 103-104) 
The concept of hegemony is subject to various interpretations. While the central tenet is indeed the 
consent of subaltern social forces, backed up by force and coercion only in the last instance 
(Abrahamsen, 1997, p. 147; Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 87; Bruff, 2010, p. 412; Gill, 2008, p. 92; 
Overbeek, 2004a; Simon, 1990, p. 24), it cannot always straightforwardly be evaluated whether 
subaltern forces are “consenting” to the prevailing order. It should be noted that the difference 
between hegemony and dominance is hence better seen as spanning a continuum than as a 
dichotomy. Moreover, hegemony is always conjunctural and never fully realized. As the late Stuart 
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Hall (2012, p. 25) wrote: “No project achieves ‘hegemony’ as a completed project. It is a process, not 
a state of being. No victories are permanent or final. Hegemony has constantly to be ‘worked on’, 
maintained, renewed, revised” (for similar assessments see van der Pijl, 2010, p. 50; Robinson, 2005, 
p. 8; Rupert, 1998, p. 428; Simon, 1990, p. 42). It is also a matter of discussion whether hegemony 
requires only passive submission or whether it requires active consent of subaltern social forces. For 
Simon (1990, p. 72), for instance, hegemony entails active agreement, but how then is active 
agreement conceptualized (and operationalized)? 
Hegemony does certainly not imply that all social forces or individuals actively agree on every single 
thing (Sekler, 2009, p. 61). Nor does it necessarily imply a lack of contestation by opposing social 
forces (Gill, 2008, p. 193; Rupert, 1998, p. 428).xv It could argued that protest does not preclude the 
existence of a hegemonic order, as it does not exclude the possibility that a (large) majority still 
(whether actively or passively) approve of the established social order. Again, the difference between 
a hegemonic and a non-hegemonic order is more a matter of degree than a matter of clear 
distinction. In general, one could agree with Bruff’s interpretation of Gramsci, namely that “active 
consent and contained dissent are distinct yet connected aspects of hegemony” (Bruff, 2010, p. 413). 
The difficulties with assessing hegemony is even more difficult at the international level than at the 
national level, because of the range of varieties of capitalism, and even combinations of modes of 
production. Further, the uneven development of capitalism tends to undermine hegemonic 
configurations which were based on the hegemony of capitalist fractions in a particular geographical 
area (see Saull, 2012). Neo-Gramscian perspectives have therefore been criticized for using the 
concept of hegemony for non-hegemonic international orders (Lacher & Germann, 2012, p. 99)xvi. 
Another difficult question is whether hegemony can be present in a non-(liberal) democratic, more 
authoritarian order.xvii However, for the sake of this dissertation, the notion of hegemony refers 
(admittedly, somewhat vaguely) to a national or international order based largely on consent instead 
of coercion. 
 
  3.2.3 A theory of the capitalist state 
While ideas matter, institutions also matter, especially in stabilizing a particular (hegemonic) order 
(Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 88). The main institution under capitalism has until now been the 
capitalist (national) state. As “a fully developed theory of the state is not evident” in neo-Gramscian 
perspectives (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 100), this dissertation derives inspiration from Marxism in 
general for a notion of how the capitalist state works. There are several contradicting Marxist 
theories of the state, based on different notions that were already present in the writings of Marx 
and Engels (Barrow, 2000, p. 88; Hobson, 2010; Manley, 2006, p. 168; Simon, 1990, pp. 13-14). The 
purpose of this section is not to go back to the “original texts” – which are compatible with a range of 
state-theoretical positions according to Barrow (2000, pp. 87-88) – but to clarify a theory of the state 
that is underpinning the following chapters. This is necessary since the dissertation will examine state 
policies, in particular state policies on capital controls. 
The starting point for this dissertation is the formal separation in capitalism between the “political” 
and the “economic” or between “state” and “society” (Brand & Görg, 2008, pp. 570-571; Cammack, 
2003, p. 41; Harmes, 2006, p. 729; Jessop, 2010b, p. 39; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 3; Rupert, 2010, p. 
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95). In other words, the ruling capitalist class does not directly control the political institutions and 
thus the state. Yet this does not exclude the possibility that (certain fractions of) the capitalist class 
indirectly control the state. There are thus a range of positions within the historical materialist 
literature on the relationship between capitalists and the state, which can more or less be clustered 
in three different – but not necessary always irreconcilable – theories of the state.  
A first Marxist understanding of the state is that it is essentially an instrument in the hands of the 
ruling class, despite the formal separation between the economic and the political. For instance, 
Tabb (2006, p. 8) has argued that in the history of the US, the government had more or less always 
acted “in the interests of the rich”. In this orthodox Marxist interpretation policymakers or “state 
managers” implement policies that are in the (short-term) interest of capitalists. Such crude Marxist 
analyses have become quite rare, and do not seem warranted. Although the state can under certain 
circumstances and in a particular place and time be nothing more than the “committee for managing 
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”, as the Communist Manifesto stated, the (modern 
liberal democratic) state is not always just an instrument in the hands of the capitalist class. Or put 
differently: “There is no guarantee that political outcomes will serve the needs of capital” (Jessop, 
2002, p. 41). 
In the second interpretation of Marx, state managers do not necessarily act in the interests of 
capitalists, but they do act in the long-term interest of the capitalist system. In this regard, the 
concept of the “relative autonomy” of the capitalist state is crucial (see e.g. Bieler & Morton, 2003, 
pp. 486-488; Cammack, 2003, pp. 41-42). The state is “autonomous” in that it is not directly 
controlled by the capitalist class or a particular fraction of capital. However, this autonomy is only 
“relative” in the sense that state managers will act to secure (what they perceive as) the long-term 
reproduction of the capitalist system as a whole, even against the will of certain capitalists or 
capitalist fractions (Manley, 2006, pp. 166-167; Panitch & Gindin 2005, p. 102). According to some, 
this relative autonomy is not only a reality, it is also a precondition because without it the capitalist 
system would not be able to reproduce itself (Hirsch & Kannankulam, 2011, p. 21; for an outline see 
also Block, 1980, p. 228; Hobson, 2010, pp. 112-113). Other authors admit that there is no guarantee 
that this relative autonomy is present in every space and time (Cammack, 2003, p. 42). This relative 
autonomy is not fixed and is historically and contextually differentiated (Kennedy, 2006, p. 183). And 
even when it is present, this does imply that state managers will never act to fulfill the short-term 
interests of (part of) the ruling class. Moreover, it is also questionable whether the policies that are 
necessary to reproduce the capitalist system can be “defined” objectively. Finally, one should also 
not overlook the similarities between this interpretation and the first interpretation. As Hobson 
(2010, p. 112) argues: “The key shift is from a short-term class instrumentalist model (…) to a long-
term class structural-functionalist model.” In both theoretical stances, however, state managers still 
try to act in the interest of the capitalist class and the capitalist system. 
A third position moves further away from the instrumentalist vision and sees the state as “a terrain 
for political struggle between the two major classes – the working class and the capitalist class” 
(Simon, 1990, p. 18). More concrete, this interpretation also takes into account the existence of 
fractions within each class: “as a social relation constituting and constituted by broader production 
relations, the state is a terrain of systematic intra-elite and class struggles” (Tsolakis, 2010, p. 387; 
also Macartney, 2008b). In other words, state institutions are a battle field for the social forces 
within society. As such, while they are “relatively autonomous” from the ruling class, they are not 
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“independent” from societal power relations. After Poulantzas, states can generally be considered as 
the material condensation of the changing balance of class forces (see Brand & Görg, 2008, pp. 570-
571; Bryan, 1987, p. 257; Gerstenberger, 2011, p. 65; Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157). As a 
result, the state is not a “thing in itself”, but a form of social relations (Brand, 2007; Demirović, 2011, 
p. 42; Kelly, 1999, p. 110; Morton, 2006, p. 65). The contradictory relations between and interests of 
different fractions and classes are “internalized” within the state (Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 487). 
Moreover, the state is often not seen as homogeneous, because the balance of forces crystallizes 
differentially within different state apparatuses (see e.g. Tsolakis, 2010, p. 395). Class struggle 
between various social forces is thus also present within the state. 
This third understanding leads to a focus on the agency of and the struggles waged by social forces 
within a certain social formation. Therefore, it moves away from a determinist position towards a 
more open-ended one, depending upon a historically and nationally differentiation balance of forces. 
Further, it allows for differentiation and struggles within the state, and it leaves room for state 
policies that benefit subaltern social forces. However, somewhat simplistically, it can still be labelled 
as determinist in that it assumes that state managers have no “free will”; they are fully determined 
by the specific balance of forces in society. Therefore, “the state is not conceptualized as a subject 
imbued with agency” (Demirović, 2011, p. 42; also Bryan, 1987, p. 257). This position, in our view, 
still does not acknowledge adequately the potential autonomy of state managers. It must be 
recognized that within the limits defined by the struggles between social forces it is possible to think 
of several conceivable policies. In concrete terms: is it, for instance, unimaginable that in a liberal 
democracy with proportional representation several different coalitions would be possible, which 
could implement different policies? Or, that different outcomes in elections, which do not necessarily 
categorically reflect the balance of power, can make a difference? Denying this would imply that 
elections are totally irrelevant, a position with which not many leftists would fully agreexviii. In sum, 
state institutions and state managers are part of the power relations between social forces and, 
crucially, in turn also impact upon these power relations through certain policies or through altering 
institutional configurations (see Brand, 2007; Major, 2008). Therefore, a focus on the agency of state 
managers is also essential. 
This theoretical stance thus goes beyond many historical materialist positions by adopting an even 
more open-ended and less determinist point of view, in line with the historicized approach sketched 
above.xix It must be acknowledged that the consequence is less theoretical rigor (as noted on Jessop’s 
theory by Konings, 2010b, p. 176), but, it could be argued, to the benefit of a more reality-based 
framework. However, an important question then arises: Why, if state policies are open-ended, do 
states often adopt policies that please the short-term or long-term interests of the capitalist class or 
particular capitalist fractions? Indeed: “The deployment of public authority in ways that 
systematically benefit some interests more than others suggests the need for a more profound 
appreciation of the ways in which socio-economic sources of power make themselves felt in the 
political arena” (Konings, 2010b, p. 174). This brings us to what Konings (2010b, p. 177) defines as 
“the classical problem of Marxist state theory, that is, how to attribute authority a degree of 
institutional independence while still being able to articulate its constitutive connections to socio-
economic power”. In other words, if there are any, what are the limits of the autonomy of state 
managers from the ruling class? 
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The position adopted here is more or less in line with Fred Block’s theory of the state, which is based 
on “the acknowledgement that state power is sui generis, not reducible to class power” (Block, 1980, 
p. 229; also Anievas, 2011, pp. 608-610; Tsolakis, 2010, pp. 395-401). However,  it also recognizes 
that “the exercise of state power occurs within particular class contexts, which shape and limit the 
exercise of that power” (Block, 1980, p. 229). State managers do not act in a vacuum, but in a specific 
societal (capitalist) context. It seems clear that “the state cannot be understood independently from 
broader social struggles: it simultaneously is shaped by and shapes them” (Tsolakis, 2010, p. 395). In 
other words, while state policies are the result of agency of policymakers or “state managers”, 
several structural elements impact upon this agency. The capitalist context therefore leads to 
“structural selectivities” on the part of state managers (Brand, 2007)xx. There are many reasons for 
this pro-capital class bias. 
First, the formal separation of the economic and the political sphere itself has an ideological function. 
As Konings (2010b, p. 179) claims: 
“To make a distinction between state and society is not merely to describe a pre-existing state 
of affairs, but it is to participate actively in the construction of an institutional configuration in 
which certain kinds of relationships are said to be non-political even though they involve 
power and control. In other words, the state/society distinction is part of a political discourse 
that produces social effects (...).” 
As such, the notion of a political realm and a separate economic realm mystifies that the economic is 
also political, and this formal separation is instrumental to the workings of capitalism. 
A second cause of the pro-capitalist bias of state managers is that they share the goal of private 
capital accumulation with the capitalist class (Lipson, 1985, p. 257). Therefore, as Anievas (2011, p. 
609) contends: “State managers and capitalists can thus be viewed as constituting two distinct group 
of actors, drawn into strategic alliances with one another through the pursuit of their own distinctive 
interests.” There are at least two reasons why state managers share the same objectives as the 
capitalist class. First, in a capitalist system, they are dependent on the economic activities of 
capitalists – especially multinationals, banks, wealthy individuals, and large investors – for growth, 
employment, and taxes (Block, 1980, p. 231; Rupert, 2010, p. 95). As capital accumulation by private 
capitalists is thus crucial to maintain the legitimacy both of the state as a whole and of individual 
state managers, state managers will try their very best to promote capital accumulation within their 
territory (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 3; Rupert, 2010, p. 95). This explains the need to provide a 
favourable “business climate” and the compulsion to build, preserve and improve “business 
confidence”, “investor confidence” and “policy credibility” (see also Chapter 3). 
Third, states also operate in a structural context of international competition. If a state wants to be 
able to compete geopolitically, or even survive within an international system, it is more or less 
forced to develop the national productive forces (Anievas, 2011, pp. 609-610; Block, 1980, p. 230; 
Lockwood, 2006, p. 170). While cooperation between states is of course not impossible, it is plausible 
to assume that state managers don’t want their countries to stay behind too much. Therefore, state 
managers want an economic structure that stimulates capital accumulation. As explained above, in a 
capitalist context this implies providing a favourable climate for the capitalist class. The concept of a 
“state-capital nexus” has been invoked to highlight that state power in a capitalist context cannot be 
separated from the private power of capital (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 472)xxi.  
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As a fourth structural element leading to biased pro-capital state policies, the unequal power 
relations between capital and labour, as outlined above (see 3.2.1), in general obviously also lead to 
unequal power to influence state policies (Wolfson, 2003, p. 261). Integral to this power is the wealth 
of capitalists. This wealth can be used for all kinds of ways to influence both state managers and the 
public opinion (Block, 1980, p. 231; Tabb, 2006, p. 8). For instance, private media are often owned by 
capitalists; capitalists are better able to lobby (or even bribe) state managers; and capital has more 
resources to pay for PR and spokesmen, fund think tanks, and so on. The fact that the state often 
acts in the interests of the capitalist class is a reflection of capital’s power, but it does not imply that 
this power (both outside and inside the state) cannot be challenged (Tsolakis, 2010, p. 396). 
The background of state managers, and the “institutional and social channels through which 
capitalists and state managers directly relate” (Anievas, 2011, p. 609), is the fifth feature that causes 
a pro-capital bias. Highly ranked officials are often themselves members of the wealthier groups in 
society (Tabb, 2006, p. 8). Most state managers also have many things in common with capitalists, 
such as the sociological background, education, cultural influence, ... (Davidson, 2010, p. 84). Fifthly, 
it could be argued that in away, the raison d’être of state managers is to make the system work and 
manage its contradictions. Consequently, they are often impelled to protect and manage capitalism 
instead of trying to overthrow it (Block, 1980, p. 231). 
If you take all these elements together, it becomes obvious why states have generally acted in the 
interests of the capitalist system and the capitalist class. This is not always because of conscious 
actions by state managers: “Policymakers and politicians may therefore very well think of themselves 
as disinterestedly serving the common good, but their historical constitution as actors in a capitalist 
society makes it likely that their epistemic framework will be biased in favour of capitalist interests” 
(Konings, 2010b, p. 178). Finally, it must be mentioned that one important aspect that affects the 
potential autonomy of state managers, concerns the degree of politicization: the less politicized a 
policy domain, the more autonomy for state managers. For this dissertation, this is crucial, as the 
issue of capital controls has often been considered as a highly technical, apolitical policy field (see 
Chapter 1). 
 
 3.3 The shortcomings of neo-Gramscian perspectives 
There are three important shortcomings of neo-Gramscian perspectives which have been or could be 
identified with regard to neo-Gramscian perspectives, and which are relevant for this dissertation. 
First, with regard to geographical focus, neo-Gramscian concepts and theories have mostly been 
applied to the leading developed countries, especially Western Europe and the US.xxii For that reason, 
they have been blamed to pay insufficient attention to states outside of the core of the global 
political economy (van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 169; Worth, 2008, p. 640). While some authors have 
offered an account of recent or less recent developments in particular (groups of) EMDCsxxiii and the 
former communist countries in Eastern Europexxiv, it could reasonably be argued that scant attention 
has been given to the question on whether and how rising powers will challenge the Western-made 
neoliberal world order. As van Apeldoorn (2004, p. 169) has stated on the neo-Gramscian 
perspectives developed by the “Amsterdam School”, “more research and theorization of ‘the 
transnational’ beyond our traditional geographical approach seems all the more called for”. Although 
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recent articles have examined the BRICs in general or particular countries (see van der Pijl, 2008, 
2012; Rucki, 2011; Saull, 2012; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012; Stephen, 2014), this dissertation will provide 
one of the first efforts to systematically fill this gap by studying three of the main rising powers. 
Second, it could be argued that while neo-Gramscian accounts – and Marxism more generally – 
sometimes , while rich in theory, lack empirical substantiation. This is not surprising, as class (as well 
as class fractions) is an abstract concept which is not always empirically observable. However, the 
lack of empirical material potentially results in more “intuitive” assessments of the prospects of 
counterhegemonic projects in the Global South. This dissertation aims to strengthen neo-Gramscian 
perspectives by offering an empirically rich study. Besides a large amount of academic literature as 
well as empirical studies, the dissertation therefore makes use of four kinds of sources: (1) databases 
and statistics from international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF; (2) official 
documents of governmental organs; (3) websites of the organized representation of various social 
forces such as certain capital fractions; and (4) 33 interviews (8 in China in September/October 2013, 
13 in Brazil in May/June 2013 and 12 in India in November 2013) with state managers, 
representatives of different social forces and academics. Moreover, this dissertation is probably also 
one of the first in critical IPE in general, and neo-Gramscian IPE in particular, to offer a detailed 
examination of capital account policies and their relation to certain constellations of social forces (for 
a partial exception see Soederberg, 2002, 2004, for a historical materialist analysis of capital 
controls). 
Third, neo-Gramscian perspectives as a whole have been accused to focus too much on elites, and to 
pay insufficient attention to labour and other subaltern social forces, resulting in a pessimistic and 
determinist view (e.g. Belfrage, 2012, p. 159; Strange, 2002, p. 343). While there is undoubtedly 
some truth to this claim (see Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 480 for an assessment), recently there have 
been a range of accounts of labour and trade unions in different countries, especially under the 
impulse of Andreas Bieler (see Bergholm & Bieler, 2013; Bieler, 2012; Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008a; 
Bieler, Lindberg & Sauerborn, 2010). However, even if there is some truth that neo-Gramscian 
perspectives focus more on elites, this focus is not entirely misguided, as the capitalist class still calls 
the shots in a capitalist social order. Moreover, it is not always easy for trade unions to politicize 
depoliticized issues, such as capital account policies (see Chapter 3). Therefore, while this 
dissertation will also try to pay attention to the role and ideas of subaltern social forces, especially 
labour, concerning capital controls, it must be acknowledged that the centre of the analysis will 
probably be elites, such as capital fractions and state managers. 
 
 3.4 By way of conclusion: a neo-Gramscian approach and capital controls 
This chapter has sketched the neo-Gramscian perspective and concepts that will be used as a device 
in the following chapters. In the next chapter, a historicized approach will outline how the current 
(neoliberal) world order came into being after the Bretton Woods order disintegrated, and the role 
that capital account policies played in this transition. Commensurate with the approach described in 
this chapter, the deep cause for this transformation in world order is sought in the social relations of 
production and the evolution of profitability. Further, primacy will be accorded to the consequences 
of this transition for the relations between capital and labour, for the capitalist state, and for the 
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various capital fractions, in particular financial capital and industrial capital. The role of ideas will also 
be discussed, as well as the limits of a primarily ideological interpretation of the neoliberal historical 
structure. 
The three subsequent chapters will focus on the domestic political economy of capital controls in 
China, Brazil and India respectively. In line with the neo-Gramscian perspective outlined in this 
chapter, a historicized approach will sketch their capital account policies up until today, with an 
emphasis on the last three decades. These policies will be examined in relation to the respective 
countries’ accumulation regime, social relations of production and (historic) blocs of social forces. 
Attention will also be given to the ideas within the BICs on capital controls (and neoliberal 
globalization more generally), and to how state managers have used their (relative) autonomy in the 
context of the pressures exerted on them by various social forces. On the whole, these analyses will 
allow us both to understand and explain the role played by capital account policies in these 
countries, and to assess whether the BICs can be a progressive force for change in the Western-
centred, US-made neoliberal world order which is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                          
i
 The prefix “neo” indicates a different historical era than the one in which Gramsci lived (see Morton, 2001, p. 
35). 
ii
 Note that this is not even possible given the fragmented and sometimes contradictory writings of Marx (see 
e.g. Barrow, 2000) and Gramsci (see e.g. Green, 2002, p. 3). 
iii
 For a different perspective see Germain & Kenny, 1998. A good refutation of similar arguments can be found 
in Gill, 2008, xx-xxiii. 
iv
 Morton (2003) counterposes an “absolute historicism” to an “austere historicism”. The former admits that 
one has to look at concepts in the historical-geographical contexts in which they arose, but assumes that these 
concepts can still be relevant in other contexts. Austere historicism, on the other hand, suggests that the 
usefulness of concepts beyond the context in which they arose is limited.  
v
 Of course, these are ideal-types, and the delineation between problem-solving and critical theory is not 
always clear. 
vi
 This is thus in contradiction with a more determinist approach. 
vii
 Note that this runs contrary to an “end of history” worldview (Fukuyama, …) or a teleological Marxist view. 
viii
 This should not be read as a pure constructivist stance, since the materiality of social relations and 
knowledge is stressed (see Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1157). 
ix
 As Gill (2008, p. 22) puts it, “the process of thinking is part of a ceaseless dialectic of social being”. 
x
 For a non-mainstream critique of this materialist ontology, see Germain, 2007, 2011 
xi
 The focus on class and production relations does not exclude analysing other forms of identity and 
exploitation, such as ethnic, gender, sexual, ..., and “non-class issues” such as peace, ecology, feminism and 
racism. However, these issues, identities, and forms of exploitation should also be considered in the context of 
and in relation to capitalist production relations and capitalism’s tendencies (Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 477; see 
also Simon, 1990, p. 27). 
xii
 This is also why the rate of profit is a key variable in the functioning of capitalism, and thus in an analysis of 
the evolution of a capitalist society (Duménil & Lévy, 2002, p. 48). Note that the profit maximization motive is 
intensified by the competition between employers to survive in the market (Bieler, 2012, p. 367). 
xiii
 There are also divisions within fractions. For instance, productive capital can be nationally-oriented or 
internationally-oriented, while financial capital can be banking capital but also capital in the form of investment 
funds, … (see e.g. Bieler & Morton, 2003, p. 487; van der Pijl, 1998, p. 52). 
xiv
 The notion of a hegemonic project is similar to the concept of a “comprehensive concept of control” (see van 
Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 155; Overbeek, 2004a; van der Pijl, 1998, p. 4, 2010, p. 50). Kees van der Pijl (1998, p. 51) 
defines a concept of control as follows: “Concepts of control are frameworks of thought and practice by which 
a particular world view of the ruling class spills over into a broader sense of ‘limits of the possible’ for society at 
large. (...), a concept of control strategically articulates the special interests of a historically concrete 
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configuration of classes and states with the management requirements of the order with which those interests 
are most immediately congruent. Remaining largely implicit as long as it is actually hegemonic, a concept of 
control turns a particular interpretation of capitalist development into orthodoxy.” 
xv
 According to Martin (1997, p. 38), (neo-)Gramscians, because of their focus on hegemony, have often been 
blamed by other Marxist strands to overemphasize the role of consensus and downplay the presence of 
antagonism, conflict, and violence. For an analysis that criticizes the emphasis based on consent, see Miller, 
2002. However, this dissertation assumes that consent is a necessary precondition for the sustainability of a 
social order. In simple terms, without underestimating the power of capitalist coercion, if a large majority 
consciously wants to overthrow capitalism, then it seems reasonable that capitalism would be overthrown. 
xvi
 According to Lacher and Germann (2012, p. 99), in the international context hegemony can only be applied 
to the post-1945 world order under American leadership. 
xvii
 The same goes for “historic bloc”, as it is not clear whether one can speak of an organic alliance of social 
forces in an authoritarian context. 
xviii
 This is also pointed out by Paul Krugman (2014a). 
xix
 In terms of the dilemma between “a so-called bourgeois dead-end” and “the cul-de-sac of Marxist economic 
reductionism” as sketched by Hobson (2010, p. 115), this dissertation thus clearly leans towards the “bourgeois 
dead-end”. 
xx
 On Jessop’s concept of “strategic selectivity” see also van Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 168; Hay, 1994, pp. 350-351; 
Morton, 2006, p. 67 
xxi
 Another related tendency is that state managers often feel pressured to imitate the example of the leading 
states. As long as this leading state’s example is based on a capitalist accumulation regime, state managers in 
other countries will feel inclined to apply this discipline of capital. 
xxii
 See e.g. Bieler & Morton, 2001; Bruff, 2010; de Graaff & van Apeldoorn, 2010; Macartney, 2008a, 2008b, 
2009b; Overbeek, 2004b; van Apeldoorn, 2002. 
xxiii
 See e.g. Abrahamsen, 1997 on sub-Sahara Africa; Morton, 2003c, 2005 on Mexico. 
xxiv
 E.g. Shields, 2008, 2011. 
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4. Neoliberalization: bringing class back in 
 
 4.1 Introduction: “neoliberalism” in the scientific literature 
To assess whether the BICs deviate from the West, some kind of benchmark is needed. While the 
Western norm of full capital mobility in itself already provides a useful indication, the analysis can be 
improved if this move towards the free movement of capital is historicized, and put in the context of 
the changing relations between classes and class fractions. In this chapter, it will be argued that the 
move towards the free movement of capital in the West and the global economy as a whole can only 
be understood in relation to the transition from the Bretton Woods era to the “neoliberal” era. Full 
capital mobility and neoliberalism are mutually related: the neoliberal era cannot be understood 
without referring to capital account liberalization; and capital account liberalization can only be 
understood within the context of the neoliberal era. 
This chapter will therefore conceptualize “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” with three 
objectives in mind. The first is to clarify the relationship between neoliberalism and capital account 
liberalization, and to demonstrate that the free movement of capital is a fundamental element in the 
neoliberal project. Second, a conceptualization of neoliberalism makes it possible to assess not only 
whether the BICs deviate from the norm of full capital mobility but also to examine where they stand 
on the neoliberal project more generally. Third, the neoliberal world order can be seen as the 
structural global context in which the BICs’ policies and evolution should be considered. 
The concept “neoliberalism” seems to be everywhere in the social sciences, and the academic debate 
has been vibrant. Indeed, “its recent expansion into a field of academic inquiry has been nothing 
short of meteoric” (Springer, 2010, p. 1026) so that it “has rapidly become an academic catchphrase” 
(Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 138; also Cerny, 2008, p. 1; Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 97; 
Sparke, 2006, p. 357). Yet, while the use of “neoliberalism” has become widespread, its 
conceptualization and definition is a contentious issue, both in the academic literature and in the 
broader public debate. From the beginning of the use of the concept, “the life of this keywords has 
always been controversial” (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 96). 
Moreover, scholars have recently raised several concerns on the use of neoliberalism. First, 
neoliberalism is rarely explicitly conceptualized or defined (Boas & Ganse-Morse, 2009, pp. 138-139; 
Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010b, pp. 183-184; Mudge, 2008, p. 703). Second, the concept is used in 
many different (though sometimes overlapping) ways, so that it is often unclear what is meant by it 
(Birch, 2011; Boas & Ganse-Morse, 2009, p. 139; Ferguson, 2009, p. 166; Gamble, 2001, p. 134; Hall, 
2012, p. 9; Patomäki, 2009, p. 432; Springer, 2010, p. 1031). Third, it is used in too broad a manner, 
for too wide a range of phenomena (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 143, p. 156; Brenner, Peck & 
Theodore, 2010b, pp. 183-184; Cerny, 2008, p. 3). Fourth, for many critics, neoliberalism “is used as 
an all-purpose term of abuse” (Gamble, 2009, p. 4) or as “a kind of gigantic, all-powerful cause” 
(Ferguson, 2009, p. 171). Relatedly, while “neoliberalism” is often invoked by its opponents, few 
would readily describe themselves as “neoliberals” (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1084; Boas & Gans-Morse, 
2009, p. 140; Patomäki, 2009, p. 432; Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 96). This is also very clear 
in public debates. In sum, “‘neoliberalism’ appears to have become a rascal concept – promiscuously 
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pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested” (Brenner, Peck 
& Theodore, 2010b, p. 182). 
After the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 (and is in fact still ongoing), the 
issue of conceptualizing neoliberalism has become even more pressing (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 
2010b, p. 183). Analysts , journalists, politicians and academics have often labelled the crisis “a crisis 
of neoliberalism”i (e.g. Dello Buono, 2010, p. 22; also Albo, 2009, p. 120; Brie, 2009, p. 16; Rucki, 
2011, p. 346). In the early aftermath of the crisis, the question regularly being asked was therefore: 
does the collapse of global financial markets mark the end of neoliberalism? The popular answer in 
the public debate was that it definitely did; something was about to change. Some scholars agreed 
with this prediction and labelled the crisis the end of neoliberalism (e.g. Altvater, 2009, p. 75; 
Ceceña, 2009, p. 33; Li, 2010, p. 290; Nesvetailova & Palan, 2010, p. 797) or have at least posed the 
question whether the end of neoliberalism could be in sight (Harvey, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008). It seemed 
as though the crisis would herald “the final demise of the neoliberal project” (van Apeldoorn, de 
Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 476; see also Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, pp. 94-95). Keynesianism, 
seen as incompatible with neoliberalism, was back in fashion (as noted by Hendrikse & Sidaway, 
2010, p. 2037).  
As time passed by, however, it appeared that the neoliberal project had at least bought some time 
(van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 478). Scholars increasingly claimed that 
neoliberalism is still alive and kicking (van Apeldoorn, 2011, p. 172; Buch-Hansen & Wigger, 2010, p. 
39; Cahill, 2011, p. 488; Comaroff, 2011, p. 144; Henry, 2010, p. 549; Konings, 2009, p. 122; 
Macartney, 2009a, p. 111). Indeed, it is argued that “it would seem that the rumours of 
neoliberalism’s death were premature” (Heyes, Lewis & Clarke, 2012, p. 236). Neoliberalism was 
even deepened and strengthened, so that “the aftermath of the crisis is turning out to be a 
neoliberal dream in the making” (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1086; also Morgan, 2013). In this view, while the 
global economic crisis may well be a crisis within neoliberalism, it has not turned into a crisis of 
neoliberalism (Fine & Milonakis, 2011, p. 7; Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 248, 264; Stockhammer, 2010). Of 
course, if different scholars conceptualize and understand neoliberalism’s fundamentals in a 
different way, then neoliberalism can be both dead in one meaning and still alive in another 
meaning. 
These concerns have led some authors to argue that we should drop the concept altogether (Barnett, 
2005, p. 10; more prudently also Ferguson, 2009, p. 171). Yet, this is problematic for several reasons, 
which are also part of the reason why this chapter is devoted to the conceptualization and features 
of neoliberalism. First, neoliberalism “seems to be on the tip of virtually everyone’s tongue” 
(Springer, 2010, p. 1025). Indeed, it has become so widespread in the scientific literature that it 
cannot be just be brushed aside. Relatedly, it is often invoked in popular debates and social scientists 
cannot just ignore this fact. 
Second, the term “neoliberalism” is also a powerful political weapon. According to Stuart Hall, using 
neoliberalism “is politically necessary, to give resistance content, focus and a cutting edge” (Hall, 
2012, p. 9, original emphasis). It brings together various progressive social forces against a common 
enemy. This enemy is associated with the policies and discourse of the last decades. But for these 
progressive social forces to know what they are fighting against, it should be clarified what exactly 
defines neoliberalism, and what is the driving force behind it. As will be argued below, it is especially 
54 
 
problematic that even many progressives believe that neoliberalism is predominantly an ideological 
project.  
Third, as will be argued in this chapter, there have been global tendencies during the past decades 
that have played a similar (but still variegated) role in almost all countries in the world.ii Clearly then, 
if this is accepted, then it cannot be argued that “there is no such thing as neoliberalism”, as one 
scholar puts it (Barnett, 2005, p. 9), or “that we have never actually been subject to neoliberal 
political-economic restructuring after all” (Birch, 2011). Fourth, the fact that the changes predicted 
right after the crisis did not materialize also raises questions. To many, especially on the left, it seems 
clear that the neoliberal era “should have concluded with the financial crisis of 2007” (Morgan, 
2013); the question then is: “So why didn’t the situation force a move away from neoliberalism after 
2008?” (Callinicos, 2012, p. 69). 
In general, the various conceptualizations of neoliberalism can be headed under five categories: (1) 
neoliberal economics; (2) neoliberal ideology; (3) neoliberal policies; (4) a neoliberal culture and 
governmentality; (5) a neoliberal class project (for other overviews see Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 
143; Centeno & Cohen, 2013, p. 318; Fine, 2010, p. 12; Larner, 2000, p. 6; Mudge, 2008, pp. 704-705; 
Springer, 2010, p. 1026, 2012, pp. 136-137; Stockhammer, 2010). It is rather naïve to expect that 
scholars (or various social forces) will be able to agree on a “common” meaning or “proper usage” of 
neoliberalism (as advocated by Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 156), because paradigmatic, ontological 
and political differences inhibit this. Yet if scholars invoke the concept, they should explain clearly 
how they define it. This chapter therefore clarifies the use of “neoliberalism” in this dissertation. 
The second section after this introduction briefly sketches the main tenets of the post-World War 
Bretton Woods order, and its downfall in the 1960s and 1970s. In the third section, a neo-Gramscian 
view of neoliberalism is offered as primarily a class project, as opposed to primarily an ideological 
project (for a similar distinction see Brand & Sekler, 2009, p. 6; Nesvetailova & Palan, 2010, p. 800). 
The role of ideas is assessed in the fourth section, and it is argued why neoliberalism cannot be seen 
as primarily an ideological project. In the fifth section, it is argued that the implementation of 
neoliberalism is differentiated, depending on the spatio-temporal context. It is therefore argued that 
a process of variegated neoliberalization can be discerned in many countries, instead of a single, 
uniformly implemented policy programme all over the world. This also implies that the BICs’ policies 
and perspectives could deviate substantially from the neoliberal class project. 
  
 4.2 The rise and fall of the Bretton Woods order 
  4.2.1 The Keynesian Bretton Woods order in the era of “embedded liberalism” 
To start an analysis of neoliberalism, a first element is that most historical materialist analyses see it 
as a new phase of capitalist development (Duménil & Lévy, 2006, p. 25; O’Connor, 2010, p. 692). 
Many authors talk about the “neoliberal era” (Fine & Milonakis, 2011, p. 15; Konings, 2010a, p. 742; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 9; Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 95; Sader, 2009, p. 175; Watkins, 
2010, p. 6). The start of this epoch can be situated in the 1970s. Neoliberalism can therefore only be 
conceptualized in the historical context of capitalist phases. This chapter starts with the resumption 
55 
 
of “the making of global capitalism”iii under the aegis of the American state after the Second World 
War, and after the long period of inter-capitalist war and rivalry (1914-1945). 
After the defeat of Germany as a contender state in 1945, starting its incorporation into the 
heartland, the US as the leading state in the developed world created a new world order, the 
predecessor of the neoliberal era, based on what has been called an “embedded liberal” framework 
(Ruggie, 1982).iv In terms of social forces, the Keynesian or embedded liberal historical structure was 
based on a historic bloc in the Western “Lockean” heartland (see chapter 5 for this term) consisting 
of productive capital and organized labour. It was underpinned by the American state as the leading 
power in the developed world (Ruggie, 1982, p. 397; Saull, 2012, p. 329). Ideologically, Keynesian and 
New Deal ideas, as well as anti-communism, were crucial in cementing the historic bloc together. 
There was also a shared social purpose of economic growth with full employment and social stability 
(Ruggie, 1982, p. 397). Institutionally, the Bretton Woods monetary order, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and the national welfare states supported the embedded liberal social order. Finally, the 
Fordist accumulation regime led to high growth rates and the incorporation of the working class into 
Western capitalism. The fifties and sixties are therefore labelled as capitalism’s Golden Age 
(Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, p. 118). 
The embedded liberal or Keynesian era was based on a number of compromises: between capital 
and organized labourv; with regard to economic policies between liberal internationalism and 
national interventionism; and between the aspirations of the people and the needs of the capitalist 
mode of production and the capitalist class (see Boyer, 2010, p. 349; Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 118; 
Germain, 2009, p. 672; Gill, 2008, p. 61; Neilson, 2012, p. 167; Ruggie, 1982, p. 393; Thompson, 1997, 
pp. 100-101). The class compromise between capital and labour, making this a relatively inclusive 
settlement, was especially innovative. However, it was also inherently limited and contradictory. 
On the one hand, this compromise was only possible because of mass protests and actions by the 
working class (Brenner, 2007, p. 38; Halperin, 2004, p. 285). Without this mass industrial militancy, 
the New Deal reforms and social compromises in developed states would probably not have 
materialized.vi Capital controls, as documented in chapter 1, played a crucial – but insufficient by 
itself – role in this class compromise. By limiting the freedom of financial capital, they reflected and 
institutionalized “a partial victory of productivism over financial capital” (Patomäki, 2001, p. 43; see 
also Gill, 2008, p. 185, 187). They also allowed for independent monetary policy, and for 
expansionary Keynesian and social-democratic policies in pursuit of full employment and social 
stability on behalf of the national state, without triggering too much capital flight (Thompson, 1997, 
pp. 100-101). Controls, together with lower levels of international trade and investment, left capital 
without its “exit threat” and as such removed one of capital’s main weapons in class struggles. It 
undermined capital’s capacity to prevent the implementation of national policies that it disliked 
(Crotty, 2005, p. 77; Gill, 1998, p. 29). Suppressing (to a certain extent) the global economy created 
leeway for social-democratic policies such as the creation of a welfare state. Together with capital 
controls, strong domestic constraints on finance were put in place in many countries (Duménil & 
Lévy, 2001, p. 586).vii The reforms represented important victories for the working classes (Harmes, 
2001, p. 104; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 9). 
On the other hand, the social compromise represented only a partial and limited victory for labour.viii 
Workers obtained concessions with regard to social rights, material benefits and working conditions, 
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but in turn, organized labour assured it would not question the profit motive, capitalist ownership 
and control and private property (Armstrong, Glynn & Harrison, 1991, p. 136; Baccaro, 2010, pp. 342-
343; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 84; Winters, 1994, p. 420). As Panitch (1985-1986, pp. 53-54) writes 
on this compromise: “With Keynesianism and the welfare state coming to provide new substantive 
content to ‘state intervention’ and being accepted as such by significant sections of bourgeois 
opinion, it was no longer necessary for social democratic parties to emphasise public ownership as 
the centerpiece of planning or control over the economy.” This left an important aspect of the 
structural power of capital intact (Dale, 2012, p. 11; Skocpol, 1980, p. 199). The “decommodification” 
that happened was, especially in the US, limited, and did not include the labour “market” (Konings, 
2009, p. 113; Lacher, 1999, pp. 344-345; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 9). What is more, financial capital 
was still a very powerful social force in the US, expanding even during the “restrictive” Bretton 
Woods order (Gill, 1998, p. 30; Konings, 2010a, p. 746; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 78, 86). 
Whatever the intentions of the Bretton Woods architects, even during the 1950s, international trade, 
investment and finance were already growing (Lacher, 1999, p. 344). Capital, especially financial 
capital, was no longer satisfied with growing solely within domestic borders, and increasingly 
demanded the elimination of capital controls (Baccaro, 2010, p. 343; Goodman & Pauly, 1993, pp. 
55-58, 81; Neilson, 2012, p. 168; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 111). By the 1970s, the 
internationalization of business had greatly expanded. The internationalization of productive and 
financial capital meant in the first place the internationalization of American capital, especially in 
Europe.ix During the 1960s financial capital in the form of American banks also became an important 
actor in European finance, which involved the European adoption of American practices. The stage 
was set “for the implementation of American capital as a class force inside European social 
formations” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 114). This was promoted and secured by the US state 
(Harvey, 2005, pp. 28-29; Maxfield & Nolt, 1990, p. 78). The internationalization of capital was bound 
to undermine the Bretton Woods order (see Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 118; Gill, 2008, p. 27, 95, 102; 
Panitch, 2000, pp. 10-11; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 111). Both the coherence of the historic bloc and 
the feasibility of national welfare states were fundamentally dependent on the (partial) repression of 
international economic transactions, especially short-term capital flows.x 
 
  4.2.2 The final crisis of the Bretton Woods order 
The rate of profit began falling after peaking in Europe in 1960 and in the US in 1965 (Armstrong, 
Glyn & Harrison, 1991, pp. 176-185; pp. 225-230; Brenner, 2007, pp. 37-72).xi In the US, the profit 
rate in 1970 was 40% below its highest level in the 1960s (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 135). Together 
with the oil prices this “profit squeeze” was a crucial cause of the economic crises and stagnation of 
the 1970s, the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was the main source of anxiety and 
discontent in the capitalist class (Bresser-Pereira, 2010, p. 521). The crisis, and the perception that 
Keynesian solutions were no longer effective, proved to be an important catalyst for the introduction 
of the neoliberal project (Albo, 2002, p. 46; Cerny, 2008; Clarke, 1987, p. 404; Duménil & Lévy, 2002, 
p. 43; Fine & Harris, 1987, p. 367; Harvey, 2005, p. 12). What started as an economic crisis developed 




This profitability crisis went hand in hand with a growing radicalization and strength of the working 
classes at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s, particularly in Western Europe (Albo, 2009, p. 119; 
Cumbers, 2012, pp. 45-46; Li, 2010, p. 294; Konings, 2009, p. 114; Maisano, 2012; Panitch & Gindin, 
2012, p. 112; Radice, 2009, p. 91). While the post-war compromise was based on the acceptance by 
labour of the private ownership of the means of production, many capitalists and right-wing 
politicians perceived this acceptance to be under threat. There was large-scale social unrest, social 
movementsxii and labour organizations in the West and in many developing countries were 
increasingly questioning the established order, and socialist and communist movements were gaining 
ground (Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, pp. 192-207; Harvey, 2005, pp. 14-15, 2006, p. x; Panitch, 
2000, pp. 10-11; van der Pijl, 1998, p. 123). Another challenge to the rule of capital, but also to US 
hegemony, came from the radicalization of the Third World in the form of the movement for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), aiming at more autonomous post-colonial development and 
opposition to US imperialism (Panitch, 2000, p. 10; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 112; van der Pijl, 1998, 
p. 123; Radice, 2009, pp. 91-92). 
There was thus a triple threat to the established elites (see Albo, 2009, p. 119; Harvey, 2005, pp. 14-
15): first, an economic threat in the form of a decreasing rate of profit; second, a political threat in 
the form of social unrest and the radicalization of working class and urban social movements in 
advanced countries; third, an international threat in the form of the questioning of US hegemony and 
Western dominance by developing and industrializing countries. To counter these threats, 
profitability had to be restored, the power of the working class and social movements had to be 
broken, and the Third World had to be disciplined. In order to achieve this, the social compromises of 
the Bretton Woods order would have to be sacrificed (Brand, 2005, p. 162). The 1970s thus marked 
the transition away from the era of embedded liberalism towards the neoliberal era. 
 
 4.3 Neoliberalism as a class project 
  4.3.1 Restoring profitability and changing the balance of forces 
The neoliberal project emerged as an answer to these multiple deep and profound crises that struck 
the capitalist world in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. At first, it did not entail a conscious, coherent and 
fully-formed strategy; to the contrary, the early response of state managers to the economic crises of 
the 1970s lacked coherence and clarity (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 13; Radice, 2010, p. 133). The 
economic crises initially led to a variety of reactions (Albo, 2002, p. 47). The shift to the neoliberal 
project was thus not inevitable (Crotty, 2005, pp. 77-78). In David Harvey’s words: 
“In retrospect it may seem as if the answer was both inevitable and obvious, but at the time, I 
think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood with any certainty what kind of answer 
would work and how. The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer 
through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments (...).” (Harvey, 2005, p. 13) 
Some of the policies implemented were pragmatic responses to the economic turmoil (Barnett, 2005, 
p. 10; Clarke, 1987, p. 404).xiii One of these was the Volcker Shock (see Grahl, 2001, pp. 151-152), 
which proved to be one of the decisive turning points towards neoliberalism (Overbeek, 2004b, p. 
132; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 171; Stockhammer, 2010). Yet one of the central goals of the 
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capitalist class and most state managers was to (re-)increase the rate of profit, which would 
supposedly revive private capital accumulation and economic growth.xiv In this context, the 
neoliberal project gained strength, based on two mutually reinforcing pillars: restoring corporate 
profitability and/through changing the balance of forces in capital’s favour to the detriment of labour 
(Albo, 2009, p. 119; van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 476; Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 
1991, p. 306; Duménil & Lévy, 2002, p. 53; Hirsch & Kannankulam, 2011, p. 26; O’Connor, 2010, p. 
697).xv Neoliberalism should thus primarily be seen as a class project, as many historical materialists 
have argued (e.g. Harvey, 2009). A definition which entails the most important elements is provided 
by Saad-Filho and Yalman: 
“Neoliberalism is the contemporary form of capitalism, and it is based on the systematic use 
of state power to impose, under the veil of ‘non-intervention’, a hegemonic project of 
recomposition of the rule of capital in most areas of social life. This project emerged gradually 
after the partial disintegration of post-war Keynesianism and developmentalism in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and it has led to the reconstitution of economic and social relations of 
subordination in those countries where neoliberalism has been imposed.” (Saad-Filho & 
Yalman, 2010, p. 1) 
The breakthrough of this project in the US (and UK to a lesser degree) was decisive for the new world 
order: “In fact, the shift in the balance of class forces in favor of capital promoted restructuring of the 
US economy so as to lay the basis for overcoming the crisis of corporate profitability. The way in 
which the crisis of the 1970s was resolved was decisive for realizing the project for a global capitalism 
under US leadership in the final two decades of the twentieth century” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 
164). 
The response to the radicalization of the working class and social movements was a fierce attack 
against trade unions, organized labour and the welfare state (Albo, 2009, p. 119, 133; Brenner, 2007, 
p. 42; Gamble, 2001, p. 131; Watkins, 2010, pp. 7-8).xvi While this has been clear in many countries, it 
was most explicitly expressed by the former chief economic advisor of Margaret Thatcher: 
“The Thatcher government never believed for a moment that [monetarism] was the correct 
way to bring down inflation. They did however see that this would be a very good way to 
raise unemployment. And raising unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing 
the strength of the working classes. … What was re-engineered – in Marxist terms – was a 
crisis of capitalism which re-created the reserve army of labour, and has allowed the 
capitalists to make high profits ever since.” (Alan Budd quoted in Wade, 2010, p. 61) 
Instead of an economic project, then, “neoliberalism was essentially a political response to the 
democratic gains that had been previously achieved by working classes and which had become, from 
capital’s perspective, barriers to accumulation” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 15, original emphasis). 
The logic was obvious: “If the working class was strong enough to constitute a barrier to profitability 
then it had to be disciplined, its wages and benefits reduced and all sign of its capacity to exert a 
profit squeeze removed” (Harvey, 2006, p. xxv). Neoliberalism thus implied the abandonment by 
capital of the post-war class compromise between (industrial) capital and organized labour (Bieler, 
2012, p. 368; Demirović, 2011, p. 47). 
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Even though trade unions, especially in Western Europe, were able to defend some achievements 
(Brenner, 2007, p. 43), the attack on labour can be termed successful: working people faced many 
defeats and have made many concessions (Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, pp. 280-281). Only 
after this defeat of the working class, first and primarily in the US after the Volcker shock, did an exit 
from the 1970s’ crisis become possible (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 14, 171). In developed countries, 
the regressive distribution patterns that have emerged (see 4.3.5), direct attacks on the working of 
trade unions (together with decreasing member rates, see Figure 4.1), higher unemployment, job 
insecurity and flexibilization (partly because of restrictive macroeconomic policies, technological 
innovations, and de-industrialization and tertiarization), and the gradual withdrawal of universal 
welfare provision all imply that workers (again) have been increasingly under the discipline of capital, 
and that trade unions have been increasingly on the defensive (Albo, 2009, p. 119; Armstrong, Glyn & 
Harrison, 1991, p. 262; Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008b, p. 8; Harmes, 2001, pp. 104-105; Harvey, 
2005, p. 76, 168; Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 257; Saad-Filho & Yalman, 2010, pp. 1-2; Saull, 2012, p. 331; 
Stockhammer, 2008, p. 187; Waterman, 2008, p. 252). The labour movement has ever since 
remained in an impasse. 
 
Figure 4.1: OECD unionization rate (data from OECD, 2014b) 
 
To solve the profitability crisis, one of the main instruments that has been used is the restoration and 
strengthening of the discipline of capital (or “the law of value” in orthodox Marxist terms) on many 
actors in the capitalist system: not only the working class, but corporations and states as well 
(Eisenschitz & Gough, 1996, pp. 439-440; Gill, 2002, p. 63, 2008, p. 190; Harvey, 2006, p. 149). All 
these actors have faced increasing pressures to secure higher rates of profits by all means. Moreover, 
the profit motive has been expanded both into new geographical areas and into new sectors (van 
Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 476; Gindin & Panitch, 2002, p. 42; Jessop, 2010a, p. 29; 
Overbeek, 2004b, p. 132; Saad-Filho, 2010, pp. 254-255). In Sader’s words: “Capitalism’s passage to 
its neoliberal era extended commercial relations to an unprecedented degree, as if realising 























































































































































including former communist countries, to the free movement of capital and free trade led to the 
spread and deepening of capitalist social relations (Cammack, 2003, p. 44; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 
14). Further, through privatization and liberalization a widespread commodification took place of 
fields and sectors which had previously been less subject to profitability obligations, and sometimes 
had been under public ownership (Harvey, 2005, p. 160, 165; Overbeek, 2004a). Neoliberalism, in 
sum, “meant the unambiguous reassertion of the maximization of the profit rate in every dimension 
of activity”(Duménil & Lévy, 2002, p. 52; see also van der Pijl, 2001, p. 186). 
 
  4.3.2 Capital account liberalization and the transnationalization of capital 
The expansion and intensification of the discipline of capital and the attack on workers have been 
realized through a new accumulation regime. This has been based on three related processes: the 
globalization of production, the financialization of capital and the globalization of finance (Gills, 2010, 
p. 171; also de Graaff & van Apeldoorn, 2010, p. 408; Radice, 2010, p. 129).xvii Capital account 
liberalization has been crucial in the first and third of these processes, and as such played a 
fundamental role in changing the balance of power between labour and capital.xviii 
First, with regard to productive capital, production has been transnationalized, as can be seen in the 
expansion of FDI (see Figure 4.2) and, to a lesser extent, trade (Figure 4.3). Through the 
transnationalization of production and the expansion of global production networks, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) have increased their bargaining leverage on the work floor by encouraging 
competition between workers from different countries (with different labour laws) (Albo, 2009, p. 
124; Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991, p. 262; Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008, p. 264; Boyer, 2010, p. 
349; Charnock, 2008, p. 126; Crotty, 2012, p. 85; Frieden, 1991, p. 434; Harvey, 2005, pp. 168-169; 
Jessop, 2010b, pp. 40-41; Neilson, 2012, p. 171). This competition between workers has been 
reinforced by the incorporation of the working classes of formerly communist countries, China in the 
first place, into the global capitalist economy (Foster, McChesney & Jonna, 2011, p. 17; Saad-Filho, 
2010, p. 257). The liberalization of controls on FDI has been an essential precondition for the 
transnationalization of production. TNCs can now freely choose where to invest on a global scale, 
and they can relatively easy shift funds from one country to another and threaten trade unions with 
plant closures and relocation to other countries (Gill, 2008, pp. 107, 113; Tabb, 2006, p. 13). The 
fragmentation of production and outsourcing and have changed workers’ perception of the 
economic environment and decreased their bargaining power (Cowling & Tomlinson, 2005, p. 45; 




Figure 4.2: Global inward FDI stock (% of GDP) (data from UNCTAD, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Global trade (% of world GDP) 
 
Thus, through transnationalization, productive capital has increased its material power based on its 
“exit option”, namely, the ability of transnationally mobile capital to relocate across borders when 
the conditions for profitability and capital accumulation are perceived to be deteriorating (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004, p. 159, 2011, p. 168; also Argitis & Pitelis, 2006, p. 67; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996, p. 
41; Palley, 2009, p. 29). This exit power is a form of structural power, as capital does not even have to 
act to make this power visible (van Apeldoorn, 2011, p. 168). It does not even have to mention the 
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changing the relative power relations between capital and labour, worked as a strong brake on 
workers’ aspirations and demands. 
A second tendency since the 1970s is the financialization of capital (see e.g. Bresser-Pereira, 2010, 
pp. 505-511; Harvey, 2005, p. 33).xix This process has been subject to various interpretations and 
conceptualizations, but in general it entails the dominance of financial activities and short-term 
profits over real economic activities and the long-term conditions for profitability (Eisenschitz & 
Gough, 1996, p. 443; UNCTAD, 2013b), a massive growth in global financial assets (see Figure 4.4; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 284), a growing share of the financial sector as a percentage of GDP and 
employment (Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 126; Quiggin, 2013), and new practices and financial instruments 
(Fine, 2010, p. 13; Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 114, 2011, p. 611).xx Financial capital has appropriated an 
increasingly large share of profits (De Cock, Fitchett & Volkmann, 2009, p. 11; Krippner, 2005, p. 180; 
Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 249). In the US, the share of the financial sector in total domestic corporate 
profits increased from an average of 17% in 1960-1984 to 30% in 1984-2007 (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, 
p. 187). The rate of profit in the financial sector has been higher than in the nonfinancial sector, 
unlike during the embedded liberal era (Bakir & Campbell, 2013, pp. 299-300).xxi 
 
Figure 4.4: Global financial assets (from Lund et al., 2013) 
 
Financialization was based on internal and external financial liberalization (Griffith-Jones & Stallings, 
1995, p. 70; Helleiner, 2010, p. 626). It has been crucial to breaking the power of the working class, 
and in strengthening the discipline of capitalxxii: 
“Perhaps the most important aspect of the new age of finance was the central role it played 
in disciplining and integrating labour. The industrial and political pressures from below that 
characterized the crisis of the 1970s could not have been countered and defeated without the 
discipline that a financial order built upon the mobility of capital placed upon firms. 
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Shareholder value was, in many respects, a euphemism for how the discipline imposed by the 
competition for global investment funds was transferred to the high wage proletariat of the 
advanced capitalist countries.” (Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 17) 
Securitization and derivatives have also increased the pressures to deliver high profit rates, pressures 
which have often been shifted onto workers (Bryan, Martin & Rafferty, 2009, p. 467; also Konings, 
2010c, p. 81). 
Third and finally, the transnationalization of financial capital, based on the liberalization of controls 
on foreign banks and short-term capital flows, has also played a crucial role in increasing the 
profitability imperative and disciplining working class movements.xxiii  The international financial 
system is now characterized by almost complete freedom “to roam the world in search of the highest 
return” (Dufour & Orhangazi, 2007, p. 342; also O’Connor, 2010, p. 696; Wolfson, 2003, p. 257). 
Financial capital’s appearance as “abstract” capital – its greater mobility, fluidity and short-termism – 
makes it more effective in enforcing capitalist discipline (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 20; Winters, 
1994, p. 421). As Gill notes, “financial capital can react to government policies, or expected policies, 
much more rapidly than productive capital” (Gill, 2008, p. 111; also Harvey, 2006, p. 147). Whenever 
and wherever there is a perceived threat to capitalist profitability and power, the continuing threat 
of capital flight is able to discipline progressive movements (Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 250). Capital’s exit 
power is thus even greater because of the speed with which financial capital is able to react (Grabel, 
1996, p. 1767; Palley, 2006b). It plays an important role in “reinforcing competitive processes of 
profit-equalization”, not only within but also across countries (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 290; see 
also Harvey, 2006, p. 286; Jessop, 2010a, p. 29; Went, 2002-2003, p. 490). The rise of global financial 
capital has thus strongly increased the material power of capital as a whole. 
To sum up, the new historical structure is, next to the financialization of capital, dependent on the 
transnationalization of capital: “It is this organization of production and finance on a transnational 
level, which fundamentally distinguishes globalisation from the period of pax Americana” (Bieler & 
Morton, 2004, p. 94). This has been based on internal and external (financial) liberalization, including 
the liberalization of capital controls. Changes in the balance of power between social forces caused 
the initiation of these neoliberal reforms, which, in turn, strengthened these changes in the balance 
of power (Brand, 2007) and induced the introduction of more neoliberal policies, in both internal and 
external financial regulation and other policy domains (Chwieroth, 2010, p. 520; Neilson, 2012, pp. 
170-171; Radice, 2010, p. 129; Watson, 2001, p. 88). Neoliberalization has thus led to more 
neoliberalization. 
This is because the transnationalization of financial and productive capital, together with the general 
financialization of capital, has been instrumental in the attack on trade unions and organized labour. 
As Palley (2009, p. 33) summarizes:  “Mobility of investment and production creates fear of 
employment losses, while mobility of finance creates vulnerability to financial disruption.” These 
phenomena have strongly increased the structural material power of capital, and lead to the 
introduction of neoliberal policies in many domains – from environmental regulation over taxation 
and economic policy to social security – becoming more probable.xxiv As a corollary, the position of 
trade unions and progressive social movements has been considerably weakened. The 
transnationalization of capital has hence been crucial in changing the balance of forces (Baccaro, 
2010, p. 347; Grabel, 2002, p. 39; Jayadev, 2007, p. 423). 
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  4.3.3 The “competition state” 
In line with the theoretical view of the state as sketched in chapter 2, the changing balance of power 
also had an impact upon the state and the actions of state managers. National labour movements are 
unable to strongly push through their demands when the state is faced with global capital. In other 
words, whereas the transnationalization of capital through the free movement of capital and goods 
ensures that profit rates are more or less globally equalized, labour is unable to demand national 
state policies that would potentially lower profit rates (such as policies in the realm of 
macroeconomics, social policy, the labour market, taxation and the environment). It is clear that 
social-democracy (and centre-left politics in general) – which was thriving during the Golden Age of 
capitalism – is profoundly threatened in such a situation (Birchfield, 1999, pp. 34-35; DeMartino, 
1999; Palley, 2009, p. 30). 
This is related to what Adam Harmes (2006, 2012) considers to be a self-conscious neoliberal project 
of “market-preserving federalism”. In his view, two central principles are at the heart of the scalar 
project of neoliberalism. The first principle is related to the creation of global capital “through 
greater capital mobility and the centralization of ‘market-enabling’ policy competencies” (Harmes, 
2006, p. 727). The second principle “is to decentralize the policy capabilities that neoliberals do not 
support” (Harmes, 2012, p. 67). As he argues, “neoliberalism is shown to advocate fiscal and 
regulatory sovereignty within the context of international capital mobility” (Harmes, 2012, p. 61). 
The purpose is clear, namely “to create an exit option that forces different political jurisdictions to 
compete for investment in a way that will discipline governments and constrain their options for 
pursuing market-inhibiting forms of intervention” (Harmes, 2006, p. 740). 
Accordingly, the transnationalization of production and finance have led to a new environment in 
which state managers take decisions. On the one hand international capital mobility and free trade 
are now strongly (and often also legallyxxv) anchored as the main drivers of neoliberal globalization. 
Wealthy individuals and firms have the ability to move their assets across jurisdictions. Therefore, 
states are “forced” to compete for transnationally mobile capital and export market shares. On the 
other hand, policies which comprise the core of labour movements’ demands (such as social policies, 
taxation, labour and environmental standards) most of the time still reside at a lower scale (mostly 
the national state). Internationally mobile capital is able to play off states against each other by the 
possibility of “regime shopping” or “regulatory arbitrage” (Lesage & Vermeiren, 2011, p. 45; see also 
van Apeldoorn, 2011, p. 168; Jessop, 2010b, p. 41). 
This has been captured in the notion of the “competition state” (Cerny, 1997; Fougner, 2006, 2008; 
Jessop, 2010, p. 41; Palan, 2006, pp. 259-260)xxvi. The rise to importance of concepts such as business 
or investor confidence, policy credibility, discipline and competitiveness are crucial in this regard 
(Gill, 2008; Grabel, 2000). States have been increasingly restrained to implement progressive policies 
due to the need “to act in accordance with norms and standards that first and foremost imply the 
provision of favourable conditions for mobile firms and capital” (Fougner, 2008, p. 320). Hence, 
International capital mobility has a disciplinary effect on states. The structural constraints that lead 
to a pro-capital bias on the part of state managers have been strengthened. There is both an ex-ante 
and an ex-post aspect to this (Grabel, 1996; see also Crouch, 2009, p. 389). 
The ex-ante restraint implies that as states have to compete for the investments of transnational 
capital (and export market shares), they have been more or less obliged to provide an attractive 
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investment climate on a permanent basis (Cowling & Tomlinson, 2005, pp. 44-45; Frieden, 1991, p. 
434; Gill, 2008, pp. 109-110; Harvey, 2005, p. 92; Wolfson, 2000, p. 376). The range of policies that 
are compatible with an attractive investment climate is rather narrow (Grabel, 1996, pp. 1763-1764). 
Moreover, an “international competitive dynamic” is at work “in which institutional change in one or 
more countries induce similar changes in other countries” (DeMartino, 1999, p. 346). As more states 
implement more pro-capital policies, other states are inclined to follow suit, which tends to lead to a 
vicious cycle (Gill, 2008, p. 110; van Harten, 2005, p. 609). Consequently, a good business climate is 
often given precedence over collective rights and environmental conservation (Harvey, 2005, p. 70). 
The ex-post constraint means that “in the advent of capital flight or currency crises, the government 
is compelled to adopt measures aimed at reversing the outflow of portfolio investment” (Grabel, 
1996, p. 1764). Even without actual crises, political independence is largely lost. If countries want to 
prevent capital flight, they must play by the rules of international investors and thus install the 
policies that internationally mobile capital wants them to install. Otherwise they could be punished 
by means of substantial capital outflows. As Gill (2008, p. 111) notes, the international mobility of 
capital “can swiftly force governments that deviate from policies seen as suitable by the ‘market’, to 
change course”. Hence, the liberalization of capital outflows gives transnational capital exit power 
(see 4.3.2). 
The ideological dimension, which is related to capital’s exit option, is crucial here. The globalization 
narrative is often used to justify domestic policies that are in line with the neoliberal project, and 
that are directed at an attack on trade unions and the welfare state (DeMartino, 2002, p. 83; 
Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 40). The discourse of capital flight and the exit option, facilitated by the 
mobility and short-term horizon of financial capital, has hence been an important ideological force 
(van Apeldoorn, 2011, p. 168; see also Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 328; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 
2002, pp. 568-569; Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 28; Watson, 2001, p. 87).xxvii It has strengthened the 
plausibility that there is no alternative (TINA) to neoliberalism (Cerny, 2008; Fourcade-Gourinchas & 
Babb, 2002, p. 535; Lesage & Vermeiren, 2011, p. 45; Patomäki, 2001, p. 92). As Watson (2001, p. 86, 
original emphasis) has noted: “Governments need only act on the perception of the structural 
constraints imposed by globalising tendencies in order to turn the globalisation hypothesis into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.” This ideological force has influenced not only state managers, but also 
workers and the population as a whole. In sum, the changes associated with capital account 
liberalization have further strengthened the structural selectivity of state managers in favour of 
capital (see Navarro, 2006, p. 21; Papadatos, 2009; Tsoukalas, 1999, pp. 68-69). This way, many 
national states have been moving closer towards the orthodox Marxist notion of a “committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Neilson, 2012, p. 171; Swyngedouw, 2009, 
p. 307). 
 
  4.3.4 The historic bloc underpinning neoliberalism 
An important question within the social scientific literature on neoliberalism is whether it was 
introduced as a response to systemic (economic) changes or as the product of the agency and 
pressure of fractions of the capitalist class (Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 326). While this dissertation 
does not aim to provide an answer to this question – it also probably differs from country to country 
and from policy domain to policy domain – it should be acknowledged that even though structural 
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factors are crucial (see Grahl, 2001, pp. 151-152; Kotz, 2002, p. 65), direct agency by fractions of the 
capitalist class has also played a role (see e.g. van Apeldoorn, 2000; Macartney, 2008a). 
This leads us to a focus on the “transnational historic bloc” supporting neoliberalism (Gill, 2008, p. 
93). The interests of this bloc are inherently connected with the global economy and the 
transnationalization of capital (Albo, 2002, p. 50; Gill, 2008, p. 93). At the apex of this new historic 
bloc is what has been called a transnational capitalist class (TCC), “comprised of the owners and 
managers of the transnational corporations and private financial institutions and other capitalists 
around the world who manage transnational capital” (Robinson, 2005, p. 7; also Gill, 2008, p. 93; 
Yildizoğlu, 2010, p. 43). This historic bloc was already materializing during the embedded liberal era, 
but it was consolidated and became hegemonic during the neoliberal era. 
Transnationally-oriented financial capital has become the leading fraction within this historic bloc 
(see Brand, 2005, p. 162; Demirović, 2009, p. 51; Duménil & Lévy, 2001, pp. 578-579; van der Pijl, 
1998, p. 47; Sader, 2009, p. 174). The capitalist class now derives a larger share of its wealth and 
income from financial activities (Duménil & Lévy, 2002, p. 54; Epstein & Jayadev, 2005, p. 67; Foster 
& Holleman, 2010, pp. 11-12).xxviii It is not surprising that financialization has largely benefited very 
wealthy individuals; financial wealth is highly unequally distributed, and as a result the gains made in 
financial markets are also highly unequally distributed (Lenzner, 2011; Patomäki, 2001, pp. 50-51).xxix 
The fraction of financial capital is strongest in the US and the UK, but extends across the whole world 
(Crouch, 2009, p. 389). 
Large-scale, transnationally-oriented productive capital was not just a “victim” of this new historic 
bloc. It formed a crucial element of the organic alliance, especially in the form of TNCs (Crotty & 
Epstein, 1996, p. 122; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 289; Sablowski, 2008, p. 156). This incorporation of 
a significant segment of industrial capital, which formerly more or less supported the embedded 
liberal framework, into the neoliberal historic bloc, was crucial for the adoption of the neoliberal 
project (Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 125). Due to the internationalization of production, these TNCs 
became more international in orientation and less dependent on national consuming markets, and 
increasingly supportive of a financially open global order (Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 125; Saad-Filho, 
2010, p. 250). They benefited from the instruments provided by financial capital for hedging the risks 
associated with the transnationalization of production (Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 18). Further, 
productive capital was eager to crush the power of organized labour, and benefited from the 
capitalist discipline imposed on states by financial globalization (Jessop, 2010b, p. 43; Panitch & 
Gindin, 2012, p. 163). They also became themselves increasingly involved in the world of finance and 
credit, entangled in global financial markets, and making profits through their financial subsidiaries 
and activities (Fine, 2010, p. 14; Harvey, 2005, p. 32; Krippner, 2005, p. 184; Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 127; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 188, 289-290; Patomäki, 2001, p. 55; Sablowski, 2008, p. 156). 
 
  4.3.5 Outcomes of the neoliberal era 
As a class project, neoliberalism has been rather successful. It has resulted in “the restoration and 
reconstitution of class power” (Harvey, 2006, p. xi), which can, amongst others, be discerned in 
changing distribution patterns in capital’s favour (Baccaro, 2010, p. 343; Crotty & Epstein, 1996, p. 
129; Gill, 2008, p. 97; Stockhammer, 2010). The shift in the balance of power in favour of capital 
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helped restore corporate profitability in the US and elsewherexxx. After 1982 the rate of profit started 
moving upward (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 183). In sharp contrast with the upward trend for the 
profit share, and to a lesser degree, the rate of profit, both the wage share and real wages have 
stagnated or fallen in many countries. In the US, real wages in the private sector were lower in 1999 
than in 1968 (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 184). The decrease of the wage share and parallel rise of the 
profit share is not only a US phenomenon (see Figure 4.5; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014b; 
Harding, 2011b; Palley, 2007; Plender, 2014b), but has also occurred in many other countries (Albo, 
2009, p. 123; Heyes, Lewis & Clark, 2012, p. 226; Jayadev, 2007, p. 427; Milberg, 2008, p. 427; 
Piketty, 2014, p. 222; for the OECD see Figure 4.6) and in the world as a whole (Karabarbounies & 
Neiman, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013b). According to research by Jayadev (2007, p. 424), the free movement 
of capital has a direct negative impact on the wage share, especially in developed countries. 
 
Figure 4.5: Wage share US (% of GDI) (data from Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, 2014b) 
 
 



















































































































































































Wealth and personal income inequality have also increased substantially (on the US see Figure 4.7 & 
4.8; Appelbaum, 2014; Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Gordon, 2014; Palma, 2009; globally see Harvey, 2006, 
pp. xi-xii; Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, 2014; on the UK see Inman, 2014; within the OECD see OECD, 
2011; in general see Piketty, 2014a).xxxi Several studies have demonstrated that the richest part of 
the population (mostly the “1%”) owns a large part of national wealth even in countries that are 
generally considered as more egalitarian.xxxii All these measures of wealth, personal and functional 
income distribution are both an indication and a cause of the restoration of capitalist class power 
(Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008, p. 11; Harvey, 2006, p. xi; Tabb, 2006, p. 12). 
 
Figure 4.7: US top income shares (% of total Figure 4.8: US top wealth shares (% of total 
income) (data from Piketty, 2014c) wealth) (data from Piketty, 2014b) 
 
 4.4 Neoliberalism as an ideology? 
  4.4.1 The “free market” ideology 
In the most common description of neoliberalism, especially in the public debate, neoliberalism is 
primarily an ideological project (Mudge, 2008, p. 706; Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 401); the fundamental 
force that is propelling neoliberal policies, is ideologyxxxiii (e.g. Bresser-Pereira, 2010, p. 499; 
Schwarzmantel, 2005, p. 85). Ideas are thus at the root of the global tendencies in the last few 
decades. The main idea, in this ideological project, is then the superiority of the market. Indeed, a 
number of scholars define neoliberalism as “market fundamentalism” (Stiglitz, 2008), the “free 
market project” (Peck, 2013, p. 720)xxxiv or a modern version of “laissez-faire” (Bresser-Pereira, 2010, 
p. 504; George, 1997, p. 47; Mudge, 2011, p. 337), or implicitly consider laissez-faire and the goal of 
free markets as the defining features of the past decades (Block, 2011, p. 54). Larner (2000, p. 6) 
correctly observes that: “The most common conceptualization of neo-liberalism is as a policy 
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relatively unfettered operation of markets.” It is argued to be “an updated version of the classical 
liberal economic thought” (Kotz, 2002, p. 64). 
What is defining the era of neoliberalism, then, is the “return” of the market: “The whole point of 
neoliberalism is that the market mechanism should be allowed to direct the fate of human beings” 
(George, 1997, p. 28). This is because of an ideology which stresses the strength and efficiency of 
markets, and is centred around the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the idea that markets are 
automatically efficient and self-regulating. Thus, “the very core of the neoliberal dogma is premised 
on the belief in markets as the most efficient mechanisms of resource allocation” (Nesvetailova & 
Palan, 2010, p. 798). Neoliberalism in this sense is often equated to neoclassical economics, which 
can be seen as its theoretical foundation (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1085; Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 144; 
Bresser-Pereira, 2010, p. 499; Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 328; Chang, 2002, p. 540). One of the main 
theoretical propositions of neoclassical economics is that “decentralised decisions taken by 
competitive individuals responding to market signals generate an optimum allocation of resources 
which no central planner, however well informed or benign, could hope to match” (Fine & Harris, 
1987, p. 381; see also Palma, 2009). The policy implications of the neoliberal ideological project are 
outlined by one of its gurus, Thomas Friedman (1999, pp. 86-87): 
“To fit into the Golden Straitjacket a country must either adopt, or be seen as moving toward, 
the following golden rules: making the private sector the primary engine of its economic 
growth, maintain a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state 
bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, 
eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign 
investment, getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing 
state-owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency 
convertible, opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and 
investment, deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible, 
eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its 
banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition, and 
allowing its citizens to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run 
pension and mutual funds.” 
Neoliberal ideology consequently consecrates markets and diabolizes state intervention (Albo, 2002; 
Amable, 2011; Ferguson, 2009, p. 170; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006; Prasad, 2005; Schwarzmantel, 
2005, p. 85). Many analysts argue that neoliberalism is opposed to not only state ownership, but also 
the state regulating the market and intervening in market outcomes with regard to distribution. In 
sum, the neoliberal state is supposed to be a “minimal state” (Öniş & Şenses, 2005; see also Kotz, 
2002, p. 64). Postneoliberalism, then, implies in the first place a larger role for state intervention 
(Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012, pp. 2-3; Riggirozzi, 2010, p. 71). 
This conceptualisation is based on a dichotomy of “the market” versus “the state”: “The concept of 
free markets (which is itself untheorised and treated as unproblematic) is presented as the opposite 
pole from state intervention with the result that state involvement in the economy is shown to be 
harmful (or irrelevant)” (Fine & Harris, 1987, pp. 368-369). This dichotomy is not only misguided in 
general (see theory of the state in chapter 2; see also Brand & Sekler, 2009, p. 7; Cahill, 2011, pp. 
481-482; Chang, 2002, p. 544; Dale, 2012, p. 15; Krippner, 2007; Underhill, 2003, pp. 756-757), but it 
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is also a major barrier to understanding the transformations of the neoliberal era (Albo, 2002, p. 51; 
Amable, 2011, p. 7; van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 476; Panitch, 2000, p. 8). 
Neoliberalism needs the state, and is a state-directed project. 
 
  4.4.2 Ideas versus practices and the material structure of ideas 
First, in practice the “free market” ideas have in many cases not led to competitive markets with 
many enterprises competing, but to monopolistic or oligopolistic markets where a few 
(multinational) corporations yield huge market, political and other power (see e.g. Nolan, Sutherland 
& Zhang, 2002, p. 91; also Gill, 2008, pp. 130-131).xxxv These uncompetitive markets might not be the 
explicitly intended objective of early neoliberal ideologues, but it is not a coincidental outcome 
either. Many markets, when left to themselves, tend towards oligopoly and monopoly (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 67)xxxvi. Additionally, neo-liberal ideologues, such as within the Chicago School, have also changed 
their attitudes over time from an anti-monopoly position towards an attitude that is very permissive 
towards monopoly and uncompetitive markets (Birch, 2011; Crouch, 2009, p. 396; Jackson, 2010, p. 
145). Finally, if markets are competitive, this is in general bad for profits (Dillow, 2014; Palan, 2006, 
p. 258). Therefore, attempts by states to introduce or maintain genuine competition are often 
fiercely resisted by capitalists. There is then often a contradiction between the rhetoric of 
competition and the reality of the increasing consolidation of power within a few TNCs, due to the 
reluctance to prevent the concentration of capital in practice (George, 2000, pp. 29-30; Harvey, 2005, 
p. 80; Henry, 2008, p. 218; on EU competition policy Buch-Hansen & Wigger, 2010, p. 37). 
Second, globalization has not been about the retreat of the state, but about transformations in the 
form and purpose of the state, from stimulating domestic capital accumulation to facilitating global 
capital accumulation (Bryan, 1987, p. 254; Panitch, 1994, pp. 63-64; Underhill, 2003, p. 775). It never 
resulted in the retreat of the state, but only to state intervention of a different kind, benefiting 
different interests (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1084; Altvater, 2009, p. 85; Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 325; Fine 
& Harris, 1987, p. 369). The state has not just been a passive bystander of the internationalization of 
capital, it has actively authored, stimulated and managed this process. Related to this, “deregulation” 
has always been more about “re-regulation” benefiting certain social forces than just eliminating 
regulations. This is especially true for American finance, which is seen as an exemplary case of 
deregulation (e.g. Konings, 2010c, p. 80). 
Third, even if neoliberalism was about the state facilitating and encouraging the private sector, the 
state has at several occasions intervened whenever the interests of this private sector have been 
threatened. This is especially clear with regard to the bailouts of financial institutions, which has not 
been a recent phenomenon, but has been a recurrent feature of the neoliberal era ever since at least 
the US savings and loan crisis of 1987-1988 and even before (Harvey, 2005, p. 73; Konings, 2010c, p. 
743; Panitch & Gindin, 2009, pp. 18-19). Neoliberalism has been implemented very selectively, 
“quietly ignored when it would not serve dominant interests” (Massey, 2012a, p. 100; also Harvey, 
2005, p. 19; Henry, 2008, p. 218). 
This indicates that state withdrawal from markets has been “an ideological illusion” (Panitch & 
Konings, 2009, p. 72).The “return” of the state after the present economic crisis does not represent a 
clear deviation from earlier practices during the neoliberal era, even though it is irreconcilable with 
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neoliberal ideology. As Harvey (2009) states: “One of the basic principles that was set up in the 1970s 
was that state power should protect financial institutions at all costs. (…) The current bailout is the 
same old story, one more time, except bigger.” Just like previous interventions of the state in the 
financial system, the current state actions have mostly benefited financial capital (see van Apeldoorn, 
de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 477; Blackburn, 2011, p. 36; Centeno & Cohen, 2012, p. 322; Marois, 
2011, p. 189; Papadatos, 2009; Watkins, 2010, p. 9).xxxvii This also implies that ending neoliberalism 
requires more than just strengthening states vis-à-vis markets. The idea that neoliberalism can be 
ended by merely bringing the state back in is in this sense a dangerous illusion (see Panitch, 2000, p. 
7). 
In summary, there are two crucial pitfalls in interpretations of neoliberalism as an ideological project. 
First, there has always been a deep discrepancy between neoliberal ideology and neoliberal practices 
(Cahill, 2011, p. 482; Harvey, 2005, p. 21; Konings, 2010a, p. 760; Krippner, 2007, p. 481; 
Montgomerie & Williams, 2009, p. 100). Despite the idea of state withdrawal, the neoliberal era did 
clearly not entail a retreat of the state (Cahill, 2011, p. 482; Panitch, 2000, p. 6). As Martijn Konings 
(2009, p. 110) writes: “IPE tends to assume that neoliberalism has been reshaping the world in its 
own image (…). But it is important to be critical of such strong constructivism: beliefs and ideas shape 
the world, but they do not do so by producing a reality that resembles or approximates their 
idealized version.” What is rejected, here and elsewhere, “is neoliberalism’s self-presentation as a 
regime of self-regulating markets” (Krippner, 2007, p. 481). To sum up: “Neoliberalism is much more 
than the above ideas of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Robert Nozick replacing those of J. M. 
Keynes, J. K. Galbraith and John Rawls” (Albo, 2002, p. 47). 
This does in no way deny the importance of ideas. Ideas have been and still are a powerful force (as 
acknowledged by Harvey, 2005, p. 19; Henry, 2008, p. 218; Konings, 2009, p. 110), and have strongly 
influenced people in general, and state managers in particular, all over the world. In this sense, ideas 
are undoubtedly important in understanding the neoliberal era, however distorted some neoliberal 
ideas have been implemented in practice. Nevertheless, the focus on ideas, discourse and rhetoric 
masks which interests these ideas serve and have served, as noted by many authors (e.g. Aalbers, 
2013, p. 1084; Hart-Landsberg, 2006, p. 2; Harvey, 2009; Lucarelli, 2009, p. 50). This is the second 
weakness in the understanding of neoliberalism outlined above. What is entirely missing in the 
neoliberalism-as-ideology account, is interests, class (fractions), the balance of power, and material 
developments. As Doreen Massey (2012, p. 81b) summarizes these flaws:  “‘Neoliberalism’ as a 
purely economic doctrine – a doctrine about how to run an economy – was always (if not only then 
certainly in part) a tool in the armoury of a battle between social forces: the battle to restore profits 
at the end of the social-democratic settlement against a labour force that had made substantial 
gains.” 
The aftermath of the crisis offers more proof that neoliberalism is not just about ideas. Several 
authors have argued that neoliberal policies and practices were still alive and kicking in state policies, 
even though the severe economic crisis delegitimized neoliberal ideas (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1083; 
Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010a, p. 340). As Peck (2013, p. 720) notes: “Austerity politics seem to 
epitomize neoliberalism’s paradoxically undead presence: intellectually bereft and operationally 
vacuous, yet retaining an icy grip.” Most scholars now agree that the answer in terms of policies and 
practices has been “more neoliberalism” (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1085; also Hendrikse & Sidaway, 2010, p. 
2038). This cannot be explained in the conceptualization of neoliberalism as primarily an ideological 
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project. In this sense, ending neoliberalism does not only require ending neoliberal ideas or 
strengthening states, but changing power relations and ending the dominance of global financial 
capital. 
Finally, the question could be posed why certain ideas become successful and others do not. The 
conceptualization of neoliberalism as primarily an ideological project neglects “the underlying power 
structures promoting individual discourses (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p. 105). As was explained in 
Chapter 2, in a historical materialist perspective, the material structure of ideas is therefore 
emphasized. With regard to neoliberal ideology, this puts the focus on two aspects. 
First, the fact that neoliberal ideas have become so dominant in society is not due to the inherent 
quality of these ideas or the fact that they represented new scientific breakthroughs, but because of 
“their partial correspondence with the programme adopted by the dominant sections of the 
bourgeoisie” (Fine & Harris, 1987, p. 365; see also Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008, p. 6). While they 
were not “predestined” to become dominant, there is a certain logic to it; their rise to 
prominencexxxviii reflected the new balance of forces, and the fact that they were useful to (especially) 
the transnational fraction of the capitalist class (Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay, 2008, pp. 6-7; Bresser-
Pereira, 2010, p. 521; Cahill, 2013, p. 81; Fine & Harris, 1987, p. 386).xxxix Ideas have been an 
important instrument to legitimize policies that have benefited this fraction (Cahill, 2013, p. 81; 
Harvey, 2005, p. 19). It is also no coincidence, then, that these ideas became common sense first in 
the Atlantic heartland, mainly the US, and were then diffused to other countries (Macartney, 2008a, 
p. 447). 
Second, a lot of money and effort has been spent by conservative and right-wing foundations on 
producing and spreading neoliberal ideology (George, 1997, pp. 49-51, 2000, p. 28; Henry, 2008, p. 
215; Kotz, 2002, p. 70; Salmon, 2013). As David Harvey (2005, p. 115) writes, “there is overwhelming 
evidence for massive interventions on the part of business elites and financial interests in the 
production of ideas and ideologies: through investment in think-tanks, in the training of technocrats, 
and in the command of the media.” It is reasonable to think that these ideas would not have become 
hegemonic without these organizational and financial efforts: 
“The now-dominant economic doctrine, of which widespread exclusion is a necessary 
element, did not descend from heaven. It has, rather, been carefully nurtured over decades, 
through thought, action, and propaganda: bought and paid for by a closely knit fraternity 
(they mostly are men) who stand to gain from its rule.” (George, 1997, p. 41) 
 
 4.5 Variegated neoliberalization 
  4.5.1 A hegemonic project? 
If neoliberalism is primarily a class project, making selectively use of and supported by ideas on the 
free market and neoclassical economics, an important question is: has it been, and is it still, a 
hegemonic class project? Some are sceptical whether it appeals to broader swathes of society than 
just the fractions of financial and productive capital. Neoliberalism is sometimes seen as a dominant 
project, based largely on coercion, rather than based on consent. For instance, according to 
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Demirović (2009, p. 46), “an essential characteristic of the neoliberal-dominated accumulation 
strategy is correspondingly the abandonment of consensus and hegemony”. Stephen Gill (2008, pp. 
123-124) has also called neoliberalism “politics of supremacy” rather than a politics of hegemony 
(see also Robinson, 2005, p. 12). It is often assumed that the contemporary trajectory of capitalism 
has a rather small base of support, especially amongst subaltern classes. Neoliberalism is thus facing 
a crisis of legitimacy (Gill, 2008, p. 147; Robinson, 2005, p. 12). The crisis has reinforced ideas about 
this non-hegemonic nature of neoliberalism, because the crisis makes it more difficult to make 
material concessions to the subaltern classes (e.g. Altvater, 2009, p. 78; van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & 
Overbeek, 2012, pp. 478-479; Demirović, 2009, p. 49; Ivanova, 2011b, p. 411). 
A logical question consequently becomes: “Why, then, has the world not erupted into revolutionary 
revolt against this capitalist restoration and its burgeoning inequalities and its lack of concern for 
distributive justice?” (Harvey, 2006, p. xii-xiii). In the view of neoliberalism as non-hegemonic, it is 
only a matter of time before more coherent coalitions of opposition emerge and end the temporary 
dominance of neoliberalism (see Brand, 2007; Gill, 2008, p. 125; Robinson, 2005, p. 8). The only 
reason why this has not happened yet is because of the fragmentation, weakening and 
disorganization of the social forces that are affected by neoliberal policies. 
This analysis does not seem very convincing. It downplays the support that the neoliberal project, or 
at least certain aspects or parts of it, has received within subaltern classes. Indeed, within some 
historical materialist analyses there is a tendency to emphasize the neoliberal impulses from above 
and to downplay the neoliberal impulses from below (see for a critique Barnett, 2005, p. 9; Germain, 
2011, p. 72; Germain & Kenny, 1998, p. 18). As Konings, (2012, p. 610) writes: “What has gone largely 
untheorized in this way is a more basic ethical dimension, an affective charge that is at the heart of 
the neoliberal image of social order and enjoys a significant capacity to stir popular democratic 
sentiment.” While the above analysis suggests that neoliberalism has only achieved such importance 
because it corresponds to the material interests of transnationally-oriented, especially financial, 
capital, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that there has been a dialectical interplay between 
neoliberalism from above and neoliberalism from below. Popular support for neoliberalism has been 
based on material, ideological and moral mechanisms through which subaltern classes have not only 
passively accepted, but also actively supported, neoliberal policies. All these mechanisms also make 
it more difficult to create solidarity between and class consciousness within the working classes 
(Harvey, 2006, p. xiii; Panitch & Konings, 2009, p. 83). 
Materially, even though the neoliberal era has led to larger inequality and a stagnation or decrease 
of the wage share, working classes have been integrated through several mechanisms, such as house 
ownership, consumerism, consumer creditxl and ownership of financial assets (Aitken, 2005; Ivanova, 
2011a, 2011b; Langley, 2006, p. 929, 2008, p. 135; Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 10; Saull, 2012, p. 331; 
Schwartz, 2008).xli Even though financialization does not deliver many of its promised advantages for 
many individuals (Erturk et al., 2007; Froud et al., 2010; Montgomerie, 2009), and even though 
financial ownership is highly unequally distributed (Harmes, 2001, p. 122), “mass investment” has 
resonated with many individuals: 
“By transforming tens of millions from passive savers into ‘active’ investors, mutual funds 
may be vastly expanding the constituency in favour of neoliberal macroeconomic policies and 
structures, and creating a far more powerful ideological tool for finance capital than free-
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market orthodoxy alone can provide. By ensuring both the apparent benefits and the willing 
participation crucial to a genuinely hegemonic order, as well as helping to naturalize and 
depoliticize its processes, the new mass investment culture may serve to reproduce 
neoliberalism in a far more consensual form.” (Harmes, 2001, p. 105) 
Ideologically, neoliberalism as a discourse – even if not implemented consistently as noted in 4.4.2 – 
has become hegemonic among broad swathes of society (Hall, 2012, p. 25; Harvey, 2005, p. 3; 
Schwarzmantel, 2005, p. 89). Some ideas have been quite popular, especially among the so-called 
“middle classes”. For instance, there is a widely spread distrust of the state in general, and of state 
intervention in the economy in particular (Brenner, 2007, p. 48; Hall, 2012, p. 9; Massey, 2012b, pp. 
80-81; Stephens, 2012).xlii Support for the welfare state has also waned among parts of the middle 
classes in developed countries, as it is perceived as a drain from which they derive little benefit 
(Toporowski, 2010, p. 14). 
Finally, ideology is also mixed with moral considerations. As Amable (2011, p. 4) writes, “it is totally 
wrong to believe that neo-liberalism is devoid of any moral content to start with. On the contrary, 
one may say that morals play a central role in the establishment of a neo-liberal society.” The 
founding fathers of neoliberalism claimed that their project was based on compelling values such as 
individual freedom, personal choices, human dignity, meritocracy, and self-discipline and self-
sustenance (Amable, 2011; Hall, 2012, p. 9; Harvey, 2005, p. 5, 119; Langley, 2008, pp. 134-135; 
Larner, 2000, p. 13; Morgan, 2013; Saull, 2012, p. 331).xliii It is argued that the best way to guarantee 
these values is through the “free market”.xliv Market outcomes are also seen as “just”, so that 
redistribution through state policies is unfair, and inequality is justified (Amable, 2011, pp. 5-6). To 
downplay the moral force of neoliberalism is not only theoretically, but also politically unsound, as it 
miscalculates the durability of the neoliberal class project. 
 
  4.5.2 The centrality of the US and the West 
As Panitch and Gindin (2012), as well as Panitch and Konings (2008), have convincingly 
demonstrated, the “making of global capitalism”, and of the neoliberal project, have both been 
American-led and –centred processes. The US has been at the apex of the global capitalist political 
economy since at least the making of the post-war world order. This is also true for the neoliberal 
era, which was largely a response to a hegemonic crisis within the Western heartland. In other 
words: “Although these neoliberal transformations are global processes, as a political project 
neoliberalism must be viewed as centred within and led by the liberal West, above all the US” (van 
Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 476, original emphasis; also van der Pijl, 1998, p. 129). 
US capital has been dominant in the global economy (Nolan, Sutherland & Zhang, 2002, p. 105), with 
both the inward and outward FDI stock growing strongly since 1980 (see Figure 4.9).xlv The rise of 
global finance did not undermine US dominance but merely shifted and at the same time 
strengthened its basis (Patomäki, 2001, p. 76; Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 252). American dominance is 
greatest in global financial services, and Wall Street has clearly derived huge benefits from the 
neoliberal era (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 289; Watkins, 2010, p. 8). Neoliberalization has in many 
countries involved the adoption of American standards and practices. It is therefore possible to speak 
of “neoliberalization-cum-Americanization” (Peck & Theodore, 2007, p. 734; see also Sablowski, 
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2008, pp. 156-157; Watkins, 2010, p. 8). The agency of the US state has been crucial in the spread of 
the discipline of capital and in encouraging countries to open up their capital accounts (Panitch & 
Gindin, 2005, p. 106, 2012, p. vii; Wade in Challenge, 2004, pp. 67-68; Watkins, 2010, p. 8). In the 
end, then, despite the talk of American decline in the 1970s, neoliberalism has reasserted US power 
and hegemony in the global political economy (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 5; Saull, 2012, p. 330). 
 
Figure 4.9: US inward and outward FDI stock (% of GDP) (data from UNCTAD, 2014b) 
 
Western Europe and the developed world more broadly have been the most integrated into the US-
led neoliberal world order, with the inward and outward FDI stock growing even stronger in the 
developed European countries than in the US (see Figure 4.10; Gill, 2008, p. 178; Panitch & Gindin, 
2005; Saull, 2012, p. 333). US capital has been the most important “national” fraction of 
transnational capital, but capitalists from other countries have not been passive bystanders: 
“American industrial and financial capital deepened its penetration of Europe and Asia, while 
European and Japanese capital largely embraced, at home and abroad, the competitive terrain 
defined by neoliberalism” (Panitch & Gindin, 2005, p. 111). The US state and US capital have thus not 
just acted to secure US interests; they have also acted “on behalf of transnational capitalist interests” 
(Robinson, 2010, p. 71; see also Panitch & Gindin, 2005, p. 110). In sum: “Disciplinary neo-liberalism 
is commensurate with interests of big corporate capital and dominant social forces in the G7, 






















































































































































Figure 4.10: European developed countries’ inward and outward FDI stock (% of GDP) (data from 
UNCTAD, 2014b) 
 
  4.5.3 Neoliberalization instead of neoliberalism 
Despite the character of neoliberalism as a global class project, this dissertation acknowledges the 
importance of variety within the neoliberal global political economy. Many discussions on 
neoliberalism are based on the perception of a dichotomy between neoliberalism and other 
“varieties of capitalism”. In this view, a country (or a person, region, ...) is either neoliberal or it is 
not. Relatedly, it is sometimes stated that neoliberalism does not exist in reality, because there are 
no completely neoliberal societies (as noted by Aalbers, 2013, p. 1084). It has also been argued , hat 
the concept of neoliberalism does not sufficiently recognize the differences and variation between 
and within countries. 
It is of course true that there is no single, monolithic neoliberalism, that is implemented in a uniform 
and homogeneous way in different social formations. Neoliberalism, as implemented in practice, is 
marked by plurality, unevenness and variegation (Albo, 2002, p. 46; Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 
2010b, p. 184; Macartney, 2009b, p. 459). However, recognizing this contextual diversity and uneven 
development should not retract attention from the tendency of most countries in the world going in 
a similar direction, and from the global structural context increasingly pushing countries in this 
direction (Aalbers, 2013, p. 1088; Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010a, pp. 329, 332; Centeno & Cohen, 
2012, p. 319; Neilson, 2012, p. 170). Therefore, it is better to speak of a neoliberal project with 
differentiated manifestations and outcomes. Instead of a country “becoming” neoliberal, there are 
uneven and dynamic processes of “neoliberalization”, or “variegated neoliberalization” rather than a 
fully realized, rigid, monolithic neoliberalism (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010b; Macartney, 2009b, 
pp. 457-458; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Springer, 2010). There are many “varieties of neoliberalism” or 
“varieties of neoliberalization” (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2009). 
National processes of neoliberalization are shaped by a range of factors. One of the main 

















































































































































Inward FDI stock (% of GDP) Outward FDI stock (% of GDP)
77 
 
forces (e.g. Gill, 2008, p. 117; Harvey, 2005, p. 116; Overbeek & van Apeldoorn,  2012, p. 9).xlvi In 
particular, the strength and resistance of national working classes  and trade unions could be a vital 
variable in (holding back) processes of neoliberalization. Another important factor may be the 
motivation behind neoliberalization. A distinction has been made between countries in which 
neoliberal policies were pragmatically adopted because they were seen as necessary to remain 
competitive in a global economy, and countries which implemented neoliberal policies out of the 
ideological conviction of powerful social forces (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002). Hence, the 
interplay between domestic and “external” factors in different social formations may be a significant 
factor (Harvey, 2005, p. 117). Finally, other aspects such as historical legacies, national traditions of 
thought, the timing of transformations in the direction of neoliberalization, and the institutional and 
geopolitical context may also play a role (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002, p. 534; Gill, 2008, p. 
117; Harvey, 2005, pp. 116-118; Overbeek & van Apeldoorn, 2012, pp. 8-9). This also implies that the 
degree of hegemony differs from country to country. 
 
 4.6 By way of conclusion: the BICs and neoliberalization 
This chapter has argued that the neoliberal era is defined primarily not by an ideological project, but 
by a neoliberal class project. This class project aimed to provide an answer to the issues emerging 
during the Bretton-Woods era, namely how to restore profitability, break the power of organized 
labour in developed countries, and inhibit state-led or more radical development strategies in the 
Global South. The transnationalization of productive and financial capital, together with the 
financialization of capital, was crucial in this class project. Capital account liberalization changed the 
power relations between (global) capital and (national) labour, strengthened the profitability 
imperative, and made it more difficult for state managers in the West and beyond to (radically) 
deviate from domestic neoliberal policies. Decreasing wage shares and rising inequality are two of 
the main outcomes of these transformed power relations. 
Further, it was outlined how neoliberalism is a flexible project, with a differentiated implementation 
depending on the spatio-temporal context. In specific settings, it is therefore better to speak of a 
process of “variegated neoliberalization” instead of a uniform neoliberalism. This process of 
variegated neoliberalization also implies that the degree to which the neoliberal project is hegemonic 
varies from country to country. Neoliberalism is obviously a US-led, Western-based project. As such, 
it is possible that neoliberalization has not been implemented in the BICs (despite the global 
neoliberal structural context). It is also possible that it is not – or less – hegemonic there, and that 
the rise of the BICs will thus lead to a challenge to the Western-made neoliberal world order. By 
examining the domestic political economy of the China (Chapter 5), Brazil (Chapter 6) and India 
(Chapter 7), in particular regarding the issue of capital controls and capital account liberalization, the 






                                                          
i
 Or “a crisis of the neoliberal hegemonic project” (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 471). 
ii
 As noted by Watkins (2010, p. 7), some concept is needed to describe the common developments or 
paradigm of the last decades. “Neoliberalism” is probably the best term there is. 
iii
 This is the title of a masterly book by Leo Panitch and Gindin (Panitch & Gindin, 2012). 
iv
 Or “corporate liberalism”, in van der Pijl’s terminology (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 6) 
v
 Even though this compromise between capital and labour was still highly skewed in favour of capital (Crotty & 
Esptein, 1996, p. 118). 
vi
 In the US, for instance, most capitalists opposed the New Deal reforms (Allen, 1991, p. 687). 
vii
 By the 1970s, for instance, state-owned banks (SOBs) accounted for around 40% of all banking assets in 
developed countries, and 65% in developing countries (Marois, 2013). Other constraints include the separation 
of commercial and investment banking, and interest rate controls. 
viii
 The compromise was also based on the defeat of radical labour in both the US and Europe (Armstrong, Glynn 
& Harrison, 1991, pp. 75-78, 84-105). 
ix
 On the internationalization of American productive capital see Panitch & Gindin, 2012, pp. 112-117. 
x
 The effectiveness of capital controls was also more and more undermined by the growth of international 
linkages (Goodman & Pauly, 1993, pp. 55-58). The result was that if states wanted to go against the power of 
financial capital, they would have to introduce more stringent capital controls and other policies (Panitch & 
Gindin, 2009, p. 16). TNCs feared that stronger controls on capital flows would also hit FDI, and opposed 
measures that would move in this direction (Goodman & Pauly, 1993, p. 58, 81). 
xi
 In Japan, it fell sharply after a peak in 1970. 
xii
 Such as the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement and the student movement. 
xiii
 Some neoliberal outcomes were also the result of well-meant policies in the context of a changing and less 
favourable balance of forces (see e.g. Bertram, 2011-2012 on welfare reform in the US). 
xiv
 Even though neoliberalism may then not have been “the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological 
projects” (Barnett, 2005, p. 10), there is a certain logic to it; it did not come about “accidentally”. 
xv
 For this neoliberal project, the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher proved to be a decisive turning point 
(Overbeek, 2004b, p. 132). 
xvi
 The context in which neoliberalism rose also defined its enemies: organized labour and the post-war class 
compromise. This is an important difference with classical liberalism (Watkins, 2010, pp. 7-8). 
xvii
 For the link between globalization of production and financialization see e.g. Milberg, 2008. 
xviii
 This dissertation, then, with its conceptualization of neoliberalism, does not at all agree with Birch’s claim 
that the erosion of national control over financial capital mobility “has nothing to do with neoliberalism in 
practical, policy or political terms” (Birch, 2011). 
xix
 Ben Fine (2010, p. 108) even writes that financialization is a synonym for neoliberalism. I would not go that 
far, because it neglects other dimensions, such as the transnationalization of production and finance. 
Financialization within financially closed off economies, for instance, is not the same as financialization in a 
financially open world economy. 
xx
 It also includes the privatization of state-owned banks and the growing importance of the private banking 
sector. The share of banking assets controlled by state-owned banks dropped from 40% in the 1970s to around 
8% today in developed countries, and from 65% to 22% in developing countries (Marois, 2013). 
xxi
 The financial sector has achieved “exceptional profitability” (Saad-Filho, 2010, p. 250) or “super-profitability” 
(Wade, 2010, p. 57). 
xxii
 See also Crotty, 2005, p. 78; Lucarelli, 2009, p. 48; Marois, 2011, pp. 185-189; Overbeek, 2004b, p. 131; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 337; Tabb, 1999, p. 4. 
xxiii
 Note that the international financial system has been said to represent “one of the most significant 
absences in work on financialization – and certainly the most surprising” (French, Leyshon & Wainwright, 2011, 
p. 808). 
xxiv
 It could be argued that this is one of the reasons why the US has promoted capital account liberalization in 
other countries, as “the US sees free capital movements as a battering ram to force other economies to adopt 
free market structures not only in finance but across the board” (Wade & Veneroso, 1998, p. 36). 
xxv
 The “new constitutionalism” of the free movement of capital is still advancing after the global economic 
crisis (see chapter 8). 
xxvi
 This is related to what has been called the “internationalization of the state” (Cox, 1981, pp. 144-146; Bieler 
& Morton, 2003, pp. 477-478, 2004, p. 96; Glassman, 1999, p. 673). 
xxvii
 Note, for instance, that despite of the capital flight because of wealth taxes, some studies have found that 
the effect of wealth taxes on capital flight is negligible (Stewart, 2013; Tannenwald, Shure & Johnson, 2011). 
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xxviii
 According to Foster and Holleman (2010, p. 11), in 2007 27.3% of the Forbes 400 derived its wealth mainly 
from finance. 
xxix
 To give one example: dividends in the US have risen as a share of the profits of nonfinancial corporation 
from an average of 32% in the period 1960-1980 to an average of 60% in 1981-2007 (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 
187). 
xxx
 For a contrasting view, see Roberts (2014). 
xxxi
 Estimates on inequality are probably an underestimation, because wealth that is hidden offshore is not 
taken into account (Shaxson, Christensen & Mathiason, 2012). 
xxxii
 On Canada see The Canadian Press, 2014; on the Netherlands see Dekker, 2014; for a critical note on these 
studies see Salmon, 2014. 
xxxiii
 For a genealogy of neoliberal ideology see Peck, 2008. 
xxxiv
 These varieties include “free-market ideational programme” (Peck, 2008, p. 3), the “new free-market 
models” (Boas & Ganse-Morse, 2009, p. 157), “the pursuit of free markets” (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2009, p. 356), 
“the pursuit of unregulated markets” (Crotty & Dymski, 1998, p. 3), “free-market economics” (Challies & 
Murray, 2008, p. 230). 
xxxv
 Due to this concentration, the Monthly Review school has labelled the current era the phase of “global 
monopoly-finance capital” (Foster, McChesney & Jonna, 2011, p. 1). 
xxxvi
 Note that this is not necessarily bad for the economy, as these industries often “generate high productivity 
growth and consequently high standards of living” (Chang, 2002, p. 546). If one accepts that there are 
increasing returns of scale in many sectors, than competition is bad and concentration and oligopoly are good 
for the economy. 
xxxvii
 The difference has then largely been one of visibility and explicitness of state intervention, from “an 
ostensibly market-led neoliberalism to a much more overtly state-led neoliberalism” (Watson, 2009, p. 184). 
xxxviii
 But not their initial production. 
xxxix
 On the danger of functionalism, and a (partial) answer on how to avoid this, see Fine & Harris, 1987, pp. 
385-386. 
xl
 In developing countries microfinance plays a similar role (Bateman & Chang, 2012). 
xli
 In this sense, finance is more “embedded” today, especially in the US, than during the “embedded liberal 
era”, because many workers are now more involved in various aspects of financial markets and products 
(Montgomerie, 2008, p. 243; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 192). 
xlii
 Populism, which used to be an emancipatory movement against big business, has in the last decades been 
directed against the state in the US (Goebel, 1997, p. 148; Konings, 2013) 
xliii
 Morality also plays a role in the popularity of austerity among the American population (see Konings, 2012, 
p. 612). 
xliv
 The figure of the “entrepreneur”,  already identified by 1930s’ ordoliberalism (Bonefeld, 2012, p. 642), is 
also more and more worshipped in Western countries and beyond. 
xlv
 As a share of domestic non-residential investment, US outward FDI increased from 10% in the 1990s to 22% 
in 2007; inward FDI also grew from 5% of domestic non-residential investment in the mid-1980s to 20% in 2007 
(Panitch & Gindin, 2012, pp. 283-284). 
xlvi
 Transnationally-oriented fractions of capital remain at the same timed embedded in different national 
contexts (Macartney & Shields, 2011, pp. 40-41). Neoliberalism’s variegation thus “enables it to incorporate, 
subsume and, where necessary, marginalise competing tenets” (Macartney, 2009b, p. 459). 
80 
 
5. China’s capital controls: between contender state 
and integration into the heartlandi 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
China is generally considered to be the most important rising power today. As Minqi Li (2005, p. 420) 
summarizes the prevailing consensus: “The rise of China as a major player in the capitalist world 
economy is likely to become one of the most significant developments in the first half of the 21st 
century.” The “rise of China” is therefore at the heart of international attention today, not only in 
public debates, but in the academic literature as well. The strong economic growth  has brought 
about various assessments of China’s rise, from various theoretical perspectives. Some scholars 
argue that China represents a challenge to the Western “liberal order”. In this view, a sort of “clash 
of ideas” is coming between Western-backed ideas and Chinese views (e.g. Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 
2007; McNally, 2012, p. 769; Rucki, 2011; Strange, 2011). This has been captured in notions such as 
the “China Model” or the “Beijing Consensus” (see Breslin, 2011b; Ferchen, 2013; Fewsmith, 2011; 
de Haan, 2010b; Huang, 2011; Kennedy, 2010; Naughton, 2010), which are supposed to oppose the 
“Anglo-American model” or the “Washington Consensus”.ii The country’s state-led growth has in any 
case deviated from neoliberal precepts (Breslin, 2010, p. 153, 2011b, p. 1324). Especially if China is 
seen as a powerful state capable of challenging the liberal order, then “China’s attempt to construct 
an alternative model of development is bound to make a systemic impact on the future direction of 
globalization” (Lo, 2007, p. 208). 
Others, however, do not believe that the country will be able to make a systemic impact. In this view, 
China’s rise will simply lead to changes within the current world order, without putting the Western-
made world order into jeopardy (e.g. Panitch & Gindin, 2012; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2006; 
Ikenberry, 2008; Parisot, 2013; Petras, 2006). According to David Harvey (2005, p. 151), for instance, 
China has undergone “neoliberalization with Chinese characteristics”, and therefore does not form 
an ideological challenge to the American-led global capitalist economy. Authors have even gone as 
far as to label China “America’s head servant” (Hung, 2009, p. 5). 
Whether China will form a challenge to the American-led Western neoliberal order, or whether it will 
get integrated into this Western order, is still unclear at the moment (Chin & Thakur, 2010, pp. 118-
119). Therefore, the potential future impact of China’s rise is often evaluated based on ideological 
viewpoints and political hopes. This chapter will assess whether China will mount an ideological 
challenge to the neoliberal world order sketched in Chapter 4 by empirically mapping the evolution 
of capital controls in China, and by placing them in the context of China’s social relations, 
accumulation regime and geo-economic rivalry with other states. 
In the second section after this introduction (5.2) I briefly sketch Kees van der Pijl’s theory of the 
heartland-contender structure in the global political economy. It is shown that China shares many of 
the characteristics of a contemporary contender state, despite the dependence on Western 
capitalism. The third section (5.3) considers China’s capital control structure before the global 
economic crisis. It is argued that these controls are underpinned by a “historic bloc” supporting 
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controls for different reasons, composed of foreign export-oriented industrial capital, Chinese 
export-oriented and investment-oriented industrial capital (among which many state-owned 
companies), Chinese (state-owned) banking capital, and a fraction of China’s state class. In the third 
section, the liberalization of capital controls after the crisis is discussed. It is argued that the main 
reason for this has been the strategy of a fraction of China’s state class of “challenging America 
through Americanization”. Other social forces that are in favour of a more open capital account 
include China’s technocrats, wealthy individuals and foreign financial capital. Faced with opposition 
from the historic bloc favouring a continuation of the current accumulation regime, this fraction has 
resorted to “the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB)” as a hegemonic project. It is unclear 
whether this strategy on the part of the fraction of China’s state class will be able to overcome 
domestic opposition. As the conclusion will sketch, for now, however, it seems that further 
liberalization and integration into the heartland are likely to continue. 
 
 5.2 The heartland-contender state structure and China 
  5.2.1 The heartland versus contender states 
The question whether China will be integrated into the American-led Western-based global political 
economy can be answered from various theoretical perspectives. This chapter is loosely based on 
Kees van der Pijl’s framework. Van der Pijl makes a difference between the “Lockean heartland” and 
“Hobbesian contender states” (see van der Pijl, 1998, 2008, 2012). The starting point for his analysis 
is the existence of two distinct state/society complexes. On the one hand, after the Glorious 
Revolution in England in 1688, in the English-speaking West a rising bourgeoisie created a liberal 
state. In this state form the primacy of the ascendant capitalist class is confirmed, and civil society in 
these countries is “self-regulating” and relatively autonomous towards the state. In the Lockean 
configuration prevailing in the West, there is therefore a differentiation between a property-owning 
ruling class, which controls the key levers in the economy and which define the pace of social change 
in society, and a governing class, which manages the state and day-to-day affairs. Over the next 
centuries, this state/society complex was expanded transnationally, so that the Lockean “heartland” 
has “occupied the international terrain commercially and culturally” (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 79). 
On the other hand, in countries resisting subordination to this Lockean heartland, this differentiation 
between a ruling class and a governing class is largely absent. In these countries there is a Hobbesian 
configuration, in which one class controls both the economy and the state. Van der Pijl names this 
class a “state class”, “because its power primarily resides in its hold of the state apparatus rather 
than in a self-reproducing social base” (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 79). There is no autonomous property-
owning ruling class as in the Lockean state/society complex. These contender states rely “on state 
initiative to accelerate and sustain the pace of social change and develop the economic and military 
assets necessary to hold its own against the West” (van der Pijl, 2012, p. 504). The state’s role is thus 
required to resist “peripheralization” in the face of a far more powerful heartland (van der Pijl, 1998, 
p. 78). Power resided by the state class instead of by the ruling (capitalist) class as in the heartland: 
“The sovereign state, rather than capital, ultimately determines the status of social actors and 
constrains for instance their capacity to articulate their interests (…)” (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 80). 
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In their struggle to catch up with the advanced capitalist countries in the heartland, contender states 
in general share several features. First, as already noted, is their distinct state/society complex. The 
second characteristic is that a strong degree of state control over the economy is maintained, and 
the state class steers the economy through an activist attitude. The aspirations of social forces within 
society are subordinated to national economic development as planned by the state class. State 
ownership in strategic economic sectors is often essential in this regard. Third, contender states in 
the past have been able to assert their sovereignty and maintain their contender position by “locking 
out Western influence and capital” (van der Pijl, 2008). A Hobbesian state is thus ideally closed off 
from processes materializing within the heartland. 
Finally, it should be noted that all previous contender states have been defeated by the Western 
heartland, whether through warfare or through arms races (as well as economic competition). While 
this is not a foregone conclusion, there is a certain logic that results in contender states being 
integrated into the heartland. First, contender states inevitably enter into geo-economic competition 
with the heartland. However, the heartland enjoys the advantage, economically, militarily, and 
ideologically, because they are the “the prime movers of the capitalist revolution in the world and 
very much the controllers of the world economy” (van der Pijl, 2008). This competitive disadvantage 
forces contender states to (selectively) copy practices and elements of the heartland economies and 
state/society complexes, as the state class “is engaged in driving forward social development along 
lines effectively dictated by the society that enjoys the advantage” (van der Pijl, 2012, p. 505). 
Consequently, the domestic class constellation in contender states develops more and more “in the 
direction of the pattern prevailing in the heartland” (van der Pijl, 1998, p. 82). At some point, the 
ascending capitalist class asserts itself as a “class for itself”, “aspiring to merge into the social 
universe projected by the West” (van der Pijl, 2012, p. 505; also 1998, p. 82). 
Second, there are also “transnational channels preparing hegemonic integration” (van der Pijl, 1998, 
p. 117). Thus, pressure by domestic social forces from the inside to evolve to a Lockean state-society 
structure and global Western capitalist standards is supplemented by pressure from the outside: 
“The West historically has exerted pressure on contender state societies (as on all others) to submit 
to capitalist discipline, and consciously probes for partners in the target state willing to be mobilized 
behind transnational liberalism” (van der Pijl, 2010, p. 45). Especially in a more globalized capitalist 
economy, the chances are greater that the “offshore” element in the contender states will be 
activated by the Western heartland.iii To sum up, “the potential combination of outside pressure and 
internal contestation always exists” (van der Pijl, 2012, p. 505). 
 
  5.2.2 The road to capitalism with Chinese characteristics 
As may already be clear from the description of the typical contender state characteristics, China 
could be described as a contemporary – and possibly even the only remaining – contender state. 
Indeed, van der Pijl (2008, 2012) himself has argued that today China is the main contender state, 
potentially challenging Western hegemony. The basis for this was already laid during what has been 
called the “state-socialist” era (e.g. Harris, 2009, p. 17; van der Pijl, 2012, p. 508; Wu, 2008, p. 1094; 
Zhu, 2005, p. 498) under Mao in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, which “emphasized heavy industry, 
centralized economic planning, state ownership of the means of production, and party control over 
political and cultural life” (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 27; see also Li, 2008, p. 78). China’s 
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annual growth rate was more than 5% on average, and per capita GDP grew with an annual average 
of around 3% (see Figure 5.1).iv Moreover, during the 1970s, the share of manufacturing in the 
economy remained at over 40%, indicating that China already had a large industrial sector (see Figure 
5.2; Dunn, 2007, p. 14; see also Hart-Landsberg, 2011, pp. 61-62; Wang H., 2011, p. 240). 
 




Figure 5.2: Value added per sector China, 1960-1978 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Nevertheless, the growth rate was far behind its Asian neighbouring countries. This created an 
impetus for economic reform (Amin, 2013, p. 21; Harvey, 2005, pp. 122-123; Hasan, 2008, p. 577; 
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emulation of the leading states because of geopolitical and geo-economic pressures (see Callinicos, 
2010, p. 495; Gill, 2008, p. 54; Morton, 2010, p. 326; Palan, 2006, p. 249; Teschke, 2005, pp. 8-9). 
According to Deng Xiapoing, the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader, the introduction of the 
“market” was the best way to enhance the country’s productive potential (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 
2004, p. 30). As David Harvey (2005, p. 1) writes: “The path that Deng defined was to transform 
China in two decades from a closed backwater to an open centre of capitalist dynamism with 
sustained growth rates unparalleled in human history.” Since the start of “economic reform and 
opening up” under Deng Xiaoping, presented at the Third Plenum of the CCP in 1978, China has 
grown at an average annual rate of more than 8.5%, and per capita growth has almost been 7.5% 
(see Figure 5.1). 
At first, in the beginning of the 1980s, reforms created what has been called “a non-capitalist market 
economy” (Andreas, 2008, p. 127). While the market mechanism became more and more important, 
until 1988 there was balanced growth led by household consumption, as well as government 
consumption and fixed investment (Li, 2008, pp. 82-83; Lo, 2007, p. 198; Piovani & Li, 2011, p. 79; 
Zhu & Kotz, 2011, pp. 14-17). Although there was a gradual hollowing out of state-socialist elements, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remained dominant, profitability was not yet the guiding motive for 
enterprises, state-directed planning was still the central principle and a labour “market” only 
emerged very slowly (Andreas, 2008, p. 127; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 33-38). However, 
reforms gave impetus for further reforms and changes, and while this was not an intended outcome 
of the pragmatic reforms embraced by the CCP, under Deng Xiaoping China was put firmly on the 
road to capitalist restoration (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 31; Harvey, 2005, pp. 122-123; 
Rucki, 2011, p. 347; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 493).v  
After the Tiananmen events of 1989 slowed down reform, Deng Xiaoping launched the next stage of 
the restructuring of China’s economy in early 1992 with his “southern tour” (Andreas, 2008, p. 129; 
Dickson, 2007, p. 832; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 41; Piovani & Li, 2011, pp. 79-80; Zhang, 
1998, pp. 57-58). In 1994 the privatization program was extended, and the privatizations, downsizing 
and plant closures of SOEs were numerous especially in the late 1990s (Andreas, 2008, p. 131; Cooke, 
2010, pp. 308-309; Dickson, 2007, pp. 835-836; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 42; Lo & Zhang, 
2010, p. 171; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 23). While figures vary depending on the method and source, it is 
clear that employment in SOEs declined strongly. According to Cooke (2010, pp. 308-309), while SOEs 
still provided 62.3% of employment in 1990 in urban areas (down from 78.3% in 1978), this number 
declined to 35.0% in 2000 and to 22.7% in 2006. Whereas in 1981 the number of workers in SOEs 
was almost thirty-five times as large as the number of workers in the private sector, employment in 
the private (including foreign-owned) sector had overtaken SOE employment by 2000 (World Bank, 
2013b).vi Profitability has become the primary goal for most of both state-owned and private 
enterprises, which were also obliged to subject to (international) competition (Andreas, 2008, pp. 
132-133; Hung, 2008, p. 156).vii Financial reforms were implemented, and in 1990 the Shanghai & 
Shenzhen stock markets were established (Hope & Hu, 2006, p. 69; Chen & Thomas, 2002, p. 675; 
White & Bowles, 1994, pp. 89-92). The social relations of production have transformed completely, 
as a sort of cadre-capitalist class has come into the making (So, 2003, p. 369, see 5.4.3), and as 
workers became subject to the disciplines of the profitability imperative, the labour market, 
unemployment and shrinking welfare provisions (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, pp. 58-63; He, 
2000, pp. 79-84; Hung, 2008, p. 156; Lu & Jiang, 2008, p. 63; Rucki, 2011, p. 348). 
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The 1992 southern tour launched the definitive breakthrough not only of capitalism but also of the 
insertion of China into the global economy. Since then, the country has been firmly integrated into 
and highly dependent on global capitalism in general, and US capitalism in particular. Exports have 
grown strongly since 1978 up until the global economic crisis, from less than 10% in 1982 to more 
than 25% after 2001 (see Figure 5.3). After China’s admission to the WTO in 2001, exports surged 
even more, and even reached almost 40% in 2007 and 2008. Moreover, two of the main trading 
partners are the US and the EU. The share of exports going to the US and EU increased from around 
33% of total exports in 1994 to an average of almost 44% in 2003-2007 (data from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2014; for similar data see Lum & Nanto, 2007; see also Hart-Landsberg, 2010b, p. 
19). China is thus highly dependent on the US, and to a lesser degree EU, consumer markets (Fischer, 
2010, p. 750-751; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 276; Parisot, 2013, p. 1167; Saull, 2012, p. 325; Wang H., 
2011, p. 248). 
 
Figure 5.3: Exports China (% of GDP) (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Inward FDI, more or less introduced in 1978, have also grown strongly, especially after 1992, when 
the government expanded its efforts to attract FDI (see Figure 5.4; Breslin, 2000, pp. 211-213). While 
some authors stress that China has strategically used foreign investment to its advantage (Bach, 
Newman & Weber, 2006; Chen, 2011, p. 90), it could be said that China is qualitatively different from 
earlier developmental states or latecomer countries in the degree of importance of foreign industrial 
capital (e.g. Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 124; Fischer, 2010, p. 752; Harvey, 2005, p. 137; Kennedy, 2010, 
p. 471; Nolan, 2011, p. 57). Indeed, according to Leo Panitch (2010, p. 82), the main difference 
between China and earlier late developers “is that China has relied to a much greater degree on 
direct foreign investment”. Further, these TNCs investing in China produce more than half of all 
Chinese exports (up from 13% in 1990) (Breslin, 2005, p. 743; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 49; 
Kwong, 2010; Li, Huang & Li, 2007, p. 93; Palley, 2006a, p. 72; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 297; Yue, 
2008, p. 443). This indicates that China has been integrated into global (and East Asian) production 
networks, processing and assembling intermediate goods imported from mostly other East Asian 
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& Peng, 2007, pp. 91-92). As Martin Hart-Landsberg (2006, p. 13) therefore states, “China’s growth 
has become increasingly dependent on transnational corporate organized export activity.” As he sees 
it, therefore, China’s potential for autonomous development is lost (see also Fischer, 2010, p. 741; 
Liang, 2007a; Saull, 2012, p. 330). Obviously, the large role played by foreign industrial capital seems 
to contradict China’s contender position (see e.g. Petras, 2006). 
 
Figure 5.4: Inward and outward FDI China (data from UNCTAD, 2014b) 
 
Additionally, it has been pointed out that China still tends to dominate in low value-added sectors, 
and has not benefited from technological upgrading through FDI (e.g. Fischer, 2010, p. 751; Kiely, 
2008, p. 360; Li & Song, 2011, pp. 81-82; Saull, 2012, pp. 325-326). These analyses have also noted 
that foreign capital, which accounted for around 20% of China’s industrial production in the early 
2000s, had a market share of 47% in the domestic high-tech market, and 88% of high-tech exports, 
indicating the relative weakness of Chinese firms in high-technology production (Hart-Landsberg, 
2010b, p. 17; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 297; Yue, 2008, p. 443; see also Bach, Newman & Weber, 
2006, p. 509).  
 
  5.2.3 China as the new contender state 
While the above would indicate that China cannot be seen as a contemporary contender state, it also 
seems clear that China “represents a different ‘variety of capitalism’ than that which has become 
hegemonic in the West” (van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, pp. 480-481). Many analysts 
agree with the assumption of China as an important challenge to Western liberal capitalism. In this 
regard, van der Pijl’s conceptualization of contender states contains certain elements (although in a 
distinct theoretical framework) that are often associated with notions such as the “developmental 
state” or a “late developer”. Indeed, China has repeatedly been branded as a landmark case of a 
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Hasan, 2008, p. 588; Strange, 2011; Zhu, 2004, p. 1024; see also Golub, 2013, p. 1008; Snyder, 2013, 
p. 229), of late development (McNally, 2012, p. 754; Warner, Hong & Xu, 2004, p. 328) or of state 
capitalismviii (Amin, 2013, p. 20; Bremmer, 2012; ten Brink, 2011). Because China retains several 
characteristics of a contender state, “in the eyes of many Westerners, the Chinese model constitutes 
competition for and a challenge to Western values” (Cheng, 2010, p. 46). In the words of China 
expert Shaun Breslin (2005, p. 738): “It is not just that a new power is rising to challenge US 
supremacy, but the nature of the state that is providing this new challenge.” 
The first feature of China’s contender position is its distinct state/society complex. A state class, in 
China’s case in the form of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), controls both the economy and the 
state. Civil society is not “self-regulating”, and the pace of change in society is defined by the CCP: “In 
the political front, it is the state – not the civil society – that is the dominant institution because the 
state defines the legal channels and the scope of appropriate behavior that class forces are allowed 
to articulate their interests in the state” (So, 2003, pp. 373-374). There is no ruling class in the 
Western sense, autonomous from the Chinese state.ix Van der Pijl (2012, p. 509) writes that “the 
determining characteristics of the Chinese regime of accumulation remain those of a contender state 
– society complex, in which the state class retains the key levers of power and operates as a force 
anticipating and guiding class formation rather than being confronted by it.” Forces favouring a 
further institutionalization of capitalism are acting largely “through the state, not against it” (van der 
Pijl, 2012, p. 509, original stress). As a leading Chinese capitalist has stated, China’s capitalist class 
“dare not resist the authorities” (in WantChinaTimes.com, 2012) and it is certainly not (yet) a class 
for itself (see Tsai, 2005, p. 1135). Moreover, it “has not yet seized ‘control of the commanding 
heights’ of economy, society and state” (Walker, 2010, p. 69). 
This leads us to the second characteristic. While doubts have been cast on the capacities of the 
central state in China (e.g. Breslin, 1996; Howell, 2006; Hung, 2008, p. 155), the Chinese state 
intervenes strongly in and maintains a certain degree of control over (and direct ownership in) the 
Chinese economy (Breslin, 2004, pp. 670-671; ten Brink, 2011; Cheng, 2010, p. 51; Chin & Thakur, 
2010, p. 124; Lim, 2010, pp. 680-682; McNally, 2012, pp. 752-753; Walker, 2010, p. 67). In 2008, the 
largest forty-three companies in China were still state-owned (Panich & Gindin, 2012, p. 297). The 
state still defines the rate and direction of investment in important sectors such as steel, oil, 
petrochemicals, the automotive industry, railways and telecommunications (Andreas, 2008, p. 132; 
Hart-Landsberg, 2010b, p. 17; McNally, 2012, p. 753; Panich & Gindin, 2012, p. 297; see also Dunn, 
2007, p. 14; Liew, 2005, p. 332). It has also been able to maintain a large industrial sector after 
reform and opening up (see Figure 5.5). Moreover, within this industrial sector the share of heavy 
manufacturing has expanded, whereas the share of extractive and light industries has declined (Lo & 




Figure 5.5: Value added per sector China, 1979-2013 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
As van der Pijl (2012, p. 505) argues, “the Chinese state class today remains the ability to decide 
development priorities and can accelerate/decelerate the pace of change”. The introduction of “the 
market” does not contradict this finding.x Wu (2010, p. 624) points out: “By understanding that 
Chinese market-oriented reform is a state-engineered process, we can also understand the reason 
why the state’s capacity has not diminished but rather has increased during market transition.” 
While the role of the state may have changed (Petras, 2006, pp. 434-435), this does not imply that 
the state has weakened (ten Brink, 2011). China’s capitalist variety still assigns the state “a leading 
role in fostering and guiding capitalist accumulation” (McNally, 2012, p. 750).  
Third, the guiding logic behind the state/society complex and state intervention in the economy in 
China is “sovereign national development” (Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 124). The growth of China is in 
van der Pijl’s view owing to resistance to Western supremacy and integration into the heartland (van 
der Pijl, 2012, p. 504). However, China’s rise as a contender state has coincided with and is affected 
by the historical phase of neoliberalism and the globalizing and liberalizing world economy in the 
1970s and 1980s (Baek, 2005, p. 496; Kiely, 2008, p. 363; Saull, 2012, p. 330; Zhang, 2003, pp. 704-
706). It has been noted that the Chinese state class has chosen to build its contender state within 
globalization (Strange, 2011, pp. 544-556; also McNally, 2012, p. 750), or even “through” 
globalization (Pan, 2009, p. 23) instead of “against” globalization, using insertion into the capitalist 
global economy to stir economic growth (Breslin, 2005, p. 749). While this is often seen as a source 
of vulnerability (see above), it has not only resulted in economic growth (see Figure 5.3), but also in 
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Figure 5.6: Current account and trade balance China (data from IMF, 2014c; World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Further, while the role of FDI has been seen as a weakness by some (see 5.2.2), others claim that the 
Chinese government has used industrial policy to steer FDI towards industries it deems strategic 
(Bach, Newman & Weber, 2006, p. 508; see also Lippit, 2005, p. 446).xi Therefore, while the share of 
FDI in high-technology exports has strongly risen, the share of high-tech exports as a share of total 
exports has also risen strongly (from 3% in 1985 to 34% in 2009) (de Haan, 2010a, p. 761; Hart-
Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, pp. 82-83; Hong, Vos & Yao, 2008, p. 38; Li & Song, 2011, pp. 70-71). 
Studies have also found that Chinese indigenous firms have been climbing up the value-added ladder 
(Brandt & Thun, 2010; Cui & Syed, 2007; Zhou, 2008). Finally, an additional sign of China’s contender 
state position comes from its capital controls on non-FDI flows, which are outlined in the next 
section. 
 
 5.3 The historic bloc supporting capital controls 
  5.3.1 China’s capital controls before the crisis 
Despite the significant role played by FDI, China has preserved quite stringent capital controls on 
speculative capital flows throughout the past decades.xii Some liberalizing measures on the capital 
account were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s (see Guan, 2013, p. 7)xiii, but China’s financial 
system remained relatively insulated. The consequence of its relatively closed capital account was 
that China escaped the worst effects of the 1997 Asian crisis (Gallagher, Ocampo, Zhang, Yu, 2014; 
Liew, 2005, p. 332; Yu, 2009b). While policymakers were already planning for capital account 
convertibility in the early 1990s, the 1997 Asian crisis led to new restrictions on outflows and a 
backlash against capital account liberalization (and globalization in general) (Dean, 2000, p. 71; 
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p. 6; Interview 1, 4, 6 & 8; Lo, 2001, p. 260; Prasad & Wei, 2007, p. 453; Wang, 2000, p. 56; Yu, 2000, 
pp. 183-185, 2009b, 2013b; Zhang, 2012a, p. 86). 
In other words, although foreign industrial capital has played a large role in China’s economic 
development, foreign financial capital has been largely blocked by capital controls. Consequently, 
China’s capital account is clearly – and purposely – dominated by FDI (see Figure 5.7; Bibow, 2011; 
Prasad & Wei, 2007, p. 422; Yu, 2000, p. 177). China is one of the main countries in the world which 
maintains such strict capital controls on non-FDI flows. While it achieved convertibility for the current 
account and accepted the IMF Article VIII obligations in 1996 (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Zhang, 
2003a, p. 19), and while some liberalization occurred in the 2000s (see below), policymakers have 
been very cautious before the global economic crisis with regard to portfolio investment and debt 
flows, and the openness of the capital account was very limited (for an overview of the regulations at 
the turn of the century see Yu, 2000, pp. 179-183). Consequently, as Samir Amin (2013, p. 24) writes, 
“China has remained outside financial globalization” (also Breslin, 2004, p. 662; Hansakul, Dyck & 
Kern, 2009; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 300). 
 
Figure 5.7: Capital flows China (based on data from World Bank, 2014b, partially own calculations) 
 
In 2002, liberalization efforts were reinitiated (see Yu, 2013), but rather stringent capital controls 
have remained in place before the global economic crisis. These controls may analytically be divided 
into controls on inflows and controls on outflows. First, capital controls have strongly limited the 
entry of foreign financial capital. While gradual liberalization has been underway since 1981 (Gao & 
Yu, 2009, p. 122), China’s banking sector has remained largely closed to participation by foreign 
banks. Although the WTO entry of China included substantially increased options for foreign banks to 
penetrate China’s banking sector (Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 122; Chen & Thomas, 2002, p. 680), restrictions 
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investors have acquired ownership shares in the largest Chinese banks since 2004, their ownership 
shares remained small at between 10% and 25% (Domanski, 2005, p. 72).xiv A foreign institution can 
own up to 20 per cent of the equity of a Chinese bank, and the total foreign ownership of a Chinese 
bank is restricted to 25 per cent (Hope & Hu, 2006, p. 63; Liang, 2010, p. 62). Furthermore, while by 
the end of 2007 193 foreign banks have entered China’s financial services sector, their market share 
has remained very small, amounting to 1.8 per cent of total banking assets in September 2006 and 
2.4 % in 2007 (see Leigh & Podpiera, 2006; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 122; Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; see 
also Domanski, 2005, p. 72; Hope & Hu, 2006, p. 45; McCauley & Ma, 2008). 
The Chinese authorities have also limited the entry of foreign investors in both the share and bond 
market. With regard to shares, “portfolio equity hardly flows at all into or out of the Chinese equity 
market” (McCauley & Ma, 2008). In the A-market, which is the most important exchange market, 
foreign investors were allowed to enter only from 2002 on, through the Foreign Qualified 
Institutional Investor programme (Chen & Thomas, 2005, p. 33; Lardy & Douglass, 2011; SAFE, 2012a; 
Suttle et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012a, p. 86).xv At the end of 2007, the quota of the QFII program stood at 
almost 10$bn, or about 3 % of China’s tradable stock market capitalization, distributed among 52 
QFII investors (Dobson & Masson, 2009, p. 129; Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; McCauley & Ma, 2008). 
Additionally, one foreign investor could acquire at most 10 % of a listed company, and the share of 
one listed company held by foreign investors was limited to 20 % (Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009). In 
China’s bond market, foreign participation is even more limited. The interbank bond market, which 
dominates China’s bond market, was until 2010 closed to non-resident investors (Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 
121; HSBC, 2011; McCauley & Ma, 2008). In 2007, only 0.5 % of outstanding bonds on the interbank 
bond market were held by foreign banks in China (Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; see also McCauley & 
Ma, 2008). With around 60 % of the total amount outstanding, domestic commercial banks are the 
main players in China’s interbank bond market.xvi 
One of the consequences of strict government control and the limited role of foreign portfolio 
investment is the small size of China’s capital markets relative to GDP, especially in comparison to 
industrial countries (Baek, 2005, p. 490; Committee on the Global Financial System, 2009; Dobson & 
Masson, 2009, p. 129; Eichengreen, 2011b; Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 
2009; Laurenceson & Tang, 2005; Lund et al., 2013; Zhou, 2005). As Lardy and Douglass (2011) write: 
“By keeping fund quotas low, the authorities have limited the ability of foreign financial institutions 
to play a significant role in the domestic markets and hindered capital market development.” For 
instance, in 2003 China’s corporate bond market amounted to less than 1 % of GDP, compared to 
140 % for the US and 85 % for the EU (Chen & Thomas, 2005, p. 32). The average stock market 
capitalization during the period 1998-2007 was 45.6 % of GDP in China, compared to 79.1 % for Japan 
and 140.4 % in the US (Wu, Pan & Wang, pp. 67-69). 
Due to the limited size of capital markets, bank loans accounted for a large share of the financing 
raised by enterprises. Bank finance accounted for between 70 and 90 per cent of financial 
intermediation in the period before the crisis (Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; Thomas & Chen, 2006, p. 
21). Moreover, state-owned banks (SOBs) held a large market share (about four-fifth) in both loans 
and deposits (Baek, 2005, p. 491; Laurenceson & Chai, 2001, p. 211). In sum: “The limited 
development of debt and equity markets means that the state-owned banking system is effectively 
the only major game in town, for both borrowers and savers” (Prasad, 2009b, p. 114). As will be 
outlined below, this is crucial to China’s accumulation regime. 
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The second category of capital controls consists of controls on outflows. Outflows of Chinese 
financial capital have been even more strictly controlled than inflows. Only in April 2006 was the 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) programme introduced, which allows Chinese 
investors to invest part of their savings in foreign financial markets, and which doesn’t have a pre-
fixed overall limit, unlike the QFII programme (Dobson & Masson, 2009, p. 128; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 
121; Lardy & Douglass, 2011; SAFE, 2012a; Suttle et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012a, p. 86).At first, only 
investment in fixed-income instruments was allowed, but as from 2007 investment in equities is also 
permitted. As of end-2007, the approved quotas amounted to 42.17$bn, divided among 40 banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies (Song, 2007). At its peak in 2007, the QDII program 
represented 2.1 per cent of total Chinese household savings (Lardy & Douglass, 2011). Besides the 
QDII programme, the annual purchase limit by Chinese citizens of foreign exchange for personal 
settlement was installed at US$20,000 (Ji, 2011). Controls on both inflows and outflows were 
strengthened by strict controls on currency convertibility (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Dobson & 
Masson, 2009, p. 127). Renminbi could thus, before the crisis, only be converted into foreign 
currency for specific purposes. 
 
  5.3.2 China’s accumulation regime and capital controls 
Why has China kept such stringent capital controls in place in an era where capital account 
liberalization has become the internationally accepted norm? An important reason is that capital 
controls are crucial to maintain the current accumulation regime, and they have been “an integral 
part of China’s development strategy over the last twenty years” (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; 
Interview 2). This accumulation regime engenders social forces which could be argued to form a 
historic bloc together, benefiting from the capital controls in place. After shortly outlining this 
economic model, the role of capital controls in this accumulation regime will be discussed. The 
Chinese accumulation regime that was already coming into existence in the 1990s but materialized 
especially after the entry into the WTO in 2001, has been based on two growth poles: exports and 
investment (see Figure 5.8; Zhu & Kotz, 2011; Yu, 2009a; see also UNCTAD, 2013b), or as Palley 
(2006, p. 71) puts it, an external and internal accumulation strategy: “The external accumulation 
strategy rests on foreign direct investment (FDI) and export-led growth, while the internal strategy 





Figure 5.8: Investment, consumption and exports China (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
  
The main pillar of China’s accumulation regime, sometimes underreported, is investment. As Dunn 
(2007, p. 21) states about China’s accumulation regime: “It is the ability to sustain investments, 
through domestic processes of saving and borrowing, that has been particularly remarkable.” Fixed 
investment stood at more than 40% of GDP in 2003-2007 (data from World Bank, 2014b). The 
domestic content of fixed investment was estimated to contribute 37.7 per cent of GDP growth over 
the period 2001-2007, thereby making the most important contribution to economic growth (Zhu & 
Kotz, 2011, p. 22; see also Prasad, 2009b, p. 106; Vermeiren, 2014, p. 122). A significant part of these 
investments is made by SOEs (Geng & N’Diaye, 2012). 
Financing for this investment is especially provided by SOBs, especially the “Big Four” (Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China). 
In line with government rules, they provide cheap capital mainly to large state-owned industrial 
corporations (Overholt, 2010, p. 26; Prasad, 2009b, p. 106; Sender, 2013; The Economist, 2012; 
Yeung, 2009a). Their business model is largely built on this, as it accounts for around 75 % of total 
banks’ profits (Rabinovitch, 2012d). While some say that the government-defined spread implies a 
low return on equity for banks (Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; Lardy, 2008; Thomas & Chen, 2006, p. 
25), in general it is accepted that the spread guarantees SOBs stable and relatively high profits (e.g. 
Borst, 2012; Chancellor, 2013; Financial Times, 2012; Huang, 2013; Lardy & Douglass, 2011; Pettis, 
2013; Sender, 2012a; Zhang, 2012b, p. 52). As Central Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan argued in 2004: 
“In terms of interest rate structure, the differential between deposits and loans is still in the high 
range with promising outlooks for profits of commercial banks” (Zhou, 2004). Xiao Gang, former 
chairman of the Bank of China, acknowledged that in a liberalized environment net interest margins 
would be half of what they are in the government-controlled environment (in Lardy & Douglass, 
2011). 
The second pillar of China’s accumulation regime, often emphasized in public debate, consists of 
China’s exports. The export share amounted to 38.4 per cent of GDP in 2007 (data from IMF, 2014c). 
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in the period 2001-2007 (Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 22).xvii As mentioned above, a significant part of these 
exports – around 60% - was produced by foreign-owned enterprises. While China maintains strong 
capital controls to limit flows of financial capital, the entry of foreign industrial capital through 
inward FDI is almost completely liberalized (Lardy & Douglass, 2011; SAFE, 2012a). The importance of 
exports is mainly due to low domestic consumption, or “underconsumption” (Akyüz, 2011, p. 16; 
Hung, 2008, p. 149). Household consumption has fallen from around 50% of GDP in the beginning of 
the 1980s to just over 35% before the global economic crisis (see Figure 5.8), “the lowest among the 
world economies” (Hong, Vos & Yao, 2008, p. 41). The result of the large and growing gap between 
fixed-asset investment and household consumption is export dependency, or as Akyüz (2011, p. 3) 
writes: “When investment grows faster than consumption, rapid expansion is required in foreign 
markets so that production capacity can be fully utilized to create and maintain strong growth.” 
Capital controls are crucial in maintaining this export- and investment-led accumulation regime for 
two reasons. First, capital account liberalization could lead to more speculative capital flows, which 
would make the exchange rate more volatile and harder to control (Interview 2; Lim, 2010, p. 679; 
Zhang, 2012b, pp. 52-53). The fairly stable (and according to many undervalued) exchange rate (see 
Figure 5.9) has, together with low wages, been one of the main pillars of the large profits in China’s 
export sector. Liberalization of the capital account could thus potentially result in a loss of export 
competitiveness and lower economic growth. Moreover, to maintain its competitive exchange rate in 
the context of current and capital account surpluses, the central bank has had to buy dollars. 
Because selling RMB to buy dollars would increase the money supply and possibly cause higher 
inflation, the central bank sterilized the impact of these interventions through issuing central bank 
bills, which decreases the money supply again (Prasad, Rumbaugh & Wang, 2005; Zhang, 2012b, pp. 
52-54). As described above, capital controls made low interest rates possible, without which the 
fiscal cost of these central bank bills – and thus also the exchange rate policies – would have been 
very high and probably unsustainable (Lardy, 2008; Prasad, 2009b, p. 105; Vermeiren, 2014, p. 123). 
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Second, the imposition of capital controls is crucial for the financing of investment by SOBs because 
they imply that households have few options but to deposit their savings at the SOBs, often at 
negative real deposit interest rates (which implies that there is an “implicit tax” on these deposits) 
(see Figure 5.10; Borst, 2012; Huang, 2002, p. 383; Lardy, 2008; Palley, 2006, p. 73; Prasad, 2009b, p. 
105; Zhang, 2012a, pp. 87-88, 2012b, pp. 41, 53).xviii Controls on capital outflows have largely 
prevented the large pool of Chinese household savings from seeking higher returns abroad. 
Moreover, the absence of deep and liquid stock and bond markets implies that there are few 
alternatives to funnelling savings into deposits with banks. Finally, the small market share of foreign 
banks means that the only genuine possibility within China is to deposit savings at SOBs. 
Consequently, SOBs have plentiful cheap household savings at their disposal to provide cheap loans 
to SOEs. The liberalization of capital controls could thus endanger the SOBs and their profits (Lardy & 
Douglass, 2011; Yao, 2013). It would give households the possibility to search for higher returns on 
their savings in domestic or foreign capital markets or foreign banks. In any case, interest rate 
liberalization, closely related to capital account liberalization, would significantly reduce the banks’ 
interest margins and profits. 
 
Figure 5.10: Deposit interest rate China (%) (partially own calculations, based on data from World 
Bank, 2014b) 
 
As a more open capital account could jeopardize the SOBs, it could also put the cheap capital used 
for investment by SOEs in jeopardy (Chancellor, 2013; Dean, 2000, pp. 64-65; Ferri & Liu, 2010; Shinn, 
2014; Yao, 2013). In other words, households “are forced to subsidize the borrowing costs of SOEs, 
which receive the bulk of bank loans in China” (Vermeiren, 2014, p. 129). SOEs have played a large 
role in the high investment rate. In 2006, they constituted only 8 % of all industrial firms, but they 
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were put in danger because of higher capital costs, China’s accumulation regime would have to 
change substantially. 
In sum, capital controls are crucial to maintain China’s accumulation regime. They are therefore in 
the interest of the beneficiaries of this regime, namely (largely foreign-owned) export-oriented 
industrial capital, domestic investment-oriented industrial capital and domestic banking capital. 
These are often labelled as “vested interests” holding back reform (Huang, 2013; Sender, 2013; Yao, 
2013; Zhang, 2013b; see also Hung, 2009). As Mallaby and Wethington (2012, pp. 139-140) describe 
this bloc: “State-owned banks do not want to pay depositors market interest rates. Politically 
connected borrowers, such as the state-owned construction companies that build China’s impressive 
infrastructure, do not want to give up access to cheap capital. Politically connected exporters, on 
whom provincial governors count to create jobs in their regions, do not want to give up the 
competitive advantage created by favorable exchange rate.” These social forces form an alliance that 
does not want a transformation of the current accumulation regime (Naughton, 2008; Subramanian, 
2012b; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 28). It is also clear that they are politically powerful, with 
“representatives” in the Chinese state through amongst others the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (He, 2011, 
pp. 24-26; Liew, 2004, pp. 35-37) and the National Development and Reform Commission or NDRC 
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 75). 
 
  5.3.3 The state class: challenging the heartland 
Besides the social forces benefiting from capital controls, there is a second reason why capital 
controls have been kept in place: they allow the state class to retain a certain degree of control over 
the domestic economy. The state class has been reluctant to give up control, as this could undermine 
China’s contender position. Indeed, there is a “deep-seated reluctance to abandon tools used to 
maintain the state’s influence over the economy” (Rosen & Hanemann, 2009). 
First, control over international capital flows has given China’s authorities the ability to maintain 
financial stability and to avoid crisis and volatility (Huang, 2002, p. 383; Prasad, 2009b, p. 120). 
Indeed, “the economy has to some extent been spared the potentially destabilizing effects of 
unwanted capital movements”, especially short-term capital flows (Laurenceson & Tang, 2005). The 
dominance of FDI have meant that China “has been able to control the risks and get more of the 
promised benefits of financial integration than many emerging market that have taken a less 
cautious approach to capital account liberalization” (Prasad & Wei, 2007, pp. 451-452). An open 
capital account could lead to large capital outflows and a banking crisis (Lardy & Douglass, 2011; 
Palley, 2006, p. 75; Prasad, 2009b, p. 120). In this sense, China’s contender state can be seen as “the 
logical institutional means by which weaker players in the global system can withstand the sheer 
power of international financial flows” (McNally, 2012, p. 768). 
Second, as outlined above, capital controls have been crucial in maintaining China’s distinct 
accumulation regime, which resulted in high growth rates. It has been long known that capital 
controls may allow a country to deviate from neoliberal macroeconomic, institutional and financial 
sector policies (…). By retaining capital controls, China has, at least to a certain extent, also been able 
to control and guide domestic flows (Baek, 2005, p. 491; Cookson, 2012b; Leung & Mok, 2000, pp. 
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45-46; McNally, 2012, p. 753; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 300). While commercial performance may 
have been dismal at times, giving rise to a large amount of non-performing loans (NPL’s), “the overall 
impact of state banks on China’s economic development appears to have been positive and 
sustainable” (Laurenceson & Chai, 2001, p. 211). 
Thus, in sum: “Regulating the inflow and outflow of capital has been a cornerstone of China’s 
development reforms. For more than three decades after Deng Xiaoping’s crucial reforms began, 
China’s capital account policies were part of an apparatus to direct credit toward strategic 
development goals while maintaining financial stability” (Gallagher, Ocampo, Zhang & Yu, 2014). 
Capital controls allow the state class to keep a certain measure of control over the economy by 
keeping transnationally-oriented financial capital from flowing freely (Amin, 2013, p. 24; Baek, 2005, 
p. 486). As David Harvey (2005, p. 123) puts it: “The barriers erected to foreign portfolio investment 
effectively limit the powers of international finance capital over the Chinese state. The reluctance to 
permit forms of financial intermediation other than the state-owned banks – such as stock markets 
and capital markets – deprives capital of one of its key weapons vis-à-vis state power.” Consequently, 
capital account liberalization could imply that China’s state class, in the form of the CCP, would lose 
control over the economy (Palley, 2006, p. 76; The Economist, 2012). As such, the liberalization of 
capital controls could strongly undermine China’s contender position. The fraction of the state class 
that wants to keep control thus provides important support for the social forces benefiting from 
China’s accumulation regime, namely Chinese (especially state-owned) and foreign industrial capital 
and Chinese banking capital. It could be argued that these social forces were forming a historic bloc 
in the Gramscian sense before the global financial crisis. This historic bloc has thus benefited from 
and underpinned China’s capital controls regime. 
 
 5.4 Capital account liberalization: integration into the heartland? 
  5.4.1 Capital account liberalization after the crisis 
Despite the above assessment that the relaxation of capital controls could undermine China’s 
contender position, the gradual liberalization that had already taken place before the crisis (e.g. 
Laurenceson & Tang, 2005; Ma & McCauley, 2007), was reinforced and even speeded up after the 
crisis. Both controls on inflows, outflows and currency convertibility have been relaxed. First, the 
potential for foreign capital inflows into China’s financial markets has considerably grown. The QFII 
has been expanded by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), with a quota increase 
from US$10bn to US$30bn in 2007, and to US$80bn in 2012 (Cookson, 2012a; Wei, 2013, SAFE, 
2012a, 2012b; Suttle et al., 2012), “in one of the most significant relaxations of its strict capital 
controls in more than a decade” (Cookson, 2012a). In July 2012, the limit of 20% on shares of a single 
company owned by all QFIIs together was increased to 30% (SSE, 2012). 
Moreover, it was also announced that QFIIs would be allowed to invest in the interbank bond 
market. However, as of May 2012, the total amount approved under the QFII schema was only 
US$26bn (SAFE, 2012b), and foreign investors still account for only 1 % of stock market capitalization 
(Rabinovitch, 2011; Cookson, 2012a; see also Xinhua, 2013). Yet more liberalization was fostered, as 
the quota was further increased to US$150bn in July 2013, and the outstanding amount stood at 
US$59.7bn in August 2014 (Reuters, 2014; Xinhua, 2013). Moreover, while the number of QFII 
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licences was still beneath 100 at the end of 2010 (Zhang, 2012a, p. 86), it has expanded to around 
270 by July 2014 (China-XBR, 2014b). 
In December 2011 a new scheme has also come into being, named the Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (RQFII) scheme (also called the mini QFII scheme), allowing foreign investors to 
invest their offshore renminbi holdings in China’s stock markets (Fung & Yau, 2012, p. 119; Suttle et 
al., 2012; SWIFT, 2011). The quota of the Hong Kong RQFII scheme was increased from the initial 
RMB20bn first to RMB70bn in April 2012, and then to RMB270bn in November 2012, and the 
outstanding amount of the RQDFII scheme for all countries, assigned to 89 foreign institutional 
investors, has risen to RMB278.6bn in August 2014 (China-XBR, 2014c; Tan, 2014; Timewell, 2014; 
Wu, 2012).xix 
Second, the potential for outflows of Chinese financial capital has also increased. The investment 
quota of the QDII programme has increased from $42.17bn in 2007 to $75.247bn in March 2012 
(SAFE, 2012a). 2012 saw the biggest increase in quotas since its introduction, and the central bank is 
thinking about a second program which would allow Chinese investors to invest overseas directly 
(Wei, 2013). The number of QDII licensed institutions has grown from 40 to 96. Despite the 
significant expansion, the QDII programme remains small compared to total Chinese household 
savings (Lardy & Douglass, 2011). Moreover, although the number of quota holders increased further 
to 121 in August 2014, the outstanding amount increased only slightly in 2013 and the first half of 
2014, reaching US$84.5bn in August 2014 (China-XBR, 2014a). 
Another innovation is the Qualified Domestic Limited Partner programme, which has given foreign 
hedge funds permission to tap China’s savings (Rabinovitch, 2012a). The low ceiling (about $5bn), 
however, implies that this will at the moment not be a significant opportunity for capital outflows. 
Another novelty was that from 2009 on qualified enterprises were permitted “to use, within a certain 
limit, their self-owned foreign exchange, foreign exchange purchased with RMB and other permitted 
foreign exchange to grant overseas loans, and such matters as the opening of special foreign 
exchange accounts for overseas loans” (SAFE, 2012a). Finally, the quota for individual purchases of 
foreign exchange for personal settlement was increased in 2007 from $20,000 to $50,000 (Ji, 2011; 
Ma & McCauley, 2007; PBOC, 2008, p. 143). 
While these new openings are unlikely to significantly change the interpenetration between 
domestic and foreign capital, both in China and abroad, the QFII, QDII and RQFII programmes 
“represent important steps opening and liberalizing the financial sector” (Suttle et al., 2012), and 
they signal the path that has been chosen. A clearer signal, however, and the main transformation in 
the integration with global financial markets concerns the liberalization of controls on currency 
convertibility and the international use of the RMB (Gallagher, Ocampo, Zhang & Yu, 2014; for the 
various policies, see Cheung, Ma & McCauley, 2011, pp. 50-53; Dobson & Masson, 2009, p. 129; Fung 
& Yau, 2012; Gao & Yu, 2009; Huang & Lynch, 2013, pp. 576-577; Prasad & Ye, 2012; Ranjan & 
Prakash, 2010; Sekine, 2011; Shotter & Wildau, 2014; Suttle et al., 2012; Yu, 2012; Zhang, 2012a, p. 
87). First, China has, after initial experiments, promoted the use of the RMB in trade settlement, and 
the Chinese currency is now widely and increasingly used for trade with especially Asian countries.xx 
Second, in the aftermath of the global crisis, bilateral currency swap agreements have been 
concluded with around 25 countries. Third, in 2007 Chinese financial institutions were allowed to 
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issue RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong, the so-called dim sum bonds. The issuers have 
gradually expanded to many other actors, such as Chinese domestic enterprises and TNCs. 
Fourth, some foreign financial investors, including foreign central banks and Hong Kong-based RMB-
settlement banks were allowed to invest in China’s domestic bond market. The Chinese authorities 
have also allowed some 20 designated overseas banks to invest in the interbank bond market. Entry, 
however, is still subject to a quota and to approval. Fifth, since 2005, international development 
institutions were allowed to issue RMB-denominated bonds in China, the so-called panda bonds. 
Sixth, while RMB-denominated deposits in Hong Kong were already introduced in February 2004, 
there has been a fairly rapid growth after 2007 both in the value of deposits, from RMB33.4bn in 
December 2007 to RMB925.9bn in June 2014 (HKMA, 2014). There have also been measures to 
expand the convertibility of the RMB.xxi 
 
  5.4.2 The crisis of China’s accumulation regime 
To many, the global financial crisis that broke out in 2007 highlighted the capacity of the Chinese 
state “to mobilise the economy behind a national effort when it needs to” (Breslin, 2011a, p. 186). 
Moreover, as China’s financial system was – despite the strong fall of the stock market (see Figure 
5.14) – relatively undamaged, and China did not experience a sharp fall in its exchange rate against 
the dollar contrary to what happened in other EMDCs (see Figure 5.11; de Haan, 2010, p. 761; 
Interview 2 & 8; Liang, 2010, pp. 61-62; Yu, 2010, p. 2), this could have resulted in a backlash against 
free capital mobility and integration into the heartland, as happened in the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis in 1997-98. As Huang and Lynch (2013, p. 573) point out: “If anything, the financial turmoil in 
recent years could be expected to have made Chinese policymakers more inclined to retain controls 
over key financial variables and capital movements than to pursue liberalization.” 
 
Figure 5.11: RMB-USD exchange rate, 2001-2014 (own calculations, based on data from Board of 
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However, as demonstrated above, this has not been the case, as China has liberalized cross-border 
capital flows significantly, and further liberalization is on the agenda. What are the causes of this 
puzzle? It could be argued that the hegemony of the historic bloc described above (see 5.3.3) has 
been unraveling. The most important reason is that the American-centred crisis led to a general 
feeling that China’s accumulation regime “no longer contributes to a desirable pattern of 
development” (Wolf, 2012; also Sender, 2012a). As the prominent Chinese economist Yu Yongding 
has argued (Yu, 2009a): “China’s investment-driven and export-led growth pattern is not sustainable. 
(...) The global economic crisis exposed the vulnerability of China’s growth pattern in a dramatic 
fashion.” The latest IMF Country Report stated: “With economic, social and environmental challenges 
rising, the need for another round of reforms has become ever more urgent” (IMF, 2014a). 
First, the main lesson drawn from the global financial crisis is that China’s accumulation regime, 
especially the export-oriented growth based on cheap labour, is no more viable for several reasons 
(Aglietta, 2013). In particular, while China was able to avoid financial havoc because of its capital 
controls and low financial integration, it was largely hit through the collapse of exports (Bibow, 2011; 
Breslin, 2011a, pp. 190-191; de Haan, 2010, p. 763; Liang, 2010, p. 65; Mallaby & Wethington, 2012, 
p. 138; Yu, 2009a, 2010, pp. 2-3; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 24). Exports were 27% lower in May 2009 than 
in May 2008 (CIGI/CASS, 2009), and exports as a share of GDP fell from more than 38% in 2007 to 
less than 30% in 2009 (see Figure 5.3). It is estimated that between 20 and 36 million jobs were lost 
because of the crisis, especially in export-oriented sectors (World Bank, 2013b). China’s excess 
capacity in many sectors has been widely reported (e.g. Akyüz, 2011, p. 16; EU Chamber of 
Commerce in China, 2009; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 64; Yu, 2010, p. 3). In sum, “the sharp 
drop in exports has raised questions regarding whether China can return to rapid and sustained 
export-led growth as the world economy recovers from the crisis” (Akyüz, 2011, p. 2). 
Second, there are concerns about China’s dependence on the US dollar (Chen & Cheung, 2011, p. 14; 
Cheung, Ma & McCauley, 2011, p. 45; Chin & Wang, 2010, p. 3-5; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 105; Vermeiren, 
2014, p. 121). After the Asian crisis, to protect itself against a run on the currency, China started 
accumulating massive foreign reserves (especially after 2004) (see Figure 5.12; Corden, 2009, p. 435; 
Interview 1; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 292). The problem is that a depreciating dollar, as well as US 
inflation, could affect the value of China’s international reserves. China’s concerns about the dollar 
were thus magnified by the depreciating dollar, which affected the value of China’s international 
reserves (Bowles & Wang, 2013, p. 1376; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 105; Huang, 2010; Kynge, 2014; Yu, 
2009a, 2010, p. 3). However, if China disposes of its dollar reserves, the dollar would fall further. 
China is thus “stuck” with its dollar reserves, captured in the notion of the “dollar trap” (Krugman, 
2009; Lim, 2010, p. 680; Mallaby & Wethington, 2012, p. 140; Wade, 2009, p. 545; Yu, 2009a). In 
sum, as two CASS scholars stated (Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 105): “The current crisis has exposed the 
vulnerability of China’s financial position under the existing international monetary system, which is 




Figure 5.12: Foreign exchange reserves China (data from SAFE, 2014b) 
 
The lesson learnt by a fraction of China’s state class was therefore that China needs to change its 
accumulation regime if it wants to remain a challenger to the Western heartland in general and 
American hegemony. One of the solutions is to develop domestic demand, to diminish the reliance 
on exports (Liang, 2010, p. 66; Palley, 2006, p. 81). Rebalancing the economy away from exports and 
towards domestic consumption is necessary both to keep up economic growth and maintain social 
stability, and to become less dependent on the US consumption market and the US dollar. One of the 
deeper causes of the sluggish consumption, and the concomitant reliance on exports, is the falling 
wage share and growing inequality, as well as a high precautionary saving rate to compensate for 
inadequate government provision of public goods such as health care, education, pensions and 
housing (see Akyüz, 2011, p. 3; Foster & McChesney, 2012, p. 10; Hong, Vos & Yao, 2008, pp. 41-42; 
Hung, 2008, p. 162). Rebalancing the economy away from investment- and export-led growth 
towards domestic consumption thus requires an increasing wage share, reduced inequality, and the 
development of a welfare state (which necessitates higher taxes), which implies a significant 
redistribution towards China’s workers (Akyüz, 2011, p. 21; Liang, 2010, p. 70; Palley, 2006, pp. 85-
87; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 336; Piovani & Li, 2011, p. 88; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 27). 
Making abstraction of ecological constraints, there are two major problems with rebalancing. First, 
the wage hikes that are necessary to increase consumption could possibly lead to the relocation of 
(foreign-owned) plants to countries with lower wages (Foster & McChesney, 2012, p. 9). There have 
been indications that some industrial corporations have already relocated or are about to relocate to 
even cheaper locations, such as Cambodia and Bangladesh (Bradsher, 2013; CLB, 2014; Morgan, 
2008, p. 431; Wang, Appelbaum, Degiuli & Lichtenstein, 2009, pp. 497-498; Weil, 2006, p. 46). 
Second, an increase in the wage share will be and is already being opposed vigorously by the coastal 
export-oriented foreign and domestic industrial capitalists (Hung, 2009, p. 6; Li, 2011, pp. 47-48; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 336; Zhao, 2012, p. 4). As Li (2011, p. 48) puts it: “Which section of the 
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class?” Consequently, rebalancing requires a shift in the power relations, and the breaking of the 
power of China’s coastal urban elite (Hung, 2009, p. 6; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 28). 
It seems that this shift has not occurred until now. While exports fell strongly as a share of GDP after 
the crisis because of the crisis in advanced countries, the share of capital formation has grown 
strongly, from around 42% before the crisis to almost 50% of GDP in 2009-2013 (see Figure 5.8; data 
from World Bank, 2014b). An important cause was the large fiscal stimulus (14% of GDP) 
implemented after the crisis, which was strongly geared towards investment (amongst others in 
infrastructure) (Akyüz, 2011, pp. 16-17; Breslin, 2011a, p. 194; EU Chamber of Commerce in China, 
2009; de Haan, 2010, pp. 764-765; Hung, 2009, p. 22; Liang, 2010, p. 68; Yu, 2009a; Vermeiren, 2014, 
pp. 144-147; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 27). This perpetuates China’s unsustainable accumulation regime 
and only leads to more overcapacity, export dependency and the built-up of dollar reserves. In the 
absence of fundamental rebalancing, China is left with trying to reduce the country’s dependence on 
the US dollar, which has been the main aim of China’s international financial strategy after the crisis 
(Interview 2; Zhang, 2009, p. 22). The paradox is that this has led to a strategy that could be 
called“challenging America through Americanization”.xxii In particular, to challenge the hegemony of 
the dollar it was assumed that China needs, amongst other things, an internationalized and 
internationally accepted currency.xxiii 
The global economic crisis has thus been a key catalyst of the internationalization of China’s currency 
(Bowles & Wang, 2013, p. 1374). As Zhang (2012a, p. 87) writes: “After the global financial crisis, the 
Chinese government has been promoting RMB internationalization aggressively.” The 
“internationalization of the renminbi” has become an important target for Chinese policymakers, and 
a much-debated theme in academia (see e.g. Bowles & Wang, 2013; Eichengreen, Walsh & Weir, 
2014; McCauley, 2011) and the international financial press (e.g. Hancock, 2013; Jones, 2013). 
McNally (2012, p. 763) argues that China’s current strategy “attempts to benefit from the 
internationalization of the yuan, while not upsetting China’s development model”. 
However, many analysts are sceptic whether this can be maintained. It is commonly accepted that 
capital controls are a huge impediment to the internationalization of the renminbi (Chin & Wang, 
2010, p. 13; Dobson & Masson, 2009, p. 125; Fung & Yau, 2012, p. 108; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 112, p. 
118; He, 2013, p. 240; Hu, 2008, p. 222; Kahler, 2013, pp. 714-715; Lee, 2010; Ross, 2014). 
Consequently, next to liberalized, deep and liquid financial markets, “full internationalisation 
ultimately requires a fully open capital account” (Cheung, Ma & McCauley, 2011, p. 63), or as Yu 
Yongding puts it (Yu, 2012): “The process of yuan internationalization essentially is a process of 
capital account liberalization.”xxiv As outlined above, however, capital account liberalization is 
incompatible with the export- and investment-led accumulation regime. Barry Eichengreen (2011) 
writes that the liberalization of capital controls “presupposes fundamental changes in China’s 
development model”. While before the crisis, capital account policies where largely a domestic issue, 
they are now seen in the bigger picture of the international financial architecture (Interview 2). This 
brings the contradiction to the fore between China’s domestic accumulation regime and concomitant 





  5.4.3 The social forces pushing for liberalization 
The objective of RMB internationalization has provided an opportunity for the social forces which 
have long been in favour of capital account convertibility. The main force backing liberalization 
consists of a group of economic reformers, especially technocrats, but also academics and private 
analysts in think tanks. They are for the most part trained in (Western) neoclassical economics, which 
has become dominant both in the Chinese universities’ economics departments (Interview 8; Kotz, 
2007, pp. 59-60; Li, 2009a, pp. 15-18; Morgan, 2004, p. 74; Naughton, 2003; also Cheng, 2010, p. 55) 
and with political and bureaucratic leaders (Wang Q. K., 2011, p. 465). Their objectives are to make 
the domestic economy more market-led, to make it more attractive to international capital and more 
in line with international standards (e.g. Zhou, 2005, p. 9; see also Breslin, 2003, pp. 227-228). 
One of the main agencies within reform this technocrat group is China’s central bank, the People’s 
bank of China (PBOC), which is largely staffed by pro-market Western-educated economists and 
which, according to one scholar, had become “the most influential ministry in economic affairs” by 
the late-1990s (Liew, 2004, p. 50; see also Chovanec, 2013; Kennedy, 2008, p. 75; Wei & Davis, 
2014a). The president of the PBOC, Zhou Xiaochuan, is in particular considered as a powerful and 
determined reformer (e.g. Kennedy, 2008, p. 76; Naughton, 2013; Yao, 2013; Wei & Davis, 2014b). 
The PBOC has been the key organ in the push towards convertibility (Interview 2, 3 & 6). Since 2002, 
the PBOC has been advocating further capital account liberalization (Yu, 2012).xxv In 2011, Zhou 
argued (in Prudhomme, 2011, author’s translation): “We know we have to render our currency 
convertible and liberalize the capital account.” In a 2012 report the central bank proposes a roadmap 
for capital account liberalization in three phases (Rabinovitch, 2012b; Sekine, 2012a; Yu, 2013). In 
November 2013 Zhou said that investment caps for both the QFII and QDII programs will be phased 
out, and this was reiterated in the official PBOC 2013 Annual Report (released in English in August 
2014) (Li & Zhou, 2013; PBOC, 2014). 
As several journalists have argued, the recent decision that Zhou can remain in office as head of the 
PBOC even after the official retirement age of 65, could signal that China’s new leaders want to 
maintain the momentum of reform and speed up the transition to a new accumulation regime, in 
particular dismantling capital controls (Lim & Bi, 2013; Yao, 2013). Another indication is that Yi Gang, 
vice-governor of the PBOC and close to Zhou Xiaochuan, has been named a senior official in the CCP’s 
top economic advisory organ in June 2014 (Wei & Davis, 2014b).xxvi 
These technocrats and reformers not only support capital account liberalization as a goal itself, but 
also because it would force a change in the domestic accumulation regime, necessitating financial 
liberalization and market reform (Huang & Lynch, 2013, p. 574; Interview 2, 3 & 6). In this regard, the 
internationalization of the renminbi and capital account liberalization are similar to entry into the 
WTO in 2001, which provided domestic reformers “with an external tool to use to pressure reluctant 
domestic forces to accept greater domestic liberalization” (Breslin, 2003, p. 226; see also Breslin, 
2004, p. 665; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 293; Prasad & Rajan, 2008, p. 169; Subramanian, 2012b). It 
has long been known that internal and external liberalization in China (and arguably, everywhere) are 
strongly interrelated (Dean, 2000, pp. 63-64; Zhang, 2003b, p. 707). That is also one of the reasons 
why Western actors are keen on the liberalization of China’s capital account: not only because it 
would supply them with new profitable investment opportunities, but also because it could generate 
domestic change within China.  
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A second group underpinning liberalization entails Chinese financial capital in the form of the 
wealthy Chinese. Because of economic growth and increasing inequality, with the gains going to the 
higher-income groups after 1987 (see Figure 5.13), a “relatively small but numerically significant 
upper income group of Chinese” (Hart-Landsberg, 2006, p. 14) has come into being.xxvii This wealthy 
“one per cent” – owning one third of Chinese wealth according to a recent survey (Xinhua, 2014) – 
consists of, next to CCP officials, managers of SOEs and SOBs, the executives of large and medium-
sized companies, and the owners of large or medium-sized private firms (Andreas, 2008, p. 135; He, 
2000, pp. 73-74; Petras, 2008, p. 323).xxviii 
 
Figure 5.13: Income shares China (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
This wealthy elite is intimately related with China’s state class.xxix The capitalist restoration in China 
has changed the social base of the CCP: “In the marketization process, the boundary between the 
political elite and the owners of capital grows gradually more indistinct. The political party is thus 
changing its class basis” (Wang H., 2006, p. 39; see also Breslin, 2004, p. 672; Hung, 2008, p. 157; 
Liew, 2005, p. 342). On the one hand, members of the state class have “embourgeoisied” with the 
sell-off of state-owned assets and the changing nature of SOEs (So, 2003, pp. 367-368). On the other 
hand, while the number of private entrepreneurs within the CCP (sometimes called “red capitalists”) 
already grew strongly in the 1990s, then  president Jiang Zemin’s July 2001 speech on the “Three 
Represents” implied that the CCP now would also represent capitalists instead of only farmers and 
workers (Dickson, 2004, pp. 251-252; Li, 2009b, p. 20; Liew, 2005, pp. 343-344). Since 2002, then, 
private entrepreneurs have officially been allowed as Party members (Dickson, 2007, p. 827; Yan, 
2012). Not unlike state managers, “private” entrepreneurs are wholly dependent on the CCP (Khong, 
2014). But they also have strong (family) ties with CCP officials (Andreas, 2008, p. 139; Barboza, 
2012; McNally & Wright, 2010). This also implies that they have access to political power, and that 
their political weight has grown strongly (Petras, 2008, p. 324). There is thus a growing integration, as 
well as blurring, of party and business elites, and of private and state purposes (ten Brink, 2011; 
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McNally, 2012, p. 751; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 493). This has been captured in the notion of a 
“cadre-capitalist class” (So, 2003, p. 369). 
This elite is eager for more investment (and consumption) opportunities abroad. As outlined above, 
real negative interest rates on deposits (see Figure 5.10) have meant low returns on their savings. 
Wealthy Chinese have therefore been looking for other investment channels with higher returns on 
capital (Cooper, 2012). The stock market has proven to be a bad option, due to volatility and a large 
fall in stock prices after the global economic crisis (see Figure 5.14).xxx Another favourite outlet has 
been investment and speculation in real estate (see e.g. Rabinovitch, 2012a; Huang, 2013; Zhang & 
Sun, 2006, p. 63). While many analysts have talked about a housing and real estate bubble (Akyüz, 
2011, pp. 16-17; CIGI/CASS, 2009; Foster & McChesney, 2012, p. 2; IMF, 2014a; Walker & Buck, 2007, 
p. 49; Zhu & Kotz, 2011, p. 23), it seems that recently this bubble has run out of steam, and that the 
bubble is about to burst (see Anderlini, 2014; Davis, 2014b).xxxi 
 
Figure 5.14: Stock market capitalization China (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
The search for higher yields has also been important in fuelling the shadow banking sector in China, 
especially via the off-balance wealth management products (WMPs) which allow for higher returns, 
but are also more risky investments (see Barnett & Roache, 2014; Cookson, 2011b; Cooper, 2012; 
Huang, 2013; IMF, 2014a; Rabinovitch, 2012d; The Economist, 2013; Yu, 2014). It has been argued 
that the development of this riskier shadow banking sector (as well as the development of stock 
market and real estate bubbles) demonstrates the need to create more options for capital outflows 
(Huang & Lynch, 2013, p. 583; see also Anderlini, 2014). 
In any case, it has been widely reported that wealthy individuals have already tried to invest more of 
their money abroad, sometimes through illegal capital flight (Anderlini, 2011b; Chancellor, 2012; 
Ding, 2000; Frangos, Orlik & Wei, 2012; Harris, 2012, p. 27; Harvey, 2005, pp. 146-147; Huang, 2014; 
Lardy & Douglass, 2011; Pomfret, 2014; Qin, 2014; Rabinovitch, 2012c; Wei, 2014).xxxii Some of them, 
especially corrupt officials, are afraid that one day their property might be nationalized, or that 
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this reason and to obtain higher returns, they want to transfer their wealth abroad. Estimates 
suggest that the top 1 per cent of households owns between 30 and 50 per cent of bank deposits, so 
capital outflows by wealthy individuals might have a significant impact on the Chinese economy, and 
it might undermine the investment- and export-led accumulation regime (Chancellor, 2011). There is 
thus a contradiction between their position as wealthy individuals on the one hand and as owners 
and managers of the SOEs and SOBs as well as members of the state class on the other hand 
(Interview 8).xxxiv 
Finally, it is clear that foreign financial capital is keen on exploiting more opportunities for investment 
in China’s financial markets and banking sector (see e.g. Chancellor, 2013; Hutchens, 2002, p. 34; 
Poole, 2006; PwC, 2012a; Strongin, 2006; US-China Business Council staff, 2007; Wang Y., 2013; also 
Interview 2, 6 & 8).xxxv As researchers of the Deutsche Bank state, “China remains one of the most 
insulated financial markets in the global arena, and many market participants are hoping for greater 
integration with international financial markets” (Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009). Despite the fact that 
export-oriented TNCs have benefited from China’s competitive exchange rate regime supported by 
capital controls, TNCs in general are also in favour of more opening up (Interview 2, 6 & 8).xxxvi For 
instance, the US-China Business council’s “long-standing position is that China should move faster to 
implement the financial sector reforms needed to remove capital controls” (Henry, 2012). Numerous 
reports by foreign business associations call for the liberalization of capital controls, increasing RMB 
convertibility, and the easing of restrictions in the financial sector (e.g. AmCham China, 2011, 2013; 
AmCham Shanghai, 2011; EU Chamber of Commerce in China, 2014). 
These TNCs and Western banks are supported by Western states. According to a former US Treasury 
official in Beijing, the opening up to foreign investment in financial services is one of the main 
priorities of the US state (see Katz, 2014; see also Wade, 2008, p. 51).xxxvii Although the IMF has (more 
recently) advocated a gradual, cautious approach (IMF, 2014a; Prasad, Rumbaugh & Wang, 2005; see 
also Davis & Wei, 2013c), it has in general also been in favour of and pushing for capital account 
liberalization and the convertibility of the RMB (e.g. IMF, 2014a; Lagarde, 2012; Leigh & Podpiera, 
2006; Sahay, 2013; see also Bretton Woods Project, 2012).xxxviii As the IMF’s Deputy Director for the 
Asia Department, Markus Rodlauer (2013, p. 281) has stated, “China will be served well by continuing 
its careful approach, (...). (...) At the same time, liberalization must continue, and China’s ultimate 
goal to make the Renminbi fully convertible is well placed.” 
 
  5.4.4 Opposition from the state class 
The dismantling of controls attracts opposition from the historic bloc identified above (see 5.3.3), as 
exporters, SOEs and SOBs are likely “to be nervous about currency internationalization, for fear of 
breaking the levers of growth at home” (Helleiner & Malkin, 2012, p. 52). However, the cohesion and 
strength of this historic bloc has been weakened not only by the exhaustion of China’s accumulation 
regimexxxix, but also because Chinese state-owned capital has contradictory interests. As outlined 
above, they have been the main beneficiaries of China’s export- and investment-based accumulation 
regime and have thus benefited substantially from China’s capital controls. On the other hand, 
however, they are increasingly globally active, due to “enterprise-led overseas investment, despite 
the constraints imposed by China’s political system and economic transition” (Hong & Sun, 2006, p. 
613; see also Breslin, 2013, p. 1274; Song, Yang & Zhang, 2011, p. 39). In 2001, the Chinese 
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government adopted its “Going Out Strategy” (first announced in 1999) in the Tenth Five-Year Plan 
(Gonzalez-Vicente, 2011, p. 402; Hong & Sun, 2006, p. 621; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010, p. 75; Zhang & 
Daly, 2011, p. 391), and the outward FDI stock has grown vigorously especially since 2006, to reach 
more than 6% of GDP in 2012 (Figure 5.4; see also Rosen & Hanemann, 2009; Suttle et al., 2012; 
Zhang, 2012a, p. 85). A significant part of overseas investment is done by SOEs (e.g. Morck, Yeung & 
Zhao, 2008, p. 340). As SOEs go abroad, they might benefit from and be in favour of RMB 
internationalization and thus capital account liberalization (Interview 1).xl 
SOBs have also become globally activexli, especially through cross-border lending, which accounted 
for almost 60% of non-reserve outward investment in 2011 (Aksoy, 2014; Lund et al., 2013; see also 
Hansakul, Dyck & Kern, 2009; Harris, 2009, p. 19; Sekine, 2010; Timewell, 2012).xlii They also benefit 
from the increasing use of international RMB transactions, and are keen to become more 
internationalized (see Gao, 2013; KPMG, 2013; Xiao, 2012). In sum, both industrial and banking SOEs 
“display an outward-looking, economically expansionist (rather than protectionist) outlook, 
integrating themselves into transnational circuits of capitalist production and finance” (van 
Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 482). The beneficiaries of SOEs and SOBs thus have 
contradictory interests: on the one hand their interests have been served well by the export- and 
investment-led accumulation regime, on the other hand their internationalization implies that they 
might benefit from a more open capital account and an internationalized RMB.xliii 
In the context of contradictory interests for SOEs and SOBs, and the absence of strong opposition 
from these actors, it has been a fraction of the state class that has opposed capital account 
liberalization. As one interviewee noted, the “system” as a whole is more concerned than individual 
components (Interview 6). The main reason is that it does not want to risk losing control over 
Chinese economic development, with fears of financial instability and capital outflows running high. 
The effectiveness of China’s capital controls has already been declining (Interview 6; Verma, 2014; 
Yu, 2009b). De facto convertibility is higher than de jure convertibility suggests. As a SAFE official has 
said (Guan, 2013, pp. 2-3): “De facto capital account convertibility is much higher due to full current 
account convertibility, close economic and financial linkages with [the] outside world especially with 
Hong Kong SAR, and large numbers of overseas Chinese as well as foreign-funded enterprises.” 
Moreover, the more China liberalizes both its capital account and its capital markets, the harder it 
will become to maintain the effectiveness of the remaining capital controls (Ma & McCauley, 2007; 
Prasad, Rumbaugh & Wang, 2005). As many analysts have argued, further capital account 
liberalization could result in more volatile and speculative capital flows, periods of capital flight, and 
crisis (Dobson & Masson, 2009, p. 134; Edwards, 2013; Fischer, 2010, p. 755; Gao & Yu, 2009, pp. 
112-114; Huang & Lynch, 2013, p. 573; Kynge, 2014; Ma & McCauley, 2007; Saull, 2012, p. 326; 
Zhang, 2012a, pp. 88-89). It is clear that China is already to a certain extent undergoing volatile, 
speculative capital flows and arbitrage (see Figure 5.15; also Cookson, 2011a; Fischer, 2010, pp. 748-
749; Gunter, 2004; Guo & Huang, 2010; IMF, 2014a; Park & Dole, 2008; SAFE, 2012c; Suttle et al., 
2012; Yu, 2009b; Zhang, 2013a).xliv Growing financial integration and capital account liberalization will 




Figure 5.15: Non-FDI capital flows China (data from SAFE, 2014a) 
 
The most controversial issue would probably be the relaxation of constraints on outflows by 
individuals.xlv Until now, Chinese residents can only take out US$50,000 a year (Davis & Wei, 2013c; 
Huang, 2014; Qin, 2014).xlvi If capital controls on outflows for individuals would be abolished, there 
could be huge capital outflows, especially in times of economic or political stress (Choyleva, 2014; 
Prasad & Ye, 2012; Yu, 2013).xlvii A crisis of the domestic financial system and a full-blown economic 
crisis could ensue (Lin, 2013; Yu, 2009b). As one interviewee therefore said (Interview 6): “Letting 
Chinese individuals take money abroad is a line they won’t cross.” 
Well-known (mainstream) Chinese economists have therefore opposed further liberalization.xlviii 
Prominent among these are Yu Yongding and his colleagues at the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) and Justin Yifu Lin, the former chief economist of the World Bank (see Lin, 
2013; Yu, 2012; see also Davis & Wei, 2013c; Interview 2; Ross, 2014; Wei & Davis, 2014a). They have 
criticized the process of capital account liberalization “disguised as yuan internationalization” (Yu, 
2012). Although it seems that many Chinese scholars are less ideologically committed to capital 
account liberalization and do not view it as a goal in itself, most of the economists do not oppose 
capital account liberalization as such, but they do oppose preliminary and hasty liberalization. They 
advocate a sequenced and cautious approach and want the Chinese government to focus on the 
essential preconditions first, such as deregulating interest rates, having a flexible exchange rate and 
stirring domestic financial markets (see Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 119; He, 2013, p. 235; Interview 2 & 3; Yu, 
2012; Zhang, 2012a, p. 91; Interview 1; INTERVIEW; see also Gallagher, Ocampo, Zhang & Yu, 2014). 
As He Fan of CASS puts it (He, 2013, p. 235): “Cleaning the house then open the door and welcome 
the guests.”xlix 
But the lifting of capital controls could not only mean less impact on international capital flows, but 
also (further) losing control over domestic flows, and over the domestic economy (Cookson, 2011a, 
2012b; Eichengreen, 2011, p. 146; Huang & Lynch, 2013, p. 575; Overholt, 2010, p. 26). This is 
already becoming clear with the liberalization of interest rates. While the profitability of (state-
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that net interest margins have been falling, partly due to the liberalization of lending interest rates, 
as well as the competition of WMPs and other higher interest rate products (Chen, 2013; KPMG, 
2013; Rabinovitch, 2012d; Sender, 2012a; Wildau, 2014a; Zhu, 2014).l As Rabinovitch (2013b) has 
written (see also Zhu, 2013): “Easy profits are fast becoming a thing of the past.” If interest rates 
were fully liberalized, the banks’ return on equity could drop between 40% and 50% (see Cai, 2013; 
see also Borst, 2012). The liberalization of deposit interest rates and/or more competition from 
foreign banks could thus bring the SOBs into trouble.li This would then also bring SOEs into trouble, 
especially because the profitability of SOEs is already quite low – and lower than for private 
enterprises (see Chen, 2014b; Lardy, 2014; The Economist, 2014; Wildau, 2014c; Yu, 2014).lii SOBs 
could thus turn to private enterprises who can afford to pay higher interest rates on loans, as 
Nicholas Lardy argues (see Davis, 2014c). 
Consequently, as Martin Wolf (2012) writes, “reform is politically fraught and economically 
disruptive”. In sum, liberalization “means giving up control” (Straszheim, 2008, p. 161), which implies 
that the state class’ power will be significantly reduced (Overholt, 2010, p. 26; Shinn, 2014), and that, 
ultimately, in contradiction with the strategy of challenging America through Americanization, 
China’s contender position might be undermined. As the Financial Times has written, challenging the 
influence of the dollar and US monetary power through the internationalization of the renminbi 
“would imply inviting in the oversight of global capitalism, the rules of which were written under Pax 
Americana” (Kynge, 2014).liii In sum, as Kahler (2013, p. 715; see also Subacchi, 2010; Vermeiren & 
Dierckx, 2012) therefore states, “Chinese ambitions to change international monetary governance 
collides with deeply entrenched patterns of domestic governance.”liv 
 
  5.4.5 The internationalization of the renminbi as a hegemonic project 
To overcome domestic opposition, the forces urging a more open capital account are using “the 
internationalization of the renminbi” as a hegemonic project to promote capital account 
liberalization. As Yu Yongding has argued (Yu, 2012): “Yuan internationalization is widely talked 
about, while capital account liberalization hides in the shadows.” While capital account convertibility 
remains controversial in China’s elite and public debate, “nobody argues against RMB 
internationalization” (Interview 2) . The internationalization of the yuan is likely to resonate with a 
broader constellation of social forces, for several reasons (see also Bowles & Wang, 2013, pp. 1377-
1378). 
First, challenging the power of the US dollar through the internationalization of the RMB “ought to 
resonate well  with nationalist sentiments and help blunt domestic opposition to currency reform” 
(Prasad, 2012; see also Chovanec, 2013; Huang & Lynch, 2013, p. 573; Interview 2 & 6; Mallaby, 
2011; Murphy & Wen, 2009). As two observers note, “once the crisis exposed China’s vulnerability, 
reform acquired a fresh patriotic gloss: advocates could paint themselves as challenging the 
dangerous hegemony of the dollar” (Mallaby & Wethington, 2012, p. 140). In the China Daily it was 
stated (in Buckley, 2008): “The world urgently needs to create a diversified currency and financial 
system and fair and just financial order that is not dependent on the United States.” The proponents 
of economic nationalism are thus in favour of the internationalization of the RMB, as it could lead to 
a world order less dominated by the US. As Subramanian (2011) argues, to overcome domestic 
opposition, “the Chinese authorities will play up the benefits of the international reserve status of 
110 
 
the yuan.” PBOC president Zhou Xiaochuan already used nationalist arguments in 2009 to convince 
the State Council to support RMB internationalization (Davis & Wei, 2013b). 
Second, it is argued that capital account liberalization could help the agenda of rebalancing, helping 
small- and medium-sized enterprises obtain more loans, and facilitating the transfer from profits to 
wages. Although this is contradictory with the finding that increasing openness is correlated with a 
declining wage share (Jayadev, 2007; for China see Luo & Jun, 2010), it is argued that full capital 
account convertibility would force a shift from an export-led model to an accumulation regime based 
on domestic consumption (e.g. Barnett, 2013; Yam, 2011). It is expected that marketization, the 
growth of capital markets and the reduction of state intervention that (must) go together with 
liberalization are necessary to solve problems such as an unequal income distribution and the lack of 
environmental protection (Huang, 2011, p. 2; Lim & Bi, 2013; Wang, 2008, pp. 27-28). Capital 
mobility is also seen to be crucial to put an end to the system of financial repression and low interest 
rates (e.g. The Economist, 2012). One of the arguments is that more competition for SOBs (from 
foreign banks or higher returns on savings abroad) would have to lead to higher interest rates on 
Chinese households’ deposits (because otherwise SOBs would not be to attract deposits anymore), 
thus resulting in a lower propensity to save and more consumption (see also Davis & Wei, 2013b). 
Further, it is thought that capital account liberalization would help small- and medium-sized 
enterprises obtain more loans, thus facilitating a shift away from the SOEs’ debt-financed investment 
(Barnett, 2013; see also Hong, Vos & Yao, 2008, p. 43).lv 
These two arguments could convince a part of the “hardline nationalists and leftist ideologues” who 
are in general opposed to globalization and integration of China into the American-led heartland 
(Garrett, 2001, pp. 414-415). As a left-wing academic stated (Interview 8): “If we don’t 
internationalize the RMB, we have to accept US dollar hegemony.” Domestic social forces are thus 
using the internationalization of the RMB to force through capital account liberalization. As Yu 
Yongding has argued: “The truth is that yuan internationalization is an effort for capital account 
liberalization in disguise” (Yu, 2012; see also Lardy & Douglass, 2011). The outcome if this strategy is 
far from predetermined, as “China’s uncertain effort to internationalize its currency has exposed the 
profound struggles that lie behind the country’s larger push to transform its economic model” 
(Mallaby & Wethington, 2012, pp. 136-137). 
 
  5.4.6 Towards the full free movement of capital in China? 
What are these struggles leading to? It should be noted that the state class has a lot of autonomy 
from societal pressures in designing capital account policies (Interview 2, 3 & 7).lvi As one interviewee 
said, capital account liberalization is a “politically-driven process” (Interview 3). Besides the general 
situation of China’s political system, there are three important reasons for this autonomy in the 
domain of capital controls. First, as noted above, interest groups (both SOEs and SOBs and wealthy 
individuals) have contradictory interests. Second, the debate on capital controls, while controversial 
during the last years, is less politicized than other issues such as exchange rate policy (Interview 2 & 
4). Third, the pressures exerted by both domestic social forces and foreign capital and states are 
limited and not that significant (Interview 1, 2, 6 & 7). In this context of relatively autonomous 




Until recently, a strong wall between the offshore renminbi market and the domestic onshore capital 
markets was still in place. At the moment, China’s capital controls remain highly restrictive in 
comparison with the Western heartland, and even compared to other emerging powers (Lardy & 
Douglass, 2011; Prasad & Ye, 2012). Capital controls have been very effective in China (McCauley & 
Ma, 2008; Zhang, 2012a, p. 88).lvii For now, it also seems that developing the offshore market is more 
a priority than opening up China’s domestic capital markets to foreign investors (Wallace, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the trend towards further liberalization is very clear (Chen & Cheung, 2011, p. 12; 
Interview 3 & 4). According to many analysts, the plan is to make the RMB “fully convertible” by 
2015, or 2020 at the latest (Davis & Wei, 2013b; Edwards, 2013; Hancock, 2013; Interview 7; Lim & 
Bi, 2013; SWIFT, 2011; see also Guan, 2013, p. 24). The 11th and 12th five-year plans both recognized 
capital account convertibility as a policy goal. In 2012, the 18th National Congress again emphasized 
the objective of full capital account convertibility (Gallagher, Ocampo, Zhang, Yu, 2014; Guan, 2013, 
p. 4; see also Anderlini, 2013).lviii At the Third Plenum in November 2013 this was reiterated, and it 
was stated that RMB convertibility would be achieved by 2020 (Li & Zhou, 2013).lix After the Third 
Plenum, central bank governor Zhou said that the quotas under both the QFII and QDII will be 
expanded and then scrapped, which would be a huge step in the opening up of China’s capital 
account. The most recent experiment towards a more open capital account was started in the 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (Borst, 2013; Hu, 2013). In sum, as PBOC Governor Zhou (2013a, p. i) has 
stated at a March 2013 conference: “The achievement of capital account convertibility is an inherent 
requirement of an open market economy, and China’s willingness and determination to strive 
towards this objective are very clear.” At the moment of writing (September 2014), it seems that 
further capital account liberalization is on the agenda. Observers have noted that Chinese 
policymakers are very enthusiastic about opening up the capital account, and that they want to open 
up faster than the IMF would advise (see Rabinovitch, 2013a). 
On the other hand, analysts have said that it is improbable that all the remaining capital controls will 
be lifted shortly and quickly (Interview 2, 6 & 8).lx The fact that China has reinforced controls or 
organized a crackdown on evasion when necessary both before the crisis (see e.g. Kawai, Lamberte & 
Takagi, 2012, p. 41) and after the crisis (Bowles & Wang, 2013, p. 1380; Wang X., 2013; Wei, 2014; 
Wheatley & Chen, 2008; Wildau, 2014b) indicates that there is more pragmatism than dogmatism on 
the issue. And while Chinese policymakers want to move towards convertibility, they do not want to 
see rapid surges of either inflows or outflows (Interview 6). In that sense, the future could bring 
“capital account liberalization with Chinese characteristics”, with an open capital account but still 
numerous “soft” controls (Prasad & Ye, 2012). Repeating a phrase in the 2012 PBOC Report, Zhou 
Xiaochuan has said that 100 per cent convertibility is not necessarily the end goal (in Wang, 2012; see 
also Rabinovitch, 2012b; SAFE, 2012a; Wolf, 2012). 
Zhou has also stated that China will continue to adopt macro-prudential measures, and regulate 
“abnormal capital flows” (Zhou, 2013a). This was reiterated by China’s Executive Director at the IMF, 
who stated (IMF, 2014a): “My authorities will accelerate the pace of capital account convertibility 
while, at the same time, monitoring cross-border capital flows closely against the backdrop of a 
volatile global monetary environment.” As Martin Wolf (2012) notes, in this sense, “full integration 
would be indefinitely delayed”. Some say China will probably turn more to market-based capital 
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controls instead of quantitative controls (Zhang, 2012a, p. 89; see also Guan, 2013, p. 6, He, 2013, p. 
241). It has also been emphasized by officials, probably partly to neutralize criticism, that capital 
controls could be re-introduced in special cases (see e.g. Davis & Wei, 2013b; Guan, 2013, p. 6; PBOC, 
2014).lxi 
Moreover, even though full capital account liberalization is the official goal, this doesn’t mean that it 
will be reached. In other words: even though a large part of the Chinese state class wants to 
liberalize, this does not necessarily imply they will liberalize, particularly if their ability to control the 
domestic economy comes into jeopardy. As Bowles and Wang (2013, p. 1380) write, “China is not 
about to remove the ‘firewall’ of capital controls while there are threats to its financial stability”. 
Several analysts argue in general ad hoc crisis management measures and short-term adjustment 
prevail over a coherent long-term, well though-out grand strategy (e.g. Bowles & Wang, 2013, pp. 
1380-1382; Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 116; Interview 6; Vermeiren, 2014, p. 187).  
With all this in mind, some think that it might take very long – if it even “ever” happens – before 
capital will be fully free to enter and leave China (e.g. Interview 2 & 6). It has been asserted that 
China has recently pushed back its loose and unofficial timetable (Yao, 2014). Moreover, if 
substantial capital flight materializes, then an interruption or even reversal of liberalization is not 
unlikely (Interview 3; Sender, 2012b). It seems in any case that even many proponents of capital 
account liberalization are also quite pragmatic (e.g. Interview 1 & 2). Combined with the concern 
over financial stability for a part of the state class, and the remaining concerns over SOEs and SOBs, 
this could well mean that there will never be a completely full free flow of capital in and out of China. 
 
  5.4.7 What about the working class? 
One actor is largely missing in the above account: labour. The integration of China into global 
capitalism “required nothing less than the remaking of its working class” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 
298), which was considered the “leading class” after the communist revolution in China in 1949 (CLB, 
2014; He, 2000, p. 69). The working class lost the status that it previously enjoyed (Blecher, 2002, p. 
293; Li, 2011, p. 42; Wen, 2008, p. 91; Weston, 2002, p. 724). Workers’ rights are not high on the 
agenda, and they are subordinate to the prerogatives of economic growth (Zhu, 2004, p. 1025). As 
Kwong (2010) therefore claims: “The secret of China’s economic miracle is its browbeaten working 
class.” 
On the one hand, as incomes have risen, poverty has decreased forcefully between 1980 and 2009 
(see Figure 5.16; see also Lippit, 2005, p. 443-444). Moreover, unemployment has remained low 
according to official figures.lxii While it increased from around 2% in the middle of the 1990s to more 
than 4% from 2002 onwards, the official figure has remained below 4.5%, even after the crisis (data 




Figure 5.16: Poverty indicators China (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
On the other hand, according to the Asian Development Bank, the wage share has fallen from 53% in 
1998 to 40% in 2007 (Liang, 2009, pp. 398-399; The Economist, 2009c; see also Hung, 2009, pp. 18-
19), and in manufacturing from 48% in the mid-1990s to 42% in the mid-2000s (Rhee, 2012).lxiii It has 
been argued that unemployment is much higher than the official statistics suggest, to even above 
10% in urban areas (e.g. Baek, 2005, p. 496; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2006, p. 23; Kiely, 2008, p. 
363; Morgan, 2008, pp. 424-425; Schucher, 2009, p. 127; Walker & Buck, 2007, p. 44). Moreover, 
inequality has grown strongly, as can be seen from a rise in the Gini coefficient from less than 0.30 in 
1981 to more than 0.42 in 2005, 2008 and 2009, and according to a recent survey even 0.55 in 2010 
(see Figure 5.17; Xie & Zhou, 2014; see also Chancellor, 2011; Harvey, 2005, p. 142; Li, 2011, pp. 44-
45; see also Figure 5.13). James Petras (2006, p. 424) highlights “the ferocious exploitation of labor, 
the massive displacement of peasants, [and] the firing of millions of skilled/semi-skilled industrial 
workers and bankrupt firms” (see also Amin, 2013, p. 20; Morgan, 2008, pp. 429-430; Zhu, 2004, p. 
1015). Especially migrant workers coming from rural to urban areas have been vigorously exploited 
(see Foster & McChesney, 2012, pp. 18-21; Wen, 2008; Zhu, 2004). Social welfare provision has also 
weakened considerably (Guan, 2000). Statistics only record cash income and do not show the loss of 
goods and services previously provided by the state and work units, such as housing, health care and 
education (Andreas, 2008, p. 135; Petras, 2006, pp. 427-428). The result of all these evolutions is 
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Figure 5.17: Inequality, Gini coefficient China (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
  
After 2002, the Hu Jintao administration started promoting the ideas of the “scientific way of 
development” and the “harmonious society”, with more attention given to social rights and 
environmental protection (de Haan, 2010, p. 763; Lee & Selden, 2008, p. 35; Li C., 2005, p. 394; 
Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 494). Until now, however, it doesn’t seem to have led to a fundamental 
transformation.lxiv 
The actions of China’s working class could have a substantial impact upon the development of the 
Chinese political economy. As Robert Cox has written: 
“The orientation of the state class is indeterminate. It can either be conservative or radical. It 
may either bargain for a better deal within the world economy of international production, or 
it may seek to overcome the unequal internal development generated by international 
capital. State classes of the first orientation are susceptible to incorporation into a new 
hegemonic world economy, and to the maintenance of state corporatist structures as the 
domestic counterpart to international capital. (…) However, a state class is only likely to 
maintain the second and more radical orientation if it is supported from below in the form of 
a genuine populism (…).” (Cox, 1981, p. 151) 
If Chinese workers grew stronger, it could thus change the orientation of China’s state class towards 
a far more radical refutation of the US-made global neoliberal order (see also van der Pijl, 2012, p. 
513). As David Harvey (2005, p. 199) has written: “The potential for labour unrest in China is 
immense though unpredictable.” There are some grounds for optimism on the prospects of a 
Chinese workers’ revolt. Authors have pointed out that wages have been rising, and that strikes have 
become more frequent (e.g. Friedman, 2014; Leung & Pun, 2009, pp. 553-554; Li, 2011, p. 41; Panitch 
& Gindin, 2012, p. 337; Therborn, 2012, p. 21). The China Labor Bulletin even writes that China now 
has “a strong and increasingly active working class, one that cannot so easily be controlled by the 
state” (CLB, 2014; see also Li, 2011). Further, a socialist tradition has to some extent both 
empowered workers and functioned to legitimize workers’ struggles and socialist values, and to hold 










back reform (see Lee & Selden, 2008, p. 33; Li, 2011, pp. 42-44; Wang, 2006, pp. 44-45; Weil, 2006, 
pp. 32-34). As Li (2010, pp. 299-300) therefore contends: “It is only a matter of time before the 
working classes in China and the rest of the semi-periphery learn how to get organized effectively, 
fighting for a broad range of economic and political demands.” Other authors share this optimism 
(see e.g. Han, 2013; Leung & Pun, 2009). 
Others signs are less encouraging, however. Wang Hui, a well-known academic, for instance, has 
stated (in Khong, 2014): “Of course every day you see different protests, but what of its class 
consciousness?” According to him, disputes are more focused on legal and individual rights than on 
politicized, collective working class demands (see also Zhu, 2004, pp. 1017-1018). Protests remain 
largely localized and unconnected to other areas (Lee & Selden, 2008, p. 34; Panitch, 2010, p. 86).lxv 
Moreover, there is no independent Chinese trade union which effectively defends workerslxvi, and the 
official trade union ACFTU still seems “incapable of breaking free of its traditional bureaucratic mind-
set and actually do something to help the workers” (CLB, 2014; see also Friedman, 2014; Howell, 
2008, p. 850). And of course, the Chinese state “has been highly active in seeking to forestall the 
emergence of a political conscious organised labour movement” (Gray, 2010, p. 450; see also Zhu, 
2004, pp. 1027-1028). While it seems unlikely that a powerful labour movement will emerge in the 
near future (Hurst & Sorace, 2011, p. 522; Therborn, 2012, p. 21; Weil, 2006, p. 43), it cannot be 
ruled out either (Harvey, 2005, pp. 150-151). If that were to happen, it is bound to have a large 
impact throughout the developing world and beyond (Gray, 2010, p. 449; Han, 2013; Li, 2011, p. 50; 
Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 337; Therborn, 2012, p. 21). 
In any case, because labour does not have any clear “representation” in China (nor within the CCP, 
nor independent of the CCP), it has not had a direct influence on China’s capital account policies until 
now.lxvii It could be argued, however, that the working class has had an indirect impact. There has 
long been a tension in China between the economic objectives of economic growth and pleasing 
(international) “market actors” and the objective of maintaining socio-economic and political 
stability, requiring control over the domestic economy (Bowles & White, 1992, p. 368; Jarvis, 2011, p. 
76; White & Bowles, 1994, p. 86; Yeung, 2009b, pp. 188, 190). The CCP’s concern with social (and 
hence political) stability implies that they need to maintain control over the domestic economy. 
Large-scale workers’ unrest could thus force the state class to choose the stability of a more closed 
capital account over the more uncertain consequences of capital account liberalization and RMB 
internationalization. 
 
 5.5 Conclusion: towards integration into the heartland? 
In this chapter I have outlined the evolution of China’s capital controls. It was argued that China’s 
extensive capital controls were underpinned by a historic bloc of social forces supporting controls for 
two reasons. First, controls are crucial to maintain China’s accumulation regime, benefiting Chinese 
(state-owned investment-oriented) and foreign (export-oriented) industrial capital and Chinese 
banking capital. Second, a fraction of China’s state class supports controls because it allows them to 
control and guide the Chinese contender state economy in the face of an economically more 
advanced (neoliberal) Western heartland.  
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Despite the hegemony of this historic bloc, controls have been significantly relaxed, especially after 
the global financial crisis. The main reason has been the strategy of a fraction of China’s state class of 
“challenging America through Americanization”, in the context of the exhaustion of the investment- 
and export-led accumulation regime. This fraction has received support from technocrats, Chinese 
financial capital in the form of wealthy individuals and foreign financial capital. The objective of 
capital account liberalization has faced opposition however, especially from the fraction of the state 
class afraid of losing control, supported by pragmatic economists concerned over sequencing and 
pacing the opening up of the capital account. To cope with this opposition, the social forces in favour 
of liberalization have resorted to “the internationalization of the RMB” as a hegemonic project. It is 
still unclear whether this strategy, tapping into nationalist and leftist feelings, will be able to 
overcome domestic opposition. 
What can we conclude about the potential of China challenging the Western norm of full capital 
mobility then? First, China has been gradually moving towards a freer flow of capital. While inward 
FDI have been liberalized earlier, especially in the last decade (since 2002) there has been a gradual 
liberalization of outward FDI, equity and bond inflows and outflows, (inward and outward) foreign 
loans and restrictions on currency convertibility. This drive towards a more open capital account was 
fastened and deepened after the global economic crisis. In sum, “the sharp increase in capital flows 
during the past several years underscores the move toward currency convertibility and the growing 
openness of the economy” (Suttle et al., 2012).lxviii 
Second, these liberalizing measures also indicate that China has internalized the norm of the free 
movement of capital. Full capital account convertibility is not only (quite enthusiastically) embraced 
by many officials and technocrats, it is also an official goal, included in important official documents 
such as the Five-Year Plans. There has been even more enthusiasm about the internationalization of 
the RMB, as a way to challenger US dollar hegemony. This embrace of the norm of the free 
movement of capital is also because, and this is the third conclusion, it seems that the main social 
forces do not strongly oppose capital account liberalization. Even though it is difficult to clearly 
delineate the positions of important social forces due to the fact that interest group representation is 
different in China than in the Western liberal democracies (Interview 6), it seems that the 
(importance of) opposition of “vested interests” (mostly SOEs and SOBs) holding back capital account 
liberalization has been overstated. It is especially a fraction of the state class which still supports 
capital controls, supported by some well-known economists. However, in general they only oppose 
the pace and sequencing of liberalization, not its inherent desirability. 
Based on these three conclusions, the case of capital controls indicates that China will not 
fundamentally resist the fact that full capital mobility is seen as a norm.lxix In larger terms this 
indicates that China is not a challenger to the Western-based, US-led neoliberal world order, as 
economic and financial integration into the heartland is likely to continue, even though this might 
undermine its contender state position.lxx As Kennedy (2010, p. 477) has argued, “in the grand 
scheme of things these challenges do not match the ideological conflicts of the Cold War between 
communism or capitalism or even those pitting the global wealthy North against the poor South.” 
Several authors argue that China has thrived because of integration into the Western (neoliberal) 




However, and this is the fourth conclusion, China obviously still deviates from the norm of the full 
free flow of capital. It has used stringent capital controls in the past, and still uses a range of capital 
controls. Despite the decreasing effectiveness of capital controls, China is still more closed off from 
short-term capital flows than most countries in the world. Moreover, while full capital account 
liberalization and convertibility could be considered to be the norm within China, this is not entirely 
uncontested. The consequence is that the norm has to a certain extent be “distorted”, as it is now 
stated that the realization of capital account convertibility does not mean that there will be no 
controls at all, that short-term capital flows will still be monitored closely, and the controls might be 
re-introduced when necessary. In this sense, the norm will be applied less rigorously, and more 
pragmatically. 
Additionally, the fact that China has deviated from the norm of the free movement of capital might 
show other countries that capital controls are not undesirable. As a large rising power, China has 
successfully used effective and comprehensive foreign exchange and capital controls (Epstein, Grabel 
& Jomo, 2004; Yu, 2009b). These stringent capital controls have not prevented high economic 
growth, and FDI has not been deterred by controls on other capital flows. As one economist has 
stated, China’s capital control regime “may be a model for other EMEs to follow” (Bibow, 2011). On 
the other hand, even if China wanted to export its “capital controls model” to other countries, it is 
doubtful whether this would work. As Francis Fukuyama (2014) has written: “China no longer 
projects a universalistic ideal beyond its own borders, as it did in the revolutionary days of Mao.” 
Indeed, several interviewees in India and Brazil indicated that China’s capital controls structure does 
not represent a model to be followed, because “we’re a democracy” (Interview 17; similar remarks 
were made in Interview 12 & 32). 
Fifth, although China is now strongly associated with transnationally-oriented capital through several 
channels,lxxi it is clear that global financial capital – and even transnationally-oriented capital in 
general – has not (yet) developed the structural power in China that it has developed in many other 
countries (including Brazil and India, see Chapter 6 and 7). In other words, “foreign transnational 
capital fractions gained importance throughout the reform process, but still have only limited 
influence on state institutions” (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 493). As Breslin (2011b, p. 1329) writes, 
China is often considered to have become integrated into the world economy on its own terms and 
conditions. China’s experience makes it clear that deviating from the neoliberal precepts and from 
subjecting itself to the power of transnationally-oriented financial capital is possible. If 
neoliberalization is seen as a class project under the auspices of global financial capital, then China 
thus clearly deviates from it. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that China’s autonomy 
has to a certain extent (and increasingly) been compromised by its decision to integrate into the 
neoliberal world economy (e.g. Breslin, 2004, p. 672), or as Lo and Zhang (2010, p. 173) write, “given 
that China has by now already deeply integrated itself into the world market, it will be a challenge of 
unprecedented scale to move  against the currents of globalisation in the pursuit of ‘constructing a 
harmonious society’.”  
Finally, if one sees the exploitation and powerlessness of the working class in order to increase 
profitability as an important feature of the global neoliberal order, “then China certainly qualifies as a 
neoliberal economy, albeit ‘with Chinese characteristics’” (Harvey, 2005, p. 144; also Kwong, 2010; 
Wu, 2008, p. 1093). In this sense, while China’s capital controls have allowed to avoid being subject 
to the whims of global financial capital, they not been used to create a more progressive order. The 
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main difference with other countries in this regard is that the country’s state class has not needed 
foreign financial capital to discipline the working classes. Capital controls, in this sense, have not at 
all been used to finally legitimize the “People” in the “People’s Republic of China”. 
 
                                                          
i
 This chapter is based on two articles, one published (Vermeiren & Dierckx, 2012), one submitted (Dierckx, 
2014a). 
ii
 Ferchen (2013, p. 39) asserts that China has been following closely the precepts of the Washington 
Consensus. Others (Liew, 2005, pp. 331-332; Lo & Zhang, 2010, p. 166) claim exactly the opposite.  
iii
 Note that this is commensurate with certain liberal-institutionalist perspectives, that state that the 
(economic) advantages of integration into the “liberal order” are large (e.g. Ikenberry, 2008). 
iv
 It has also been said that in spite of the lack of technological upgrading, the outcomes of the Mao area with 
regard to health, literacy and education were also significant (Christiansen, 2010, p. 125) 
v
 This goes against Arrighi’s claim that “the nature of development in China is not necessarily capitalist” 
(Arrighi, 2007, p. 24). For a critique of Arrighi’s claim and book, see e.g. Andreas, 2008; Chase-Dunn, 2010; 
Panitch, 2010. 
vi
 According to Harvey (2005, p. 129), while SOEs still accounted for 40% of manufacturing employment in 1990, 
this share had fallen to 14% by 2002. Note that these figures do not match the World Bank figures, which show 
a far larger share of SOEs both in 1990 and 2002. For more/other figures, see Andreas, 2008, p. 130; Baek, 
2005, p. 487; Guan, 2000, p. 119; Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004, p. 117; Lo & Zhang, 2010, p. 171; Zhu, 2012, 
p. 111. 
vii
 The number of goods of which the price was fixed by the state instead of by the “market” has also declined 
immensely, for producer goods from 100% in 1978 to 64% in 1985, 16% in 1995 and 10% in 2003, and for retail 
prices from 97% in 1978 to 47% in 1985, 9% in 1995 and 2.6% in 2003 (Hart-Landsberg, 2011, p. 58). 
viii
 The theoretical weakness of this term is noted by van Apeldoorn, de Graaff and Overbeek (2012, p. 480): “In 
these discussions the term ‘state capitalism’ is used in a rather loose and a-theoretical way as a colloquialism 
referring to a perceived tendency of an increased role of the state in the management of the economy 
(whether nationally or of the global economy as a whole).” 
ix
 The attraction of FDI FDI can be seen as a way of introducing capitalism, while at the same time preventing 
the development of a coherent, autonomous indigenous Chinese capitalist class (Harvey, 2005, p. 123). 
x
 As Wooldridge (2012) has written: “The current system of state capitalism is surely more market-friendly than 
its predecessors. State capitalists use the disciplines of the market to strengthen their national champions 
rather than to protect them from global competition.” 
xi
 According to Petras (2006, p. 426), “the notion that foreign investment and TNCs are being subordinated by 
the Chinese state to serve Chinese strategic goals” is a “questionable presumption”. 
xii
 For the evolution of China’s capital controls and the policies introduced in 1980-2010 see Prasad & Wei, 
2007, pp. 462-478; Prasad & Ye, 2012. 
xiii
 In particular, some measures were taken to foster capital inflows. In 1982, domestic entities were allowed to 
issue foreign currency bonds abroad, and in 1993 they were allowed to issue shares abroad. Foreign investors 
were allowed to invest in a special stock market, the B-share market, in 1991, but this B-market remained 
small. 
xiv
 25% was also the ceiling for foreign ownership, with a maximum share of 20% ownership for a single foreign 
investor (Planning Commission India, 2009; Yeung, 2009a). 
xv
 Before that, foreign investors had access only to the smaller dollar-denominated US-dollar B-market and to 
the Shenzhen Security Exchange denominated in Hong Kong dollars  (Chen & Thomas, 2002, p. 675). 
xvi
 Besides the interbank bond market, China also has a stock exchange bond market, but the trading volume of 
bonds on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was only about 5% of the interbank bond market (McCauley & Ma, 
2008). Moreover, QFIIs were only given access to China’s stock exchange bond market in September 2007. 
xvii
 According to Akyüz (2011, pp. 15-16), exports even accounted for between 40% and 50% of GDP growth in 
2004-2007. 
xviii
 A large part of the profitability of SOEs can be explained by the low interest rates on loans by SOBs (see 
Pettis, 2013). 
xix
 Besides Hong Kong, other countries have been assigned RQFII quota as well, namely the UK and France 
(RMB80bn each) and Singapore (RMB50bn) (Tan, 2014). Taiwan is expected to be assigned RMB100bn. 
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xx
 For instance, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Central Asian states, Russia, … (Ranjan & Prakash, 2010). 
xxi
 Companies can now use RMB for FDI into China (see Cookson, 2011a) 
xxii The partial integration of China into the global economy has already “allowed some of the dominant Anglo-
American institutions and values to enter China” (McNally, 2012, p. 750). It is clear that there has been a 
gradual and still partial Americanization of capital markets, for instance in the introduction of derivative 
markets (Bradsher, 2012; Lardy & Douglass, 2011), and the acquisition of foreign standards and practices (SAFE, 
2012b). It seems unlikely that the strategy of challenging the US through Americanization of China’s financial 
system is going to work, however. The American state capacities and financial system have “organically” grown, 
incorporating the working class through various strategies. A replication of this strategy is unlikely to succeed in 
a completely different spatiotemporal context. This has already been demonstrated with regard to the 
European Union’s emulation of the American “model” (e.g. Ryner, 2010, pp. 560-561; see also Grahl, 2011). It is 
also comparable to earlier incomplete achievements in state-led attempts of developmental catch-up (see 
Morton, 2010, p. 227). 
xxiii
 China also called for a larger role for the special drawing rights (SDRs) as a multilateral alternative for the US 
dollar (see Zhou, 2009). It was partially out of frustration with the slow or non-progress in regional financial 
cooperation and the reform of the international monetary system that RMB internationalization was seen as 
the only way to reduce the reliance on the dollar (Gao & Yu, 2009, p. 106). 
xxiv
 It has also been stated that China also needs political liberalization for its currency to get internationally 
accepted (see Kynge, 2014). 
xxv
 According to Yu (2013b), most economists in China support the PBOC’s call for capital account liberalization. 
xxvi
 One of the main economic advisors close to president Xi Jinping, Liu He, is also a market-oriented reformer 
(see Davis & Wei, 2013a). 
xxvii
 According to World Bank (2014b) data, the income share held by the highest 10% increased from  21.6% in 
1984 to 32.0% in 2005, after which it decreased to 30.0% in 2009. 
xxviii
 An outward-looking Chinese middle class (around 20% of the population) keen on Western consumption 
standards has also come into existence (Elfick, 2011; Saull, 2012, p. 332). In general, a culture of consumerism 
has developed in China (Pun, 2003, p. 487; Tomba, 2004; Walter & Buck, 2007, pp. 50-51). 
xxix
 According to one study, 2932 out of the 3220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of more than 
RMB100m (US$13m) are children of high-level cadres, and children of high-level cadres hold around 85-90% of 
the key positions in key industrial sectors (Holz, 2007, p. 38). 
xxx
 Note that “most Chinese economists believe that the alteration of the boom and bust in China’s stock 
markets so far is mainly a domestic matter”, largely due to capital controls (Yu, 2010, p. 2). 
xxxi
 For a more optimist vision on the real estate sector see Liu, 2014. 
xxxii
 According to a central bank report, corrupt officials have sent about RMB800bn abroad since the mid-1990s 
(see Rabinovitch, 2012c). The Guardian has reported how family members of China’s CCP leaders (among them 
the brother-in-law of China’s president Xi Jinping) are making use of offshore tax havens, in particular the 
British Virgin Islands, with a central role played by Western accountancy firms and banks (see Ball & Guardian 
US Interactive Team, 2014; see also Zubak-Skees, 2014). 
xxxiii
 As a New York Times journalist has written (Barboza, 2012): “The apparent efforts to conceal the wealth 
reflect the highly charged politics surrounding the country’s ruling elite, many of whom are also enormously 
wealthy but reluctant to draw attention to their riches.” 
xxxiv
 The question then becomes which of these two identities will be dominant. Several authors have argued 
that the wealthy elite “cannot even think of the longer-term interests of its own class” (He, 2000, pp. 95-96; 
also Li, 2011, p. 45). 
xxxv
 Note that while foreign banks’ market share accounted for less than 2% nationally, the market share in 
Shanghai was around 12% (PwC, 2012a). This demonstrates that foreign banks already have a considerable 
presence within China. 
xxxvi
 This is despite the fact that TNCs are to a certain extent exempt from capital controls: they are allowed to 
borrow from global capital markets as long as the amount does not exceed the gap between the firm’s 
registered capital and the investment amount (Norton Rose, 2010; Sekine, 2012b; Zhang, 2012a, p. 87). 
Analysts have argued, however, that TNCs are not (yet) a key driving political force in China (Interview 6; see 
also Vermeiren, 2014, p. 134). 
xxxvii
 It could also be argued that it is important for the US that China not only liberalizes its financial sector and 
capital account, but also gives up its “alternative” model of statist capitalism in general (see Wade, 2008, p. 51). 
xxxviii
 It could be argued that foreign financial capital is not yet very “present” within the Chinese state, as it has 
not yet penetrated the Chinese economy, and  
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xxxix
 The Economist (2014) writes: “The received wisdom in China used to be that ‘vested interests’, namely 
SOEs themselves, would thwart reform. Few believe that any more.” 
xl
 Note that although SOEs account for 72% of Chinese outward FDI, the main investors going abroad in the 
sector of manufacturing are private enterprises (with a share of 64% (see Wang & Wang, 2011, pp. 103-104). 
This might be one of the reasons why private investors are in favour of capital account liberalization (Interview 
4). 
xli
 For the Bank of China, for instance, overseas profits accounted for almost a quarter of their post-tax profits in 
the first quarter of 2012 (Xiao, 2012). 
xlii
 Around 25% of non-reserve outward investment concerned FDI, and 15% was made up by the purchase of 
foreign equities and bonds (Lund et al., 2013). Note that almost 50% of China’s non-reserve foreign assets were 
in developing countries, and that a large part of both FDI and foreign lending is linked to commodities. 
xliii
 It is not completely surprising then, that some interviewees stated they are opposed to capital account 
liberalization (Interview 2, 5 & 8), other said they are in favour of liberalization (Interview 1 & 6). 
xliv
 For instance, while a net $35.5bn hot money entered China in 2010 (Dyer, 2011), it was estimated that 
speculative outflows reached $214bn in 2012 (Edwards, 2013). 
xlv
 In 2013, it was stated that the PBOC will start a trial program (QDII2), which allows individuals to invest 
overseas, which was until now limited to institutional investors (Li & Zhou, 2013). 
xlvi
 Although it has been argued that wealthy Chinese “have always had an open capital account” (Prasad in 
Frangos, Orlik & Wei, 2012). 
xlvii
 According to estimates (Choyleva, 2014), capital outflows could reach 5 to 10% of Chinese bank deposits. 
xlviii
 This has been a minority position within China (Interview 2, 3, 4 & 5). 
xlix
 Note that opponents of liberalization can use these academics’ arguments to advance their interests without 
seeming self-interested (see Davis, 2014a). 
l
 It is no coincidence that China’s banks’ association opposes interest rate liberalization (see Davis, 2014c; Shih, 
2011, pp. 443-444). 
li
 Especially because foreign banks would target the lucrative market of high-end costumers, which has in the 
past accounted for almost 80% of the profits for Chinese banks (see Yeung, 2009b, p. 185; Zhou, 2004). 
lii
 The banking sector is still by far the most important source of financing in China. In 2011, it provided 75% of 
external financing, whereas bonds provided 14% and equity only 11% (Group of Thirty, 2013). For non-financial 
corporations 92% of debt financing consisted of loans, and only 8% of bonds. 
liii
 This contradiction is the consequence of two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, this is a classical 
example of how “the serial emergence of powerful capitalist states each so alters the terms of geopolitical 
competition as to increase the pressure on the surviving old regimes to transform themselves or succumb” 
(Callinicos, 2010, p. 495). While this has been similar for earlier developmental states, the global neoliberal 
context implies that China (assumes that it) must copy the “most advanced” capitalist model, namely the 
financialized US growth regime, to challenge the Western heartland. On the other hand, this geopolitical and 
geo-economic competition also provokes pressure for the state class maintain control over the productive 
forces in the country, and to direct the domestic economy (see Cox, 1981, p. 151). These contradictory 
pressures lead to a statist contender catch-up strategy, but the nature and form of this strategy is quite 
different from earlier contender states (see van Apeldoorn, de Graaff & Overbeek, 2012, p. 480). 
liv
 See also Mallaby, 2011. 
lv
 It is often stated that SMEs don’t get a lot of loans from SOBs (e.g. Anderlini, 2011a; Interview 5), although a 
recent assessment concludes (Borst, 2014a): “On both access to finance and cost of borrowing, China’s small 
enterprises are doing better than the conventional wisdom would suggest.” Additionally, a survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that SMEs are the lowest priority out of several activities for foreign banks (see 
PwC, 2012a). It thus far from certain that the entry of foreign banks (or expansion of capital markets) would 
improve the situation of SMEs. 
lvi
 Although one interviewee disagreed with this assessment (Interview 8). 
lvii
 However, it must also be noted that China has seen huge outflows of illicit capital, which averaged 
US$246.77bn annually in 2000-2009 (Kar & Freitas, 2011). One of the major channels has been trade 
mispricing. 
lviii
 According to Sekine (2012a), the 2012 PBOC report, while not an official policy stance, also suggest “growing 
support” within the government on capital account liberalization. 
lix
 The goal of turning Shanghai into an international financial centre by 2020 (see Deloitte, 2009; PwC, 2012a; 
Sekine, 2012a; Subacchi, 2010) also suggests that the authorities intend to proceed with capital account 
liberalization and financial reform. 
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lx
 Note that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone experiment has been criticized for the slow progress on reforms 
related to capital account liberalization (see Waldmeir, 2014; Wildau, 2014d), although this should not be 
exaggerated (Borst, 2014b). 
lxi
 Justin Lin (2013)’s response has been: “It is not easy to curb the flow after opening the capital account.” 
lxii
 On the unreliability of China’s unemployment numbers, see Pi, 2014. 
lxiii
 Other sources give different figures, but the same trend (see e.g. Piovani & Li, 2011, p. 81; The Economist, 
2010). 
lxiv
 One important law was the 2007 Labour Contract Law. However, the problem is lack of effective 
enforcement (see Cooke, 2010, pp. 310-311; Wang, Appelbaum, Degiuli & Lichtenstein, 2009, pp. 489-494). 
lxv
 The working class is also divided between permanent workers in the SOEs and rural migrants with temporary 
jobs (So, 2003, p. 370; Weil, 2006, pp. 27-29). 
lxvi
 Although labour rights groups, NGOs defending workers’ rights, have become more important, especially in 
the southeastern coastal provinces (CLB, 2014). 
lxvii
 This is despite the fact that the left in China has a clear and very strong opinion against capital account 
liberalization (Interview 8; Naughton, 2006). 
lxviii
 According to Yu Yongding (2009b), around 80% of China’s capital account had already been liberalized 
before 2010, using calculations based on the IMF’s formula. 
lxix
 Authors differ on whether international norms in general have been internalized by China’s elites and 
population (see Wang Y., 2006, p. 43), or whether the acceptance of international norms has been largely 
based on instrumental calculations (see Zhang, 2003b). 
lxx
 Developments in class formation might also undermine China’s contender state position. As van der Pijl 
(2012, p. 512) has written: “All contender states in the past at some point entered into a conjuncture in which 
external pressure emanating from the Lockean heartland (as capital seeking access and property rights 
guarantees and as liberal constitutional demands usually constructed from the individual human rights vantage 
point) combined with demands articulated by liberal capitalist forces to dispossess the state class.” Analysts 
have already spoken about a Chinese fraction of the transnational capitalist class (Harris, 2012, p. 18; Morgan, 
2004, p. 84; Thornton, 2007, p. 214). While for now both overseas Chinese investors and the indigenous 
capitalist class are still intertwined with the state class, domestic and external liberalization might at some 
point activate the “offshore” element (as identified in 5.2.1) within China, which could lead to the 
dispossession of the state class and the transition to a more Lockean configuration. 
lxxi
 It has also been noted that: “While foreign pressure does not explain why China initiated economic reform 
and opening up, foreign response to China’s policy initiatives is often the reason that China undertook steps for 
further economic liberalization” (Zhang, 1998, p. 52). 
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6. Capital controls in Brazil: towards neo-
developmentalist neoliberalism? 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies Brazil’s capital account policies and puts them in the context of Brazil’s changing 
accumulation regime and constellation of social forces. In the second section of this chapter, Brazil’s 
import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) model is sketched. This provides the context for the 
transition to a neoliberal project in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s (symbolized by the 1994 
Real Plan), handled in the third section, and the concomitant shift from an almost completely closed 
capital account to a basically open capital account. The fourth section discusses the way the first Lula 
administration (2003-2006) perpetuated and even deepened the neoliberal accumulation regime and 
capital account liberalization, even though it implemented social policies alleviating poverty and 
(moderately) decreasing inequality. 
In the fifth section, the introduction of more neo-developmentalist policies during the second Lula 
administration (2007-2010) and first Dilma government (2011-2014) is debated, including the re-
introduction of moderate controls on capital inflows. It is argued that though this shift has had an 
important impact, it remains within the context of a neoliberal project, including an almost fully open 
capital account, and has not affected the power of (global) financial capital in Brazil’s accumulation 
regime. The sixth section discusses the limits that the adherence to a neoliberal macroeconomic 
framework imposes, and the limits of moderate capital controls. It is claimed that Brazil’s 
accumulation regime is not sustainable, and that the orthodox macroeconomic framework, 
combined with the power of global financial capital, only allows for “easy gains” in terms of social 
progress. Finally, in the conclusions of this chapter, the research questions identified in Chapter 1 are 
answered, and in particular the question is discussed whether Brazil’s capital controls challenge the 
neoliberal norm of the free movement of capital. 
 
 6.2 Brazil under ISI 
From the start of the era of the Portuguese colonization in the sixteenth century, Brazil remained a 
largely natural resource-based economy, dependent on international demand for commodities , and 
dominated by an agrarian (especially coffee-producing and export-oriented) aristocracy committed 
to laissez-faire (Amann, 2005, p. 150; Cammack, 1991, pp. 23-25; Del Roio, 2012, p. 220; Paulani, 
2012, pp. 90-91). It wasn’t until the 1930s under Getúlio Vargas that the dominance of this 
aristocracy faded, and that the modernization and industrialization really began with the ascendancy 
of the fraction of industrial capital (Amann, 2005, p. 151; Castro & Carvalho, 2003, p. 467; Del Roio, 
2012, p. 223; Roett, 2010, p. 37). This marked the start of the era of ISI in Brazil, which was 
consolidated in the next decades. This growth model, also called “national-developmentist”,  was 
based on large-scale capital-intensive activities producing consumer goods for the domestic market, 
and the export of both primary and manufactured goods (Cammack, 1991, p. 22). It relied on a 
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“triple alliance” between the state, transnational industrial corporations, which were active in the 
more dynamics sectors, and domestic capital as a junior partner (Cammack, 1991, p. 22; Oliveira, 
2006b, p. 269; de Paula, 2011, p. 28; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 490). The state was to play an 
active role, and stringent capital controls and import tariffs guaranteed the (relative) autonomy of 
domestic economic policies (Castro & Carvalho, 2003, p. 468; Doctor, 2012, p. 800; de Paula, 2011, p. 
28). 
The economic results of this growth model were, at first sight, quite impressive, with an average 
annual GDP growth of almost 7% between 1950 and 1980 (see Figure 6.1; see also Amann, 2005, p. 
149; Bruno, 2008; Frieden, 1981, p. 419; Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 487). 
Moreover, the share of industry in GDP increased from less than 30% in the beginning of the 1950s 
to more than 40% in the second half of the 1970s (see Figure 6.2; IPEA, 2014f).i Summed up: “A poor 
agricultural country, specialized in coffee production and exports, became a large, diversified and 
relatively wealthy industrial power, capable of exporting aircraft to the United States, durable 
consumer goods to China, and construction technology to the Middle East” (Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 4; 
see also Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 116). A national (industrial) working class, protected by labour 
legislation, came into existence, even though labour legislation protected only some segments of the 
working class (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 116). 
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Figure 6.2: Value added per sector Brazil, 1960-1980 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
However, there have always been contradictions in and limits to this accumulation regime. 
Economically, growth was dependent on two important variables. First, the evolution of “the mass of 
appropriated ground-rent”, in other words, profits from the primary sector which could be 
transferred to fund the expansion of Brazilian industrial capital (Grinberg, 2008, 309, 2013, p. 184). 
Second, external credit, especially in the form of foreign loans (Grinberg, 2008, p. 309; Nassif & Feijó, 
2013, p. 560). ISI was unable in the long term to close the persistent deficit on the current account 
balance, and thus to lift the balance-of-payments constraint (Amann, 2005, p. 151; Saad-Filho, 2003, 
p. 7). The result was a heavy reliance upon foreign borrowing and a heavy external indebtedness (see 
Figure 6.3; see also Cammack, 1991, p. 22; Del Roio, 2012, pp. 228-229; Frieden, 1981, p. 420)ii. 
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There were other economic problems too. Crucially, Brazilian industrial capital was deterred by, 
amongst other things, high financial costs, due to high interest rates and an inefficient and short-
termist (private) financial system (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 116; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 195, 2003, 
p. 7). Consequently, Brazil was strongly dependent on FDI by TNCs for its industrial sector (Jakobsen 
& Barbosa, 2008, p. 116). By the 1970s, foreign corporations were responsible for about half of 
manufactures produced in Brazil (Schneider, 2009, p. 560). These TNCs did not provide the economic 
(and technological) upgrading needed in the longer term (Baer & Borges Rangel, 2001, p. 86). 
Moreover, the gains of the economic growth were divided highly unequally, and social exclusion, 
poverty and inequality remained widespread (Amann, 2005, p. 151; Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006). 
This also restricted the domestic market, which remained largely limited to the richest 30% of the 
population, and was thus an important impediment to economic growth (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, 
p. 116). Besides the economic troubles, it also proved to be hard for the dominant capitalist fractions 
to forge a hegemonic project accepted by various social forces. There was both intra-capitalist 
fighting between the different fractions, and radical pressure and trade union militancy from below. 
The 1964 military coup has been interpreted as a strategy “against the risk of democratic revolution”, 
and a means to deepen capitalist rule in Brazil in the absence of a hegemonic bourgeoisie (Del Roio, 
2012, p. 227). 
After 1973 the social and economic contradictions became more and more apparent. The decline of 
the prices of raw materials, one of the sources of Brazil’s economic growth, meant an increasing 
importance of the second source, capital inflows in the form of foreign loans (Grinberg, 2013, p. 186). 
In the beginning of the 1980s Brazil was one of the countries suffering an external debt crisis, caused 
both by an increase in foreign interest rates due to the Volcker Shock in the US and by the growing 
current account deficit in the 1970s (de Paula, 2011, p. 28). External debt increased strongly, from 
20.4% of GDP in 1972 to 31.7% in 1980 and 52.9% in 1984 (World Bank, 2014b; see also Goldfajn & 
Minella, 2007, p. 362). Next to the debt crisis, faltering growth, falling profit rates, and persistent and 
rising inflation all pointed to the limits of the ISI model as it was implemented in practice (Marquetti, 
Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 492; Morais, Saad-Filho & Coelho, 1999, pp. 10-11). The debt 
crisis marked the beginning of the end for Brazilian ISI. Economic stagnation, together with political 
instability and social conflict, convinced analysts and policymakers that a different development 
model was needed (Doctor, 2012, p. 800; Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 181-182; Marquetti, Maldonado Filho 
& Lautert, 2010, p. 487; Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, pp. 5-6; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 9, 2003, pp. 8-9). 
The 1980s were therefore not only a decade of stagnation, but also a decade of transition, although 
it was not clear at first whereto.iii 
 
 6.3 The neoliberal project in the 1990s 
  6.3.1 The Real Plan and the neoliberal breakthrough 
It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s – after the return to civilian rule in 1985 – especially 
under president Collor who was elected in December 1989, that a final rupture with ISI became clear, 
and that a neoliberal project was introducediv, although still slowly and tentatively at first, and 
unable to proceed as a generally supported hegemonic project (Amann, 2005, pp. 152-153; 
Cunningham, 1999, pp. 75-76; Filgueiras, 2006, p. 186; Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, 
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p. 488; Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, p. 4; Oliveira, 2006b, p. 273; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 193, 2003, p. 9; 
Vernengo, 2004a, p. 62).v 
The definitive and resolute breakthrough of a neoliberal project arrived with the Real Plan in 1994, 
which brought neoliberal policies together in a consistent way (Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & 
Lautert, 2010, p. 489; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 103; Vernengo, 2003, p. 62, 2004a, p. 62). Its main 
architect was finance minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who would be Brazil’s president 
from 1995 until 2002. The Real Plan was in the first place a stabilization program, meant to control 
the hyperinflation that had increasingly haunted Brazil (see Figure 6.4). As Nassif and Feijó (2013, p. 
562) state: “In this sense, we can say that the long fight to curb high inflation paved the way to the 
implementation of radical liberalizing reforms (...).” However, it was much more than “just” a 
stabilization program; it represented the deepening and strengthening of earlier neoliberal policies, 
bringing them together in a consistent and systematic way (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 119; Mollo 
& Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 103). The Real Plan, together with earlier and subsequent policies, included 
trade and capital account liberalization, financial liberalization, privatizations, and fiscal and labour 
market reform. 
 
Figure 6.4: Consumer prices inflation Brazil, 1981-1994 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
A central role in the Real Plan was played by extremely high nominal (see Figure 6.5) and real interest 
rates (on these mechanisms see Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 198; Garcia & Barcinski, 1996; Kregel, 1999, 
p. 26, 34; Gonçalves & Teixeira, 2006, p. 1867; Libânio, 2010, p. 76; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 104; 
Oliveira & Nakatani, 2007, p. 46; de Paula, 2011, p. 38; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 196; Vernengo, 2003, p. 
65). These high interest rates, together with a liberalized capital account, attracted large inflows of 
(short-term) foreign capital, which wanted to take advantage of interest rate differentials. Excessive 
capital inflows in turn resulted in an overvalued exchange rate. Currency overvaluation led to 
cheaper imports, which would have to reduce inflation. The Real Plan was, then, quite successful in 
rapidly bringing down inflation (see Figure 6.6; see also Amann, 2005, p. 153; Beynon & Ramalho, 
2001, p. 226; Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 489; de Paula, 2011, p. 37; Saad-Filho & 
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because it had positive effects on consumption, especially in combination with the overvalued 
exchange rate, cheaper foreign products because of trade liberalization, and greater supply of credit 
(Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, pp. 12, 21-22). 
 
Figure 6.5: Selic, 01/07/1996-21/11/2002 (data from IPEA, 2014n) 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Consumer prices inflation Brazil, 1995-2010 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
However, it has not been able to bring about a new, sustainable and stable accumulation regime. 
Limits, contradictions and vulnerability remain until this day. The most important problem is the 
dependence on foreign finance and the vulnerability to volatility in capital flows (Saad-Filho & Mollo, 
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to hold down inflation have made it difficult for the Brazilian industrial sector to compete with 
international productive capital and intensified the balance-of-payments constraint (Amann & Baer, 
2012, pp. 416-417; Kregel, 1999, p. 34; Oliveira & Nakatani, 2007, p. 46; Vernengo, 2004a, p. 67). 
Increasing import penetration and the low competitiveness of exports have spelled trouble for the 
trade account balance with large and unsustainable current account deficits (including increasing 
repatriation of profits and interest and dividend paymentsvii) in the 1990s (see Figure 6.7; Mollo & 
Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 106; Saad-Filho, 2003, pp. 13-14; Vernengo, 2003, p. 64). External debt, which 
had been brought down after the 1980s debt crisis, grew strongly again, from 28.5% in 1994 to 47.7% 
in 2002 (see Figure 6.3; see also Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 489; Mollo & Saad-
Filho, 2006, p. 109; Vernengo, 2003, p. 65). 
 
Figure 6.7: Current account balance Brazil, 1988-2001 (data from IMF, 2014c) 
 
To finance these deficits, steady large capital inflows were needed (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 
119; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 106; Rocha, 2002, p. 12). The dependence on, especially short-
term, capital inflows has made the Brazilian economy vulnerable to international shocks and volatility 
(Carvalho, 2002-2003, p. 37; de Paula, 2011, p. 38; Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 12). A sudden-stop pattern of 
economic growth is the consequence, with strong capital inflows during the boom, and decreasing 
capital inflows and increasing capital outflows leading to or reinforcing the bust. This was painfully 
demonstrated by the 1998-1999 crisis caused by the outflow of speculative capital (O’Farrell, 2011; 
Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 14). 
A second problem resulting from the neoliberal project is public debt (see Castro & Carvalho, 2003, 
p. 482; Kregel, 1999, p. 34; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 106; Morais, Saad-Filho & Coelho, 1999, p. 9; 
Oliveira & Nakatani, 2007, p. 46; Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 13; Vernengo, 2007, pp. 89-90). Orthodox 
monetary policies and high interest rates, together with the sterilization of capital inflows to limit the 
expansion of the monetary base, led to a strong increase both in public debt and in interest 
payments. According to IPEA (2014a), a Brazilian government body collecting statistics and data, net 
public debt increased from 30.0% in 1994 to 50.5% in 2002.viii The result is permanent fiscal austerity 
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because of the larger debt service (Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 196).ix In 
other words: “It has become obvious that the debt is far more sensitive to the level of interest rates 
and the changes in the exchange rate than to the size of the fiscal surplus” (Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, 
p. 115). Interest payments after 1994 have been around 4% of GDP (Vernengo, 2007, p. 84). 
Monetary policy has thus been a threat not only to external stability but also to fiscal stability 
(Vernengo, 2003, p. 69). It has also been a hamper on both public investment, for instance in 
infrastructure, and social expenditures (Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 115; Vernengo, 2007, pp. 89-
90). 
Third, the accumulation regime after the Real Plan with high interest rates, an open capital account 
and, most of the time, an overvalued exchange rate, does not lead to impressive results with regard 
to economic performance (Castro & Carvalho, 2003, p. 482). In 1995-2003, average annual growth 
was only 2.2% (Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 413). One of the main reasons is a low rate of investment 
(see Figure 6.8; see also Amann, 2005, p. 157; Gonçalves & Teixeira, 2006, p. 1869; Gonçalves, 2006, 
p. 210; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 106; Oliveira & Nakatani, 2007, pp. 47-48). Both private and 
public investment have been held back by high interest rates. Additionally, the overvalued exchange 
rate hampers both exports and investment in the tradable goods sector. 
 
Figure 6.8: Investment rate Brazil, 1987-2000 (data from IMF, 2014c) 
 
Finally, the Real Plan has made the framework of high interest rates to attract foreign capital flows in 
order to maintain an overvalued exchange rate more or less permanent. Attempts to lower interest 
rates could lead to capital outflows and depreciation of the exchange rate, a currency and/or 
sovereign debt crisis, and the return of high inflation (Kregel, 1999, p. 23, 34; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 
2006, p. 107; Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 196). The Real Plan has thus created a policy trap from which it is 
very difficult to get out of: 
In this context, if the administration wants to avoid the inflationary pressures caused by 
depreciation, as it did after 1994, the main policy instrument is to increase the rate of interest 
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flows become central irrespective of the monetary regime once the capital account is open. 
(Vernengo, 2006) 
 
  6.3.2 Capital account liberalization and the transnationalization of capital 
As can be derived from the above, foreign capital has played an increasingly important role in Brazil’s 
accumulation regime, based on high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate. The 
internationalization of the Brazilian economy through capital account liberalization and attracting 
productive and financial capital inflows was deliberately attempted by both the Collor and FHC 
administrations (Abu-El-Haj, 2007, p. 99; Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 118; Rocha, 1994, p. 85, 2002, 
pp. 7, 10). With the stabilization of the Real Plan, the transnationalization of capital within Brazil 
became reality: “The Real plan inserted the Brazilian economy much more deeply into international 
financial and productive circuits” (Saad-Filho & Mollo, 2002, p. 126). As such, the country’s economy 
was transformed “in order to service the short-term imperatives of global accumulation” (Morais & 
Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 12, original emphasis). 
Liberalization started cautiously in 1987, when legislation 1,289 authorized foreign portfolio capital 
to enter the Brazilian capital market (see Freitas & Prates, 2000, p. 58; Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, pp. 
372-376; Gonçalves & Teixeira, 2006, p. 1868; de Paula, 2011; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 59 for a 
detailed overview of these liberalizations)x. This was followed by legislation (Resolution 1,552) which 
allowed previously forbidden foreign exchange operations, with quantitative limits on each type of 
operation, which were later gradually increased and abolished. In May 1991, an important resolution 
(CMN Resolution 1,832) was approved that allowed foreign investors to enter the Brazilian capital 
market directly. With regard to capital outflows, two regulations (Circular Letter 2,259 and 
Resolution 1,946) in 1992 transformed CC5 accounts, which basically indirectly made all (short-term) 
capital outflows possible, though still in an indirect way, both for residents and non-residentsxi. While 
certain taxes on foreign portfolio inflows and other moderate restrictions were introduced in the 
mid-1990s – and later repelled or lowered, especially after the 1997 Asian crisis and with the 1998-
1999 Brazilian crisis (see Garcia & Barcinski, 1996; Magud, Reinhart  & Rogoff, 2011), these 
temporary measures did not at all go against the trend towards full capital mobility. Moreover, these 
taxes on inflows went together with further measures easing capital outflows (Garcia & Barcinski, 
1996; Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, pp. 373-374). Finally, Resolution CMN no. 2,689 in 2000 gave 
unrestricted access to foreign investors to all segments of the Brazilian capital markets, including 
derivatives (de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 59).xii 
All in all, while there was no “big bang” liberalization, the opening up of the capital account in the 
1990s was comprehensive and rather quick, and Brazil did not maintain more thorough capital 
controls as China and India did (see respectively Chapter 5 and Chapter 7) (de Paula, 2011, pp. 30, 
67). “By the end of the decade, controls over both capital inflows and outflows were banned from 
the policy arsenal of the federal government” (Carvalho, 2002-2003, p. 42). 
The evolutions which were identified in Chapter 4 as central to a neoliberal class project have, then, 
also been present in Brazil: the transnationalization of both productive capital and financial capital. 
First, with regard to the transnationalization of productive capital, there was a strong increase of FDI, 
with net inflows rising from an annual average of US$1.7bn in 1990-1994 to an average of US$16.9bn 
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in 1995-1998 (see Figure 6.9; see also Baer & Borges Rangel, 2001, p. 87; Hennings & Mesquita, 2008, 
p. 104). Brazilian manufacturing was integrated into global production networks (Saad-Filho & Mollo, 
2002, p. 126). Large Brazilian companies have also embraced transnationalization and international 
competition abroad, helped by state policies and the country’s diplomacy (Marques, 2010; Morais & 
Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 35).xiii 
 
 Figure 6.9: Inward and outward FDI Brazil (data from UNCTAD, 2014b) 
 
While TNCs accounted for 30.8% of the 500 largest corporations in Brazil in 1980-1994, this share 
rose to 41.3% in 1995-2004, against 38.2% for national private corporations (Gonçalves, 2006, p. 
216).xiv A significant part of foreign productive capital entered through mergers and acquisitions, 
often targeting state-owned enterprises that were being privatized (Baer & Borges Rangel, 2001, pp. 
86-87; Hennings & Mesquita, 2008, p. 105; Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 121; Rocha, 2002, p. 22).xv 
Moreover, transnational capital was less interested in investing in Brazil’s industrial sector which was 
not really competitive in international markets. About 80% of FDI between 1996 and 2000 was 
directed to the services sector (Abu-El-Haj, 2007, p. 98; Hennings & Mesquita, 2008, p. 105; Jakobsen 
& Barbosa, 2008, p. 121). 
Second, financialization has also been visible. From 1994 on, “Brazil became an emerging financial 
power” and “positioned itself as an international platform for financial valorization” (Paulani, 2010, 
p. 369). Financial activities – not in the least through public bonds – have been far more lucrative 
than productive activities, especially thanks to high interest rates (Boito Jr., 2006, pp. 243-246; 
Filgueiras, 2006, p. 196; Gaulard, 2012, pp. 375-376; Gonçalves, 2006, p. 216). In relative terms, the 
importance of productive capital has declined, while income out of financial operations has increased 
(Bruno, 2008; Paulani, 2010, p. 369). Mechanisms that have been seen in advanced financialized 
economies, such as non-financial groups creating their own financial institutions, have also been 
observed in Brazil (Filgueiras, 2006, p. 190; Gaulard, 2012, pp. 375-376). Representatives of financial 
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and economic ministries (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 19). In sum, the economy has been 
subordinated to the interests of financial capital (Filgueiras, 2006, p. 195; Gonçalves, 2006, p. 207; 
Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 32). 
Third, regarding the transnationalization of financial capital, it is clear that Brazil has a high degree of 
financial openness, and has been far more financially open than China and India (Goldfajn & Minella, 
2007, p. 349; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 58; Prates, 2011, p. 909; Roett, 2010, p. 122). The opening 
up to portfolio inflows resulted in increasing foreign participation in Brazil’s financial markets (see 
Figure 6.10; see also Freitas & Prates, 2000, p. 61; Schwartzman, 2006, p. 278)xvi. In sum, Brazil has 
become integrated with world financial markets (Roett, 2010, p. 121). 
 
Figure 6.10: Capital flows Brazil (based on data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
The banking sector has also been transformed as Brazilian banking “has become closely bound up 
with global finance through extensive privatisations, mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances 
between domestic and foreign institutions” (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 13). In 1995, in the 
context of banking distress, legislation was approved (Exposição de Motivos no. 311) which allowed 
the president to authorize the entry of foreign banks on a case-by-case basis (Freitas, 2011; Freitas & 
Prates, 2000, p. 64; de Paula, 2002, p. 72, 2011, pp. 159-160; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 56)xvii. The 
share of foreign banks’ assets as a share of total assets of the banking sector in Brazil rose from 7.5% 
in 1994 to 12.8% in 1997 and then to 27.4% in 2000 (Freitas, 2011; de Paula, 2002, p. 74; de Paula, 
2011, p. 169; de Paula & Sobreira, 2010)xviii. In 2000, seven out of the twelve biggest private banks 
were foreign-owned (de Paula, 2002, p. 77). It was especially state-owned banks that lost market 
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centralization of capital in the banking sector has also increased (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 14; de 
Paula, 2002, p. 74). 
It must be noted, however, that because it was on a case-by-case basis, the opening up and 
denationalization/transnationalization of the banking sector was less dramatic in Brazil than in many 
other countries (de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 56; also Abu-El-Haj, 2007, p. 104; Nölke, 2010, p. 8). The 
private sector was still dominated by Brazilian banks (de Paula, 2002, p. 77). Moreover, important 
federal public banks were not privatized and continued to play a strategic role (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 
2008, pp. 121-122)xix. The result was that by end-2000, public banks’ market share, with 36.6% of 
total assets, was still higher than both Brazilian private banks (35.2%) and foreign-owned banks 
(27.4%) (de Paula, 2002, pp. 74-76). 
 
  6.3.3 The new historic bloc underpinning neoliberalism 
As with neoliberalism in general (see Chapter 4), and as seen in many other countries, the results of 
the neoliberal policies benefited capital to the detriment of labour. The profit rate recoveredxx, and 
the profit share rose significantly, from 43% in 1990 to 56% in 2003 according to some estimatesxxi 
(Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 487). However, it benefited certain fractions of 
capital more than others. Domestic and international financial capital were clearly among the 
winners. It is clear that tight monetary policy and high interest rates have benefited financial capital. 
The Brazilian banking sector has been particularly lucrative (Doctor & de Paula, 2007).xxii The bank 
spread in Brazil has been extremely high (compared to other countries), at around 40% in 2000-2005 
(Oreiro & de Paula, 2010, p. 573, 580). While before the Real plan it had been able to use inflation to 
make large profits, high interest rates now meant that the banking sector was able to make high 
profits out of credit operations and fixed-income assets (Bruno, 2008; Bruno et al., 2011, p. 740; 
Oreiro & de Paula, 2010, p. 574; de Paula, 2011, pp. 154-155; de Paula & Sobreira, 2010). High 
interest rates have also made government securities, which accounted for around 40% of total 
banking assets in 1998-2005, highly lucrative (de Paula, 2011, p. 165; see also Boito Jr., 2006, p. 245; 
Bruno et al., 2011, p. 746; Gaulard, 2012, p. 376). The growing Brazilian financial markets have also 
been an important platform for financial profits. 
While foreign industrial capital benefited from privatization schemes and liberalized trade and 
investment, domestic industrial capital was damaged by high interest rates and an overvalued 
exchange rate (Doctor & de Paula, 2007). The transnationalization of productive capital did not 
translate into sustained economic gains, however, but rather to denationalizationxxiii and a process of 
de-industrialization throughout the 1990s and continuing in the early 2000s (Diniz, 2011, p. 61; 
Doctor & de Paula, 2007; Morais, Saad-Filho & Coelho, 1999, p. 9; Oreiro & Feijó, 2010, p. 229; Sader, 
2005, p. 66). The share of industry declined from 43.8% in 1980 and 40.0% in 1994 to 27.1% in 2002 
(see Figure 6.11; see also Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 487). Plant closures and 
employment losses were numerous.xxiv Moreover, trade liberalization and an overvalued exchange 
rate after the Real Plan made imports surge, with a deterioration in the trade balance as a 
consequence (Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, pp. 104-106).xxv The imports of the TNCs present in Brazil 
increased far more than their exports (Abu-El-Haj, 2007, p. 107; Baer & Borges Rangel, 2001, p. 93; 




Figure 6.11: Value added per sector Brazil, 1980-2013 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Finally, the working class as a whole lost considerably. The wage share decreased strongly (Araújo & 
Gala, 2012, p. 50; Bruno, 2008; Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 187-188; 
Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 123; O’Farrell & Villafañe, 2013; Serrano & Summa, 2011)xxvi. In 2006, 
real average wages were still at less than 60% of their level in the beginning of the 1980s (Câmara 
Neto & Vernengo, 2006). Neoliberal policies, economic malaise and crises, the restructuring of 
production and de-industrialization also had a strong impact upon social and labor rights and working 
conditions (Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 187-188; Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 123; Novelli & Galvão, 2001-
2002, p. 25). Workers were heavily affected by unemployment (see Figure 6.12; see also Gonçalves, 
2006, p. 210), precarization, flexibilization and informalization, the decentralization of collective 
bargaining, and wage moderation. In the industrial sectors that had been the core of working class 
militancy until the 1980s, unionization dropped significantly (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 130; 
Oliveira, 2003, p. 46, 2006a, p. 5).xxvii All these evolutions meant that trade unions saw an important 
part of their power base crumble (Beynon & Ramalho, 2001, p. 230; Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, p. 
28; Sader, 2005, p. 66). What was posed on the neoliberal project in general in Chapter 4, can thus 
also be said about Brazil in particular: “What actually happened was a counter-revolution 
orchestrated by capital in an attempt to defend itself from the alternatives that could have been set 
up by various segments of civil society, and especially organized labour, during its awakening in the 
1980s” (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 123). It succeeded in reinforcing the power of the capitalist 
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Figure 6.12: Unemployment rate Brazil (data from IMF, 2014c) 
 
In sum, financial interests clearly benefited from the neoliberal transition and the Real Plan, while 
Brazilian manufacturing and the working class were forced to bear the costs (Vernengo, 2006). A new 
historic bloc was thus formed by the neoliberal policies (see Boito Jr., 2003, p. 12; Del Roio, 2012, p. 
233; Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 183-185). At the apex of this new bloc is both domestic and foreign 
financial capital, which benefited from high interest rates and financial liberalization. It also included 
transnationally-oriented industrial capital in the form of foreign-owned TNCs. These fractions of 
capital found support amongst the middle classes as well as marginalized parts of the population 
which did not have the means to defend themselves against inflation (in contrast with a large part of 
organized labour), and even a part of the working class which was opposed to the “privileges” of 
public sector workers (Anderson, 2011; Boito Jr., 2003, pp. 24-34; Filgueiras, 2006, p. 185; Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 491). Agribusiness was also part of the historic bloc (in a subordinate position) 
because of its important role in exports (Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 190-191). Indeed, Brazil’s exports 
remained concentrated in commodities (Rocha, 2002, p. 26). 
There were, as can be derived from the above, two important social forces who were not included in 
this historic bloc. The first is the largest part of urban and rural organized labourxxviii, which had since 
the early 1980s been the spine of the Brazilian left (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 5). The second 
concerns (a part of) the industrial fraction of Brazilian capital, which was disappointed by the 
outcomes of the neoliberal project (Del Roio, 2012, p. 232; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 5; Saad-
Filho, 1998, p. 195)xxix. Both organized labour and Brazilian industrial capital were part of what has 
been called the “losers’ alliance” which would elect President Lula da Silva of the Workers Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in the 2002 presidential elections (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 21, 
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 6.4 Lula and the Workers Party in power 
  6.4.1 From hope to illusion 
When Lula took office in January 2003, there was a strong expectation that fundamental changes 
were imminent (Amann, 2005, p. 155; Gonçalves, 2014, p. 8; Tavolaro & Tavolaro, 2007, p. 426; 
Vernengo, 2011, p. 18). His victory “clearly revealed a widespread desire for change” (Diniz, 2011, p. 
65; see also Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 99). The PT had the image of a radical party, associated with 
left-wing movements such as the trade union confederation Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) 
and the landless peasants’ movement Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) (Mollo 
& Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 100). It is no surprise then that his victory has been seen as “one of the most 
important achievements of the Left, anywhere in the world, in the last two decades” (Saad-Filho, 
2003, p. 15). However, expectations and hopes have not materialized. The PT in power under Lula 
has from 2003 onwards strengthened many of Cardoso’s orthodox neoliberal policies, especially in 
the macroeconomic front (Amann, 2005, p. 159; Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Boito Jr., 
2003, pp. 10-11; Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Filgueiras, 2006, p. 186; Fortes, 2009, p. 116; Gill, 
2008, p. 262; Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 137; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, pp. 18-19; Paulani, 2003; 
Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 38; Rocha, 2007, pp. 138-139; Vernengo, 2011, p. 18). Initial propositions 
or anticipations that this would be a mere transitory arrangement in the context of international 
vulnerability, and that this would change later, have been proven wrong (Bresser-Pereira, 2002-2003, 
p. 78; Sader, 2005, pp. 70, 73). The Lula administration has been orthodox to such an extent that the 
first Lula-mandate has been labelled by critics as “the third mandate of FHC” (Oliveira, 2006b, p. 
285). 
The causes for this turn are multiple and complex. First, already before election, it was clear that the 
PT’s ideological profile was in flux. While the PT was never a Marxist organization, after the defeats 
with the presidential elections of 1989, 1994 and 1998, together with the PT’s gradual rise within the 
state apparatus, a small group of cadres around Lula secured the de-radicalization of the party and a 
decrease in the weight of social movements and the Party’s radical base (Bianchi & Braga, 2005, p. 
1749-1751; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 19; Oliveira & Nakatani, 2007, p. 40; Sader, 2005, pp. 65-
66; Samuels, 2004, pp. 1001-1002). In the program for the 2002 elections (as in 1998), references to 
socialism were then completely absent (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 19; Samuels, 2004, p. 1004; 
van der Westhuizen, 2012, pp. 340-341). The alliances that the PT established before the elections – 
in particular with the right-wing Liberal Party (PL), supported by wealthy businessmen and 
evangelical pastors – were another sign that gaining power was more important than ideological 
considerations (see Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Saad-Filho, 2003, pp. 16-17; van der 
Westhuizen, 2012, p. 343).xxxi 
Second, international “financial markets” played a role in the 2002 election by showing their 
“concern” about the possibility of socialist policies introduced by Lula (Roett, 2010, p. 7; Morais & 
Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 20; Vernengo, 2004b). When it became clear that Lula would probably become 
the new Brazilian president, capital flight led to a large depreciation of the currency, foreign reserves 
decreased from US$42 bn in June to US$35 bn in November, and demand for Brazilian public 
securities decreased strongly (Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, pp. 193-
194). This “terrorism committed by the international financial market” (Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, 
p. 31) demonstrated the power that international (including Brazilian) financial capital already had 
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acquired in Brazil, and its “ability to sabotage any new government to which it objected” (Sader, 
2005, p. 69; see also Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 114; Morais 
& Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 10). The consequence was that Lula released a document called Carta ao Povo 
Brasileiro [Letter to the Brazilian People] in June 2002, in which he promised to maintain all the 
commitments made by previous governments, including the repayment of external and public debt 
and the freedom of capital movements (Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 
2006, p. 113; Paiva, 2006, pp. 200-201; Sader, 2005, p. 69; van der Westhuizen, 2012, pp. 340-341). 
These events and the curve of the PT “may have been the best illustration of the irrelevance of 
politics under capital account liberalization” (Carvalho, 2002-2003, p. 44). 
Third, the economic team appointed after the election ensured the continuation of the neoliberal 
policies. Lula named the orthodox Henrique Meirelles, a former vice president of the Bank of Boston, 
president of the Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil, BCB), and Antonio Palocci, the man behind 
the Letter to the Brazilian People, became the minister of finance (Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 
2007; Castro & Carvalho, 2003, p. 484; Diniz, 2011, p. 66; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 114; Oliveira, 
2006a, p. 12; Sader, 2005, pp. 69-70). All the important positions with regard to economic policies 
were filled with orthodox, neoliberal technocrats, and leftist economists were excluded from the 
government.xxxii 
 
  6.4.2 Neoliberal policies under Lula 
Once in power, the Lula administration thus adopted orthodox macroeconomic policies based on 
three pillars: (1) high primary surpluses and thus permanent fiscal austerity; (2) an inflation-targeting 
regime, with high nominal and real interest rates; (3) a flexible (but in practice overvalued) exchange 
rate with free capital mobility (Rocha, 2007, p. 139). As Sader (2005, p. 71) has written: “Cardoso’s 
economic policy was not simply maintained but, with the hike in interest rates and raising of the 
primary fiscal surplus, taken a step further.” On the fiscal front, one of the first decisions taken under 
Lula was to increase the primary fiscal surplus target from 3.75% of GDP to 4.25% of GDP (Arestis, de 
Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 18). The primary surpluses have been even 
higher in the first years under Lula than under FHC (Amann, 2005, p. 159). On average, it reached 




Figure 6.13: Primary surplus, interest payments and operational deficit (“public sector net borrowing 
requirements”) Brazil (source: BCB, 2014a) 
 
 Primary surplus Interest payments Operational deficit 
2003 3.27 8.51 5.24 
2004 3.72 6.62 2.90 
2005 3.79 7.36 3.58 
2006 3.20 6.83 3.63 
2007 3.31 6.11 2.80 
2008 3.42 5.46 2.04 
2009 2.00 5.28 3.28 
2010 2.70 5.18 2.48 
2011 3.11 5.71 2.61 
2012 2.39 4.87 2.48 
2013 1.89 5.14 3.26 
Table 6.1: Primary surplus, interest payments and operational deficit (“public sector net borrowing 
requirements”) Brazil (% of GDP) (source: BCB, 2014a) 
 
Next to fiscal policy, monetary policy has also been even more tight than in the last years under FHC 
(Amann, 2005, p. 160). The BCB’s (nominal) base interest rate Selic (Sistema Especial de Liquidação e 
Custodia), which was at 25,00% when Lula came to power, was increased to 25,50% in January and to 
26,50% in February 2003 (see Figure 6.14).xxxiii From June on, it was lowered to reach 16% in April 
2004, after which another round of tightening started in September, culminating in another peak of 
19,75% in May 2015. It was only – after easing began in September 2015 – in July 2006 that Selic was 
brought under 15%, to finally reach its lowest point during the first Lula administration in December 
2006, at 13,25%. Brazil’s real interest rates were still exceptionally high compared to similar (Latin 
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Figure 6.14: Selic, 01/01/2003-30/07/2014 (data from IPEA, 2014n) 
 
One of the results of high interest rates was high interest payments on public debt, which accounted 
on average for 7.33% of GDP in 2003-2006 (see Figure 6.13 and Table 6.1; see also Mollo & Saad-
Filho, 2006, p. 106; Rocha, 2007, p. 143).xxxiv As this is more than double the primary surpluses, Brazil 
had an average government deficit of 3.8% of GDP, despite the strong budgetary efforts. Because 
interest payments were high, the reduction in government debt was – compared to the budgetary 
efforts – rather small (Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Sader, 2005, p. 74). However, the 
reduction was still substantial, with net public debt (including the BCB and government enterprises) 
decreasing from 62.9% of GDP in September 2002 to 47.3% in December 2006 (see BCB, 2014a, 
2014c).xxxv This was done to the detriment of public investment (Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 202). Despite 
this reduction of government debt, the Lula administration kept a regressive arrangement intact, 
through which “Brazil’s government budget has become a giant machine for recycling scarce tax 
revenues back to Brazil’s wealthy elites in the form of interest payments” (Palley, 2006b; also 
Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 195; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 106; Vernengo, 2004b).xxxvi The Workers’ 
Party thus did not reverse the fact that interest payments accounted on average for almost half of 
total government spending since 1994, far more than spending on social security, health care and 
education (Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006). 
The Lula government also proceeded with and consolidated capital account liberalization (see 
Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Kaltenbrunner, 2010, p. 302; de Paula, 2011, pp. 45, 75; 
Prates, 2006, pp. 122-123; Prates & Paulani, 2007, pp. 35-36; Souza & Carvalho, 2011, p. 567). The 
most important changes involved the unification of the foreign exchange market, and especially the 
abolition of limits “on the amount physical and juridical persons could convert from reais into dollars 
and transfer abroad” (de Paula, 2011, p. 77). This implied that capital could now flow out of Brazil 
directly, without the use of the CC5 accounts which could previously be used to transfer money 
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79; Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 35).xxxvii Foreign investors became more important in Brazil’s stock 
market, holding more than 25% of the total market capitalization in 2004-2010 (see Park, 2012).xxxviii 
Moreover, the combination of high real interest rates and the tendency of the exchange rate to 
appreciate led to a carry-trade and the internationalization of the Brazilian currency, which meant 
that foreign (and domestic) financial capital was able to make gigantic speculative profits in Brazil 
(Kaltenbrunner, 2010, pp. 297, 307-308). 
Financialization was not reversed under Lula. To the contrary, it was fostered and deepened: 
“Measures taken by the Collor/Itamar and Cardoso governments were instrumental in preparing the 
Brazilian economy to participate fully in the financial turn of the capitalist economy. The Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva (Lula) Administration perpetuated this process” (Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 32; see also 
Bruno et al., 2011). Brazil has been hailed for its “substantial progress in capital market 
development” during the Lula governments (Park, 2012). The stock market Bovespa grew strongly 
and offered high speculative profits (see Figure 6.15; see also Anderson, 2011, p. 37; Committee on 
the Global Financial System, 2009). 
 
Figure 6.15: Stock market capitalization Brazil (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Furthermore, the banking sector also grew strongly (Gonçalves, 2014, pp. 27-28; Kaltenbrunner, 
2010, p. 303; Roett, 2010, p. 122). The continuity of high interest rates and high spreads, together 
with the consumer credit boom, has assured the sustained existence of high profitability for banks in 
Brazil, with loan revenues accounting for more than 40% and security revenues around 30% of total 
revenues (de Paula, 2011, pp. 171-173). Banks’ profits have thus been very high under the PT 
governments (see Figure 6.16; Oliveira, 2006a, p. 14; Rocha, 2007, p. 143). The return on equity in 
















































































































Figure 6.16: Return on assets banking sector (data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014a) 
 
The PT government disappointed the Left in other fields as well, such as social security, tax reform, 
labour legislation, and, not least, land reform and agricultural policies which were strongly criticized 
by the MST (Fortes, 2009, pp. 120-121; Gill, 2008, p. 262; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, pp. 18-19; 
Sader, 2005, p. 71; Stedile, 2007, pp. 50-53). It is not surprising, then, that the government had to 
face opposition from within the party, from intellectuals, social movements and the most organized 
and politicized workers (Filgueiras, 2006, p. 202; Rocha, 2007, pp. 138-139; Tavolaro & Tavolaro, 
2007, pp. 432-433). In sum, the leftward shift that had been expected with the election of Lula did 
not at all materialize, especially during the first years of his first term. While the causes are multiple, 
at least one important cause has been the transnationalization of capital and the necessity of 
maintaining the confidence of international investors (Amann, 2005, pp. 155-156; Bruno et al., 2011, 
p. 746; Filgueiras, 2006, pp. 183, 190; Interview 14 & 19). Transnationalization has thus implied the 
subordination of the Brazilian economy to international capital flows:  
“The forms of dependence become more complex, restricted not only to the decisions made 
by multinationals or the export of more volatile goods in terms of prices, but dependent upon 
the submission to international financial capital, which establishes conditionalities for the 
internal economic policy, thus limiting the state’s autonomy to set interest and exchange 
rates, and holding the state’s investing capacity hostage to the international conjuncture.” 
(Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 123) 
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  6.4.3 The social agenda and Lula’s re-election 
There was one important areaxl in which the PT represents a partial break with the previous 
governments: social policies and inequality (Anderson, 2011, p. 48; Fortes, 2009, p. 113; Vernengo, 
2011, p. 17). While it should be noted that the targeted anti-poverty approach comes nowhere near 
the idea of – and the PT’s historical commitment to – universal social rights (Hunter & Power, 2007, 
p. 17; Marques & Mendes, 2006, p. 73, 2007, p. 22; Motta, 2013; Rocha, 2007, p. 145), the targeted 
social policies have made a huge difference in the lives of many poor families. Under Lula, several 
anti-poverty programmes were merged into a single one, called Bolsa Família, a conditional cash 
programme which disburses a low amount, directly paid by the federal government, to poor families 
(see Anderson, 2011, p. 37; Marques & Mendes, 2006, pp. 67-70). Spending increased from 1.1% to 
2.5% of government expenditures and from 0.2 to 0.5% of GDP, and the number of beneficiaries 
increased from 3.6m to almost 11 million between 2003 and 2006, so that the programme reached 
about one quarter of the entire population (Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 204; IPEA, 2014g; van der 
Westhuizen, 2012, p. 348). 
Probably even more important than the Bolsa Família have been the minimum wage increases, which 
improved the situation of the low-paid workers in the formal sector significantly.xli The real minimum 
wage rose with 27.4% between 2002 and 2006, whereas per capita income increased only 8.5% in 
2003-2006 (see Table 6.2; see also Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 205; The Conference Board, 2014).xlii 




0.7% 3.7% 7.0% 14.1% 6.0% 3.1% 7.2% 5.3% 0.1% 8.4% 2.5% 2.6% 
Table 6.2: Annual growth of the real minimum wage Brazil (based on annual averages) (calculated 
with data from IPEA, 2014m) 
 
The results of these policies was a reduction in poverty and inequality (see e.g. Morais & Saad-Filho, 
2011a, p. 36). The number of poor diminished from 58.7 million in 2002 to 49.0 million in 2006 or 
from 34.38% to 26.75% of the population, and the number of extreme poor from 23.9 million to 17.3 
million in the same period, or from 13.98 % to 9.45% of the population (see Figure 6.17; data from 
IPEA, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e).xliii With regard to inequality, the Gini coefficient, which had only 
decreased with 0.15 percentage points between 1993 and 2002, was reduced from 0,589 in 2002 to 





Figure 6.17: Poverty indicators Brazil (data from IPEA, 2014d, 2014e; World Bank, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Inequality, Gini coefficient Brazil (data from IPEA, 2014i) 
 
It must be emphasized that these social and minimum wage policies did not at all endanger the 
commitment to fiscal stability, and left the interests of financial capital unharmed. As Sader (2005, p. 
72) has argued: “While some good initiatives have been proposed on social issues, they have largely 
been stymied by the Finance Ministry’s rigid fiscal austerity.” In sum, the very poor would be helped, 
but in a context of macroeconomic (and other) policies that conformed to the expectations of 
financial capital. These achievements have not been enough to neutralize criticism from the left 
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But despite the disappointments of the first Lula administration, Lula managed to get re-elected in 
2006. This was in large part thanks to the votes of the poorest, a “subproletariat” that appreciated 
Lula’s “order with redistribution”, and benefited from the Bolsa Família programme (Singer, 2009, p. 
86).xlv This programme has been very important in Lula’s re-election (and later Dilma’s election as 
well): “The Bolsa Família has created a new base of support for the Lula government, one 
independent of unions and social movements” (Marques & Mendes, 2007, p. 27). Research has 
demonstrated that the poor have voted in large numbers for Lula (Hunter & Power, 2007, pp. 1, 4; 
Marques & Nakatani, 2007, p. 17). Lula’s victory was impressive in the impoverished North and 
Northeast, but he also received most votes from the poor in many other parts of Brazil. Their main 
motivation seems to be the improvement of their personal situation (Hunter & Power, 2007, p. 1; 
Marques & Nakatani, 2007, p. 20; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 40). 
 
 6.5 Towards neo-developmentalist neoliberalism? 
  6.5.1 The turn towards neo-developmentalist policies 
From the beginning, there had been a split between the neoliberal current in the Lula administration, 
and a more heterodox, neo-developmentalist current, represented by amongst others then Chief of 
Staff Dilma Rousseff and BNDES head Guido Mantega (Boito Jr., 2007, p. 125; Sader, 2005, p. 72; 
Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 491; Wheatley, 2010)xlvi. While the neoliberal faction had all the 
powerful positions at first, it seemed that the neo-developmentalist faction gained traction from 
2005/2006 on, and especially during the second Lula administration (Erber, 2011, p. 31; Interview 14; 
Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 31, 2011b, p. 521, 2012, p. 792; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, p. 566). In March 
2006 Guido Mantega succeeded Antonio Palocci as Finance Minister after a series of corruption 
scandals.xlvii 
The PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), an investment programme of about US$290bn 
introduced in 2007,xlviii has been perceived as an important pillar of a neo-developmentalist economic 
programme (Ban, 2013, p. 305; Erber, 2011, pp. 45-48; Kröger, 2012, p. 889; Morais & Saad-Filho, 
2012, p. 793; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, p. 567; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 491)xlix. Public investment has 
increased from 1.4% of GDP in 2006 to 2.2% of GDP in 2008 (see Table 6.3). It has been one of the 
causes of the rise of Brazil’s investment rate from 16.21% in 2005 to 20.69% in 2008, the highest 
level since 1994 (see Figure 6.19; see also Ban, 2013, p. 305; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 210; Morais & 
Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 35)l. Another cause has been the expansion of credit lines by state-owned 
banks, in the first place the national development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (BNDES)li (Diniz, 2011, p. 66; Flynn, 2007, pp. 19-20; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, 
p. 35). The market share of state-owned banks increased considerably after 2006, while the share of 
both foreign banks and domestic private banks decreased (Freitas, 2011; de Paula, 2002, p. 74, 2011, 
p. 169; de Paula & Sobreira, 2010; Rumsey, 2013).lii 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.7% 2.2% 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.5% 






Figure 6.19: Investment rate Brazil, 1999-2013 (data from IMF, 2014c) 
 
A new industrial policy entailing tax cuts and financial incentives was also introduced in 2008 (Política 
de Desenvolvimento Produtivo, PDP) (Barbosa-Filho, 2010; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, p. 567).liii Another 
important policy has been an increase of the real minimum wage (see Table 6.2).liv As described 
above, this already started in 2003, but it was more forcefully implemented from 2005 onwards (see 
Baltar, 2014). Whereas real minimum wage growth was 0.7% in 2003 and 3.7% in 2004, its average 
growth rate was 7.1% in 2005-2010.lv The increases have been crucial not only for expanding 
domestic demand, but also for diminishing income inequality, probably more so than the Bolsa 
Família programme (Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 418; Ban, 2013, p. 318). A boom in consumption credit, 
which was not affected during the global economic crisis, has also been vital for domestic demand 
(Barbosa-Filho, 2008, pp. 194, 207; Paulani, 2010, p. 371).  
Thus, there was a combination of these neo-developmentalist policies with the more established 
neoliberal framework of fiscal austerity, high interest rates and capital account convertibility (Ban, 
2013, p.320; Erber, 2011; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011b, p. 507, 2012, p. 790). This hybrid could 
therefore be called “neo-developmentalist neoliberalism”.lvi The introduction of neo-
developmentalist elements was beneficial to the two social forces which were excluded from the 
neoliberal historic bloc: national productive capital and (organized) labour (Boito Jr. & Berringer, 
2013, p. 31; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 37; see also Ban, 2013, pp. 321-322). Agribusiness also 
became more deeply integrated into the historic bloc, not in the least through Lula’s foreign 
economic policy aimed at opening up markets for Brazil’s agricultural products (Boito Jr., 2007, p. 
116; Hopewell, 2013; Motta, 2013; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 491; Stedile, 2007, pp. 52-53). 
However, this was done in such a way as not to harm the interests and hegemony of financial capital 
(and transnational industrial corporations), with the maintenance of the neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy framework (Ban, 2013, p.320; Boito Jr., 2006, pp. 247-252; 2007, p. 119; Filgueiras, 2006, p. 
199; Interview 11; Kingstone, 2009, p. 106; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011b, p. 516; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, 
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regime; it only used the available policy space within the neoliberal model to advance the interests of 
the previously excluded social forces. Through making it more inclusive, Lula thus strengthened the 
hegemonic nature of the neoliberal project (Boito Jr., 2007, pp. 116, 121). 
 
  6.5.2  After the crisis and under Dilma 
The global economic crisis that hit Brazil hard in the fourth quarter of 2008 (see below) did not lead 
to the withdrawal of neo-developmentalist policies. To the contrary, neo-developmentalism was 
rather strengthened than weakened. An anti-cyclical Keynesian policy package was introduced with, 
amongst other things, the accelerated realization of the PAC investment programme (Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 495). Fiscal policy was slightly loosened, but without running fiscal deficits or 
endangering fiscal stability (see Table 6.1; also Ban, 2013, p. 306; Barbosa-Filho, 2009). In 2009, the 
primary surplus was only 2.0%, the first time under a PT government that it went under 3%.lviii 
Monetary policy was loosened as well, with lower interest rates (see Barbosa-Filho, 2010). The 
nominal interest rate was lowered to under 10% in April 2009 for the first time since the PT took 
power (see Figure 6.14). The real interest rate went under 5% in 2010 (see Figure 6.20). 
 
Figure 6.20: Real interest rate Brazil (based on Modenesi, 2014) 
 
Other components included wage increases and additional social spending through increases in the 
Bolsa Família programme. The number of beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família rose from almost 11m in 
2006 to 12,8m in 2010, and to almost 14m in 2012 (IPEA, 2014g).lix Industrial policy was deepened, 
with, amongst others, taxes levied on certain manufactured imports (Imposto sobre Produtos 
Industrializados), which seems to have had a positive influence on FDI in certain sectors (UNCTAD, 
2012). A second investment programme, PAC II, with a volume of US$539bn, was approved for the 
period 2011-2014 (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 495). Further, Brazil more forcefully used its state-
owned banks as an anti-cyclical and industrial policy instrument (Ban, 2013, p. 306; Barbosa-Filho, 
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2009lxi, and the assets of state-owned banks as a share of total banking assets increased from 39.8% 
in 2008 to 43.5% in 2010 and around 47% in 2012 (Marois, 2013; Rumsey, 2013; see also IMF, 
2013a).lxii The balance sheet of BNDES doubled in size, from 7.5% of GDP in 2007 to 15% in 2011 
(Park, 2012)lxiii. In August 2011 the BNDES loan programme was expanded again (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Early signs – including the appointment of a “market-friendly” transition team – indicated that the 
first administration led by Dilma Rousseff, who was elected in 2010 by the same social base as Lula’s, 
would again be rather moderate (Anderson, 2011, p. 47; Colitt, 2010; Rathbone, 2010; Vernengo, 
2011, p. 22).lxiv However, quite soon, especially after the orthodox chief of staff Palocci quit in June 
2011 over a corruption scandal, the neo-developmentalist policies were continued, and according to 
some, even strengthened (see Ban, 2013, p. 315; Colitt, 2010; Modenesi, 2014; Morais & Saad-Filho, 
2012, p. 792; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, pp. 495-496). After only a very small rise of 0.1% in 2011, 
minimum wage growth reached 8.4% in 2012 and 2.5% in 2013 (see Table 6.2).lxv Fiscal stimulus and 
industrial policy were continued as well (Biller, 2012; IMF, 2013a). Further, Dilma, which had 
promised during the elections to reduce interest rates, not only vocally criticized high spreads and 
banks’ profits; she was also able to reduce spreads through lower interest rates, and through using 
state-owned banks as a competitive pressure on private banks (Interview 9 & 11; Leahy, 2013a; 
Rumsey, 2013). Spreads and banks’ profits remained high, but they did not return to their pre-crisis 
levels (Caplen, 2011; Rumsey, 2013).lxvi The relationship with the more orthodox central bank over 
interest policy has also come under strain (see Modé, 2013). 
In sum, several authors have argued that the neo-developmentalist approach was strengthened after 
the crisis, and after the election of Dilma Rousseff (Ban, 2013, p. 312; Kröger, 2012, p. 889; Interview 
20; de Lucena, 2013; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, pp. 572-573; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, pp. 495-496). As 
such, it seems that the hybrid of neo-developmentalist neoliberalism has been preserved under 
Dilma (Ban 2013, p. 305; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 790). On the one hand, the neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy framework was not replaced – although it was used in a more flexible way. 
The capital account remained open, and fiscal surpluses, the inflation targeting framework and a 
flexible exchange rate were maintained. On the other hand, however, financial capital has more and 
more felt threatened by the neo-developmentalist policies and the PT’s vocal opposition against 
speculation and high spreads (see also Boito Jr. & Berringer, 2013, pp. 31-32; Interview 11). 
Consequently, a fracture within the neo-developmentalist neoliberal bloc has become clearer, with 
on the one hand national large-scale industrial capital, organized labour and the lower middle class, 
and the marginalized poor, and on the other hand financial capital, large landholders and the wealthy 
Brazilians, and the upper middle class (see also Boito Jr. & Berringer, 2013). Two of the main divisive 
issues are exchange rate policy and interest policy, as productive capital tends to support a reduction 
in interest rates and a less appreciated exchange rate (Amann, 2005, p. 165; Diniz, 2011, pp. 70, 72; 
Erber, 2011, pp. 42-43; Interview 10; Leahy, 2013a; Pinto, 2013).lxvii 
 
  6.5.3 The return of capital controls in 2009 
The neo-developmentalist policies of the Lula-administrations did not, however, forge a revival of the 
industrial sector. To the contrary, the share of industry in total value added, if anything, decreased 
rather than increased (see Figure 6.10; O’Farrell, 2011; see also Souza & Carvalho, 2011, p. 575). 
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Brazil’s exports are still mostly concentrated in commodities and natural resources, as well as some 
labour intensive low-technology goods; the share of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods in 
exports has also fallen strongly; and imports are mostly medium- and high-technology goods 
(Anderson, 2011, pp. 47-48; Carvalho & Souza, 2011; Gaulard, 2012, p. 374; Nassif & Feijó, 2013, p. 
571; Paulani, 2012, p. 94; Prates, 2006, pp. 139, 143; Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 37).lxviii The trade 
deficit in manufacturing has grown (Doctor, 2012, p. 801; Gaulard, 2012, p. 375). Beside the 
appreciated exchange rate (see below), the competition of Chinese goods – both in Brazil and in 
export markets – has also played a large role, not only in low-technology labour-intensive products, 
but also in high-technology products (Castro, 2008; Doctor, 2012, p. 803; Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012, 
pp. 75, 77).lxix With regard to FDI, the share of extractive industries in the inward FDI stock grew from 
3% in 2005 to 15% in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Academics have claimed that the appreciation of the real exchange rate has been an important 
factor in the explanation of the loss of dynamism in the industrial sector (see Figure 6.21; see also 
Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 207; IMF, 2012a; Oreiro & Feijó, 2010, p. 228; Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, 
p. 929; Palley, 2006b; Souza & Carvalho, 2011, p. 574). After the crisis, when the favourable climate 
of the global economy had faded, the debate on de-industrialization and the importance of the 
exchange rate, was reopened (Doctor, 2012, p. 805; see also Pinto, 2013). Several observers have 
argued that Brazil will face further de-industrialization and hollowing out of manufacturing – and a 
concomitant “re-primarization of the economy” – in the longer term, especially if it doesn’t address, 
amongst others, its overvalued exchange rate (Doctor, 2012, p. 806; Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012, pp. 75, 
81; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 109).lxx 
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Exchange rate appreciation ended abruptly in the fourth quarter of 2008, when the consequences of 
the global economic crisis once again demonstrated Brazil’s vulnerability to capital flow volatility (see 
Figure 6.10; see also Barbosa-Filho, 2010; Kaltenbrunner, 2010, pp. 310, 318-319; de Paula, 2011, p. 
60; de Paula & Sobreira, 2010; Prates, 2011, pp. 904-905). Despite solid fundamentals and a sound 
banking system, US$27bn of capital outflows, or a capital flow reversal of over 11% of GDP (see 
Barbosa-Filho, 2009; IMF, 2012a), resulted in a strong fall of equity prices on the Brazilian stock 
market (see Figure 6.15) and a sharp depreciation of the real.lxxi This depreciation demonstrates the 
“international financialization” of the Brazilian economy, in particular the increased use of the Real 
as an international portfolio asset and the concomitant increasing participation of foreign investors 
in short-term Brazilian assets (Kaltenbrunner, 2010, pp. 296-297). Next to portfolio flows, outflows 
also entailed a  rise in the remittance of profits and dividends by subsidiaries of TNCs (de Paula & 
Sobreira, 2010). 
In January 2009, however, the tide turned again. With the low interest rates and abundant liquidity 
in the developed world, especially the US, and the high interest rates in Brazil, substantial carry-trade 
flows into Brazil re-emerged (Biancarelli & Rossi, 2014; Bibow, 2011; O’Farrell, 2011; de Paula & 
Prates, 2013, p. 60; Prates, 2011, p. 907).lxxii These short-term portfolio capital inflows appreciated 
the real, which led to an even more difficult situation for Brazilian industrial capital (Gaulard, 2012, p. 
367; O’Farrell, 2011; de Paula, 2011, p. 62; Pearson, 2012a). Politically powerful domestic 
manufacturers – as well as labour – lamented this strong appreciation (AFP, 2012; Boito Jr. & 
Berringer, 2013, p. 33; Leahy, 2012a; Market News International, 2012; O’Grady, 2012; Pearson, 
2011c). It is clear that the government became more and more concerned, because it doesn’t want 
to lose the manufacturing sector, as Finance Minister Mantega has explicitly acknowledged (see 
Leahy, 2012b; also O’Grady, 2012).lxxiii It is in this context then, to prevent further appreciation and 
loss of competitiveness, that the government introduced some moderate capital controls. These 
measures received support from domestic industrial capital and trade unions (Andrade, 2012; Carlos, 
2010; De Lorenzo, 2010; IEDI, 2010; Interview 9, 10 & 21; Machado, 2012; Veja, 2009).lxxiv 
In October 2009, Brazil imposed a tax of 2% on purchases of stocks and bonds by foreign investors, 
named IOF1 (Imposto sobre Operações Financeiras) (Gallagher, 2011b; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & 
Ocampo, 2011; Gaulard, 2012, p. 373; HSBC Global Research, 2010; Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; 
O’Farrell, 2011; Prates, 2011, p. 909).lxxv It is clear that there were many backdoors to evade this tax 
(Gallagher, 2011b; O’Farrell, 2011; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 62). Therefore, in November 2009, the 
government implemented a 1.5% tax on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)lxxvi, called IOF2 
(Gallagher, 2011b; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2011; O’Farrell, 2011). Because the taxes 
were not very successful, the tax on foreign investments in fixed-income instruments and investment 
funds (but not on the purchase individual equities) was increased first to 4% and then to 6% in 
October 2010 (HSBC Global Research, 2010; O’Farrell, 2011; Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). 
Moreover, the IOF on margin requirements on FX derivative transactions was increased from 0.38% 
to 6% (Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 62). In January 2011, a non-
interest bearing reserve requirement was adopted on certain positions by banks, to counter evasion 
of the existing capital controls (Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2011; de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 
62). 
Because companies were evading controls and trying to benefit from carry-trade activities through 
intercompany loans (Gaulard, 2012, p. 376; Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 62; Pearson, 2012c, 2012d), the 
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IOF of 6% was extended to loans with a maturity of up to one year in March 2011, and to loans with a 
maturity of up to two years in April 2011 (Deloitte, 2014). To close another loophole, a tax of 1% – 
which could be increased if necessary to up to 25% – on all derivatives was introduced in July 2011 
(O’Farrell, 2011). In March 2012, finally, the 6% IOF on foreign borrowing, which was previously 
applied only to loans with maturities of under two years, was extended first to overseas loans with 
maturities of up to three years and later to foreign borrowing with maturities of up to five years 
(Pearson, 2012b, 2012c). All these measures should thus be seen in the context of a sort of renewed 
“neo-developmentalism” which entails a form of state activism in stimulating and even steering 
industrial activity, and with the purpose of protecting the industrial sector from the detrimental 
effects of extreme exchange rate appreciation. 
 
  6.5.4  The neo-developmentalist neoliberal accumulation regime 
Despite the limits imposed by the tightened fiscal and monetary policy, and despite the outbreak of 
the global economic crisis, the implementation of neo-developmentalist policies has resulted in 
better results during the years of the Lula and Dilma administrations than under the previous 
governments. Average annual growth was 4.6% in 2004-2008, whereas it had been only 2.5% in 
1995-2002 (see also Figure 6.1). The accumulation regime leading to this growth has been called a 
“commodity and consumption based model” (Loman, 2014). Economic growth, in the context of 
abundant international liquidity, has mostly been due to the export of commodities (including price 
rises), in particular from the expanding agribusiness sector and from mining, especially to China 
(Amann, 2005, p. 163; Anderson, 2011, p. 28; Canuto et al., 2013; Grinberg, 2013, pp. 186-187; 
Kingstone, 2012; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 109; Oliveira, 2006a, p. 13; Palley, 2006b; Paulani, 
2012, p. 94; Prates & Paulani, 2007, p. 37; Sader, 2005, p. 73; Saull, 2012, p. 331; Schmalz & Ebenau, 
2012, p. 491). Exports of goods and services amounted to an average of 14.7% in 2003-2008 against 
only 7.8% in 1995-2000 (data from World Bank, 2014b). 
This initial growth, together with increases in the minimum wage, social spending and the rising 
availability of consumer credit fuelled consumption and domestic demand, which has led to a 
discourse on the development of a growing “middle class” (Anderson, 2011, p. 29; Amann & Baer, 
2012, p. 417; Biancarelli & Rossi, 2014; Loman, 2014; Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 920; Paulani, 
2012, pp. 99-100; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 491; Souza & Carvalho, 2011, p. 574)lxxvii. Higher 
domestic demand has in turn resulted in higher economic growth and more jobs. Finally, the increase 
in gross fixed capital formation, based on the neo-developmentalist policies, has also led to an 
acceleration of growth (Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 920). 
The growth of exports has been positive for the balance-of-payments, with current account surpluses 
from 2003 onwards (see Figure 6.22). These surpluses have been used to repay foreign debt, which 
decreased from 47.7% of GDP in 2002 to 19.9% in 2012, and to accumulate foreign reserves, which 
grew from US$37.8bn in 2002 to US$85.8bn in 2006, US$206.8bn in 2008 and US$375.8bn in 2013 
(Amann, 2005, p. 163; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 206; IPEA, 2014l; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 794; 
World Bank, 2014b). Vulnerability also decreased on the fiscal front, with the stabilization of public 
debtlxxviii, the reduction of public debt owed to foreign creditors, and a change in the composition of 
public debt (see Ban, 2013, p. 308; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 201; IMF, 2013a; Jaeger, 2011; Mullins & 
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Murphy, 2009, pp. 440, 446). Moreover, the conditionality agreement with the IMF was terminated 
in December 2005. 
 
Figure 6.22: Current account and trade balance Brazil, 2000-2013 (data from IMF, 2014c; World Bank, 
2014b) 
 
Social indicators have also improved (see e.g. Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 418; Baltar et al., 2010; 
Vernengo, 2011, pp. 19-20). The number of poor declined further from 26.75% of the population in 
2006 to 15.93% in 2012, and the number of extremely poor declined from 9.45% to 5.29% of the 
population in the same period (data from IPEA, 2014d, 2014e; see Figure 6.17). With regard to 
inequality, the Gini coefficient, which had already decreased during the first Lula government, 
decreased further from 0,563 in 2006 to 0,543 in 2009, and to 0,530 in 2012 (data from IPEA, 2014i; 
see Figure 6.18). Other indicators have shown improvement as well, such as an increasing share of 
formal employment (Baltar, 2014), and increasing expenses on education (Anderson, 2011, p. 29; see 
also data from World Bank, 2014b). Crucially, the real median wage, which had been decreasing after 
1996, has also started (and kept) rising again after 2003 (see Figure 6.23), and contrary to the 
international trend, the wage share also rose significantly (Araújo & Gala, 2012, p. 50; ILO, 2013; 
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Figure 6.23: Real median wage Brazil (based on data from IPEA, 2014k) 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn: “The achievements of Lula’s administration are in no way 
revolutionary, but they are real enough” (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 38; see also Therborn, 2012, 
p. 23). However, as the next section shows, it is questionable whether these gains are sustainable, let 
alone whether further gains will be possible if the neoliberal project is not opposed. While the 
progress that the governments under Lula and Dilma have realized deserves to be lauded, there are 
fundamental limits to what this neo-developmentalist neoliberalism can achieve. 
 
  6.6 The limits of neo-developmentalist neoliberalism 
  6.6.1 Economic and social limits 
The adherence of the PT administrations to neoliberal economic policies, meant to please 
transnationally-oriented financial capital, inherently limits social and economic progress (Boito Jr. & 
Berringer, 2013, p. 32; Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 794; Sader, 
2005, p. 74). In other words, “despite the considerable successes achieved by the hybrid economic 
policies pursued by Lula and Dilma, the suspension of the incompatibility between their two 
component parts is likely to be provisional” (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 796; see also Nassif & 
Feijó, 2013, p. 566). 
Economically, higher investment and the construction of an industrial sector less dependent on 
imports are needed to create a sustainable accumulation regime.lxxx The investment rate still remains 
low, especially compared to a country such as China, at an average of less than 19% of GDP in 2009-
2013 (data from IMF, 2014c; see Figure 6.19; see also Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 415; IMF, 2012a, 2013; 
Keidel, 2013; Loman, 2014)lxxxi. The consequence is that investment in (amongst others) 
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Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 210; Leahy, 2012a). More public and private investment is thus needed. The 
main impediment is high interest rates and high spreads (and thus profits) for banks (Arestis, Ferrari-
Filho & de Paula, 2011, p. 136; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 213; Gaulard, 2012, p. 375; Mollo & Saad-
Filho, 2006, p. 119). 
Moreover, after the current account surpluses in 2003-2007, (large) current account deficits have re-
emerged since 2008 (see Figure 6.22; see also Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 794).lxxxii The problem is 
that the exchange rate has still been the main (effective) instrument to contain inflation (Arestis, 
Ferrari-Filho & de Paula, 2011, pp. 134-135; Leahy, 2013b; Modenesi, 2014; de Paula, 2011, p. 44; 
Vernengo, 2011, p. 18). The BCB has reacted asymmetrically to inflation, increasing the Selic swiftly 
and strongly when inflation riseslxxxiii, and decreasing it only slowly and gradually when inflation drops 
(Arestis, Ferrari-Filho & de Paula, 2011, p. 136; Libânio, 2010, p. 73). Therefore, other policies and 
arrangements to contain inflation (as well as the acceptance of temporary higher inflation rates) are 
essential (see e.g. Interview 11; Modenesi, 2014; Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, pp. 937-938). The 
orthodox bias of the Central Bank also needs to be tackled (Diniz, 2011, p. 69; Morais & Saad-Filho, 
2012, pp. 795-796). A less overvalued exchange rate, together with more aggressive industrial 
policies, is also necessary to enable a more diversified industrial base (Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 210; 
Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, pp. 38-39). 
With regard to social policies, the amount spent on the Bolsa Família has been quite low (at less than 
1% of GDP), and even more so when it is compared to the government expenditures on debt 
servicing, with interest payments in 2009-2013 continuing to account for an average of more than 5% 
of GDP (see Table 6.1; see also Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 418; Rocha, 2007, p. 143; Saad-Filho, 2013; 
Vernengo, 2011, p. 21). This implies that almost half of the federal budget has been devoted to 
paying off public debt (Saad-Filho, 2013). As long as this “welfare programme for the rich” (Saad-
Filho, 2013) is maintained, it will be difficult to devote more resources to public investment and 
social expenditures. Besides lower interest rates (Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Mollo & Saad-
Filho, 2006, p. 118; Vernengo, 2007, p. 90), renegotiation of government debt has also been 
proposed to lower interest payments (Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais in Hochstetler, 2004; 
Galbraith, 2003, p. 89; Rocha, 2007, p. 141). 
To sum up, a more sustainable and socially just accumulation regime will require getting out of the 
high interest rate – overvalued exchange rate trap (Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 921), and 
moving towards lower interest rates (and a lower spread for banks), a less appreciated (controlled) 
exchange rate and less public resources devoted to debt servicing (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2012, p. 794; 
Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 937; Vernengo, 2003, p. 71, 73). This would stimulate investment, 
consumption and exports. It would also provide more room for both public investment and social 
spending. However, these are policies that run against the interests of financial capital, which 
benefits from high interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate and high profits from government 
debt. The logical implication is that, where until now the Workers’ Party has been able to improve 
people’s lives without any cost for financial capital and for wealthy Brazilians, and without 
challenging the balance of power (Anderson, 2011, pp. 51-52; Marques & Mendes, 2006, p. 63)lxxxiv, a 
confrontation with “the market”, with transnationally-oriented financial capital in other words, is 




  6.6.2 The limits of moderate capital controls 
Even though the financial sector has strongly opposed these moderate capital controls (Interview 13 
& 14; also noted by O’Farrell, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Souza & Carvalho, 2011, p. 577; see also Colitt, 
2010; Pinto in Pearson, 2011b),lxxxv it is clear that the government’s intention was never to challenge 
the power of financial capital. To the contrary, the government emphasized that its policies were 
“modest, temporary and market-friendly” (see Grabel, 2012, p. 62). They were used in a depoliticized 
manner. As the Secretary of Economic Policy at the Ministry of Finance emphasized: “Capital account 
management measures are rather a technical than an ideological issue” (Holland, 2013; also 
Interview 20). The measures were also endorsed by the IMF (IMF, 2012a, 2013a).lxxxvi More forceful 
capital controls were probably never considered, despite calls from industrialists for more stringent 
controls (see Leahy, 2011; Pearson, 2011c).lxxxvii As The Economist (2009a) noted: “Brazil seems 
almost apologetic about its taxes [on capital inflows], which it insists are meant only to prevent 
excesses.” Indeed, Finance Minister Mantega emphasized (in Peel, 2011): “We have to make it clear 
that we limit capital flows because we have no other alternative. We would prefer to have capital 
freedom and a freely floating exchange rate system.”lxxxviii 
The cautious approach of the Brazilian authorities means that these capital controls are inherently 
limited in three ways. First, although studies have indicated that Brazil’s capital controls had some 
effects, they “had a very small impact on cooling hot money flows and were not enough to 
significantly mitigate the harmful effects of speculation” (Gallagher, 2012a; see also Baumann & 
Gallagher, 2012; Chamon & Garcia, 2013; Holland, 2013; IMF, 2013a; Jinjarak, Noy & Zheng, 2013; 
Munhoz, 2013; Pereira da Silva, 2013, p. 376).lxxxix Many analysts have argued that the tax rate is or 
could be too low (Akyüz, 2012, p. 90; Bibow, 2011; O’Farrell, 2011; Spiegel, 2012, p. 81; Souza & 
Carvalho, 2011, p. 577), or that direct, quantitative controls could also have been introduced (Bibow, 
2011; Prates, 2011, p. 910). As Akyüz (2012, p. 91) has argued on the Brazilian IOF: “It is often such 
half-hearted attempts that lend support to the orthodox contention that capital controls do not 
work.” 
Second, the Brazilian government is still subjected to the whims of transnationally-oriented financial 
capital. This became clear when the inflow surge was halted and turned again into capital outflows, a 
fall in stock market prices and the depreciation of the real in 2011 (see also Figure 6.15, Figure 6.21), 
resulting in calls for the withdrawal of the capital controls (Cookson & Leahy, 2011; Pearson, 2011a). 
Moreover, in 2013, FDI inflows were for the first time since 2001 insufficient to cover the current 
account deficit (data from IMF, 2014c; World Bank, 2014b; see also Figure 6.22; Murphy, 2013). This 
implies that Brazil remains dependent on and subject to volatile short-term capital flows (Interview 
11), or as the IMF (2013a) puts it, “Brazil’s continued reliance on foreign saving and its highly 
integrated financial markets leave it vulnerable to swings in global financial conditions.” From 
December 2011 onwards, then, the moderate capital controls introduced in 2009-2011 were 
gradually lifted “in response to a large and sustained decline in gross and net portfolio inflows” (IMF, 
2013a). Moderate capital controls were thus abolished to please international financial markets and 
regain investor confidence (Interview 9). In December 2011, the IOF on the purchase of Brazilian 
securities by foreign investors was eliminated; the maturity of foreign loans to which the 6% IOF 
applied was lowered first to up to two years in June 2012, then up to one year in December 2012, 
and finally up to only six months in June 2014; and in June 2013 the IOF tax was reduced to zero on 
all purchases of bonds by non-residents in both the primary and secondary market, as well as on 
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currency derivatives (Biller, 2012; Deloitte, 2014; IMF, 2013a; Leahy & Pearson, 2013; Strauss, 2014). 
Besides lifting the taxes on capital inflows, other measures to please (foreign) investors, were also 
announced, including less fiscal stimulus and more fiscal austerity (see Pearson, 2014).xc 
Third, as noted above, a more sustainable accumulation regime would require lower interest rates 
and a less appreciated (controlled) exchange rate. However, as these policies would undoubtedly 
lead to capital flight, they would not be possible without much stronger capital and exchange 
controls, with both controls on speculative inflows and (administrative) controls on capital outflows 
as well as higher taxes on the repatriation of profits and dividend payments (Arestis, de Paula & 
Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006; Galbraith, 2003, p. 89; Kaltenbrunner, 2010, p. 
298; Keidel, 2013; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 118; Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 937; de Paula, 
Oreiro & Silva, 2003, pp. 108-113; Vernengo, 2003, p. 73).xci 
Both domestic and international regulations give Brazil the policy space to regulate capital flows. 
Domestically, Law 4,321/1961 and Law , which is still in effect, allows for the introduction of capital 
controls at any time (Carvalho & Garcia, 2005, pp. 33-35; Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, p. 351; de Paula 
& Prates, 2013, p. 58). Because all foreign exchange transactions above a certain amount have to be 
reported to the BCB, it would also be relatively easy to implement controls (Vernengo, 2004b). 
Internationally, Brazil has ensured that it has not made any commitments with regard to the 
(non)regulation of capital flows, nor in trade or bilateral investment treaties, nor in multilateral 
treaties such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Anderson, 2009; de Paula & 
Prates, 2013, p. 55, 58).xcii At the moment, however, it seems unlikely that enforcing more stringent 
capital controls is a path that the PT wants to follow. 
 
  6.6.3 Renewal of the left? 
One development that could lead to the introduction of more comprehensive capital controls is 
pressure from below. It is an open question whether social movements and organized labour will be 
willing to accept the limits imposed by the neoliberal project. From the beginning of the election of 
Lula as president, and the PT’s rise to power, the Workers’ Party administrations had to find a 
difficult balance between pleasing international (financial) capital through “macroeconomic stability” 
on the one hand and the aspirations of their militants and the Brazilian people in general on the 
other hand (Amann, 2005, pp. 155-156; Gill, 2008, p. 262; Hochstetler, 2004; Paiva, 2006, p. 204; 
Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 22; Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 18).xciii This has been visible in the combination 
of orthodox macroeconomic and financial policies and more neo-developmentalist social and 
industrial policies. The favourable international economic climate more or less allowed for this 
compromise for a while. 
However, with the current less favourable (international and domestic) economic climate, the ability 
to keep everyone satisfied will be difficult to maintain. As Saad-Filho (2013) notes: “The economy has 
stalled, and it has become difficult to continue to reduce inequality without directly hurting 
established privileges.” While the income share of the rich has decreased, the highest 20% still 
earned almost 60% of Brazilian income in 2009 (see Figure 6.24), and the richest 1% captured 12.58% 
in 2012 against 13.43% in 2002 (data from IPEA, 2014j).xciv It is also questionable whether further 
substantial improvements in the distribution of income can be realized without a reduction of wealth 
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inequality (see Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 420).xcv Further, the tax system remains very regressive, 
despite changes implemented in 2008 which made it more progressive (Anderson, 2011, p. 37; Baer 
& Galvão Jr., 2008; Ban, 2013, p. 319; Barbosa-Filho, 2010, p. 8; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006, p. 119). 
This implies that distributional tensions between various social forces are bound the resurface.xcvi 
 
Figure 6.24: Income shares Brazil (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Moreover, analysts have expressed doubts on whether neoliberalism represents a truly hegemonic 
project in Brazil (e.g. Boito Jr., 2007, p. 122; Oliveira, 2006b, pp. 282, 286-287). In contrast with 
countries where the neoliberal ideology has been strong, it has also been argued that the adoption of 
neoliberal policies has more been a consequence of pragmatism (Interview 20; Kingstone, 2009, p. 
106; Martinez-Diaz in Doctor & de Paula, 2007; Pinheiro, 2000; Pinheiro, Bonelli & Schneider, 2004). 
This also implies that to the extent that neoliberal policies were only an instrument and not a goal in 
itself, their failure could also lead to their removal. In sum: 
“When we assess the implementation, from the 1990s onwards, of neoliberal policies, we 
realize that Brazil, after all, was one of the countries in Latin America where they were less 
easily internalized.(…) That does not mean that the neoliberal destructive avalanche was less 
powerful in Brazil, but simply that resisting it may be a less arduous endeavor here than in the 
rest of Latin America, in both political and economic terms.” (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, p. 
136) 
But although some have stated that the demobilization of social movements was not (only) the PT’s 
fault (see Fortes, 2009, pp. 114-115), it is clear that the PT administrations are “doomed to leave 
behind a huge political vacuum in the Brazilian left” (Tavolaro & Tavolara, 2007, p. 440), and the 
difficulty with dealing with a supposedly leftist party in power has created many problems for the 
position and strength of organized labour (especially the CUT), social movements and leftist social 
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administration; the difficulty of organizing frontal opposition against a former radical party and a 
charismatic president, a former trade unionist, with popular appeal; the lack of a noteworthy 
opposition party to the left of the PT; the process of co-optation of the left orchestrated by the 
government; and for the working class, especially the CUT, their integration into the financialized 
neoliberal economy (amongst  through workers’ pension funds) (Arcary, 2008; Bianchi & Braga, 2005, 
p. 1761; Boito Jr., 2003, pp. 15-23, 2007, p. 123; Hochstetler, 2004; Interview 16; Jakobsen & 
Barbosa, 2008, pp. 137-138; Marques & Mendes, 2006, p. 64; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 23, 33; 
Motta, 2013; Oliveira, 2003, p. 55, 2006a, p. 13; Saad-Filho, 2013). The consequence is that the left is 
currently probably not in a position to push through radical change (see Saad-Filho, 2013). Moreover, 
there is no credible left-wing political alternative to the Workers’ Party, which implies that the defeat 
of the PT would result in a right-wing victory, with negative effects on the Brazilian and Latin-
American left (Saad-Filho, 2013; see also Fortes, 2009, p. 119). 
This does not mean that pessimism should rule. As Therborn notes, Brazil “still has the strongest left-
wing forces to be found in any of the world’s ‘giant’ states, and offers the brightest prospects for 
social change” (Therborn, 2012, p. 23; see also also Beynon & Ramalho, 2001, p. 219; Boito Jr. & 
Marcelino, 2011, p. 65). Pressure on the state from below could lead (and already has led) to 
victories, especially combined with the reorganization and rebuilding of an organized working class 
(Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 41; Saad-Filho, 2013). Saad-Filho (2003, p. 20) already postulated at 
the beginning of the first Lula-administration, “the most important terrain of struggle for the 
Brazilian Left remains outside the state, or even against the state (...)”. 
The mass protests that started in June 2013 are highly significant in this regard. However, they 
should not be considered as inherently leftist. The protesters represented  a heterogeneous coalition 
with heterogeneous demands. Included in the protests was a right-wing movement, supported by 
right-wing media, and based on upper and traditional (upper) middle class people, which have always 
rejected the PT, Lula and Dilma (Saad-Filho, 2013). While they have not necessarily lost in material 
terms under the PT governments, they deplore their loss of privilege because of the democratization 
of the state and the expansion of mass consumption (see Anderson, 2011, p. 37; Morais & Saad-
Filho, 2005, p. 7, 2011a, p. 38; Saad-Filho, 2013).xcvii Moreover, they condemn the “populism” of the 
PT and the “buying of votes” through the Bolsa Família. Financial capital is also opposed to the 
increased interventionism of the Second Lula and first Dilma government. There are signs that 
financial capital has turned more strongly against Dilma ahead of the coming October 2014 elections 
(see e.g. Brito, 2014; Grabois, 2014). 
On the other hand, the protests also included a left-wing movement, which seems to have regained 
some force during the past year, with strikes, and significant victories of, amongst others, the Free 
Fare Movement (MPL), fighting for free public transportation, and the Homeless Workers’ Movement 
(MTST). One of the reasons for the left’s protest is that progress under the PT largely remained 
limited to private consumption, whereas collective public goods such as education, health, 
transportation have been neglected (see Biancarelli & Rossi, 2014). It seems that the labour 
movement has regained force during the last year (Fernandes, 2014). Trade unions hope to be able 
to force the government to implement more policies which are favourable to the working class. They 
have already declared their support to Dilma Rousseff and the PT for the presidential elections (Carta 
Maior, 2014; Telesur, 2014).  
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The coming elections represent, therefore, the same choice as the 2010 elections. It is, as Morais and 
Saad-Filho (2011a, p. 39) state on the 2010 elections, “a choice between two political economic and 
social projects and two visions of the Brazilian state. (...) One was [is] about broader-based economic 
growth, the expansion of citizenship, continuing (if intrinsically limited) redistributional gains, and the 
incremental democratization of the state, while the other was [is] about the renewal of elite control 
of the state, economy, and society and the promotion of neoliberal dependent development.” It 
seems that, for now, another PT president and incremental gains is the most that the Brazilian 
working class can hope for. For broader, deeper, and more sustainable gains to be realized, however, 
the working class will also have to mount a stronger challenge the power of financial capital, 
including a reversal of capital account liberalization (Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 18). 
 
 6.7 Conclusion: Brazilian capital controls and global neoliberalism 
This chapter has offered an historicized account of Brazil’s capital account policies put in the context 
of their accumulation regimes and the social forces comprising different historic blocs, with a 
particular focus on the period from the late 1980s until the time of writing (July 2014). To shortly 
recapitulate, the chapter has argued that the ISI period, including extensive capital controls, became 
unsustainable in the 1980s due to mounting contradictions. From the late 1980s onwards, and 
especially after 1994, a neoliberal project was implemented, including almost complete capital 
account liberalization. 
While the first Lula government did not reject this neoliberal project, the second Lula government 
and first Dilma administration did adopt more neo-developmentalist and social welfare elements. 
However, these elements were implemented within the context of a neoliberal macroeconomic 
framework, including an open capital account. Therefore, this accumulation regime was labelled as 
“neo-developmentalist neoliberalism”. This chapter has argued that this regime, and the power 
relations coming with the free movement of capital, ultimately limit social progress and the adoption 
of a sustainable neo-developmentalist growth model. Brazil remains economically vulnerable, and 
the space for more broad-based (universal) social policies is limited by the orthodox fiscal and 
monetary framework. Moreover, the moderate capital controls that were implemented in 2009-2014 
did not temper the neoliberal constraints. 
What can we conclude about Brazilian capital account policies and the Western, neoliberal norm of 
the free movement of capital then? A first conclusion is that since the late 1980s Brazil has 
unquestionably and strongly moved towards the adoption of this norm, both in terms of policies and 
in terms of the internalization of this norm. Before 2009, capital was almost completely free to enter 
and exit Brazil. This indicates that the Brazilian capital account policies do not seem to offer a 
challenge to the norm of full capital mobility. 
A second conclusion which confirms this general proposition is that Brazil does not want to challenge 
the norm of full capital mobility, as many interviewees in both the government (Interview 17) and 
the private sector (Interview 9 & 20) emphasized. It is especially relevant that after more than ten 
years of the PT in power, main policymakers are not supporting permanent or more stringent capital 
controls. They do not explicitly promote the adoption of controls by other countries, and in this 
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sense, again, Brazil’s capital account policies do not seem to form a substantial challenge to the norm 
of full capital account liberalization. 
The third conclusion is that there are no powerful domestic social forces politicizing the debate on 
capital controls, and trying to push for more stringent and permanent capital controls. Brazilian and 
international financial capital were strongly opposed even to the introduction of the moderate IOF. 
Domestic productive capital supported the IOF in order to weaken exchange rate appreciation, but 
while it is quite pragmatic with regard to capital controls, in general it prefers other instruments and 
still sees full capital mobility as the ideal end-goal (Interview 10). Finally, it seems that although more 
radical leftist groups and social movements still try to politicize the debate on capital account 
liberalization and support more strict capital controls (see Carvalho & Kregel, 2009; Interview 15; 
Lourenço, 2014), the labour movement (including the CUT) in general, and the Workers’ Party as the 
political party closest to the trade unions, do not have a well-developed view on capital account 
policiesxcviii, and are not in favour of a significant closure of the Brazilian capital account (Interview 10, 
19 & 21).xcix 
Fourth, even though Brazil is not fond of its own capital controls, the fact that it still adopts controls, 
as “there is no alternative” given the consequences of capital flows (Interview 15), deviates from the 
norm of the complete free movement of capital. The recent re-introduction also shows that Brazilian 
policymakers are less “ideological” and more pragmatic with regard to the use of capital controls, as 
Brazil “has always been a proponent of the view that capital controls are a tool just like any other” 
(Interview 12; also Interview 20). This may have a demonstration effect, and may delegitimize the 
norm of the free movement of capital to a certain extent. Indeed, there have already been many 
references to and (economic) research on Brazil’s capital controls, which makes them a kind of 
reference point, and to a certain extent legitimizes restrictions in other countries as well. Moreover, 
it is clear that Brazilian policymakers do not want to lose the autonomy to impose capital controls, 
and therefore avoid binding constraints on the use of controls in international and multilateral trade 
and/or investment treaties (Gomes, 2013; Interview 15).c This will also be demonstrated with regard 
to the IMF framework on capital controls in Chapter 8. The inclination to maintain policy space also 
deviates from the Western view of the full free movement of capital. 
Finally, while the introduction of neo-developmentalist policies have strengthened Brazil’s working 
class in some ways, it has not (yet) developed into a challenge to the power of global financial capital. 
What is more, economic and social progress is fundamentally limited by the adherence to an 
orthodox macroeconomic framework which benefits financial capital, and by the potential 
mobilization of financial capital’s exit option, if more radical policies would be implemented. That 
Brazil’s neo-developmentalist policies have not challenged the power of global financial capital can 
also be observed in the depoliticized way in which Brazil has implemented capital controls, which 
might have prevented worse things from happening, but which did not form an actual challenge to 
the neoliberal project and the concomitant power relations. This was, amongst others, demonstrated 
by the fact that Brazil already reconsidered its moderate capital controls on capital inflows when it 
was faced with a capital flow reversal and the depreciation of the real. Brazil, especially in the 
context of its more or less structural current account deficit, does not endorse any alternative to 
subjecting itself to the power of global financial capital, and has not promoted nor implemented 
transformative restrictions on capital flows. In this sense, Brazil’s capital account policies do not form 




                                                          
i
 According to data from IPEA (2014f), the share of industry grew from 26.3% in 1953 to 44.1% in 1980. World 
Bank (2014b) data also indicate an increasing share, but only from 37.1% in 1960 to 42.8% in 1980. With regard 
to the primary sector, the share of agriculture decreased from 24.4% in 1953 to 10.9% in 1980 (Marquetti, 
Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 487). 
ii
 Besides external indebtedness, public indebtedness was also a growing problem. The state was incapable of 
introducing a strong tax system necessary for activist industrial policies (Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 8). High interest 
rates and orthodox monetary policies after the 1964-1965 financial reform, intended to increase savings, posed 
an additional problem for the domestic public debt (Saad-Filho, 1998, p. 196). 
iii
 It was definitely not yet clear that a transition to neoliberalism was forthcoming. The 1988 Constitution, for 
instance, foresaw universal social security, health care and education (Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006). The 
privatization of state-owned enterprises was also rather limited in the 1980s (Pinheiro, 2000). 
iv
 Brazil was thus a latecomer in Latin America and the developing world in general to implement the neoliberal 
project (Cunningham, 1999, pp. 75-76; Filgueiras, 2006, p. 180; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, pp. 17-18; 
Vernengo, 2004a, p. 62). 
v
 The rise of neoliberalism in Brazil was at first largely due to the influence of the IMF, the World Bank, the US 
and the UK on financial-market practitioners, economists and politicians, and as a pragmatic answer to the 
economic problems such as inflation (Gómez-Mera, 2011, p. 260; Gonçalves & Teixeira, 2006, p. 1867; Saad-
Filho, 2003, p. 9). It also had the support of (part of) national industrial capital (Rocha, 1994, p. 88). Moreover, 
as one interviewee explained, “globalization required that you had some kind of policy geared at integration, a 
degree of openness” (Interview 18). 
vi
 Annual inflation declined from 2,489% in 1993 to less than 22% in 1995 and remained at one digit for seven 
years during the Cardoso administrations (Novelli & Galvão, 2001-2002, p. 14). 
vii
 Profit and dividend remittances rose from about US$1bn in the early 1990s to US$6.5bn in 1997 and 
US$7.3bn in 1998 (Baer & Borges Rangel, 2001, p. 94). 
viii
 There are different data available on Brazil’s public debt (see BCB, 2014b, 2014c; IMF, 2014c; IPEA, 2014a). 
The database used for the 1994-2002 data (IPEA, 2014a) is only available until 2008, while for the other two 
databases I only found data from respectively 2000 (IMF, 2014c), 2001 (BCB, 2014b) and 2006 (BCB, 2014c) 
onwards. This implies that I found no data which allow for an exact comparison from 1994 to 2014. However, 
the databases together do make clear several trends in the period from 1994 onwards. 
ix
 Interest payments have on average accounted for almost one fifth of both government expenses and 
government revenues in 1997-2002 (data from World Bank, 2014b). 
x
 Foreign portfolio capital could, from now on, enter the Brazilian capital market under three “annexes”: Annex 
I (investment company), Annex II (investment funds) and Annex III (securities portfolio) (de Paula, 2011, p. 69). 
xi
 Although more so for residents than for non-residents (Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, p. 373). 
xii
 For an overview of all the regulations liberalizing capital flows see Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, pp. 403-417. 
xiii
 This even goes for SOEs, e.g. on the state-owned Banco do Brasil see Caplen, 2011. 
xiv
 The share of TNCs grew especially at the expense of SOEs, whose share decreased from 28.7% in 1980-1994 
to 20.6% in 1995-2004; the share of national private corporations decreased only slightly from 40.5% to 38.2%. 
xv
 Note that market concentration increased since 1993 (Amann & Baer, 2008). 
xvi
 For instance, the share of foreign investors in the total amount traded on Bovespa, Brazil’s main stock 
market, increased from 6.5% in 1991 to 29.4% in 1995 (Freitas & Prates, 2000, p. 61). 
xvii
 As de Paula (2011, p. 2) explains: “Although the 1988 Brazilian Constitution prohibited the installation of 
foreign banks, it allowed entry on a case-by-case basis through authorizations resulting from international 
agreements, from reciprocity or from the interest of the Brazilian government.” 
xviii
 For other data, demonstrating similar trends, see Abu-El-Haj, 2007, pp. 103-104; Domanski, 2005, p. 72;. 
xix
 Even though state-owned banks “are legally required to operate under market rules” (Morais & Saad-Filho, 
2005, p. 13). 
xx
 Even though it was still below the 1983-1984 level in 2003 (Marquetti, Maldonado Filho & Lautert, 2010, p. 
492). 
xxi
 Other estimates give different percentages, but the same trend of an increasing profit share (e.g. Câmara 
Neto & Vernengo, 2006). 
xxii
 The return on equity of the 3 largest domestic private banks was 19.0% in 1997-2000, while it was only 
12.0% in 1989-1993 (de Paula, 2002, p. 82). 
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xxiii
 A good example of denationalization is the automobile sector (see Doctor & de Paula, 2007). While domestic 
and foreign capital each accounted for about half of both assets, sales revenues and investments in the auto 
parts industry in 1994, in 2005 foreign capital account for about 80%, while the share of domestic capital had 
fallen to around 20%. 
xxiv
 In total, around 1 million jobs in manufacturing were lost in the 1990s, circa one third of total employment 
(Saad-Filho & Mollo, 2002, p. 127). 
xxv
 Especially significant is the fact that the import of capital goods increased from $7.5bn in 1995 to $14.8bn in 
2001, and for intermediate goods from $15.6bn in 1995 to $27.3bn in 2001 (Rocha, 2002, p. 24). 
xxvi
 To give an example, according to one estimate, it decreased from 45.1% in 1991 to 40.1% in 1994, and to 
35.6% in 2003 (Câmara Neto & Vernengo, 2006). 
xxvii
 Unionization as a whole, though, remained fairly stable, thanks to increases in unionization in agriculture 
and the public sector (Jakobsen & Barbosa, 2008, pp. 129-130; see also ILO, 2014).  
xxviii
 This includes “especially skilled and semi-skilled manual and office workers, the lower ranks of the civil 
service, sections of the professional middle class and many informal workers” (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005, p. 5). 
xxix
 Even though it could be argued that Brazilian industrial capital benefited from some of anti-labour 
neoliberal policies, other policies went against its interests. For instance, after 1994 the profit rate of 
productive capital also increased (Bruno, 2008). 
xxx
 Other groups in the losers’ alliance included parts of the middle class, especially the upper middle class, 
many unorganized informal and unemployed workers, and right-wing oligarchs and landowners which had 
been removed from their influential positions within the state by officials associated with financial capital 
(Boito Jr., 2007, p. 122; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 21, 2005, pp. 5-6). This alliance did not form a historic 
bloc in the Gramscian sense (see Morais & Saad-Filho, 2003, pp. 21-22, 2005, pp. 4-5). The respective social 
forces shared the negative experience of losing under neoliberalism, but they did not were not united behind a 
common positive project. This implies that Lula did not receive a clear, unambiguous mandate. 
xxxi
 That the PT had to form a coalition government, has also been pointed out as a reason for the 
deradicalization of the PT and the fact that it did not reverse capital account liberalization (Interview 15 & 19). 
xxxii
 Other reasons that has been cited is the clientelist and fragmented political system (e.g. Fortes, 2009, p. 
112; Saad-Filho, 2003, p. 15) and the exhaustion of the extra-parliamentary left (in particular trade unions) 
during the 1990s and after 2002 (Anderson, 2011, p. 33; Fortes, 2009, pp. 114-115; Sader, 2005, p. 70). 
xxxiii
 For data, see IPEA, 2014m. 
xxxiv
 Around 50% of government debt was indexed to Selic, so that an increase in interest rates immediately and 
directly resulted in an increase in interest payments on public debt (see Arestis, Ferrari-Filho & de Paula, 2011, 
p. 136; Arestis, de Paula & Ferrari-Filho, 2007; Vernengo, 2004b). 
xxxv
 These data are based on the methodology used by the BCB since 2008. According to the methodology used 
until 2007, net public debt (including the BCB and government enterprises) declined from 60.4% in December 
2002 to 47.3% in December 2006 (see IMF, 2014c), while still other calculations indicate a smaller reduction, 
from 50.5% in 2002 to 44.0% in 2006 (see IPEA, 2014a). Gross government debt declined from 79.4% of GDP in 
2002 to 66.7% in 2006 according to the IMF (2014c), while according to BCB (2014b) data (methodology used 
until 2007), gross government debt of the general government (excluding the BCB and government enterprises) 
fell from 76.7% of GDP in 2002 to 65.7% of GDP in 2006. (Note that in the methodology used from 2008 on, 
gross government debt in 2008 stood at 56.4% of GDP in 2006, with no data available for the years before 
2006.) 
xxxvi
 According to research, 80% of government debt is owned by the 10% richest Brazilians (Pochmann et al. in 
Bruno, 2008). 
xxxvii
 Other measures include the reduction and elimination of minimum maturity requirements for external 
loans and taxes on capital flows, and the elimination of restrictions on investments by foreign investors in the 
securities markets (de Paula, 2011, p. 45). For an overview of the remaining restrictions see Fritz & Prates, 
2013; Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, pp. 351, 397-418; de Paula, 2011, p. 81). 
xxxviii
 The share of foreign investors in Brazil’s stock market is the largest of the BRICs (including Russia), and is 
more than double the share of foreign investors in China’s and India’s stock market (see Park, 2012). 
xxxix
 A positive side effect was that banks had less incentives to search for higher yields abroad, which is why 
they were less implicated in the US mortgage-backed securities. Although they have recently been looking for 
opportunities to expand abroad, profitability in the domestic market remains higher (Kregel, 2009, p. 350; 
Pavoni, 2011a, 2012; Rumsey, 2011). 
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xl
 Another policy domain on which it deviated from the previous governments (but less important for this 
dissertation), and on which it attracted sympathy from within the left in general, is foreign policy (Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 491; Tavolaro & Tavolaro, 2007, p. 433). 
xli
 The minimum wage is defined annually by federal law, approved by Congress. In 2007, a formula has been 
adopted on which minimum wage increases are based. This formula is based on previous inflation and 
economic growth. 
xlii
 Annual averages, calculated on basis of data from IPEA (see IPEA, 2014m). 
xliii
 For different data but similar trends with regard to poverty and inequality, see Barbosa-Filho, 2008, pp. 204-
206; World Bank, 2014. 
xliv
 It should be noted that this is mostly based on labor income, as capital income is often not well measured in 
these surveys (Amann & Baer, 2012, pp. 419-420; Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 205). Moreover, the Gini coefficient 
remains very high in comparative perspective (OECD, 2013). 
xlv
 Singer (2009, p. 84) calls the strategy of diminishing inequality without threatening the established order 
“Lulismo”. 
xlvi
 This neo-developmentalism, including market-based capital controls, also has  a theoretical basis in 
academics, based on a Keynesian-structuralist school of thought (see Bresser-Pereira, 2011). 
xlvii
 Heterodox economists were also appointed at the Ministry of Finance, the Institute of Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA) and BNDES. However, the BCB remained untouched and kept its orthodox bias (Morais & Saad-
Filho, 2011a, pp. 34-35, 2012, p. 792). 
xlviii
 PAC includes a housing programme called Minha Casa, Minha Vida, aimed at building one million new 
houses in three years (2009-2011) (Barbosa-Filho, 2010, p. 8). 
xlix
 Even though many of the PAC projects have met with delays or cancellation, due to a number of problems  
(Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 415). 
l
 Between 2005 and 2008, public investment increased from 0.5% to 0.9% of GDP, and domestic investment by 
the national oil company Petrobras increased from 0.8% to 1.3% of GDP (Barbosa-Filho, 2010, p. 3). 
li
 This is an important difference with the FHC administration, when BNDES was used mostly to steer the 
privatization of SOEs (Diniz, 2011, p. 66; Flynn, 2007, p. 20; Hermann, 2010, pp. 200-201). 
lii
 This is in contrast with the preceding period (after 2000), when it was largely domestic private banks whose 
market share increased to the disadvantage of both foreign banks and state-owned banks. 
liii
 The fact that there have been no new privatizations has also been seen as part of the neo-developmentalist 
agenda (see Ban, 2013, p. 314; Fortes, 2009, p. 113), although renationalization was not on the agenda either. 
liv
 It is important to note that pensions are indexed to the minimum wage, and the minimum wage also serves 
as a reference point for workers in the informal sector (Anderson, 2011, p. 29) 
lv
 Annual averages, calculations based on data from IPEA, 2014m. 
lvi
 Elsewhere it has been called “liberal neo-developmentalism” (Ban, 2013, p. 299). I prefer the term “neo-
developmentalist neoliberalism” because the overwhelming feature is still the neoliberal class project, not neo-
developmentalism. 
lvii
 It should also be noted that neo-developmentalism can also have a negative ecological (as well as social) 
impact (see Böhm & Flores, 2014; Hall & Branford, 2012). 
lviii
 It was also less than 3% in 2010, 2012 and 2013, reaching the lowest level under the PT at 1.89% in 2013. 
lix
 The nominal value of the amount dedicated to Bolsa Família expenditures rose from 686.7m reais in 2006 to 
1.239bn reais in 2010, and to 2,012bn reais in 2012 (IPEA, 2014h). 
lx
 Note that this increase in the market share of public banks has been forcefully rejected by the IMF (2013a). 
lxi
 In the same period, domestic private banks’ credit-to-GDP ratio increased only from 16.2% to 17.6%, and for 
foreign banks from 7.7% to 8.3% (de Paula & Sobreira, 2010). 
lxii
 According to data from Rumsey (2013), foreign banks’ market share decreased from 21% in 2008 to 16.5% in 
2012, while domestic private banks’ market share fell from 42.8% in 2008 to 36.5% in 2012. 
lxiii
 On the growth of BNDES, see also Amann & Baer, 2012, p. 420; Pavoni, 2011b. 
lxiv
 One of the indications entails the appointment of Alexandre Tombini, a rather conservative economist, as 
president of the BCB (Vernengo, 2011, p. 19) – although less orthodox than his predecessor Meirelles 
(Interview 11). 
lxv
 Annual averages based on data from IPEA, 2014m. 
lxvi
 According to data from the World Bank (2014b), while the interest rate spread was still almost 40% on 
average during Lula’s first term, it was reduced to 33.8% on average during Lula’s second term. Under Dilma it 
declined further to 32.9% in 2011 and to 28.7% in 2012. 
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lxvii
 The appreciation of the exchange rate is bad news for the rich Brazilians, as Pearson (2012e) describes: “For 
the average wealthy Brazilian, it’s those much-loved shopping trips in Miami, where iPads and Louis Vuitton 
bags will now be far more expensive.” 
lxviii
 According to World Bank (2014b) data, while manufacturing as a share of total exports was still relatively 
stable between 50 and 55% in 2003-2006, it dropped afterwards to below 50% in 2007 and 2008, and to little 
more than an average of 35% of total exports in 2009-2012. On the other hand, it was especially the share of 
fuel and metal and ore exports that grew strongly. 
lxix
 Although Brazil had a trade surplus with China, more than 80% of exports to China consisted of commodities 
(iron ore and soya in particular), while more than 90% of imports from China were manufactured goods 
(Doctor, 2012, p. 803; see also Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012, pp. 70-71). 
lxx
 Beside the appreciated exchange rate, the competition of Chinese goods – both in Brazil and in export 
markets – has also played a large role, not only in low-technology labour-intensive products, but also in high-
technology products (Castro, 2008; Doctor, 2012, p. 803; Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012, pp. 75, 77). Although Brazil 
has had a trade surplus with China, more than 80% of exports to China consisted of commodities (iron ore and 
soya in particular), while more than 90% of imports from China were manufactured goods (Doctor, 2012, p. 
803; see also Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012, pp. 70-71). 
lxxi
 The Real depreciated 42.6% in only 4 months (September – December 2008 (de Paula, 2011p. 61). 
lxxii
 While foreign investors are the most important agents in this carry trade, Brazilian institutional investors 
and companies have also engaged in carry-trade activity (de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 61). 
lxxiii
 It is also in this context that Mantega launched the term “currency war” in September 2010 (see Wheatley 
& Garnham, 2010). 
lxxiv
 For an overview of the measures see the table by de Paula & Prates, 2013, p. 63. 
lxxv
 The IOF was not without precedence. It is comparable to controls implemented taken in the 1990s, 
introduced in a period of excessive exchange rate appreciation, and lifted when capital inflows were needed to 
finance the current account deficit or to counter inflation (see Carvalho & Garcia, 2005, p. 36). There had also 
been an IOF tax of 1.5% on foreign purchases of fixed-income investments between March and October 2008 
(Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). 
lxxvi
 As Gallagher (2011b) explains: “ADRs are issued by US banks and allow investors to buy shares of firms 
outside the US – enabling investors to purchase Brazilian shares but in New York and thereby skirt controls in 
Brazil.” 
lxxvii
 Some analysts have been critical of this notion (e.g. Vernengo, 2011, p. 21). 
lxxviii
 As noted above, public debt already declined substantially between 2002 and 2006. After 2006, net public 
debt declined further (with a temporary rise in 2009), from 47.3% of GDP in December 2006 to 33.6% in 
December 2013, although gross government debt remained at more or less the same level (BCB, 2014c; IMF, 
2014c). 
lxxix
 For a less positive account, see Vernengo, 2011, p. 20. 
lxxx
 Paulani (2010, p. 371) writes the following: “The great problem is that, unlike investment, consumption is 
not dynamic enough to fully invigorate the economy, not to mention that credit-driven consumption is not 
sustainable in the long run, as the American experience clearly shows.” It should also be noted that the 
bursting of a housing and real estate bubble, fuelled by household debt and FDI related to the World Cup 2014 
and the Olympics in 2016, could cause even more havoc (Gaulard, 2012, pp. 379-384). 
lxxxi
 The (of course highly uncertain) projections of the World Bank forecast that Brazil’s investment rate will 
remain low, at around 19% in 2030 (World Bank, 2013a). 
lxxxii
 Note that one of the reasons is the increasing repatriation of profits and dividends by foreign firms to 
compensate for their losses in other markets during and after the crisis (Gaulard, 2012, p. 376; de Paula, 2011, 
p. 60). 
lxxxiii
 Even when this inflation is caused by cost pressures and not demand pressures (Arestis, Ferrari-Filho & de 
Paula, 2011, p. 139; Oreiro, Punzo & Araújo, 2012, p. 930). 
lxxxiv
 Indeed, Lula himself has stated that the Brazilian elite has never made as much money as under his 
government, and the same could be said on the Dilma administration (Saad-Filho, 2013; see also Anderson, 
2011, p. 39; Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011a, p. 38). 
lxxxv
 The American investor and co-founder of hedge fund Quantum Fund (together with George Soros) even 
said that the capital controls had made it “impossible” and “illegal” for foreign investors to invest in Brazil (see 
Xavier, 2013). 
lxxxvi
 Although they were not fancied by some of the Directors of the IMF’s Executive Board (see IMF, 2012a). 
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lxxxvii
 As has been noted, export-oriented firms can be expected to have contradictory desires with regard to 
capital account liberalization: “For just as financial openness may offer access to lower-cost finance, it brings 
the risk of currency appreciation and exchange rate volatility, which harm exports. Thus, industrial exporters 
may be expected to advocate a middle-ground position between a liberal and closed capital account, which 
allows them to mediate between these competing goals” (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012, p. 103). 
lxxxviii
 Note that Brazil also preferred the use of the term “macroprudential measures” instead of “capital 
controls”, to avoid a “deterioration in market sentiment” (Pereira da Silva, 2013, 377-378; see also Holland, 
2013). 
lxxxix
 This is similar to the mid-1990s controls which have, according to studies, also been only marginally 
effective (Cardoso & Goldfajn, 1997; Carvalho & Garcia, 2005, p. 32; Garcia & Barcinski, 1996). The advanced 
stage of Brazilian financial markets, including the well-developed derivatives market, has been suggested as 
causes for the limited effectiveness in both the 1990s (Carvalho & Garcia, 2005, p. 49, 52). 
xc
 Fiscal austerity is particularly problematic given the fact that the short-term multiplier for government 
spending is quite high in Brazil (1.84), according to UNCTAD (2013b). 
xci
 For a different view, suggesting full capital account liberalization, see Goldfajn & Minella, 2007, p. 352. 
xcii
 Note also that it seems that Brazil, with its large domestic market, is well-placed to receive market-seeking 
FDI, which do not seem to have been deterred by the capital controls that have been introduced from 2010 on 
(see Barbosa-Filho, 2008, p. 210; Suttle et al., 2012; UNCTAD, 2012). 
xciii
 For a more optimist vision on the compatibility between social targets and a (more flexible) macroeconomic 
framework, see Biancarelli & Rossi, 2014. 
xciv
 The income share of the poorest 60% went from 18.6% in 2002 to 22.4% in 2009 (data from World Bank, 
2014b). 
xcv
 According to slightly outdated data, the 10% richest control 45% of GDP and own 75% of total wealth in 
Brazil (Pochmann et al. in Bruno, 2008; for other data see Filgueiras, 2006, p. 189). Moreover, only 0.3% of the 
population invests in the stock market (Caplen, 2011). 
xcvi
 It seems that at least part of the labour movement acknowledges this. As the President and Secretary for 
International Relations of the CUT have written: “Meeting these challenges will cost money. Until now, it was 
possible to make progress with relatively modest outlays, but education and health costs are rising as services 
become more sophisticated and widely available. There are bound to be unprecedented confrontations 
between the different social strata” (Moraes & Felicio, 2013). 
xcvii
 Their hatred against Lula is even stronger because he is a former “ordinary” (industrial) worker, who lacks 
formal education. 
xcviii
 Although they do sometimes identify full international capital mobility as a problem (see e.g. CUT, 2009). 
xcix
 Note that in 2003 the Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais still demanded “control of currency exchange 
rates and capital flows” (see Hochstetler, 2004). As an interviewee confirmed, the technical nature of the issue 
makes it difficult to politicize (Interview 21). 
c
 Amongst others, Brazil does not want to “protect capital speculation or gambling”, and capital inflows may 
“require a wide range of policy tools” (Gomes, 2013). 
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7. Pragmatic neoliberalization in India: the case of 
capital account liberalization 
 
 7.1 Introduction 
India is probably the least “conspicuous” of the BRICS countries. It is less outspoken on many foreign 
policy issues than China or Russia (although it recently blocked a WTO deal), and it does not really 
have the same attractive image as Brazil. However, with its population of more than 1.2bn people, 
and becoming (or even already being) the third largest economy in the world, India’s position on a 
range of issues is bound to become more important in the future (IBRD/World Bank, 2014; Standard 
Chartered, 2013). This is also true with regard to India’s capital account policies. In this chapter, 
therefore, India’s capital controls are studied, and put in the context of India’s changing social 
relations and accumulation regime. 
The second section, after this introduction, discusses the ISI period, from India’s independence in 
1947 to the early 1990s, and the concurrent system of strict capital controls. In the third section, the 
neoliberalization of India in the 1990s is sketched, as well as the Indian approach to capital account 
liberalization. Thereafter, the fourth section looks at the period from the Asian crisis up to the global 
economic crisis. It is argued that further liberalization and the transformation of the banking sector 
have led to a new accumulation regime, which, however, is unsustainable for several reasons. In the 
fifth section, the situation of India during and after the global economic crisis is examined. It is also 
claimed that the crisis has not unraveled the neoliberal historic bloc, although it is questionable 
whether neoliberalism is a hegemonic project in India. The sixth section outlines the contemporary 
debate on capital account policies within India. Finally, in the conclusions of this chapter the question 
is answered whether India forms a challenge to the norm of the free movement of capital.  
 
 7.2 India under ISI 
  7.2.1 After Independence in 1947 
Similar to other countries in the Global South (and to Brazil), India had a state-led import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) model of development after it gained its independence in 1947, under the 
Indian National Congress Party (INC) (Agarwal, 2006, p. 95; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 30; Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 492). This state capitalist accumulation regime entailed, especially after the mid-
1950s, a rather strong involvement of the state (amongst other things in basic and heavy industries), 
a form of central planning to influence the allocation of investment, strong protectionism through 
import controls and high tariffs, and the regulation of foreign capital inflows (Amin, 2005, pp. 5-6; 
Chakrabarti, Chaudhury & Cullenberg, 2009, p. 1174; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 31; De & 
Vakulabharanam, 2013; Kohli, 1989, p. 309; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3123; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 492).i 
Although finance remained relatively free until 1969 (Jayadev, 2013), the financial system was slowly 
transformed to support the ISI model of economic growth. Prior to India’s independence, the 
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financial system was relatively liberal and sophisticated, with banks mostly under private ownership, 
and there was capital account convertibility within the sterling area (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147). 
However, between the mid-1950s and late-1960s the financial system was fully transformed, in line 
with the Keynesian thinking of the time, and under the influence of the Soviet economic success 
(Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147). Soon after independence, a broad and complex web of capital controls 
was implemented, based on the Second World War exchange controls (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147; 
Patnaik & Shah, 2011; Reddy, 2001, p. 86). These controls would be strengthened and deepened in 
1956, after a foreign exchange crisis (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147). Moreover, in the first decennia 
after independence, the Indian financial system was bank-based (Jadhav, 2006, p. 115). In 1955 the 
largest bank, the State Bank of India (SBI), was nationalized (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147).ii 
The ISI accumulation regime was underpinned by a (sometimes strained) alliance between the state, 
the national industrial capitalist class and a rural landowning class (Chatterjee, 2008, p. 57; De & 
Vakulabharanam, 2013; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3124; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 492). The state took the 
lead in fostering economic growth through public investment and government spending 
(Chakrabarti, Chaudhury & Cullenberg, 2009, p. 1174; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). However, 
“Nehru was careful to keep public sector expansion within the bounds that were acceptable to Indian 
business houses” (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). Domestic capital thus reaped the benefits of this 
accumulation regime. Urban skilled workers also benefited because of the expansion of jobs in the 
public sector. Efforts were made to improve the lives of the poor, “even if it was long on words and 
short on substance” (Nayyar, 1998, p. 3121; see also De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). The nationalist 
spirit also served as a glue, reducing conflicts (Nayyar, 1998, p. 3121). Satisfactory (industrial) growth 
until the mid-1960s also legitimized the ISI model (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 31)  
 
  7.2.2 Economic stagnation and the crisis of ISI  
From the mid-1960s, the limits and contradictions of India’s ISI model became clearer, and India 
entered a period of “secular stagnation” (see Figure 7.1; see also Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 31). First, 
while urban inequality declined over this period, income and wealth inequality (not the least the 
inequality of land ownership) persisted at high levels (Amin, 2005, pp. 6-7; Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 
32-33; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3124). The result was that the domestic market 
(for mass consumption) remained inherently limited. Consequently, the state had to provide a 
continuous stimulus to spur economic growth through government spending and public investment. 
Second, the state was incapable of creating a tax system that was able to fulfil the needs with regard 
to government expenses (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 34).iii This was bound to undermine the state’s 




 Figure 7.1: Average yearly real growth and per capita growth India (data from The Conference Board, 
2014) 
 
Third, the state was not strong enough to control the Indian industrial sector. Even though it was not 
strong enough to get all of its demands fulfilled, Indian industrial capital was able to create 
monopolies through abusing state regulation, and to prevent the Indian state from creating 
disciplinary structures and disciplinary planning (Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 32-34; D’Costa, 2000, p. 
144; Vanaik, 2004, pp. 155-157). One of the effects was that export-led growth was impossible, and 
exports grew at less than 1% (see De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). Imports on the other hand remained 
high, both because India remained dependent on energy and machinery from abroad, and because 
wealthier parts of the population wanted to emulate Western consumption patterns and were not 
satisfied consuming Indian goods (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 35; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). The 
external imbalance this entailed led to a structural balance-of-payments problem. 
A balance-of-payments crisis in 1965-1966, however, did not lead to the replacement of ISI.iv To the 
contrary, the crisis contributed to the “radical turn” of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Sengupta, 2009, 
pp. 186-187). She forged a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, adopted a populist rhetoric, and 
strengthened import controls. In July 1969, fourteen of the largest private domestic banks, which 
were criticized for insufficiently fulfilling the needs of India’s economic development, were 
nationalized, which meant that more than 80% of Indian deposits were controlled by state-owned 
banks (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Gupta et al., 
2011; Jayadev, 2013).v While foreign banks were not nationalized, they were heavily controlled. In 
the pre-nationalized period credit had been directed mostly to the urban corporate sector, which 
increased its share of credit from 34% in 1951 to 68% in 1968 (Jayadev, 2013). After the 
nationalization, banks were “persuaded” or forced to focus on (less lucrative) activities which were 
considered to be crucial in development, generating employment and alleviating poverty (including 
agriculture, small-scale industry and retail trade). By the late 1970s, “priority sector lending 
requirements” obliged banks to direct 33% – later increased to 40% by 1985 – of their credit to 
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branches in the rural and semi-urban areas. This publicly-owned financial system hence contributed 
to agrarian development and poverty reduction in the 1970s and 1980s (Jayadev, 2013). Next to the 
nationalization of the banks, in 1973, capital controls were strengthened through the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 183; Reddy, 2001, p. 
86).  
In 1965, the New Agrarian Strategy (also “Green Revolution”) was introduced, aimed at improving 
agricultural productivity through rapid modernization (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 492; Walker, 2008, p. 567). This led to the strengthening of capitalist social relations 
in agriculture and more power for agrarian capitalists. Increased subsidies to the rich peasantry 
resulted in (slightly) higher agricultural growth, but the benefits went largely to the large landholders 
and rural elites , at the cost of smaller landholders and the rural poor (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; 
Nayyar, 1998, p. 3125). Rural poverty was countered through the implementation of poverty 
alleviation programmes (on a modest scale), which could not, however, prevent urban and rural 
inequality from increasing. 
Furthermore, increasing resources towards agriculture and poverty alleviation implied fewer 
resources for industry, and less room for public investment in the 1970s (De & Vakulabharanam, 
2013). This also impacted negatively upon corporate investment. Combined with the end of the 
Bretton Woods system and the oil crises during the 1970s, the consequence was industrial 
stagnation, and overall decreased growth, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 3.18% in the 
1970s against 3.97% in the 1950s and 3.75% in the 1960s, and with average annual GDP growth per 
capita decreasing from 2.01% in the 1950s and 1.49% in the 1950s to 0.87% in the 1970s (see Figure 
7.1, data from The Conference Board, 2014). In 1979, a negative growth rate of almost 5% was 
registered, with GDP per capita decreasing with more than 7%. 
 
  7.2.3 The first steps towards liberalization in the 1980s 
Faltering economic growth, combined with both internal contradictions and a changing international 
context, weakened the ISI model, or “Nehruvian Consensus”, as a hegemonic project during the 
1970s (see Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 31-32; Kohli, 1989, pp. 307, 310; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3125; Schmalz 
& Ebenau, 2012, p. 492).vii India’s declining industrial growth rate stood in stark contrast with the 
success of the supposedly pro-market East Asian tigers (Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 2; Mukherji, 2013, p. 368; 
Sengupta, 2009, p. 188). Moreover, by the early 1980s, of the two main communist countries, the 
Soviet Union was already perceived to be in economic decline, and China had started its own process 
of liberalization. This domestic and international context provided the opportunity for liberalizers to 
advance their cause. 
During the 1980s the transition away from ISI started prudently (Mukherji, 2013, p. 368). Under 
Indira Gandhi (1980-1984) and especially Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) – who has been considered as an 
important reformer – the Congress Party abandoned the leftist rhetoric and became more pro-
capitalviii, with positive effects on private investment and economic growth (see Figure 7.2; De & 
Vakulabharanam, 2013; Kohli, 1989, p. 308, 2006a, pp. 1251-1252, 1255; Mukherji, 2013, p. 375; 
Rodrik, 2011, p. 177-178; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004; Shastri, 1997, p. 27).ix The main drivers of 
corporative investment were fiscal stimulus through increased public consumption and subsidies to 
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business (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 36; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3126). 
However, the 1980s reforms did not change the accumulation regime dramatically (Kohli, 1989, p. 
306). 
 
Figure 7.2: Investment rate India, 1950-51–1989-90 (based on data from Ministry of Finance India, 
2005, 2012, 2013a, 2014) 
 
The main reforms concerned relaxations of controls on the domestic private sector (Ministry of 
Finance India, 2007; Sengupta, 2009, p. 188). External liberalization remained largely limited to 
(moderate) trade liberalization. Trade liberalization led to a boom in imports (which grew at more 
than 7% and were important in stimulating economic growth through making capital goods cheaper), 
and export growth couldn’t keep up with imports, as exports remained at less than 7% of GDP (see 
Figure 7.3; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 36; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). This resulted in widening trade 
and especially current account deficits, with the CAD increasing from an average of 1.49% of GDP in 
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Figure 7.3: Exports India, 1960-1990 (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Current account balance India, 1980-1990 (data from IMF, 2014c) 
 
While capital inflows had been restricted to official finance until then, and capital flows had thus 
been negligible, in the 1980s (short-term) external commercial borrowings (ECBs) from foreign banks 
and deposits from non-resident Indians (NRIs) increasingly supplemented official flows to finance the 
current account deficits (Chandrasekhar, 2008a, 2010, p. 36; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Jayadev, 
2013; Joshi, 2003, pp. 194; Mohan, 2008, pp. 235-236; Reddy, 2001, p. 86).xi The result was that 
foreign debt more than doubled as a percentage of GNI during the 1980s, from 11.10% in 1980 to 
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Figure 7.5: External debt stock India (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
While the pro-reform social forces did clearly not (yet) form a (hegemonic) historic bloc, a neoliberal 
historic bloc was undoubtedly in the making. At the apex of this historic bloc was not the Indian (or 
foreign) capitalist class, but reformers within the state. Indeed, “the immediate and the most 
sustained push for liberalization has come from a group of technocratically inclined leaders that has 
come to control the levers of India’s economic policy making” (Kohli, 1989, p. 306; see also Jenkins, 
2003, p. 593; Shastri, 1997, p. 30). Key policymakers, politicians, officials, advisors, technocrats and 
bureaucrats had become convinced by the late 1970s that India’s growth model had to change 
(Shastri, 1997).xii They were inspired by “market-friendly” ideas and were in favour of opening up to 
the world economy. Moreover, new economic advisors with the same pro-market ideas, who had 
enjoyed education and/or professional experience abroad (especially in the US and the international 
financial institutions), entered the bureaucracy in the 1980s (Kohli, 1989, p. 307; Sengupta, 2009, pp. 
190-192; Shastri, 1997, pp. 31, 36, 38).xiii 
Some of the economic advisors favouring liberalization included Montek Singh Ahluwalia, later 
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission (2004-2014), Manmohan Singh, later Finance Minister 
(1991-1996) and Prime Minister (2004-2014), and Rakesh Mohan, later Deputy Governor of the RBI 
(2002-2004, 2005-2009) and Executive Director at the IMF (2012-now) (Kohli, 1989, p. 312; Shastri, 
1997, p. 39). Support from Rajiv Gandhi was crucial for these advisors: “The fact that Rajiv Gandhi 
was willing to listen and encouraged discussions on a variety of topics made it possible for 
bureaucrats with new ideas to state their ideas openly and to translate them into operational 
policies” (Shastri, 1997, p. 38). The fact that they also received support from the Bretton Woods 
institutions (both the IMF and the World Bank) has also been crucial in the rise of these “free-
market” reformers, especially in the battle with the rival faction in favour of more selective and 
restrained liberalization (Sengupta, 2009, pp. 182, 191; Shastri, 1997, p. 39). 
Indian (industrial) capital did not lead the push for liberalization. According to Kohli (1989, p. 317): 
“The business community of India has tended to react to rather than lead economic policy. Its power 
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Rajiv Gandhi’s policies, especially with regard to domestic liberalization (Kohli, 1989, pp. 306, 316; 
Mukherji, 2013, pp. 365, 376; Vanaik, 2004, p. 158). Yet a significant part of the business community 
opposed opening up to the global economy. As Kohli (1989, p. 317) writes, a major area “where 
business response has been quite hesitant, or even negative, is the extent to which the economy 
should be opened to external goods and capital.” This is one of the reasons that external 
liberalization in the 1980s was much more limited than domestic deregulation. India’s urban middle 
class also supported reforms for various reasons (Kohli, 1989, pp. 306, 318). Their buying power 
increased considerably. Although this was not an organic alliance with a shared ideological 
framework, a historic bloc was in the making, consisting of the technocrats and the bureaucracy, 
parts of Indian capital, and the urban middle class. 
Structural resistance to the reforms came from organized labour in the public sectorxiv, leftist 
intellectualsxv, and part of the rank-and-file of the Congress Partyxvi; more diffuse opposition was 
expressed by rural groups such as the landless poor and middle peasants (Jenkins, 2003, p. 593; 
Kohli, 1989, p. 306; Mukherji, 2013, p. 376; Sengupta, 2009, p. 191; Shastri, 1997, p. 47). These social 
forces did not succeed in forcing a reversal of liberalization, but they did manage to slow down 
liberalization in 1985-1989 and force Rajiv Gandhi to adopt a more populist economic programme.xvii 
Redistributive and poverty alleviation programmes grew strongly in the 1980s, and the rural elites 
continued to receive a lot of state subsidies (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3126). 
The period before the 1990s has been described then, as “a contradictory phase in policy where the 
strengthening of some measures of intervention was accompanied by a creeping process of limited 
liberalization” (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 32). 
 
 7.3 Neoliberalization in the 1990s 
  7.3.1 The 1991 economic crisis and the definitive breakthrough of neoliberalization 
The growing current account deficit in the 1980s brought India on the verge of a balance-of-
payments crisis in 1991 (see Figure 7.4 and 7.5; also Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Joshi, 2003, pp. 185-
186).xviii This balance-of-payments crisis, combined with a fiscal crisis, created an occasion for 
neoliberal reformers in the state bureaucracy, including the newly elected Prime Minister Narasimha 
Rao, Finance Minister Manmohan Sing and Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram, as well as Montek 
Singh Ahluwalia and Rakesh Mohan, to marginalize their adversaries and to introduce more 
(systemic) neoliberal policies, in the form of the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) (Chakrabarti, 2012, p. 
460; Chakrabarti, Chaudhury & Cullenberg, 2009, p. 1175; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 41; Kohli, 2006b, 
p. 1363; Mukherji, 2013, pp. 368, 377-379; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3127; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 492; 
Sengupta, 2009, pp. 181, 195; Shastri, 1997, pp. 44-45; Vanaik, 2004, p. 153).xix Thus, while the 1980s 
already saw some changes, the 1991 crisis represents the final end of ISI and the definitive 
breakthrough of the neoliberal project in India (Jha, 2008a, p. 65; Sengupta, 2009, p. 181). It 
“provided an excellent window of opportunity for India’s distinguished technocrats and economists 
to deal decisively with parts of the dominant electoral coalition at the time of a foreign exchange 
shock” (Mukherji, 2013, p. 364). 
In 1991-1993, the crisis was “solved” with an orthodox stabilization programme, including an IMF 
loan of US$2.3bn (Joshi, 2003, pp. 185-186; Raman, 2009, p. 284).xx In general, it targeted central 
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planning and state intervention in the form of regulations and state enterprises holding back private 
capital accumulation. Besides trade and capital account liberalization, the wide-ranging reforms 
comprised domestic financial liberalization such as the liberalization of interest rates (including the 
end of targeted lending at differential interest rates) and the development of capital markets, the 
sale of publicly-owned assetsxxi, and a smaller role for public investmentxxii (Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 3; 
Bery & Singh, 2006, pp. 149-150; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 32; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). In 1994, 
India accepted convertibility on the current account (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 151; Gaur, 2008, p. 269; 
Reddy, 2001, p. 92; Vasudevan, 2006, p. 1881).xxiii 
The historic bloc that was being formed in the 1980s underpinned the 1990s reforms. This bloc was 
led by Indian technocrats and bureaucrats, influenced by the global ideological climate (Mukherji, 
2013, pp. 364-365; Williamson, 2006, p. 1849). Indian capital supported many of the reforms, but it 
was not the leading force. More importantly, it did not demand external liberalization, and a 
significant part of Indian industry, organized in the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI), was even opposed to opening up the economy (Interview 24; Joshi, 2003, p. 195; 
Kochanek, 1995-1996, p. 547; Mukherji, 2013, pp. 365, 379; Sengupta, 2009, p. 183). However, a 
segment of Indian capital had become more efficient in the 1980s, and the part of manufacturing 
that was organized in the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) supported globalization, partly due to 
the changing international context (Kohli, 2006b, p. 1362; Mukherji, 2013, pp. 379-380; Williamson, 
2006, p. 1849).xxiv According to Kohli (2006b, p. 1363), the social forces supporting the neoliberal shift 
thus included “the narrow political leadership, the technocratic policy elite, a segment of Indian 
capital, and external actors, expressing their preferences mainly in the form of policy conditionalities 
set by the IMF.” This was quite a narrow support base, and the crisis and international organizations’ 
preferences were definitely important as catalysts for change (Kohli, 2006b, p. 1363; Sengupta, 2009, 
p. 196). 
While there were no “extensive or immediate, political and other protests” (Shastri, 1997, p. 49), 
organized labour was the main social force opposing the 1991 reforms, with the support of Marxist 
and non-Marxist socialist political parties (Davala, 1994, p. 406; Mukherji, 2013, p. 380).xxv However, 
trade unions had been weakened in the previous decades, which created “am ambience conducive to 
the neoliberal reforms”  (Jha, 2008a, pp. 70-71; see also Teitelbaum, 2006, p. 408). Even though they 
were able to slow down some reforms, unions’ resistance and strike actions were not able to deter 
the government from transforming the Indian economy in a neoliberal direction (Davala, 1994, p. 
406). 
 
  7.3.2 The Indian approach to capital account liberalization in the 1990s 
Capital account liberalization was also included in the reforms after the 1991 balance-of-payments 
crisis. Until 1991, except for ECBs and official finance, capital flows were restricted by means of 
administrative controls and prohibition (Kletzer, 2004; Kohli, 2001). Based on and very much in line 
with the recommendations made by the 1993 “Report of the High-Level Committee on the Balance 
of Payments”, chaired by Dr. C. Rangarajan, the 1990s are marked by the gradual, piecemeal, but 
continuous liberalization of both capital inflows and capital outflows (Francis, 2013, p. 109; Reddy, 
2001, p. 88, 2007, p. 21).xxvi The “Indian approach” to capital account liberalization has a number of 
features. First, its gradualism is often emphasized by policymakers and analysts (and even leftist 
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critics), as opposed to a “big bang” approach to liberalization, and in contrast to many other 
countries (e.g. Ahluwalia, 2006, pp. 4, 10; Interview 26; Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 194; Mohan, 
2008, p. 250; Prasad, 2009a; Reddy, 2007, p. 20; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 610). 
Second, a hierarchy has been established in both the sources and types of capital flows. As former 
RBI Governor Reddy (2007, p. 23; see also Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 10; Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 171; Epstein, 
Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Reddy, 2001, p. 90) explains: “The priority has been to liberalize inflows 
relative to outflows, but all outflows associated with inflows have been totally freed. Among the 
types of inflows, FDI is preferred for stability, while excessive short-term external debt is eschewed. 
A differentiation is made between corporates, individuals, and banks. For outflows, the hierarchy for 
liberalization has been corporates first, followed by financial intermediaries, and then individuals.” 
Moreover, there is also a difference between capital outflows for residents (restricted) and capital 
outflows for non-residents who have invested in India (not restricted). 
Thus, inflows have been more liberalized than outflows (except for outflows related to inflows, see 
below). Liberalization with regard to capital inflows especially concerned FDI and portfolio equity 
inflows (Bibow, 2011; Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004); “FDI was generally viewed as a preferred form 
and these inflows were liberalised early in the reform, while the liberalisation of portfolio flows took 
place a little later” (Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 2; also Jayadev, 2013). In contrast with the opening up to FDI 
and equity inflows, India tried to deter private debt flows, especially short-term debt flows (Bibow, 
2011; Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 2003, pp. 194-195; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 609). The experience of the 
1991 crisis was important in this regard, as it had exposed the dangers of short-term debt flows. 
Deposits by NRIs with Indian banks, and ECBs by Indian corporations, as well as banks’ borrowing and 
lending abroad, remained largely managed (Bibow, 2011; Jayadev, 2013). With regard to the NRI 
deposits, which had proven to be potentially volatile during the 1991 crisis, interest rate incentives 
were eliminated and there was a fine-tuning of reserve requirements (Joshi, 2003, p. 184; Mohan, 
2008, p. 241). Interest rates on repatriable NRI deposits were made subject to adjustable ceilings 
(Reddy, 2001, p. 91). ECBs for corporations and financial institutions were to be approved on a case-
by-case basis, with limits on the amount of each loan and an overall annual ceiling for all ECBs, and 
regulations on the maturity (short-term loans to be disfavoured) and end-use (with a priority given to 
projects in the energy and infrastructure sectors) of loans (Joshi, 2003, p. 184; Mohan, 2008, p. 236; 
Reddy, 2001, p. 91). 
With regard to outflows, there are no restrictions on outflows (including repatriation of the principal, 
interest income, dividends, profits and capital gains) associated with inflows (Interview 28; Reddy, 
2001, p. 91). Corporations investing in India are allowed to repatriate capital, and foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs) as well enjoy full capital account convertibility and are thus permitted to 
retract from the Indian capital markets whenever they like (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 159; Jayadev, 
2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 183; Reddy, 2001, p. 90; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 620). While there are thus 
limits on portfolio equity inflows by FIIs there are no limits on outflows  by these FIIs.xxvii For Indian 
corporations, capital outflows in the form of outbound FDI were allowed after October 1992, 
although on a restricted scale, both via an automatic list and through case-by-case approval (Bibow, 
2011; Joshi, 2003, p. 185; Pradhan, 2005; Reddy, 2001, p. 91). Capital outflows for Indian individuals, 
however, remained highly restricted, and individual residents were “virtually prohibited from holding 
foreign currency assets” (Reddy, 2001, p. 91; see also Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 185). 
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A third feature of India’s approach is that it has consisted of a large number of quantitative 
restrictions operated by a bureaucratic apparatus, with a gradual and incremental increase in the 
quantitative ceilings and number of sectors available to foreign investors (Reddy, 2001, p. 83; Shah & 
Patnaik, 2007, pp. 609-610). As Reddy (2001, p. 90) has written: “Thus, moves from more restrictive 
to less restrictive take place from time to time based on both micro-experience and the macro-policy 
environment.” With regard to incoming FDI, the automatic approval of FDI of up to 51% of 
shareholding was allowed for a range of industries in 1991, which was a major symbolic event 
(Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 183; Mohan, 2008, p. 236).xxviii After that, more industries were 
opened up to FDI, and the ceiling was gradually raised, in some sectors to up to 74% of equity in 
1996.xxix By the early 2000s, most sectors were open to FDI, although important restrictions remained 
in banking, finance, real estate, retail and infrastructure (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 171; Epstein, Grabel 
& Jomo, 2004). 
Since September 1992, portfolio equity inflows are allowed only, as in China, through a framework 
with registered FIIs such as pension funds and mutual funds (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 171; Bibow, 
2011; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 2003, p. 183; Mohan, 2008, p. 236; Reddy, 2001, 
p. 91; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, pp. 617-618). At first, one FII could own no more than 5% of a company, 
and all foreign investors together could own no more than 24% of a company. In April 1997, the 24% 
limit was raised to 30% (subject to the shareholders’ approval), and the 5% limit was increased to 
10% in June 1998 (Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 619).xxx 
Restrictions on portfolio bond flows have also been eased, but less than equity flows (Shah & 
Patnaik, 2007, p. 618). A complex regulatory framework was established with two investor classes: 
on the one hand regular FII investors, which could at most invest 30% of their portfolio in 
(government and corporate) debt securities (and thus had to devote at least 70% of their investment 
to equity), and on the other hand 100% debt FIIs, which had to register separately (SEBI, 2004a). It 
was only in April 1998 that FIIs were allowed to invest in government bonds, with a ceiling of US$1bn 
(Jadhav, 2006, p. 128; Joshi, 2003, p. 183; RBI, 2006d; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, pp. 619, 625). Indian 
companies were also allowed to issue shares in foreign markets, through the American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) and the Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), subject to approval by the Ministry of 
Finance (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 159; D’Costa, 2003, p. 219; Jadhav, 2006, p. 117; Jayadev, 2013; Joshi, 
2003, p. 184; Reddy, 2001, p. 91; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 625).xxxi These contributed to large capital 
inflows in the mid-1990s (Jayadev, 2013). 
A few general remarks can be made about the mix of capital flows during the 1990s (and afterwards). 
First, capital inflows “gained momentum from the 1990s after the initiation of economic reforms” 
(see Figure 7.6; see also Mohan, 2008, p. 235; also Kohli, 2001; Ministry of Finance India, 2007).xxxii 
The economic reforms thus succeeded in attracting foreign capital and inserted India firmly into the 
global economy. There was a rise in both net and gross capital flows and in FX turnover (Bery & 
Singh, 2006, p. 164; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 730; Ministry of Finance India, 2007; Mohan, 
2008, pp. 237, 246; Ranjan & Prakash, 2010; Prasad, 2009a; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, pp. 611, 613, 
2008).  
Second, a large part of capital inflows to the Indian stock market occurred through “participatory 
notes” (PNs), over-the-counter derivatives sold by registered FIIs to foreign investors which are not 
registered in India (such as hedge funds), linked to a security traded in the Indian market 
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(Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Kawai, Lamberte & Takagi, 2012, pp. 41-42; Patnaik & Shah, 2011; Prasad, 
2009a; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 620, 2008). As Chandrasekhar (2008a) explains: “Through these 
routes, entities not expected to play a role in the Indian market can have a significant influence on 
market movements (…).” 
Third, as foreseen, debt flows, and especially short-term loans, have decreased in importance during 
the 1990s (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Mohan, 2008, p. 235; Reddy, 2007, p. 22; Shah & Patnaik, 
2007, pp. 610, 613; Singh, 2007). The external debt stock shrank from 32.08% of GNI in 1991 to 
21.72% in 1999 (see Figure 7.5). It declined further to go under 20% in 2003 and stood at 16.54% in 
2007, before the global economic crisis broke out.xxxiii Fourth, an unintended outcome was a larger 
role for portfolio inflows over incoming FDI – in contrast with most emerging markets and developing 
economies (see Figure 7.6; see also D’Souza, 2008, p. 35; Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Mohan, 
2008, p. 240). 
 
Figure 7.6: Capital flows India (based on data from World Bank, 2014b, partially own calculations) 
 
Finally, besides the transnationalization of capital, it is important that a market-based system of 
finance has been developed. In the traditionally bank-based system, financial markets assumed a 
more prominent place (Jadhav, 2006, p. 115). The National Stock Exchange (NSE) was established in 
1993 (Jayadev, 2013). India’s stock market has been the “first place in India where modern finance 
and financial regulation have taken root” (Shah & Patnaik, 2011). The average value of the stock 
market went from less than 10% in 1988-1990 to almost 30% in 1991-1995 (data from World Bank, 
2014b). Slowly but steadily, derivatives markets were also developed (especially accessible to banks), 
although with a precautionary and controlled approach (Jadhav, 2006, p. 117; Joshi, 2003, p. 184; 
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 7.4 From the Asian crisis to the global economic crisis 
  7.4.1 The Tarapore Report and the Asian crisis 
When P. Chidambaram became Finance Minister in 1996 he argued for full capital account 
convertibility in India within the next three years (Venkatesh, 2008). There was a relative consensus 
within the bureaucracy and the political arena, among mainstream economists, and in the media that 
the Indian economy was ready for convertibility, and opposition to the idea was rare. A committee 
was constituted to prepare a road map for capital account convertibility, under the chairmanship of 
the Deputy Governor of the RBI S.S. Tarapore (Bery & Singh, 2006, pp. 168-169).xxxiv The committee 
finished their report, commonly called the Tarapore Report, in 1997, on the eve of the Asian crisis.xxxv 
This report represents “the culmination of a paradigm shift in development strategy that began in 
July 1991” (EPW Research Foundation, 1997, p. 1300). Even though it accepted some limited controls 
on debt flows, it was clearly in favour of capital account liberalization, and recommended the 
completion of (almost full) capital account convertibility by 1999-2000 (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 170; 
EPW Research Foundation, 1997, pp. 1302-1303; Mohan, 2008, p. 236).xxxvi It stated that opening up 
would bring with it great benefits and would stimulate the development of the Indian financial 
system (see Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 170). There was pressure from the bureaucracy and from parts of 
the private non-bank financial sector to implement the Tarapore Report recommendations swiftly 
(EPW Research Foundation, 1997, p. 1300; Joshi, 2003, p. 195). 
The Asian crisis, however, demonstrated the potential havoc that a liberalized capital account can 
cause. India, thanks to stronger capital controls, emerged relatively unscathed – as did China – 
compared to other Asian countries. The crisis thus reaffirmed to many the wisdom of India’s gradual, 
cautious approach to capital account liberalization, and of its controls on outflows in particular 
(Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 10; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Dutt, 2006, p. 1853; Interview 23 and 27; Joshi, 2003, 
pp. 182, 192; Kletzer, 2004; Reddy, 2001, p. 97, 2007, p. 20).xxxvii Capital account convertibility had 
even become “a dirty word, disowned and discredited thanks to the East Asian Crisis” (Venkatesh, 
2008). The timing of the Tarapore Report was thus rather unfortunate for the pro-liberalizers, as the 
Asian crisis aborted the process towards the free movement of capital in and out of India. The 
memory of this crisis lingered in the first decade of the 21st century (Barua, 2006, p. 1875). 
 
  7.4.2 Capital account liberalization after 1997 
Even though the goal of full capital account convertibility was off the agenda after the Asian crisis, 
the liberalization of the capital account continued and even accelerated in the 2000s (Chandrasekhar, 
2008a; Francis, 2013, p. 109; Gokarn & Singh, 2011, p. 190; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 610; Venkatesh, 
2008). In June 2000, the 1999 Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), which replaced the 1973 
FERA, took effect (Francis, 2013, p. 109; Patnaik & Shah, 2011; Reddy, 2001, pp. 86, 95). With the 
new legal framework, the philosophy changed from control to liberalization. However, importantly, 
the FEMA retained the option to re-impose capital controls when necessary.xxxviii 
With regard to incoming foreign institutional investment, from March 2000 to September 2001, the 
limit of foreign portfolio equity investment by all FIIs in a single company was gradually increased 
from 30% of the paid-up capital first to 49% and then to the “sectoral cap” for FDI if approved by the 
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company’s shareholders (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 159; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 
619). FEMA also created the Portfolio Investment Scheme for NRIs, which allows them to buy up to 
5% of the paid-up capital of a single company, and with a limit of 10% of paid-up capital for all NRIs 
together, which can be increased to 24% subject to approval by the shareholders (Ministry of 
Overseas Indian Affairs, 2001).xxxix In 2002-2003, inflows and outflows for NRIs were also further 
liberalized (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 171; Padmanabhan, 2003; RBI, 2003b). With regard to portfolio 
debt flows, in November 2004 the ceiling for FII investment in government securities was raised from 
US$1bn to US$1.75bn, and a ceiling for foreign ownership of corporate bonds was set at US$0.5bn 
(Planning Commission India, 2009; RBI, 2006d; SEBI, 2004b; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, pp. 619, 625). The 
ceilings were raised to US$2bn and US$1.5bn respectively in April 2006, and the ceiling for FII 
investment in government bonds was further increased to US$2.6bn in January 2007, and to 
US$3.2bn in January 2008 (SEBI, 2006, 2008a). In June 2008, finally, the ceilings were raised again, 
from US$3.2bn to US$5bn for government bonds, and from US$1.5bn to US$3bn for corporate bonds 
(SEBI, 2008b). 
ECBs were also liberalized. In March 1997 restrictions on the end-use were largely eliminated, limits 
for individual borrowers were increased, interest rate limits were eased, and the list of sectors 
allowed to raise ECBs was expanded (Padmanabhan, 2003, p. 125). More liberalization ensued in 
2000, with ECBs automatically approved for an amount up to US$50m per company, and with a 
further relaxation of end-use limits. In 2004, regulations were approved which created a new 
framework for ECBs, with an automatic route for ECB up to US$20m with a minimum average 
maturity of three years, and for between up to US$500m with a minimum average maturity of five 
years, and with approval from the RBI needed (but generally obtained without limits) for larger loans 
abroad (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 171; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; RBI, 2004a). A ceiling was installed for 
both automatic and the case-by-case route; companies could only borrow if the cost was at most 200 
basis points over Libor for loans with a maturity between three and five years and at most 350 basis 
points over Libor for loans with a maturity of more than five years. The ceilings were lowered in 2007 
but again raised to 200 and 350 basis points over Libor in May 2008. There was also an overall annual 
ceiling for all ECBs, which was set at US$22bn in 2006-2007 (up from US$16bn in 2005-2006) 
(Ministry of Finance India, 2007). In sum, before the crisis: “Indian companies operate in a fairly 
liberal environment for external borrowings” (Barua, 2006, p. 1876). The result was that ECBs 
increased considerably (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 730; Prasad, 2009a). 
Outward FDI was liberalized in 2002-2004, with Indian corporations being allowed to invest 100% of 
their net worth abroad under the automatic route from 2003 onwards (Pradhan, 2005; Shah & 
Patnaik, 2007, p. 625). In May 2005, this ceiling was increased to 200% of the company’s net worth 
(Rao & Dhar, 2012; RBI, 2006d). Finally, in June and September 2007, the ceiling was raised first to 
300% and then to 400% of net worth (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Mohan, 2008, p. 251; Rao & Dhar, 
2012). Portfolio outflows by Indian mutual funds were allowed in January 2003, with a ceiling of 
US$1bn (RBI, 2003a). Again, this limit was raised in several steps to reach US$5bn in September 2007 
and US$7bn in April 2008, besides a facility to invest up to US$1bn in overseas Exchange Traded 
Funds for a limited number of Indian mutual funds (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Mohan, 2008, p. 251; RBI, 
2006a, 2006b, 2007d, 2007f, 2008a). From February 2004 onwards, individuals were also able to take 
up to US$25,000 abroad for any purpose through the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) (RBI, 
2004b, 2006d; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 625). This was gradually increased in 2006-2007 to reach 
US$200,000 in September 2007 (RBI, 2006c, 2007c, 2007e), “a generous ceiling by any standards” 
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(Prasad, 2009a). Corporations were also allowed to buy stocks abroad, with a limit of 25% of their net 
worth from January 2003 onwards (RBI, 2003a). This limit was increased to 35% in June 2007 (RBI, 
2007a) and to 50% in September 2007 (RBI, 2007b). 
However, despite ongoing liberalization, after the Asian crisis Indian governments did not have the 
courage to explicitly push for complete capital account convertibility (Venkatesh, 2008). It was only in 
2005 that the issue of capital account convertibility was more explicitly put on the agenda again, 
when a committee was established to investigate fuller capital account convertibility (Vasudevan, 
2006, p. 1881). The 2006 Report of the Committee on Fuller Capital Account Convertibility was in 
favour of more liberalizing measuresxl and generally set out the preconditions for liberalization, but it 
also stated that fuller capital account convertibility “would not necessarily mean zero capital 
regulation” and that one of the lessons of the East Asian crisis was that “imposition of safeguards in 
the form of moderate controls on capital flows may be necessary in some cases” (RBI, 2006d). 
Nevertheless, in 2005-2008, pressure was building up to move towards complete liberalization of the 
capital account, and the RBI “was criticized as being antediluvian and ad hoc, since full capital 
account convertibility was always seen to be the end goal” (Jayadev, 2013). The 2007 Report of the 
Higher Powered Expert Committee on Making Mumbai an International Financial Centre endorsed a 
swift move towards full capital account convertibility (Ministry of Finance India, 2007). It seems then, 
that India was getting closer to adopting the norm of the free movement of capital before the global 
economic crisis broke out. 
 
  7.4.3 The transformation of the Indian banking sector in the 1990s and 2000s 
The Indian banking sector had appeared relatively unscathed from the 1980s reforms (Jayadev, 
2013). Until the 1990s the banking system was almost entirely state-owned, and was crucial in the 
allocation of resources. It was only after the 1991 crisis that the sector was reformed through 
financial liberalization. Reforms were based on the 1991 Narasimham Committee, which 
recommended, amongst others, the entry of new private banks, the deregulation of interest rates, 
the widening and deepening of financial markets, and the phasing out of priority sector lending 
(Jayadev, 2013; Reddy, 2001, p. 89). With regard to ownership, although the state-owned banks 
remained dominant, the entry for both domestic and foreign private banks has been liberalized 
(although with different degrees of freedom) (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 152; Gupta et al., 2011). Foreign 
investors may, since 2004, own up to 74% of private banks and 20% of public banks, with a respective 
ceiling of 10% and 1% for one single foreign investor (Chandrasekhar, 2012; Gupta et al., 2011; 
Hindustan Times, 2013; Planning Commission India, 2009). More important has been the changing 
role and functioning of (public sector) banks. In particular, the practices of priority sector lending and 
differential interest rates were undermined, and the focus shifted from redistributive and 
developmental concerns to profit-making (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Jayadev, 2013). 
Besides the regulations and the new political emphasis on profitability for state-owned banks, the 
entry and expansion of private banks have also exerted competitive pressures upon public banks 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Gupta et al., 2011; Jayadev, 2013).xli Between 1994 and 2004, a total of 12 
new private banks were permitted to operate (Shah & Patnaik, 2011). In 2002-2003 foreign banks 
were also given more flexibility in their operations in India (Bery & Singh, 2006, pp. 152-153). As 
public banks have to compete with private and foreign banks to attract savers, they also have to 
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search for more profitable activities, instruments and lending operations (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 
2009, p. 733; Chandrasekhar, 2008a).xlii One of the consequences is a rapid build-up of retail credit 
before the global financial crisis, especially housing loans (some of which of doubtful quality) 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 734; Mor, Chandrasekhar & Wahi, 2006, p. 
18). This move to retail finance was led by domestic private banks, and followed by foreign banks, 
but also public banks.xliii The off-balance sheet exposure of banks also increased significantly between 
2002 and 2008, mainly on account of derivatives (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 734). 
While the positive result is that the threat of non-performing assets (NPAs) has receded, all of this 
has happened at the expense of the urban and especially rural poor (Jayadev, 2013). Growth of bank 
branches in rural and semi-urban sectors (and in the poorest states) has fallen, especially in the late 
1990s. Although the priority sector requirement of 40% of credit remained in place, it has been 
expanded to many other sectors, including housing for middle income families (Jayadev, 2013).xliv 
Consequently, priority lending has been hollowed out, as its original intention has been eroded. Both 
the share of total bank credit going to the agricultural sector and small-scale industry have fallen 
strongly (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; EPW Research Foundation, 2008, p. 26; Jayadev, 2013). Smaller 
borrowers have thus been led towards expensive informal borrowing and microfinance, both of 
which are unable to improve their situations durably.xlv As Jayadev (2013; see also EPW Research 
Foundation, 1997, p. 1303) writes, therefore: “Overall, the story of finance in the age of reforms 
suggest a profound gap between what is fiscally prudent and profitable for banks and financial 
institutions in a liberal, competitive requirement and the social needs of a society in India.” 
India’s banking sector is still largely dominated by Indian banks. In March 2008, foreign bank credit 
amounted to only 20% of total bank credit (McCauley & Ma, 2008). The share of assets held by 
foreign banks as a share of total banking assets has never been more than around 8% (in 2004), and 
stood at 5% of total assets in 2009 and 6% in 2012-2013 (data from World Bank, 2014a; PwC, 2013a; 
for other estimations in the same range see Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 152; Domanski, 2005, p. 72; 
Mehon, 2010).xlvi The 34 foreign banks active in India owned around 315 branches in 2010, against 
more than 65,000 for domestic banks (Mehon, 2010). Moreover, in 2010, almost 74% of total 
banking assets in India were owned by state-owned banks (Marois, 2013; see also Bery & Singh, 
2006, pp. 145, 152; Crabtree, 2012a; Gupta et al., 2011; Reddy, 2010; Shah & Patnaik, 2008, 2011). 
As in China, the financial system thus remains dominated by publicly-owned banks (Planning 
Commission India, 2009). 
It is not surprising, then, that the banking sector has been one of the primary aims of pro-
liberalization reformers (see e.g. Barber, Crabtree & Mallet, 2013; Gupta et al., 2011; Ministry of 
Finance India, 2007; Planning Commission, 2009; RBI, 2013d).xlvii In December 2012, a law was passed 
which allows the RBI to issue new banking licences, and which raised the limit of foreign investment 
by one foreign investor in Indian private banks from 10% to 26% and in public banks from 1% to 10%, 
despite a two-day nationwide strike at the public banks, organized by the United Form of Bank 
Unions, in August 2012 (Crabtree, 2012a, 2012c; PwC, 2012b; Talwar Thakore & Associates, 2013). In 
November 2013, new rules were released by the RBI which created new opportunities for foreign 
banks, although with certain regulations and with clear advantages if they set up a local subsidiary 
instead of a branch of a foreign parent (Crabtree, 2013e; Jain & Anand, 2013). This indicates that 
efforts to privatize, liberalize and internationalize the banking sector are ongoing. However, in 
contrast to capital account liberalization, the debate on the privatization of state-owned banks, 
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liberalization of the banking sector and expansion of foreign banks has been quite politicized and 
controversial in India (see Bery & Singh, 2006, pp. 152, 154, 161-162; Crabtree, 2012a; Planning 
Commission, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2011). 
Finally, it should also be noted that, despite the attention given to the stock market in India, and 
while capital flow volatility has a strong impact upon the Indian economy, equity is not at all the 
most important source of financing for corporate investment. Investment by Indian corporations is 
financed mostly through internal sourcesxlviii, and loans from commercial banks (Chandrasekhar, 
2008a). Despite the rapid development of India’s capital markets, the financial system remained 
largely bank-based. As a report on “making Mumbai an international financial centre” states: “Indian 
finance continues to be rooted in the past, with a banking-dominated financial system that should, 
by now, have become much more capital-market oriented especially in the market for debt in the 
form of traded securities rather than bank loans” (Ministry of Finance India, 2007). 
Equity has never accounted for more than 20% of corporate financing and even accounted for no 
more than 10% in 2000-2005 (Chandrasekhar, 2008a).xlix Stock prices thus have little effect on real 
productive investment (Dutt, 2006, pp. 1852-1853).l The corporate bond market is even less 
important than the equity market (see Group of Thirty, 2013; Jadhav, 2006, pp. 123-125; Lund et al., 
2013; Wigan, 2011). On the other hand, internal sources accounted for more than half of corporate 
financing in 2000-2005, and still stood at 44% in 2005-2006, and the role of commercial banks has 
also grown, with 24% of total corporate financing in 2003-2004 (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). The 
argument that portfolio inflows have fuelled India’s investment and economic growth is thus not 
credible. 
 
  7.4.4 Towards a new accumulation regime? 
Through capital and trade liberalization, India’s growth model has robustly turned away from ISI. At 
first sight, the implications for economic development have been positive (see also Reddy, 2010). 
Although a growth spurt had already taken place in the 1980s, it increased even more. Annual 
average growth mounted from 3.63% over the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to 5.61% in the 1980s, 5.73% 
in the 1990s and 7.73% in the 2000s, while annual average per capita growth rose from 1.45% over 
the ISI decades to 3.40% in the 1980s, 3.84% in the 1990s and 6.00% in the 200s (see Figure 7.1).li 
However, a number of problems have been identified with regard to India’s economic growth in the 
neoliberal era. 
The first problem is that the growth drivers of India’s recent growth are not sustainable. In the first 
place, while public spending had been the principal stimulus under ISI, in the 1990s it was replaced 
by debt-financed housing investment and private consumption of the higher-income groups 
(especially in urban areas), which in turn fuelled corporate investment (especially after 2003-2004, 
see Figure 7.7) and economic growth (Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 43-46, p. 58; De & Vakulabharanam, 
2013; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, pp. 726-727). The liberalization of banking, and the 
concomitant increasing availability of credit (and retail loans, see above), allowed for investment in 
housing and real estate to rise. Rising inequality and larger income growth for the higher-income 
groups (see Figure 7.8)lii, resulted in more private consumption and “the expansion of a productive 
structure catering to the ‘class and comfort’ of both the expanding middle class and India’s tiny, but 
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by world standards extremely wealthy, ‘billionaire’ bourgeoisie” (Walker, 2008, p. 558; see also 
Banerjee-Guha, 2008, p. 57). 
 
Figure 7.7: Investment rate India, 1980-81–2012-13 (based on data from Ministry of Finance India, 
2005, 2012, 2013a, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Income shares India (based on data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
Capital inflows contributed to the rising asset prices (see Dutt, 2006, p. 1853; Jayadev, 2013), in 
particular real estate and stock prices, with a clear stock market bubble (see Figure 7.9). The number 
of registered FIIs in the equity market rose from 18 in 1993 to 540 in 2004 (Jayadev, 2013). With FIIs 
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and volatility (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Dutt, 2006, p. 1853; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 731; 
Jayadev, 2013; Singh, 2009). Rising asset prices in turn powered rising consumption (especially in 
consumer durables and automobiles) among the rich and the (higher) middle class.liii This credit- and 
bubble-fuelled growth model was already reaching its limits before the global crisis hit. Moreover, 
inequality coming with this “enclave based growth model” (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013) has meant 
that the domestic market remains strongly limited (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 727). One of 
the constraints on domestic demand is the strong dependency on the services sector, with a 
declining share of agriculture and manufacturing in GDP (see Figure 7.10).liv To generate employment 
opportunities for the “reserve army of labour”, the manufacturing sector must expand, as the growth 
of services is inadequate (Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012; Sanyal, 2014; Subramanian, 2012a).lv 
 
Figure 7.9: Stock market capitalization India (based on data from World Bank, 2014b). 
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A second problem is that India has been running a persistent deficit in the trade balance and the 
current account balance (see Figure 7.11; see also Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012). The problem is 
situated in India’s manufacturing sector. Although exports have grown strongly (see Figure 7.12), 
unlike in China, export growth – as with economic growth in general – has largely been confined to 
services, with the share of software exports in total exports up from less than 2% in 1994-1995 to 
16.3% in 2001-2002, swelling to around 30% in 2011 (with ITC accounting for 45% of services 
exports) (D’Costa, 2003, p. 215; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 727; Hyvonen & Wang, 2012, p. 34; 
Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012).lvi FDI is concentrated in the services sector (with on average 
almost 70% of inward FDI in 2007-2011 in the tertiary sector) – again in contrast with China and East 
Asia – and/or aimed to serve the domestic market, rather than exports, and therefore does little to 
overcome the balance-of-payments constraint (Interview 29; Jayadev, 2013; Mohan, 2008, p. 240; 
Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 610, 2008; UNCTAD, 2013a). 
 

















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013












Third, to finance the current account deficit, India has relied on capital inflows, and is thus 
dependent on financial liberalization (Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012). The volatility in capital 
flows which can ensue has been evident in India, with consequences for the value of the rupee, asset 
prices and economic growth (Dutt, 2006, pp. 1852-1853; Jha, 2008b, p. 264; Ranjan & Prakash, 2010). 
Capital flows thus create difficulties in managing the economy, as they can either be too large or too 
small. Excessive capital inflows can result in exchange rate appreciation, which undermines 
competitiveness and further increases the trade and current account deficit, and which potentially 
creates an asset price bubble (Interview 29; Kohli, 2001; Mohan, 2008, p. 235; Nabar-Bhaduri & 
Vernengo, 2012; Rangarajan, 2011; Subramanian, 2012a). The larger CAD then makes India even 
more reliant on volatile capital inflows, and creates the danger of a vicious cycle. This was precisely 
the problem before the global economic crisis broke out. During the 1990s and early 2000s, there 
was a moderate increase in the volume of capital inflows. These inflows were used to cover India’s 
current account deficit. However, especially after 2003, inflows surged, as a response to both India’s 
liberalization and the higher returns available, and inflows were far in excess of what was needed to 
finance the current account deficit (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; D’Souza, 2008, p. 35; Ghosh & 
Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 730; Mohan, 2008, p. 244; Prasad, 2009a; Reddy, 2007, p. 22; Singh, 
2009).lvii Because of capital inflows, the exchange rate appreciated (despite the trade and current 
account deficits), leading to a deteriorating current account balance (D’Souza, 2008, p. 35). 
The government and RBI have weakened the appreciation of the exchange rate through sterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Through these interventions, the RBI buys dollars with 
rupees, and then sells government bonds to prevent an increase in the domestic money supply 
caused by their rupee-for-dollar transactions. These interventions resulted in a rapid rise of foreign 
reserves (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 730; Mohan, 2008, p. 237; 
Prasad, 2009a; Venkatesh, 2008).lviii However, the surge in capital inflows has made it difficult for the 
RBI to manage the exchange rate.lix In April 2004, the Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS) was 
launched, which allows the RBI to issue government securities for sterilization (Chandrasekhar, 
2008a; D’Souza, 2008, p. 37). The government has to pay the interests on the government securities 
issued under the MSS, which means that the interest burden of the Indian government rises with 
sterilization. Sterilization of capital inflows may thus lead to cuts in capital and social expenditures 
and as such inhibit development (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). In sum, there are clearly limits to the 
sterilization of large-scale capital inflows (Chandrasekhar, 2008a; D’Souza, 2008, pp. 36-38; Mohan, 
2008, p. 244; Planning Commission, 2009; Subramanian, 2007, p. 2416). If encouraging outflows is 
not a viable option – although this was the road taken by the government – because it often only 
leads to more capital inflows, then curbing capital inflows is the only remaining possibility (see 
Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Jha, 2008b, p. 269; Subramanian, 2007, p. 2417). 
Besides the problem of too much inflows, capital flow volatility can also result in sudden capital 
reversals, with capital outflows or not enough capital inflows, which affects the rupee, stock prices 
and the repayment of debt denominated in foreign currency, and which can even lead to a balance-
of-payments crisis. The increasing CAD also increases the odds of balance-of-payments difficulties: 
the larger the capital inflows, the larger the current account deficit becomes, the greater the 
possibility that investor confidence suddenly wanes (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). The opening up to 
short-term capital flows has thus increased India’s financial fragility: “Dependence on portfolio equity 
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and debt inflows of this magnitude meant that if any internal or external development was seen to 
warrant pulling out of India, the exit could be as strong as the earlier inflow of foreign capital” 
(Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 731). This was demonstrated in 2007, when a proposal issued by 
SEBI to tighten regulations on PNs (which accounted for about half of all FII inflows) caused a stock 
market crash (Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 620; Singh, 2007; The Economic Times, 2007). After the 
Finance Minister made clear that a ban was not on the table, however, capital flows resumed.lx The 
vulnerability to capital outflows was demonstrated again after the global financial crisis broke out 
(see 7.5.1). 
A fourth problem is that India’s public finances have become less conducive to economic 
development. Before the 1991 reforms, a substantial part of government deficits was financed by 
low-interest borrowing from the RBI (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). Financial liberalization, less financial 
repression and higher interest rates (in part to attract foreign capital flows) have led to an increasing 
share of interest payments, both relative to government expenditures (see Figure 7.13) and relative 
to GDP (see Figure 7.14; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Jayadev, 2013; Kletzer, 2004).  
 
Figure 7.13: Interest payments as a share of government expenditures India (own calculations, based 





















































































































Figure 7.14: Interest payments as a share of GDP India (own calculations, based on data from IMF, 
2014c)lxi 
 
On the other hand, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has only feebly risen (see data from Ministry 
of Finance, 2013b; World Bank, 2014b). Indeed, as even the Indian Liberal Group has stated, the 
figures “do not show any alarming rise in the size of the government”, and compared to developed 
countries, “the size of the government in India is more modest” (Indian Liberal Group, 2006). The 
result is that public investment has declined (see Figure 7.7), with negative consequences for future 
growth prospects (Jayadev, 2013). Various reports have therefore argued for more public investment 
(e.g. Indian Liberal Group, 2006; see also Vikaraman, 2012). 
Finally, a fifth problematic characteristic of India’s opening up, and the liberalization of capital flows 
in particular, is that it has reinforced the tendency of state governments to do everything to please 
(foreign) investors (Ahluwalia, 2006, p. 6; Banerjee-Guha, 2008, p. 55; see also Das, 2001, p. 109; 
Jeffrey & Lerche, 2000, p. 868; Raman, 2009, p. 297; Sud, 2009, pp. 662-663). As Chatterjee (2008, p. 
58) writes, “the dismantling of the licence regime has opened up a new field of competition between 
state governments to woo capitalist investment, both domestic and foreign.” Competition to attract 
capital – probably a zero-sum game – thus strengthens the pro-capital bias of Indian states, at the 
expense of subaltern groups.lxii This has been stimulated by competitiveness rankings of states 
(produced by business organizations and think tanks).lxiii Capital account liberalization has 
consequently also reinforced the uneven development within India (see e.g. Desai, 2013; Kapur & 
Subramanian, 2012). According to Kohli (2006a, p. 1252), “Indian states with more pro-growth and 
pro-business governments have tended to experience higher rates of economic growth.” States that 
have tried to please investors more have thus fared better. As former Deputy Chairman of the 
Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia (2006, p. 6) has written: “There is little doubt that 
individual states have responded differently to the economic reforms and this has been reflected in 













































































































Interest payments (% of GDP)
188 
 
 7.5 After the global economic crisis 
  7.5.1 India in the global turmoil 
On the one hand, India emerged relatively unscathed through the first years of/after the global 
financial crisis. Economic growth decreased from a high of 9.57% in 2006 to 9.32% in 2007 and to 
6.72% in 2008, but then rose again to reach 8.59% in 2009 and 9.32% in 2010.lxiv The low financial 
integration and prudential banking regulation were important in this regard (Schmalz & Ebenau, 
2012, p. 496). This probably also explains why India reacted relatively late to the economic crisis, and 
why only a small fiscal stimulus was implemented (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 736; Schmalz & 
Ebenau, 2012, p. 496). 
However, this does not at all mean that India remained unaffected. The Indian feature of equity 
portfolio flows being more important than FDI had continued in the first decade of the 21st century 
(Bibow, 2011; D’Souza, 2008, p. 34; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 610).lxv After the global economic crisis, 
their “hot money” nature and concomitant volatility has been underscored (Bibow, 2011; Mohan, 
2012, pp. 30-31; Nabar-Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012).lxvi The existing capital controls could not prevent 
the contagion from the global economic crisis: “De facto integration has risen sharply in recent years, 
but India still remains fairly closed. The rapid transmission of the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy 
into Indian financial markets was consequently unexpected”(Patnaik & Shah, 2009-10, p. 39). There 
was a sudden reversal of capital flows, because of the global “flight to safety” whereby international 
investors sold assets which were perceived to be more risky (generally in EMDCs) and bought assets 
perceived to be more risk-free (in general in developed countries, in particular the US). FIIs pulled out 
US$5.7bn out of the Indian stock market during the first seven months of 2007, causing the collapse 
of the stock market (see Figure 7.7; Bibow, 2011; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 
2009, p. 731; Subramanian, 2008).lxvii Capital outflows also resulted in a strong rupee depreciation 
(see Figure 7.15; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 732). 
 
Figure 7.15: INR-USD exchange rate, 2006-2010 (own calculations, based on data from Board of 
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One of the channels through which the Indian economy was affected involved Indian TNCs which had 
borrowed abroad in foreign currency before the crisis, often to finance mergers and acquisitions or 
to benefit from the carry-trade with higher interest rates in India than abroad (Chandrasekhar, 
2008a; Interview 26; Subramanian, 2008; Patnaik & Shah, 2009-10, pp. 39-40; Prasad, 2009a). After 
the crisis hit, they got short of dollars, borrowed rupees and converted them into dollars, which was 
partly responsible for the depreciation of the rupee. To deal with these strains, the RBI enhanced 
access to domestic and foreign credit (EPW Research Foundation, 2008, p. 25; Ghosh & 
Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 735). In October 2008 the limit of FII investment in corporate bonds was 
increased from US$3bn to US$6bn, and in March 2009 from US$6bn to US$15bn (SEBI, 2008c, 2009). 
Moreover, in October 2008 the 70/30 ratio for FII investment in equity/debt was eliminated (SEBI, 
2008c). Regulations on NRI deposits too were liberalized (Jain, 2012; Mohanty, 2012).lxviii ECBs were 
also progressively relaxed in the wake of the crisis, “in view of the tight liquidity conditions in the 
International financial markets” (RBI, 2008b). The ceiling was raised in October 2008 to 300 basis 
points over Libor for loans with a maturity between three and five years, and to 500 basis points over 
Libor for loans with a maturity of more than five years.  In January 2009 ceilings were even lifted 
completely, although they were reinstalled in January 2010 “in view of the improvement in the credit 
market conditions and narrowing credit spreads in the international markets” (RBI, 2009b; see also 
RBI, 2009a). During the crisis, the RBI also had to lend foreign currencies to Indian banks to help them 
meet their obligations on their foreign branches (The Economist, 2009b). 
Despite the relatively strong transmission of the global economic crisis to India, the difficulties in 
India were relatively short-lived.  In its Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation, completed in 
January 2010, the IMF (2010b) already wrote: “India’s economy is rebounding strongly ahead of most 
countries in the world, bringing policy trade-offs to a head earlier than in other countries. Growth is 
approaching pre-crisis levels and leading indicators bode well for continued recovery.” Capital 
inflows had also resumed. 
 
  7.5.2 Between liberalization of inflows and controls on outflows after the crisis 
While India recovered rather quickly, after the crisis India’s trade and current account balance, which 
had already been deteriorating since 2003, got even worse, with trade deficits of more than 6% of 
GDP (see Figure 7.11). As Bibow (2011) argues: “Traditionally cautious with regard to global finance, 
India has increased its external vulnerability in recent times through liberalization and toleration of 
larger current account deficits.” According to the World Bank (2013a), India will maintain a current 
account deficit between 2015 and 2030, which implies that it will remain dependent on foreign 
capital inflows during this period. Two of the main problems are oil importslxix, and gold imports 
which increased by 60% in 2011-2012 (amongst others as a hedge against inflation) (IMF, 2011a, 
2013b; Interview 26; Kazmin, 2013a; Suttle et al., 2012). Moreover, during the last years net FDI 
flows were increasingly insufficient to finance the current account deficit, which means that India 




Figure 7.16: Current account balance and net FDI flows India (based on data from World Bank, 
2014b, partially own calculations) 
 
The rising current account deficit, the need for foreign short-term capital, and the depreciation of the 
rupee in 2011 (see Figure 7.17; IMF, 2012b) (after the temporary inflow surge in 2009 in the context 
of quantitative easing in the US, see Figure 7.6, Figure 7.15) have already led to more liberalization 
(Bibow, 2011; Subramanian, 2012a; The Economist, 2009a).lxx In different steps ( until January 2014), 
the limits of FII investment in government and corporate bonds were increased from US$5bn and 
US$15bn to US$30bn and US$51bn respectively, although with certain sub-limits and other 
stipulations (RBI, 2013b; SEBI, 2014).lxxi ECBs were also relaxed again. In November 2011, the ceiling 
for loans with a maturity of between three and five years was raised to 350 basis points over Libor 
instead of the earlier 300 basis points, while the ceiling for longer-term loans remained unchanged 
(RBI, 2011, 2014c). The overall annual ceiling for all ECBs was also increased in several steps, from 
US$22bn in 2006-2007 to US$40bn in 2013-2014 (Arun, 2013).lxxii The result was that, as before the 
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Figure 7.17: INR-USD exchange rate, 2010-2014 (own calculations, based on data from Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2014) 
 
Further, in September 2012, the Indian parliament made the contentious move to allow FDI in the 
retail sector (as well as investment by foreign broadcasters and foreign airlines), greeted by 
industrialists and analysts but opposed by the left and (part of) the nationalists, including the BJP 
(Ahmed & Guha, 2012; Kazmin & Crabtree, 2013; Timmons, Kumar & Raina, 2012; The Wall Street 
Journal, 2012).lxxiii The debate on FDI demonstrates that foreign investment in certain sectors remains 
controversial.lxxiv 
Despite the liberalization of capital inflows and other measures to attract investment, there has been 
widespread pessimism over the investment climate with both India’s capitalist class and foreign 
capital. Complaints range from inadequate infrastructure and electricity, over red-tape, corruption 
and bureaucracy, to high interest rates, an unpredictable tax regime and high labour costs, and bad 
macroeconomic policies with large fiscal deficits and high and rising inflation since 2005lxxv (see 
Figure 7.18) (Crabtree & Mallet, 2013; Fontanella-Khan, 2012; IMF, 2012b, 2013b, 2014b; Interview 
2; Jacob, 2012; Kazmin, 2013b; Lamont, 2012; The Hindu Business Line, 2012). In the context of this 
pessimism, investors, Indian capital and analysts have not refrained from warning that capital is 
mobile and that money can be invested abroad instead of in India (see Crabtree, 2012d; Kumar & 












Figure 7.18: Consumer prices inflation India (data from World Bank, 2014b) 
 
When there were indications of tapering by the US Federal Reserve in May 2013, India was hit by a 
surge in capital outflows, and a concomitant sharp depreciation of the rupee (see Figure 7.17; 
Ministry of Finance India, 2014). The situation got worse in June and August. As the IMF (2014b) 
states: “As global liquidity conditions tightened, India was faced with significant portfolio debt 
outflows, and pressures on currency, equity, and bond markets.” In August 2013, some capital 
controls on outflows by residents were strengthened (see Chilkoti & Mallet, 2013; Mallet & Crabtree, 
2013; PwC, 2013b; RBI, 2013c; Rodrigues & Xie, 2013).lxxvi Corporations could from now invest no 
more than 100% of net worth overseas without approval instead of 400%, and individuals were 
allowed to remit only US$75,000 abroad, instead of the earlier US$200,000. These measures were 
strongly criticized by Indian and foreign capital, (foreign) economists and the international financial 
press (see e.g. Mallet & Crabtree, 2013; Financial Times, 2013). As the IMF staff has written (IMF, 
2014b): “Measures to further restrict capital outflows should be avoided, not least because recent 
experience suggests that they could well be counterproductive, potentially catalysing capital flight 
through different routes. The renunciation of such measures should be clearly communicated to 
bolster investor confidence.” 
In any case, the measures were probably unable to stop capital flight, and policymakers rejected 
broader and deeper controls on outflows, including the extension of capital controls to foreign 
investors such as FIIs (Crabtree, 2013d). The “crisis” was relatively short-lived and soft and the rupee 
rebounded slightly (see Figure 7.17; Crabtree, 2013b; Ministry of Finance India, 2014). Moreover, it is 
also clear that the Indian policymakers do not want a more significant closure of the capital account. 
The constraints on outflows have already been relaxed again, as individuals are now allowed to remit 
US$125,000 abroad instead of the earlier limit of US$75,000 (RBI, 2014b), and the restrictions for 
corporations were partially reversed in September 2013 (IMF, 2014b; RBI, 2013d). Capital inflows 
were liberalized as well. Besides the further liberalization of ECBs and FII investment in bonds 
outlined above, the restrictions on FDI inflows were eased, and NRI deposits at Indian banks were 













































































































of India, 2013). Finally, India also agreed to the launch of US$1bn (doubled in 2014) of offshore 
rupee-linked bonds in 2013-2014 by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s 
private arm, of which the proceeds were to be invested in Indian assets (Crabtree, 2014c; IFC, 2013; 
IMF, 2014b; Khan, 2014; Talley, 2013). 
On the one hand, India is now in a far better position than in 1991. With regard to the external 
situation, the external debt stood at 20.8% of GNI in 2012 against 32.1% in 1991 (data from World 
Bank, 2014b; see Figure 7.5).lxxvii The average maturity of this relatively low debt has also been 
lengthened, and the external debt service ratio has declined strongly (Kapur & Subramanian, 2013; 
Mohan, 2008, pp. 241-242; Mohanty, 2012). The fiscal situation has also improved, with gross 
government debt at 66.6% of GDP in 2012 against 75.3% in 1991 (data from IMF, 2014c), and with 
long maturities and low foreign currency government indebtedness (see Zhong, 2014). 
On the other hand, India’s is still vulnerable to capital flow volatility. While the current account and 
trade deficit have already become smaller in 2013 (see Figure 7.11; IMF, 2014b), “with a still-
significant external financing need, India is exposed to higher global interest rates and a reversal of 
capital flows” (IMF, 2014b). The external financing need implies that India is dependent on foreign 
capital and cannot alienate foreign investors too much (see Banerjee in Timmons, Kumar & Raina, 
2012; Rangarajan, 2011). It is clear that the government is now highly and permanently concerned 
about maintaining investor confidence in general and stock prices in particular (Jayadev, 2013).lxxviii 
Consequently, the Indian government “does all it can to please the financial markets, for it is these 
(metaphorical) financial shopping centres that have the power to engineer booms and busts with the 
volatile inflows and outflows of capital” (Economic and Political Weekly, 2012, p. 8). 
This was already one of the reasons why the government did not restrict capital inflows before the 
crisis, namely “the fear of annoying the financial markets, especially the global financial players, by 
imposing restrictions on capital flows” (Reddy, 2010). As the Report of the Committee on Financial 
Sector Reforms stated: “We should not stamp on foreign capital now for we may need to retain its 
confidence in the future” (Planning Commission India, 2009). One interviewee claimed that early in 
the 1990s capital account liberalization happened because of the ideology of the liberalizers, while 
now it happens out of sheer fear of a (currency) crisis (Interview 24). The reticence to impose more 
strict controls on short-term capital flows is thus also due to the concern on how foreign investors 
perceive these controls (Interview 27). It seems, then, that the statement that India “is a prisoner of 
(foreign) hot money” (Economic and Political Weekly, 2012, p. 8) is not too far-fetched. 
 
  7.5.3 The neoliberal historic bloc 
Despite the turmoil experienced by India during and after the global economic  crisis, then, it does 
not appear that India is heading towards a post-neoliberal configuration of social forces. One of the 
reasons is that the alliance that was developing in the 1980s and the 1990s is by now a fully-
developed historic bloc, which has gained from the neoliberal project in India implemented especially 
from 1991 onwards. This bloc has remained strongly committed to the neoliberal project , even after 
the crisis (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, p. 493). It consists of technocrats and bureaucrats, the Indian 
capitalist class, the urban middle class and, increasingly, foreign corporations and investors, and is 
supported by the international financial organizations (see Amin, 2005, p. 11; De & Vakulabharanam, 
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2013; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3129; Saull, 2012, p. 332; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, pp. 492-493; Sengupta, 
2009, p. 196).  
From the beginning of the reforms, the Indian state was trying to establish a new “social contract” 
with Indian capital: state support in exchange for a more competitive Indian industry (Kohli, 2006b, 
p. 1361). While the capitalist class was in many instances not the force behind external liberalization, 
both wealthy Indians themselves and their businesses are now highly bound up with foreign capital 
and the global economy (see D’Costa, 2000, p. 159; Petras, 2008, p. 326; van der Pijl, 1998, p. 131; 
UNCTAD, 2012).lxxix Since 2004, “thousands of Indian firms have embarked on turning themselves into 
multinational corporations” (Shah & Patnaik, 2008; also Gaur, 2008, p. 271; Ministry of Finance India, 
2007).lxxx Despite the scepticism by Indian industrial capital about external liberalization at the 
beginning of the reforms, it has now fully embraced opening up, globalization, incoming FDI and 
international competition (see Figure 7.19; Chakrabarti, 2012, p. 460; Interview 30; Vanaik, 2004, p. 
159). 
 
Figure 7.19: Inward and outward FDI India (based on data from UNCTAD, 2014) 
 
As Montek Singh Ahluwalia (2006, p. 12; see also Chatterjee, 2008, p. 57) has written: “Perhaps the 
most important structural change that has taken place, which augurs well for the future, is a change 
of mindset in the part of Indian business persons, which has given them confidence to cope with 
globalisation and the challenges it throws up.” Emboldened by some crucial supportive preconditions 
dating from the ISI eralxxxi, and by considerable successes in some sectors such as software, steel and 
automobiles, big Indian companies have gone abroad and transformed into global capitalist 
enterprises (Ahluwalia, 2006, pp. 12-13; Chakrabarti, 2012, p. 460; D’Costa, 2000, p. 141; Saull, 2012, 
p. 332).lxxxii Outward FDI flows increased from close to zero until 1991 to an average of 1.52% of GDP 
in 2006-2008, although there was a fall after the global financial crisis (see Figure 7.19; see also 
Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Shah & Patnaik, 2008; The Economist, 2009b). According to Vanaik (2004, p. 
159; also Interview 24, 26, 27 & 31), “very substantial sections of Indian capital now seem prepared 









Inward FDI stock (% of GDP) Outward FDI stock (% of GDP)
Inward FDI flows (% of GDP) Inward FDI flows (% of GFCF)
Outward FDI flows (% of GDP) Outward FDI flows (% of GFCF)
195 
 
expansion wherever they can and accept junior partnership with TNCs.” The consequence is that 
Indian industrial capital is by now the main social force in the neoliberal historic bloc. As an Indian 
government report puts it: “The same industrialists who opposed such reforms at the time are now 
their most ardent advocates” (Ministry of Finance India, 2007). 
The Indian urban middle class is also strongly integrated (economically and culturally) into the 
neoliberal project (Saull, 2012, p. 332). It has become more affluent and gained from the increasing 
consumption of durable consumer goods, and part of it now invests in the Indian stock market 
(Agarwal, 2006, p. 97; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 58; Raman, 2009, p. 297; Sengupta, 2009, p. 196). The 
middle class also sees the private sector as far more efficient than the state apparatus and “appears 
now to have largely come under the moral-political sway of the bourgeoisie” (Chatterjee, 2008, p. 
58). 
 
  7.5.4 Trade unions and the (un)organized working class 
While the 1990s brought higher economic growth in India, the new accumulation regime also led to a 
crisis in small-scale agriculture and in the situation of the rural poor (Agarwal, 2006, p. 97; De & 
Vakulabharanam, 2013). The liberalization of imports of commodities and the withdrawal of state 
support were detrimental to parts of the agricultural sector (Walker, 2008, p. 558). Moreover, the 
liberalization of banking and the scaling back of directed credit at regulated interest rates implied 
that the proportion of bank credit going to (small-scale) agriculture declined, which made agriculture 
more dependent on commercial banking and interest rate fluctuations (and thus to the profit motive) 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Jayadev, 2013). Finally, the expropriation of land in order to transfer it to 
domestic and international capital (amongst others in special economic zones or SEZs) led to the 
dispossession and displacement of many of the rural poor (Banerjee-Guha, 2008, p. 51; Walker, 
2008, p. 588). All these evolutions have led to an agrarian crisis, as indicated by suicides and 
starvation deaths (see Walker, 2008).lxxxiii Consequently, a large dispossessed, desperate and cheap 
“reserve army of labour” has come into existence in both urban and rural areas (Banerjee-Guha, 
2008, pp. 51, 56; Chatterjee, 2008, p. 62; Walker, 2008, p. 558). 
Capital account liberalization and the neoliberalization of India after 1991 have also, as in other 
countries, changed the balance of power to the benefit of capital, and at the detriment of labour 
(Chakrabarti, 2012, p. 461; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Jha, 2008a, p. 73; Vanaik, 2004, p. 157). As 
the benefits of higher productivity have largely gone to Indian industrial capital, the wage share has 
fallen strongly since the late 1980s and the profit share has risen (Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 55-58; 
Rhee, 2012). Unemployment increased in the 1990s, as employment in the (public) organized sector 
declined, especially after 1997, leading to fears of “jobless growth” (Agarwal, 2006, p. 97; Ahluwalia, 
2006, pp. 7-8; Chandrasekhar, 2010, pp. 55-57; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Jha, 2008a, p. 66; 
Mathew, 2006, p. 74). With insufficient employment opportunities in the formal sector, low-wage 
employment in the informal sector has been the only way out. 
Globalization has also increased the attack on workers’ rights and on trade unions (Jha, 2008a, pp. 
74-76). With increasing competition, Indian capital tried to maintain profitability through forcing the 
costs onto labour (Interview 31). They have often been supported by policymakers, as “political 
parties of all ideological hues tend to follow policies of wooing investors and encouraging cost-based 
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competition, and workers bear the brunt of those neo-liberal policies” (Ratnam and Verma, 2010, p. 
334). Trade unions have therefore been under attack, and “the ultimate objective is none else but to 
disarm the working-class movement completely” (Jha, 2008a, p. 75). 
However, it should also be noted that trade unions represent only a small part of the working class. 
The most important reason is that informality is widespread, and in general it is largely formal 
workers which are members of a union (Jha, 2008a, p. 69). A majority of India’s workforce (close to 
70%) lives in rural areas and almost 60% is employed in the agricultural sector, and less than 10% of 
the workforce is employed in the “formal” sector (which accounts for 40% of GDP) (Ahluwalia, 2006, 
pp. 7-8; Bhowmik, 2013; Jha, 2008a, pp. 65-66; Ratnam & Verma, 2010, p. 330).lxxxiv Moreover, only a 
small part – around one sixth – of the Indian workers is employed in manufacturing, a sector that is 
easier to organize (Therborn, 2012, p. 22). In sum, “India’s labour market is constituted primarily by 
the unorganized sector, and the small organized segment is like an island in this vats fluid and 
floating mass of humanity” (Jha, 2008a, p. 67). 
The consequence is that the unionization rate is less than 5% of the total workforce (Interview 24; 
Ratnam & Verma, 2010, p. 330). Moreover, only 2% is subject to collective bargaining (Ratnam & 
Verma, 2010, p. 334).lxxxv As Therborn (2012, p. 22) notices: “India’s trade unions have limped on, but 
they have failed to establish themselves as a pole of attraction for the great masses of the working 
poor.” This is one of the great challenges for Indian unions, as they cannot keep relying on a small 
“vanguard” of workers to turn back neoliberalization. While they have inhibited the pace of reform 
(especially in the case of privatizations), they have largely been on the defence, and they “have 
clearly found it extremely difficult to check the barrage of policies and practices affecting workers 
negatively” (Jha, 2008a, p. 73; see also Bhowmik, 2013; Teitelbaum, 2006, p. 411). Radical left parties 
have also been in (an electoral) crisis, amongst others because of implementing neoliberalization and 
repression of social movements at the state level (especially West Bengal and Kerala) (on the CPI(M) 
see Banerjee, 2008; Chakrabarti, 2012; Crowley, 2014; Raman, 2009). 
 
  7.5.5 Neoliberalization as a hegemonic project? 
As in Brazil, it is questionable whether neoliberalization is a fully developed hegemonic project in 
India (see Jenkins, 2003, p. 585; Parisot, 2013, p. 1169; Sahoo, 2010, p. 488; Vanaik, 2004, p. 153). 
For a long time, the “free market” and foreign capital have been viewed with suspicion by large 
swaths of the population, as they have been associated with colonialism and foreign rule (Jenkins, 
2003, pp. 594-595; Joshi, 2003, p. 194; Reddy, 2001, p. 85). Even more significant, Montek Singh 
Ahluwalia (2006, p. 8) has acknowledged that “there were aspects of economic performance which 
created a perception of unfairness in large sections of the population.” In terms of progress for the 
lower classes, the results of neoliberalism have been poor (Therborn, 2012, p. 13; see also IMF, 
2012b). As Nayyar (1998, p. 3128) has stated: “The most important failure, situated in a long-term 
perspective, was that this process of development did not improve the living conditions, or the 
quality of life, for the common people.” While poverty has declined after 1990, the decline has been 
rather small, and poverty remains widespread (see Figure 7.20). Both urban and overall inequality 
have increased after the 1991 reforms, according to various sources, whereas rural inequality first 
declined, then rose, and then declined again (see Figure 7.21; see also Azam & Shariff, 2011; De & 




Figure 7.20: Poverty indicators India (data from World Bank, 2014b)lxxxvii 
 
 
Figure 7.21: Inequality, Gini coefficient India (data from Planning Commission India, 2012; Topalova, 
2008) 
 
Inequality, persistent poverty and social tensions make it difficult to incorporate subaltern social 
forces into the hegemonic bloc (Nayyar, 1998, p. 3129; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012, pp. 492-493). 
Moreover, there has also been a decline of redistributive policies since 1999 and a shift from 
universalist towards targeted policies (De & Vakulabharanam, 2013). Because of these social 
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“does not have an acceptance at the level of the people, most of whom are poor or silent and thus 
unheard” (Nayyar, 1998, p. 3129). As Schmalz and Ebenau (2012, p. 493) write: “Consequently, far 
from representing a hegemonic project, the ruling bloc is faced with growing social discontent and 
resistance, even giving way to limited state disintegration in parts of India’s east controlled by Maoist 
guerrilla organisations.”lxxxviii 
How neoliberal India will deal with the gap between haves and have-nots might determine its future 
(Thornton & Thornton, 2009, p. 183). As in other countries, the challenge lying before every Indian 
government is to resolve the conflict “between pleasing the interests of domestic and international 
capital in order to attract investment and, at the same time, demonstrating that it is doing something 
for the poor on whose electoral verdict its survival depends” (Kamdar, 2008, pp. 103-104; see also 
Sahoo, 2010, p. 505). It remains to be seen how the BJP’s Narendra Modi government, which took 
office in May 2014 with the clear support from (foreign investors) (see e.g. Crabtree, 2013a, 2014a; 
Ghosh, 2014; Jain, 2013; Sanyal, 2014), will deal with this challenge.lxxxix 
 
 7.6 The contemporary debate on capital controls 
  7.6.1 A bureaucratic and political consensus 
While neoliberalism may not be strongly hegemonic because of its impact on the lower strata of the 
Indian population, it has not (yet) led to a debate on the difficulties that an open capital account 
produces. One interviewee even went as far as to label capital controls a “non-issue”, because there 
is no fundamental political debate on it (Interview 22). However, most interviewees agreed that 
there is at least some debate. What is the state of this debate, then? A first aspect to note is that the 
discussions are largely technical and depoliticized, and that the large public is not involved in these 
arguments (except for controversial issues such as foreign investment in retail) (Interview 24, 25, 27 
& 30). One of the consequences is that the executive (in particular the prime minister and finance 
minister) and the RBI have a lot of autonomy in defining capital account policies, with only a small 
role for parliament (Interview 22, 27, 28 & 31). Related to this, most people are more concerned 
about issues which directly impact their lives than about the abstract issue of the cross-border 
movement of capital (Interview 22 & 28). 
A second important aspect is that most analysts agree that India’s capital account is already fairly 
open, and that India has also undergone a significant degree of liberalization (e.g. Interview 23 & 24). 
Additionally, despite the still existing de jure capital controls, de facto financial integration has 
increased strongly, and some even speak of de facto convertibility (Ministry of Finance India, 2007; 
Nachane, 2008, p. 16; Patnaik & Shah, 2009-10, p. 40, 2011; Subramanian, 2008; The Economist, 
2009b). It is a common understanding in the Indian policymaking circles (and beyond) that 
liberalization is largely an irreversible process, because a reversal would immediately erode investor 
confidence and cause capital flight (Interview 23, 28, 29 & 32; also Prasad, 2009a; Subramanian, 
2007, p. 2417). Moreover, both proponents and opponents of more liberalization of capital flows are 
convinced that India needs foreign investment, although they differ on how selective India should be 
(Interview 23, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32). Further, just like a fundamental reversal is not on the agenda, a 
swift transition towards full capital account convertibility is also not being discussed, because of the 
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weakness of the Indian economy and the unfavourable international economic context (Interview 22, 
26 & 32). Therefore, the debate is already circumscribed. 
The third noteworthy aspect is that there is a relative consensus – with minor differences – within 
the Indian bureaucracy and technocracy on the way forward.  By the early 2000s, capital account 
liberalization had become less controversial according to former RBI Governor Reddy, and the issue 
had become “more one of technical judgement on sequencing rather than whether to open up or 
not” (Reddy, 2001, p. 96; see also Shah & Patnaik, 2008). Before the crisis, in 2005-2008, there was a 
lot of pressure to fully open up India’s capital account (see above). Just as with the Asian crisis, 
however, the global financial crisis and the more limited impact upon India again justified India’s 
gradualism, pragmatism and caution (Interview 26 & 27; Jayadev, 2013; Subbarao, 2010a, 2013). As 
The Economist (2009a) put it: “Having avoided the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s and escaped the 
worst effects of the most recent meltdown, India’s cautious liberalisers feel they have won the 
argument this time around. It is hard to disagree.” It seems, then, that within a large part of the 
bureaucracy, there is now a consensus on a gradualist, cautious liberalization (Interview 27, 29, 30 & 
32). Technocrats remain aware of the risks of volatile capital flows, and argue that (both indirect and 
direct) capital controls remain a legitimate instrument to deal with them (see Interview 22 & 33; 
Jayadev, 2013; Mohan, 2008; Mohanty, 2012; Reddy, 2001, p. 98; The New Indian Express, 2011). 
They also feel emboldened by the IMF’s new view on capital controls (see Chapter 8)xc as well as 
other multilateral bodies’ legitimization of capital controls (Interview 22, 23 & 32; Mohanty, 2012). In 
their view, liberalization should be pragmatic, gradual and country-specific (Interview 22 & 33; 
Subbarao, 2010a). 
However, it seems that full capital account liberalization is still the final goal for technocrats and 
policymakers, even if still far away (Interview 32 & 33; Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Subbarao, 2013; see 
also Williamson, 2006, p. 1850). As the IMF (2012c) notes, as in China, “liberalization of capital flows 
is a long-term objective of the authorities.” While they may differ on the pace and timing, they still 
see more liberalization of capital flows, with the pace depending on the domestic preconditions and 
the external environment, as the only road forward, and do not want a reversal of the opening up of 
the capital account (Interview 29 & 30). The consensus is thus in favour of the direction of 
liberalization. 
This consensus on a gradualist, pro-liberalization road extends to the largest part of the political 
spectrum. As former Central Bank Governor Reddy (2007, p. 23) has argued: “It is remarkable that, 
despite diversity in political ideologies and frequent elections, the progress of well-calibrated 
economic reforms continues to be impressive.” The nationalist BJP has also been in favour of 
globalization and capital account liberalization, restricting its nationalism to a critique of premature 
competition without making Indian companies competitive first, and has acted not fundamentally 
different from Congress in government with regard to foreign capital (Jenkins, 2003, p. 604; Nayar, 
2000; Thornton & Thornton, 2009, p. 197).xci 
Finally, the consensus also extends to Indian industrial capital. As one representative from a business 
confederation explained: “The RBI’s calibrated approach has been appreciated” (Interview 23). 
Indian industry has not pushed for full convertibility. Two important reasons is that they want a 
stable exchange rate without large fluctuations (see also Fontanella-Khan & Sender, 2011), and that 
they are concerned about hot money (Interview 23, 24, 26 & 27). Several interviewees, among which 
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the business representative, thus argued that Indian industrial capital is not necessarily opposed to 
all capital controls or in favour of a swift liberalization (Interview 23, 26 & 28). They did also not 
oppose the capital controls implemented in August 2013 (see above) to stop the depreciation of the 
rupee (Interview 23).xcii An important qualification was that the RBI has emphasized that the controls 
were only meant to be temporary, and that there was no reason to think that policymakers were 
going back to the old ISI spirit. Moreover, the limits were still quite high, so that “they don’t feel like 
restrictions” (Interview 23). In sum, Indian industry is quite pragmatic on the issue of capital account 
policies, and is not in favour of bold and swift liberalization. 
 
  7.6.2 Economists, practitioners and foreign actors as outliers 
It has been stated that the consensus in favour of more liberalization at a measured pace, without 
hastily moving towards full convertibility also extends to practitioners and academics (especially 
since the Asian crisis) (Barua, 2006, p. 1875; Reddy, 2010). Yet there is still some debate going on 
among technocrats and economists, especially as the global economic crisis has demonstrated the 
risks associated with an open capital account. On the one hand, as interviewees noted (Interview 24 
& 25) some economists and practitioners, especially those involved with (international) financial 
institutions, argue that further (rapid) liberalization would be beneficial and even that India should 
move more promptly towards full capital account convertibility (see also e.g. Barua, 2006, p. 1877; 
Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 173; Interview 30). They argue that de facto convertibility is already quite high, 
and that the best way to deal with capital flows is to move further towards full convertibility 
(Planning Commission India, 2009; Prasad, 2009a; Shah & Patnaik, 2008). Wealthy Indian individuals 
are also in favour of less limitations on their ability to transfer capital abroad, although they do not 
often publicly put pressure on policymakers, and although they have already found ways around the 
current limitations (Barua, 2006, p. 1877; Interview 24, 25 & 27).xciii 
Further, official reports and other documents demonstrate that despite the relative consensus 
identified above a part of the bureaucracy is in favour of more rapid and fundamental liberalization 
(see e.g. Ministry of Finance India, 2007, 2010; Planning Commission, 2009; RBI, 2013d; Tarapore, 
2014; see also Crabtree, 2013c; Shah & Patnaik, 2008). They have received support from a small 
circle of policymakers which is more ideologically inclined to liberalization (Interview 24, 25, 27 & 
31). These policymakers are also liberalizing out of fear of a crisis (Interview 24). 
Foreign players have also been seen to exert pressure on India to open up more rapidly. The 
Economist has slammed India’s capital controls for being too complex and for the frequent changes, 
stating that India’s current controls “seem less like stepping stones to a more open future then relics 
of its shuttered past”  (The Economist 2009a; see also The Economist 2009b). Although it has not 
always been vocal or has focused on more fundamental issues, foreign capital has also at times 
pushed for more liberalization, with especially foreign banks arguing for liberalization in the banking 
sector (Interview 23, 24, 27, 28 & 29; Joshi, 2003, p. 195; see e.g. also Deloitte & AmCham India, 
2014; Moneycontrol, 2014). Governments from the US, the UK, and other Western states have also 
asked more rapid liberalization (Interview 24 & 27). Finally, the IMF has at several occasions argued 
for more liberalization with regard to FDI and portfolio (equity and debt) flows, although it has also 
argued for caution on relaxations of ECBs (IMF, 2010b, 2012b; 2013b, 2014b). 
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  7.6.3 Opposition from the left 
Some economists are sceptical on or opposed to more liberalization and often argue that India has 
liberalized too fast in the past (e.g. Interview 25 & 29; Sen, 2006, p. 1853; Subramanian, 2007, p. 
2417). As Venkatesh (2008) argues, “the in between point, a hybrid between controls and 
liberalisation of the Capital Account, has served India rather well for nearly a decade. Why disturb 
when the going is good?” However, besides these more mainstream economists, the only critique of 
capital account liberalization has come from the left, both in the form of leftist political parties and 
MPs and of the trade union movement and NGO’s (Interview 23, 24, 28 & 29). They have voiced their 
opposition to liberalization at several occasions, have raised awareness on the consequences of 
liberalization, and have included the demand for controls in their manifestos and resolution (see e.g. 
CPI(M), 2000, 2014; Mody, 2012; NTUI, 2009; The Hindu, 2008; United News of India, 2006). 
As interviews with trade unionists made clear, there is a strong consciousness on the part of the 
leadership of trade unions that capital account policies are an important issue, and that capital 
account liberalization has detrimental effects on workers and trade unions (Interview 26 & 31; also 
Interview 24 & 27). They oppose liberalization because it makes the economy vulnerable to 
speculation and financial capital’s whims, because they recognize national development and 
autonomy as important goals, and because they are aware that capital account liberalization changes 
power relations in favour of capital and inhibits progressive policies. Although they are aware that a 
reversal of liberalization is not easy, they argue for more capital controls. Moreover, there is also a 
strong consciousness on these issues within unions representing banks’ employees and the RBI’s 
workers’ union (Interview 24, 26, 27 & 31). They have been especially important in preventing 
privatization and liberalization in the banking sector (see 7.4.3). 
A partial reversal of capital account (as well as trade) liberalization could also form the basis of and 
provide policy space for an alternative, more sustainable and equitable accumulation regime (Ghosh 
& Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 738; Interview 24 & 27). This accumulation regime would require more 
(debt-financed) public investment, high value-added manufacturing, wage-led growth and a more 
equal income distribution to widen the domestic market, less tax evasion and more good quality 
employment and industrial policies (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 737; Interview 24 & 26; Nabar-
Bhaduri & Vernengo, 2012). As India potentially has a large domestic market, it also has some 
leverage in imposing capital controls and dealing with TNCs. 
However, it is not easy for trade unions and left-wing parties to hold back capital account 
liberalization. First, because trade unions and the left are in general not in a really strong position 
(see 7.5.4). Second, although they try to instigate a public debate on capital controls, this is difficult 
because of the technical nature and sophistication of the subject (Interview 27 & 31). As one trade 
unionist admitted (Interview 26): “Is capital controls an issue we will be able to mobilize our 
membership on? The answer would be no.” It could therefore be argued that the remaining capital 
controls are not a victory of the left (Interview 28), but the consequence of India’s development level 





 7.7 Conclusion: India as an outlier? 
In this chapter, an overview was given of India’s capital control policies, and the relation with India’s 
changing accumulation regimes and social forces. It was described how India, after an initial ISI phase 
with stringent capital controls after independence in 1947, went through a gradual and cautious 
capital account liberalization after 1991, and continued liberalizing after the 1997 Asian crisis. This 
was an important aspect of the wider changes in India’s accumulation regime, which led to higher, 
but ultimately unsustainable and inequitable, economic growth. Next, it was discussed how the 
global economic crisis and its aftermath affected India. It was also outlined how India liberalized 
inflows after the crisis, but also strengthened restrictions on outflows by residents in August 2013 to 
deal with a depreciating rupee. 
However, as was examined subsequently, the crisis and its aftermath do not seem to have created 
frictions within the bloc of social forces underpinning the neoliberal project, in particular Indian 
industrial capital, foreign corporations and investors, the urban middle class, and a large part of the 
Indian bureaucracy. This historic bloc also underpins the consensus on gradual, cautious capital 
account liberalization after the global economic crisis. Opposition to this consensus comes, on the 
one hand, from social forces arguing for faster liberalization, and on the other hand, from trade 
unions and the left, opposing further liberalization and fighting for stricter capital controls. However, 
this opposition has until now (August 2014) not been able to upset the prevailing consensus. 
What can we conclude about Indian capital account policies and the Western, neoliberal norm of the 
free movement of capital then? First, India has gradually but increasingly moved towards fuller 
capital mobility, and many restrictions have been liberalized to an extent that there is a lot of 
freedom for incoming and outgoing capital flows. Moreover, the final goal of the dominant social 
forces is still the full free movement of capital. There is a relative consensus on more liberalization 
when the domestic and international environment is more favourable. 
Second, none of the interviewees considered India to be a challenge to the norm of full capital 
mobility, as it does not want to challenge the international movement of capital. However, this 
should be qualified to a certain extent. While India agrees that the full movement of capital should 
be the end-goal, it still diverges partially from the Western consensus on the way to get there, as its 
gradualism and caution are often considered too conservative by more neoliberal economists and 
policymakers. As one interviewee noted (Interview 29): “India will not argue against international 
capital mobility, but it also won’t argue in favour of unbridled or unqualified capital mobility.” In 
addition, this gradualism and caution is often emphasized by policymakers and bureaucrats, and it is 
frequently stated that the global consensus after the crisis has moved towards India’s “model” (e.g. 
Interview 32). In this sense, while India does not promote the use of capital controls, in a certain way 
it does (implicitly) promote its approach to capital account liberalization.  
The third conclusion is that there is no politicized debate on capital controls within India. While main 
social forces in India, such as Indian industrial capital and the Indian bureaucracy, are quite pragmatic 
with regard to the use of controls, there is a relative consensus on gradual liberalization, and the 
debates are framed as a depoliticized, technical issue. While trade unions and left-wing economists, 
social movements and political parties have tried to politicize the discussions and argue against 
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liberalization and for stronger controls, the left does not seem strong enough to stir a debate, or to 
mobilize a large part of society to demand stricter capital controls. 
A fourth conclusion is that even though India has liberalized substantially, it has still maintained 
capital controls, especially on debt inflows and on outflows by residents. In the current neoliberal 
world order, this deviates considerably from the norm of the full free movement of capital. As Kohli 
(2006b, p. 1361) argues: “ The scope of India’s external economic reforms must be kept in 
perspective. By India’s own past standards, the changes were quite dramatic. In a comparative and 
global perspective, however, India’s opening to the world remains relatively modest.” Indeed, India 
“is one of the few large countries with a complex system of capital controls” (Patnaik & Shah, 2011) 
and is still less financially open than many other countries (Prasad, 2009a). Indeed, India has 
widespread institutional experience with (comprehensive) capital controls, including the regulation 
of financial institutions, and a permanent legal and administrative structure to implement these 
controls (Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Joshi, 2003, p. 194; Reddy, 2001, pp. 84, 92; Patnaik & Shah, 
2011).xciv 
Moreover, as in Brazil and China, policymakers are more pragmatic on the issue, and they are 
“forced” to be by India’s economic vulnerability. As one interviewee stated (Interview 25): “Even this 
[2009-2014 Congress] government, which is an ideological believer in capital account liberalization, 
was forced to come back on liberalization when the rupee plummeted.” Indeed, the capital controls 
on outflows implemented in August 2013, although still only on residents and quite moderate, 
demonstrate this pragmatism. Further, like Brazil and China, India wants to keep the autonomy to 
impose capital controls (Interview 28 & 29).xcv As India has repeatedly stated with regard to capital 
account policies: “No policy instrument is clearly off the table and our choice of instruments will be 
determined by the context” (IMF, 2011; see also Subbarao, 2010a, 2010b). As with Brazil, this also 
became clear when the new IMF framework on capital was being developed (see Chapter 8). As with 
Brazil’s contra-cyclical capital controls, this pragmatic, gradualist, and cautious approach might serve 
as an example to follow for other countries.xcvi 
Finally, while India’s capital controls in a “narrow” view might be seen as a partial challenge to the 
norm of full capital mobility, India has not at all been willing nor able to challenge the power of 
global financial capital. To the contrary, because of its large current account deficit, the country is 
strongly dependent on short-term capital inflows. While it thus has retained some capital controls, or 
has recently re-introduced certain limits on residents, this is largely out of financial stability motives, 
and does not form a real threat to the neoliberal power relations. In sum, while India could in a 
certain sense be considered an “outlier” with regard to the full free movement of capital, it does not 
seem to be a challenger of the norm.xcvii 
                                                          
i
 The perspective underlying ISI has been called “capitalocentric-orientalist”, because it emulates – despite 
differences – the Western economic model with large-scale capital accumulation as the central goal (see 
Chakrabarti, Chaudhury & Cullenberg, 2009, p. 1174). 
ii
 Before the nationalization the SBI was named “Imperial Bank of India” (Gupta et al., 2011). 
iii
 Moreover, large-scale transfers were made to the private sector, which also limited the resources available 
for more productive means. 
iv
 An important reason that ISI remained unchallenged was that Indian technocrats and officials were still 
convinced about the advantages of the prevailing accumulation regime (see Mukherji, 2013). 
v
 In 1980, another six smaller banks would be nationalized (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 147; Gupta et al., 2011). 
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vi
 Note that the unprofitable priority sector requirements meant that high spreads were needed to keep banks 
healthy (Planning Commission India, 2009). 
vii
 The failure to fundamentally improve the lives of the poor, and the waning of the earlier nationalist and anti-
colonialist sentiments also contributed to the weakening of the developmentalist consensus (Kohli, 1989, p. 
307; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3124). 
viii
 Another important reason that Congress became more business-oriented was to neutralize the political 
threat from the private-sector-oriented Janata Party which had won the 1977 election (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 177-
178; Sengupta, 2009, p. 188). 
ix
 This is in contradiction with the popular myth that the 1991 reforms were responsible for India’s increasing 
economic growth. 
x
 Own calculations based on data from IMF, 2014c. 
xi
 Except for ECBs and deposits from NRIs the capital account remained largely closed in the 1980s, including for 
FDI. It should be noted that the rise of international financial capital in the 1970s and 1980s was a crucial 
precondition to allow for the ECBs and thus Indian economic growth in the 1980s  (Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 
38). 
xii
 As Shastri (1997, p. 42) states on these bureaucrats: “The increasing complexity of economic decisions and 
the fact that this group was insulated from the rigors of day-to-day politics had provided greater autonomy to 
their work.” 
xiii
 This stands in contrast in contrast to the earlier generation of leftist economists, who had often been 
educated in the UK (Kohli, 1989, p. 307). 
xiv
 With, amongst others, a one-day strike in January 1986 (Kohli, 1989, p. 321). 
xv
 29 economists issued a statement in October 1985, which was critical of the economic reforms (Kohli, 1989, 
p. 320). 
xvi
 There were three reasons for this opposition: ideology, electoral considerations and a personal, 
opportunistic motivation (i.e., members who had lost influence under Rajiv Gandhi) (Kohli, 1989, pp. 319-320). 
xvii
 As Ahluwalia (2006, p. 9) puts it, “the pace of reforms in India was inevitably affected by India’s democratic 
polity.” 
xviii
 Two important factors in the worsening balance-of-payments were the disruption of trade with the former 
Soviet Union, and the Gulf crisis (Reddy, 2001, p. 87). 
xix
 According to Mukherji (2013, p. 368), the technocrats could use the crisis to overcome resistance by “vested 
interests”. 
xx
 Although the reforms were probably more the result of Indian technocrats’ visions than of IMF conditionality, 
the IMF loan was useful to get the reforms approved in India (Agarwal, 2006, p. 97; Mukherji, 2013, pp. 364-
365). For an interpretation which gives more weight to the international financial institutions, see Sengupta, 
2009. 
xxi
 “Privatization” was thus limited to selling minority stakes in state-owned enterprises, and did not include the 
full-scale privatization of SOEs (Ahluwalia, 2006, pp. 2-3). Moreover, in sectors such as steel, petroleum, air 
transport, telecommunications and mining, which were previously the exclusive terrain of SOEs, private 
investment was now allowed. 
xxii
 As Kohli (2006b, p. 1361) notes: “It is clear (...) that the overall rates of capital formation in the Indian 
economy did not alter significantly between the 1980s and the 1990s. What did alter, however, was the 
composition of this investment (...): public investments declined in the 1990s and the balance was filled by a 
variety of private investors.” 
xxiii
 To prevent capital outflows in the guise of current account transactions, a range of regulations were 
adopted to strengthen the effectiveness of capital controls (see Reddy, 2001, p. 92). 
xxiv
 The changes in the international context which had already been visible in the 1980s were by now even 
more clear: the demise of the Soviet Union, the US as the only remaining super power, the rapid economic 
growth in East Asia and especially China, and the availability of international liquidity looking for investment 
opportunities (see e.g. Agarwal, 2006, p. 99; Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 32; De & Vakulabharanam, 2013; Kohli, 
2006b, p. 1362; Nayyar, 1998, p. 3128). 
xxv
 The BJP was divided on the reforms (Mukherji, 2013, p. 380). Besides organized labour, agrarian elites also 
opposed the 1991 reforms (Sengupta, 2009, p. 183). 
xxvi
 This committee recommended, amongst others, current account convertibility, a shift from debt-creating 
flows to non-debt creating flows, the strict regulation of short-term ECBs, discouraging volatile flows from NRIs, 
full freedom for outflows associated with inflows and the gradual liberalization of other outflows (Mohan, 
2008, pp. 235-236; Reddy, 2001, p. 88, 2007, p. 21). 
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xxvii
 This is an important difference with China, where there are controls on outflows by foreign investors who 
have invested through portfolio equity inflows (McCauley & Ma, 2008). 
xxviii
 There was also a discretionary, case-by-case route, but the automatic route was increasingly enlarged to 
almost all sectors (Mohan, 2008, p. 236; Reddy, 2001, p. 91).  
xxix
 It must be noted that there still were numerous bureaucratic hurdles as well (Joshi, 2003, p. 183). 
xxx
 For a detailed overview of all the changes, see Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 619. 
xxxi
 However, because of the development of the Indian equity market, the annual issuance on the GDR/ADR 
market fell from 1.08% of market capitalization in 1993-1997 to 0.4% in 1998-2007 (Shah & Patnaik, 2008). 
xxxii
 Official flows have become insignificant, compared to private capital flows (Kohli, 2001; Mohan, 2008, p. 
241; Shah & Patnaik, 2007, p. 610). 
xxxiii
 Other indicators of indebtedness also showed improvement. Short-term external debt decreased from 
almost 10% of total external debt in 1990 to 2.76% in 2001, although it increased again after 2001 (data from 
World Bank, 2014b). Indicators that also demonstrated that India’s vulnerability was reduced, include the 
external debt stock as a percentage of exports of goods, services and primary income; the interest payments on 
external debt as a percentage of GNI; and the average interest rate on new external debt commitments (data 
from World Bank, 2014b; see also Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 172; Epstein, Grabel & Jomo, 2004; Kapur & 
Subramanian, 2013; Mohan, 2008, pp. 241-242; Prasad, 2009a). 
xxxiv
 It is interesting to note that Tarapore was in favour of an amendment of the IMF articles to include capital 
account liberalization in the IMF’s objectives and jurisdiction (see Tarapore, 1998, p. 74). 
xxxv
 The official name is the “Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility”. 
xxxvi
 For a critical discussion of the Tarapore Report, see EPW Research Foundation, 1997. 
xxxvii
 Although Tarapore himself forcefully rejected this interpretation (Tarapore, 1998, p. 72). 
xxxviii
 Note that it is the RBI which is given the authority to regulate capital flows by the FEMA Act, in 
consultation with the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance India, 2010). 
xxxix
 The Portfolio Investment Scheme thus allows NRIs to enter India’s capital markets as an individual, whereas 
other foreign investors can only enter as an institutional investor. 
xl
 E.g. it stated: “It would be desirable to consider a gradual liberalisation for resident corporates/business 
entities, banks, non-banks and individuals.” It also recommended raising the ceiling on FII investment in 
government securities and corporate bonds, and on ECBs by Indian companies. 
xli
 As Gupta et al. (2011) conclude: “The paper confirms past studies’ conclusions that financial liberalization 
and increased entry of private banks has increased competition and has significantly improved the efficiency 
and profitability of public banks to the point where they are now comparable to private banks.” 
xlii
 Moreover, private and foreign banks often offer the most lucrative clients special services and terms 
(Chandrasekhar, 2008a; Planning Commission India, 2009; Singh, 2013). 
xliii
 It is also significant that many Indian banks, including the largest bank, the almost 60% state-owned State 
Bank of India (SBI), have already gone abroad, and many of the banks make around one quarter of their profits 
abroad (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 152; Timewell, 2012; UNCTAD, 2012). As Indian companies go abroad, they want 
their Indian banks to become global too, which is difficult to resist for policymakers (The Economist, 2009b). 
xliv
 For foreign banks with less than 20 branches it is only 32% (RBI, 2014a). 
xlv
 On microfinance in India see Morgan & Olsen, 2011. 
xlvi
 Foreign banks are banks of which a majority of shares is held by nonresidents. Foreign investors are not 
allowed to own more than 74% of Indian private banks (Bery & Singh, 2006, p. 154). 
xlvii
 It should also be noted many Indian companies (including the Tata group) have been wanting to transform 
their financial services division into regular banks (Crabtree, 2012c). 
xlviii
 In particular, retained profits and depreciation reserves. 
xlix
 It is also striking that foreign investors invest especially in large companies (see Ministry of Finance India, 
2010). This indicates that foreign portfolio investment is unlikely to significantly help SME’s obtain financing. 
l
 The corporate bond market is even less important, and accounted for only 3.2% of GDP in 2009 (Ministry of 
Finance India, 2010). 
li
 Own calculations, based on data from The Conference Board, 2014. 
lii
 A group of billionaires and “ultra-high net worth individuals” (UHNW) with inherited wealth (around 54% of 
which initially made money out of monopoly positions under ISI) and privileged access to political connections 
has come into existence (Crabtree, 2012b; Petras, 2008, p. 352; Rangaswami, 2011). These wealthy Indians 
have increased their share of wealth, partly thanks to the booming stock and real estate markets, and they 
have not refrained from using their wealth for “conspicuous consumption” on luxury goods. According to 
Crabtree (2012b), the billionaires’ share of wealth went from 1.8% in 2003 to 22% by 2008, to fall back to 
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around 10% after the crisis (because of the fall in stock market prices). Note that stocks are primarily owned by 
a small elite, about 20m people or 7.5% of the population in 2003 (Jayadev, 2013). 
liii
 India’s economic growth has therefore been compared to bubble-led growth in other developed and 
developing countries before the crisis (Ghosh & Chandrasekhar, 2009, p. 727). 
liv
 According to the World Bank (2013), in 2030 70% of all investment will go to the services sector, and only 
17% to manufacturing and 13% to agriculture. 
lv
 Note that this also requires a competitive exchange rate. 
lvi
 Although exports are also significant in sectors like automobile parts, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(Chandrasekhar, 2010, p. 47). 
lvii
 As Chandrasekhar (2008a) notes, this has forced India to export capital to absorb the excess capital inflows. 
lviii
 The build-up of foreign reserves as a result of capital inflows is different from most countries including 
China, where foreign reserves are build up through a current account surplus. This means that India’s surplus 
FX is not earned, but a liability. 
lix
 Two reasons are important (see Chandrasekhar, 2008a). First, the volume of government securities held by 
the RBI is finite. Second, reforms in India have imposed restrictions on the government’s borrowing from the 
RBI. 
lx
 Note that the share of participatory notes in total investments by FIIs had fallen to 7.9% by June 2012 
(Vasudevan, 2012). 
lxi
 The various annual Economic Surveys of the Indian Ministry of Finance give different data, with interest 
payments except for 2010-2011 over 20% of total government expenditures, reaching more than 30% in four 
years, but also at less than 4% of GDP from 2005-2006 onwards. Because the data change over time (in one 
Economic Survey the data for a particular year deviate from the data for that same year in a later Economic 
Survey), however, they are not comparable over a longer-term period. 
lxii
 It thus becomes harder for Indian states to implement a progressive project. For example, on the “Kerala 
model” being swept away, see Raman, 2009. 
lxiii
 States are also under heavy pressure because of fiscal austerity (and adopt policies “such as expenditure 
cuts in social sectors, the raising of utility charges such as those of power and water, and the withdrawal of 
subsidies on basic needs”, caused by amongst others, rising debt service to the federal state because of higher 
interest rates (Raman, 2009, p. 289). 
lxiv
 Data from The Conference Board, 2014. Per capita growth made a similar movement, decreasing from 7.78% 
in 2006 to 7.57% in 2007 and 5.04% in 2008, and then rising to 7.06% in 2009 and 7.81% in 2010. 
lxv
 See Mohan, 2008, p. 239 for an overview of the composition of capital inflows into India. 
lxvi
 It is important that India’s equity market was more integrated with global financial markets than China’s 
(McCauley & Ma, 2008). The main reason is that there are no quota – nor minimum investment requirements – 
for FIIs on the Indian equity market (McCauley & Ma, 2008; Shah & Patnaik, 2008). 
lxvii
 56.5% of this amount was pulled out by just five FIIs, namely Citigroup Global Markets, HSBC, Merrill Lynch 
Capital Markets, Morgan Stanley & Swiss Finance corporation (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). 
lxviii
 On the deposit schemes and facilities for NRIs, see RBI, 2013a. 
lxix
 India imports more than 70% of its oil needs (Fontanella-Khan, 2011). 
lxx
 Note that former Managing Director of the IMF Strauss-Kahn praised India for this, lauding that “while other 
countries facing surging capital inflows cry foul, India has neither undertaken massive intervention, nor further 
tightened its existing system of capital controls” (IMF, 2010a). 
lxxi
 In April 2014, for instance, a new stipulation stated that the minimum maturity for new FII investment in 
government securities would be one year (Crabtree, 2014d; SEBI, 2014). 
lxxii
 As Subramanian (2013) discusses, there is a (danger of a) kind of vicious circle in which liberalization of ECBs 
ultimately leads to or worsens a rupee shock, which then leads to even more liberalization, and so on. 
lxxiii
 It should be noted that FDI was only permitted in citied with more than one million inhabitants, and states 
had the right to opt out (Ahmed & Guha, 2012). As by February 2014, only 10 states out of 29 had permitted 
FDI in retail (Pahwa, 2014). 
lxxiv
 According to The Wall Street Journal (2012), a significant feature of the liberalization of FDI in retail was 
that “the political establishment is starting to publicly support market liberalization.” According to this view, 
earlier reforms were implemented by technocratic means, and the arguments in favour of “free markets” were 
never sold to the public opinion. 
lxxv
 According to the IMF (2014b), high inflation “is a result of a number of factors, including: food inflation 
feeding quickly in to wages and core inflation; entrenched inflation expectations; cost-push shocks from 
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binding sector-specific supply constraints (particularly in agriculture, energy, and transportation); the pass 
through from a weaker rupee; and ongoing energy price increases.” 
lxxvi
 The import duty on gold was also increased, to 10% (IMF, 2014b). 
lxxvii
 Even though short-term debt as a share of total external debt has increased strongly since 2001, from less 
than 3% to almost 25% in 2012 (data from World Bank, 2014b). 
lxxviii
 The importance of the stock market was already demonstrated in 2004, when there was a sharp fall in 
stock prices after a coalition of the Congress Party and leftist parties defeated the BJP in the general elections 
(Jayadev, 2013). The INC reassured investors with rhetoric and through naming Manmohan Singh as prime 
minister instead of the seemingly more leftist Sonia Gandhi. 
lxxix
 To give just one example, the Tata group, one of the largest business houses, generates 60% of its revenues 
abroad (Crabtree, 2012d). 
lxxx
 On the transnationalization of the garment industry see Mezzadri, 2010. 
lxxxi
 Including significant state intervention, see e.g. Saraswati, 2008 on the software industry. 
lxxxii
 However, the strength of Indian business should not be overestimated, as “most Indian firms remain 
structurally dependent on foreign technology and constrained by limited domestic markets” (D’Costa, 2000, p. 
141). 
lxxxiii
 One of the consequences is agrarian class conflict between rural elites and the rural poor, “solved” by 
violence by both the state and private landholders against the rural poor (Banerjee-Guha, 2008, p. 51; Walker, 
2008, p. 559). 
lxxxiv
 On the organization of informal workers, see Herring & Agarwala, 2006, p. 346. 
lxxxv
 In the formal sector, 30% of the workforce is covered by collective bargaining, and in the large public and 
private enterprises more than 70% is under collective bargaining. 
lxxxvi
 While the trend is similar, the figures by Azam and Shariff display a way higher rural inequality than the 
official estimates. 
lxxxvii
 The line is constructed based on data only for the years 1983, 1987-1988, 1993-1994, 2004-2005 and 2009-
2010. On India’s poverty statistics see Spagnoli, 2010. The latest official Indian report also discusses the 
problems of India’s statistics (see Planning Commission India, 2012). 
lxxxviii
 Note, however, that a class discourse has also given way to identity politics (Herring & Agarwala, 2006, p. 
328; Thornton & Thornton, 2009, p. 195; Vanaik, 2004, p. 153). 
lxxxix
 It seems that Modi is at least trying to avoid a backlash from voters and workers (Crabtree, 2014b). 
xc
 Although according to Reddy (2007, p. 22), the IMF has been supportive of India’s gradualist approach from 
the beginning of the reforms. 
xci
 Many interviewees stated that there are no differences between the BJP and Congress on capital account 
policies (Interview 23, 24, 27 & 29). 
xcii
 Indian capital is hurt by a strong depreciation of the rupee for two reasons. First, they have borrowed in 
foreign currencies (before the crisis). Second, they are importers of capital goods. 
xciii
 “Illicit outflows” averaged US$10.415bn annually in 2002-2009, and reached the sum of US$344bn in 2002-
2011 (Bellman, 2013; Kar & Freitas, 2013). As a 2007 official report by the Ministry of Finance stated (Ministry 
of Finance India, 2007): “It is estimated that Indian households have accumulated considerable wealth outside 
the country; well beyond the present limits set by the RBI.” Thus not even official committees are able to 
gather adequate information on capital outflows (Chandrasekhar, 2008a). 
xciv
 It must be noted that although research has found that India’s capital controls have been effective 
(Interview 29), although less than in China and weakening over time (Interview 29; Kohli & Belaisch, 2012, p. 
259; McCauley & Ma, 2008), many (pro-liberalization) researchers question the effectiveness (Bery & Singh, 
2006, p. 170; Ministry of Finance India, 2007; Patnaik & Shah, 2009-10, p. 40; Prasad, 2009a; Shah & Patnaik, 
2008; Tarapore, 1998, p. 71; The Economist, 2009b). 
xcv
 Although it has been stated that contrary to Brazil and China, India has signed BITs in the past which could 
limit India’s policy space to impose certain restrictions (Francis, 2013, p. 110; Ranjan, 2012). 
xcvi
 On the other hand, as India’s economy is not in a position of strength, India might not be seen as an 
example to follow. 
xcvii
 One of the interviewees made this distinction between a challenger and an outlier (Interview 26). 
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8. The institutionalization of the free movement of 
capital: beyond the new constitutionalism?i 
 
 8.1 Introduction 
In the three previous chapters, China’s, Brazil’s and India’s capital controls were examined, as well as 
placed in the context of their respective accumulation regimes and configurations of social forces. 
This chapter will look at the BICs position on the international regulation of capital controls, 
especially at the IMF, which “has been at the forefront of the debate on the merits of capital account 
liberalisation and controls” (Moschella, 2014, p. 2). The Fund’s position can be seen as a symbol for 
the changing perspectives on capital controls. As outlined in Chapter 3, it went through an evolution 
from an institution from which the Articles of Agreement explicitly allowed capital controls after the 
Second World War, to a supporter of capital account liberalization and full capital mobility in the 
(late) 1980s. If the thinking on capital controls is undergoing changes, whether or not under the 
influence of emerging countries such as China, Brazil and India, we could thus expect to observe 
these changes at the IMF as well. 
Nevertheless, in this chapter, it is demonstrated that the free movement of capital, as one of the 
main pillars of neoliberalism, is to the contrary being further institutionalized at the IMF after the 
global economic crisis, although in a less rigid and more flexible way. It is argued that this is a classic 
case of the “new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism”, by which Gill (1995) describes the 
institutionalization of neoliberalism into constitutions, laws, institutions and regulations. This new 
constitutionalism of the free movement of capital reveals that the neoliberal project remains very 
well alive, and is in fact being extended, even after the global economic crisis. Moreover, by 
institutionalizing neoliberal policies, new constitutionalism could bind future governments and make 
it even harder to transcend the neoliberal world order in the coming decades. 
In the second section (8.2), I elaborate on the concept of the new constitutionalism and the criticisms 
that it has attracted. The third section  (8.3) explores how the free movement of capital has been 
institutionalized at different scales, and how the IMF has treated capital controls before the crisis. 
Next, the fourth section (8.4) analyses how capital controls were dealt with after the crisis at the 
global level, specifically at the IMF. Evidence is presented that emerging markets and developing 
countries (EMDCs), under the leadership of Brazil, resist the new constitutionalism of the free 
movement of capital. Finally, concluding this chapter (8.5), the findings are summarized and some 





 8.2 The new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism 
  8.2.1 New constitutionalism according to Gill 
The concept of “new constitutionalism” was introduced by Stephen Gill in the 1990s (Gill, 1995, 
1998, 2002, 2008). It was meant to reflect the growing institutionalization of neoliberal frameworks 
and policies into legal and quasi-legal agreements, insulating these policies from day-to-day 
democratic debate and decision-making. As Gill has stated, the central goal of new constitutionalism 
is to firmly secure the protection of private property rights, and to transform public policy in 
accordance with the interests of internationally mobile capital. This implies binding constraints on 
fiscal, monetary and trade and investment policies, and emphasizes values such as market efficiency, 
discipline, business confidence, policy credibility, and competitiveness. Via these constraints, 
disciplinary neoliberalism is legally encoded. Moreover, “these frameworks can be modified only in 
extraordinary circumstances and through burdensome procedures, often requiring special majorities 
or unanimity” (Lesage & Vermeiren, 2011, p. 43). 
New constitutionalism entails efforts at different scales. At the national scale, one can think of the 
institutionalized independence of central banks or the IMF-sponsored  currency boards in the 1990s. 
Bilateral investment agreements (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) constitutionalize various 
aspects of neoliberal globalization between two or more countries.ii The European Union (EU) or the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are the main examples at the regional scale. Finally, 
at the global scale, the World Trade Organization is the classic case of a new constitutionalist 
framework that ties the hands of future governments. 
Three aspects are worth stressing. First, the main purpose of new constitutionalism is to limit 
democratic control over economic policymaking, and to subordinate democracy to the profit motive. 
It is a device to make sure that populations would not use democratic processes to turn back certain 
neoliberal “achievements”. Thus, “new constitutionalism is designed to ‘lock in’ commitments to 
disciplinary neo-liberalism and to ‘lock out’ other potential political economy alternatives (…) partly 
by making many of their means (…) illegal” (Gill, 2008, p. 79). 
Second, these limits to democracy are definitely not “neutral”, they are strongly political in the sense 
that they “subordinate the universal to the particular interests of large capital” (Gill, 2008, p. 175). 
Thus, new constitutionalism is the political-juridical component of the neoliberal political project 
aimed at restoring and deepening capitalist class power (Gill, 2008, p. 163), under the predominance 
of transnationally-oriented capital. By constraining democracy through the institutionalization of 
policies that favour internationally mobile capital, what is emerging is a social order in which holders 
of internationally mobile capital are conferred privileged rights of citizenship and representation (Gill, 
1998, p. 25). In effect, “the mobile investor becomes the sovereign political subject” (Gill, 1998, p. 
23). As Gill (2008, p. 139) states: “Central, therefore, to new constitutionalism is the imposition of 
discipline on public institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the property rights and 
entry of exit options of holders of mobile capital with regard to particular political jurisdictions.” 
Third, while the efforts are intended to benefit transnationally-oriented capital, they are part of an 
American-led G-7 project (Gill, 1998, p. 37, 2008, p. 142, 168). This is commensurate with what 
Panitch and Gindin have written: 
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“It was one of the hallmarks of the centrality of the American empire in the making of global 
capitalism that the multilateral and bilateral treaties that established the regime of free trade 
and investment in the final two decades of the twentieth century were deeply inscribed with 
long-standing US legal and juridical rules and practices.” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 223) 
Thus, it can be expected that governments in EMDCs are less inclined to stick to the new 
constitutionalist frameworks than Western governments, in particular the US and EU member states. 
 
  8.2.2 The limits to new constitutionalism? 
Stephen Gill’s conceptualization of new constitutionalism has prompted several (sympathetic) 
critiques. Four interrelated arguments can be identified. First, Stephen Gill’s account is too 
“determinist” (Strange 2002, 2006, pp. 206, 227; Parker, 2008). According to Hartmann (2011, p. 
565): “Law is pictured as just another political instrument at the disposal of the powerful”. This 
determinism is mistaken, because the liberal world order designed by the West makes it possible to 
engage with international institutions and legal frameworks in order to change them. Thus, it is 
better to speak of “democratic constitutionalism” (Parker, 2008, p. 397) or “liberal global 
governance” (Strange, 2011, p. 544).iii  
Second, because of Gill’s determinism, he understates the opportunities for contestation and 
resistance (Strange, 2002, p. 351; Parker, 2008, p. 398). Because of the liberal modalities of global 
institutions and regulations, global governance can also facilitate progressive change (Strange, 2011, 
pp. 555-556), and constitutionalism should be seen as a “more open terrain” (Parker, 2008, p. 401), 
on which the rules of the global political economy can be changed (Strange, 2011, p. 544). This also 
explains why organizations or states which are resisting neoliberalism, engage with these 
constitutional frameworks (Parker, 2008, p. 401; Strange, 2011, pp. 543-545). Gill is, because of his 
determinism, too pessimist in this regard (Strange, 2002, p. 344). 
These two criticisms imply that, thirdly, Gill wrongly relates the new constitutionalism to 
neoliberalism. It is argued that this association is false: constitutionalism “might be formulated in 
accordance with more social-democratic political preferences” (Parker, 2008, p. 397). Not all 
constitutional frameworks are neoliberal, and they often contain several provisions that deviate 
significantly from neoliberalism. According to these authors, the European Union is a case in point 
(Strange 2002, 2006; Parker, 2008). 
The fourth and final criticism is that it is not only “hard” constitutional modes of governance that are 
used to promote neoliberal policies (Parker, 2008). Non-legal or soft legal means may be far more 
important. Thus, the emphasis on new constitutionalism “fails to do justice to those modes or 
technologies of governance other than the law via which a neoliberal hegemony could be promoted” 





  8.2.3 Rereading Stephen Gill 
It seems that the above criticisms are mostly based on a biased interpretation of Stephen Gill’s 
conceptualization, and a tendency to equate historical materialism with determinism and orthodoxy. 
A different reading suggests that the comments are at least exaggerated. As to the first critique, Gill 
doubted the ability of new constitutionalism as a strategy to institutionalize neoliberalism in a more 
permanent way and to solve the crisis of social reproduction within neoliberalism (Gill, 2002, pp. 63-
64, 2008, p. 176). While noting the constraints that new constitutionalist strategies have produced, 
he also emphasized the “contingent and contested character” of these constraints (Gill, 2002, p. 61).iv 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it must also be recognized that when neoliberal policies are 
institutionalized via laws and constitutions, they are often difficult to change. 
Second, Gill observed that new constitutionalism already contained efforts to contain dislocations 
and to co-opt political opposition to prevent a political backlash against neoliberalism (Gill, 1998, pp. 
23-24, 27, 37; 2008, pp. 79, 163, 173). He called these efforts “trasformismo” (after Gramsci), 
“attempts by ruling classes and élites to co-opt and incorporate opposed political forces and their 
intellectual leaders in order to make their power more legitimate and sustain the prestige of their 
regimes” (Gill, 2002, p. 65). Moreover, again Gill doubted the effectiveness of these strategies of co-
optation and incorporation, especially in the longer term (see e.g. Gill, 1998, p. 24, 2002, p. 65).  
It is, thirdly, certainly not the case that constitutions and institutions do not contain non-neoliberal 
elements. It was even stated explicitly that these arrangements include “measures for dealing with 
the dislocations produced by fictitious commodities” (Gill, 1998, p. 26). Indeed, neoliberalism has 
always been a flexible project, with a “remarkable transformative capacity” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 
400). It could be argued that the growing capacity to deal with both crises and social protest is also 
an inherent part of neoliberalism (Rude, 2008, p. 220). This flexibility has been highlighted by terms 
such as “pragmatic neoliberalism” (Sandbrook, 2000).v 
With regard to the fourth critique, again, my reading is that Gill has never stated that “a neoliberal 
project [is] always to be pursued via the law” (Parker, 2008, p. 412). To the contrary, 
neoliberalization is a multidimensional process advanced via, amongst other things, political, 
economic, legal, ideological and cultural instruments (see e.g. Gill, 1998, p. 31). However, a valuable 
extension to the conceptualization of new constitutionalism has been made by Adam Harmes (2006) 
(see also Lesage & Vermeiren, 2011). According to him, the legal anchoring of neoliberalism should 
be seen in relation to neoliberalism’s economic anchoring. The free movement of capital, goods and 
services is (legally) anchored as one of the pillars of neoliberal globalization. In the meantime, 
policies of market correction (social policies, taxation, labour and environmental standards) most of 
the time still reside at a lower scale (particularly the national scale). “In this way, new 
constitutionalism more or less freezes a political-geographical mismatch between market promotion 
and market correction” (Lesage & Vermeiren, 2011, p. 45). As such, internationally mobile capital is 
able to play off different states (as well as regions, cities, ...) against one another by the possibility of 
“regime shopping” or “regulatory arbitrage”. This has encouraged states to install new 
constitutionalist frameworks as a demonstration of self-discipline to be credible in the eyes of mobile 
investors and corporations (Gill, 1998; Gill & Law, 1989). Neoliberal thinkers have consciously 
promoted this “market-preserving federalism” to constrain government intervention by anchoring 
inter-jurisdictional competition (Harmes, 2006). 
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Thus, to sum up, the concept of “new constitutionalism” provides a useful starting point for analysing 
the growing patchwork of constitutions, laws and treaties institutionalizing neoliberal policies, 
comprising both “hard law” and “soft law”. This does not imply that there is no resistance to new 
constitutionalism, that these regulations comprise only neoliberal elements, or that new 
constitutionalism is the only instrument used to strengthen and deepen neoliberalism. 
A final observation is that the new constitutionalism should not necessarily be seen as 
“conspirational”. New constitutionalist attempts are not always the result of a conscious strategy on 
the part of capital fractions to defend their material interests. For instance, it is plausible that for 
technocrats that often design these frameworks, ideological orientations and social background may 
be an essential element, and they may be relatively unaware that their ideas are in line with the 
interests of transnationally-oriented capital. However, it is also clear that the success of these 
attempts to institutionalize neoliberalism is largely dependent on the structural and direct power of 
transnationally-oriented capital. 
 
 8.3 The constitutionalization of the free movement of capital 
  8.3.1 International capital mobility institutionalized 
As the free movement of capital is crucial to the neoliberal project, it is also itself being increasingly 
constitutionalized. This was already evident to Gill, who wrote that central to the new 
constitutionalism is constitutional controls “partly to prevent national interference with the property 
rights and entry and exit options of holders of mobile capital with regard to particular political 
jurisdictions” (Gill, 1998, p. 26; see also Gill, 2008, p. 170). However economically and politically 
difficult this would be, without this institutionalization of international capital mobility, it remains a 
possibility for a country to withdraw from international capital markets and to reinstate substantial 
control over international capital movements, which would endanger neoliberal policies in other 
domains as well. Therefore, the norm of free movement of capital has been legally locked-in via a 
patchwork of bilateral, regional and global legal and institutional mechanisms (see Anderson, 2009; 
Chowla, 2011; Gallagher, 2011a, 2012b; Gallagher & Stanley, 2013). 
At the bilateral level, many countries have concluded bilateral investment agreements (BITs) and free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with the major industrialized countries, in the first place the US. These 
agreements strongly limit the rights of these countries to use capital controls, even temporary 
controls in extraordinary situations (see e.g. Anderson, 2009; Gallagher, 2011a, 2013; Kolo & Wälde, 
2008; Schneiderman, 2000). As such, “the US Bits are some of the most extensive and stringent and 
contain strong provisions against the use of capital account regulations” (Chowla, 2011). Even taxes 
on inflows or outflows could be interpreted as a violation of these agreements (Gallagher, 2011a, p. 
405). Moreover, if they violate the terms of the treaties, these countries potentially face lawsuits by 
private US investors in supranational tribunals (Anderson, 2009; Gallagher, 2011a). Therefore, 
“current government leaders are constrained by these capital control restrictions, even though the 
vast majority were not in power when these deals were negotiated” (Anderson, 2009). Although the 
EU member states’ BITs contain more exceptions that allow the use of capital controls (Gallagher, 
2011a, pp. 407-408), they still limit the policy space available to emerging markets and developing 
countries (Chowla, 2011). 
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At the regional level the European Union has institutionalized the free movement of capital in the 
Lisbon Treaty, which not only limits the use capital controls within the European Union, but with 
third countries as well (Chowla 2011).vi Another example of a regional agreement that strongly 
restricts the use of capital controls is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Albo, 
2009, p. 124; Anderson, 2009). The ASEAN member states want to create an ASEAN Economic 
Community, which would institutionalize the freer movement of capital (Kawai, Lamberte & Takagi, 
2012, p. 43). Furthermore, member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) are subject to the OECD Code of Liberalisation on Capital Movements (Chowla 
2011). As the OECD (2002) has stated itself: “It has served to entrench the capital account opening 
process as irreversible undertakings by members (...).” While the provisions in this code are 
substantial, there are broader exceptions than in other legal accords (Gallagher, 2011a, p. 407).  
Finally, at the global level, besides the IMF, which will be dealt with in the next section, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) also constitutionalizes free movement of capital in certain forms. The 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains some restrictions on capital controls 
(Albo, 2009, p. 124; Anderson, 2009; Chowla, 2011; Gallagher, 2011a). This only applies to countries 
that have committed to the liberalization of certain financial services. For these countries, the 
liberalization of cross-border trade in financial services may require opening the capital account. 
While some exceptions in the GATS text may be invoked, Gallagher (2011a, pp. 396-397) states that 
it may be “extremely difficult” to meet the conditions to use these exceptions. Again, if a country 
restricts capital flows, it potentially faces arbitration at a dispute panel. However, probably the most 
important attempts to constitutionalize the free movement of capital at the global level have been 
undertaken at the IMF. 
 
  8.3.2 Capital controls and the IMF before the 2007 crisis 
In Chapter 3, the history of capital controls at the IMF – from the more positive position towards 
controls in the Articles of Agreement in 1944 to the informal pro-liberalization approach in the 1980s 
and 1990s – was already outlined. This chapter will therefore start at the attempts to change the 
Articles of Agreement in 1995-1997. To recall, the revisions proposed by the IMF’s Interim 
Committee in September 1997 in Hong Kong would have included the promotion of capital account 
liberalization as one of the main purposes of the Fund, and would have given the IMF jurisdiction 
over the member states’ capital account policies. They would also have permitted the staff to employ 
conditionality attached to its loans to encourage capital account liberalization (Abdelal, 2006; 
Chwieroth, 2007, p. 16). 
This period in the 1990s illustrates how new constitutionalism provides a useful conceptual 
framework for interpreting these events. First, the changes to the Articles of Agreement would have 
firmly institutionalized the norm of free movement of capital, one of the main pillars of 
neoliberalism. As an amendment to the Articles requires the acceptance of three-fifths of the 
members, having 85 percent of the total voting power in the Board of Governors (IMF, 1945), this 
constitutionalization of the free movement of capital would have been very difficult to reverse. For 
example, the US could use its voting power to effectively veto an amendment. 
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Second, the proposals sought to incorporate and co-opt opponents of the new constitutionalism via 
the discourse of orderly liberalization and gradualism, as opposed to a “big bang” approach. Third, 
the events also illustrate the contingent and contested character of new constitutionalist proposals. 
In the final instance, the Asian crisis threw sand in the wheels of the institutionalization of the free 
movement of capital, and by 1999 the proposal was taken off the agenda due to resistance from 
developing countries (Abdelal, 2007, p. 143; on Brazil see Batista, 2012, p. 100; on India see Reddy, 
2007, p. 22) and some policymakers in advanced countries (Abdelal, 2007, p. 12; Chwieroth, 2010a; 
Chowla, 2011; Panitch & Gindin 2012, p. 243). It can thus be seen as “a case of failed norm 
institutionalization” (Leiteritz & Moschella, 2010; see also Leiteritz, 2005; Moschella, 2009), in other 
words, an example of how contestation can effectively block the new constitutionalism. 
Fourth and finally, it is also evident that neoliberalism was not only pursued via legal agreements. As 
explained above, without any changes to the Articles of Agreement, the staff had already changed its 
informal approach to capital account policies before the Asian crisis. After the rejection of the new 
constitutionalist proposals, whereas it could not officially demand capital account policies in its 
surveillance, policy advice or conditionality packages, it could still informally stimulate member 
states to liberalize. While the formal rules may not have changed, it might be useful to examine 
whether the Asian crisis has altered the ideas and informal practices within the IMF on capital 
controls. What, then, was the IMF’s approach during the period from the Asian crisis up to the global 
economic crisis? 
First, just like before the Asian crisis, the IMF still considered capital account liberalization to be 
beneficial, and the final goal should be the full free movement of capital (see e.g. Rossi, 1999; also 
noted by Chwieroth, 2010; IEO, 2005).vii As Stanley Fischer, then First Deputy Managing Director of 
the IMF, said in 1998 (Fischer, 1998b): “The most advanced countries have fully liberalized capital 
flows, and that is where all countries should ultimately be heading (…).” Some important IMF papers 
recognized that the empirical evidence was meagre.viii Edison et al. (2002) conclude: “There is mixed 
evidence that capital account liberalization promotes long-run economic growth.” In an influential 
paper, that is frequently referred to, Prasad et al. (2003) recognize that “it is difficult to establish a 
robust causal relationship between the degree of financial integration and output growth 
performance.” Other papers had similar findings (e.g. Epaulard & Pommeret, 2005; Gourinchas & 
Jeanne, 2004). 
Yet the absence of empirical evidence on the beneficial growth effects of capital account 
liberalization did not lead to the abandoning of the theoretical view that open capital accounts are 
beneficial (e.g. Prasad et al., 2003; Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2003). On the contrary, the staff 
attempted to find new evidence that would demonstrate the theory and nuance earlier empirical 
material. For instance, it was argued that capital account liberalization would boost productivity 
growth instead of output growth, which would only be fully evident in the long run (e.g. Kose et al., 
2006; Kose et al., 2008). Another argument was that open capital accounts are generally beneficial, 
but mostly when certain threshold conditions are met (e.g. Kose et. al., 2006). In sum, “the staff team 
clearly retains a fundamental belief in the long-run desirability of capital freedom” (Chwieroth, 2010, 
p. 222). It is fair to say that the Fund still acted as a “cheerleader” of capital account liberalization 
(see IEO, 2005; also Gallagher, 2012b) on the eve of the global economic crisis. 
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Second, while it had always recognized that an open capital account carries risks, these risks were 
more highlighted in the staff’s analyses (as noted by IEO, 2005; see e.g. Fischer, 1998b; Gupta et al., 
2003; López-Mejía, 1999; Ötker-Robe et al., 2007; Prasad et al., 2003). It was also acknowledged that 
herding behaviour and contagion could exist, without any relation to country fundamentals (e.g. 
Ariyoshi et al., 2000; Bayoumi et al., 2003; Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2001; Borensztein & Gelos, 2000; 
Fischer, 1998b, Gelos & Wei, 2002). Fischer wrote shortly after the Asian crisis that “markets are not 
always right” and that “usually, these swings are rationally based, but they may on occasion be 
excessive, and they may sometimes reflect contagion effects” (Fischer, 1998a, p. 3; see also 
Boorman, 2003). A more cautious approach became trendy, with orderly liberalization, sequencing 
and gradualism as key words (e.g. Boorman, 2003; Prasad et al., 2003; also noted by Chwieroth, 
2014, p. 453; IEO, 2005).ix As former Indian RBI governor Reddy (2007, p. 22) has stated: “The Fund 
seems to have generally softened its stance and broadly follows an eclectic and integrated approach 
towards capital account liberalization, emphasizing proper sequencing and phasing combined with 
several concomitant reforms.” 
Third, however, there was still a broad disapproval of capital controls. The risks associated with 
liberalization “are reasons to proceed with liberalisation carefully; they are not reasons for turning 
away from it altogether” (Boorman, 2003). As the IEO (2005) report concludes: “It is possible here to 
make a broad characterization that the IMF staff was in principle opposed to the use of such 
instruments, either on inflows or outflows.” There was still a lot of scepticism on the (long-term) 
effectiveness of controls (e.g. Laurens & Cardoso, 1998; Le Fort, 2005; Nadal-De Simone & Sorsa, 
1999; Ötker-Robe et al., 2007; Polak, 1998, p. 48; Prasad, Rumbaugh & Wang, 2005), and it was still 
emphasized that the costs of introducing controls are large (e.g. Ariyoshi et al., 2000; Johnston & 
Tamirisa, 1998; Polak, 1998, p. 48; Prasad et al., 2005; Wei & Zhang, 2007). 
Moreover, the staff assumed that there are better solutions to the problems associated with capital 
flows than using restrictions on international capital mobility. For instance, Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 
conclude: “The evidence presented in this paper supports the conclusion that capital controls cannot 
substitute for sound macroeconomic policies.” The emphasis was on macroeconomic “soundness”, 
the quality of domestic institutions and the depth of financial markets (e.g. Laurens & Cardoso, 1998; 
Le Fort, 2005; Ötker-Robe et al., 2007; Prasad et al., 2003; Zakharova, 2008). As Fischer (1998b) 
stated after the Asian crisis: “The first line of defense in dealing with capital flow reversals, aside 
from macroeconomic policy and exchange rate responses, is to use the foreign exchange reserves.” 
As Chwieroth (2014, p. 453) sums it up: “Thus, while the Fund began to show greater recognition of 
the risks posed by removing controls, the organisation did not fundamentally alter its norm hierarchy 
that prioritised the long-run desirability of capital freedom.” 
Fourth, there was more openness to the use of temporary, market-based controls in extraordinary 
circumstances (see e.g. Ariyoshi et al., 2000; Eichengreen et al., 1999; López-Mejía, 1999; Polak, 
1998, p. 48; Prasad et al., 2005; Rossi, 1999; Tamirisa, 2004). As the IEO (2005; also Epstein, Grabel & 
Jomo, 2004) report observes: “As a general rule, the IMF staff, in line with the evolution of the 
institution’s view, became much more accommodating of the use of capital controls over time, albeit 
as a temporary, second-best instrument.” Fifth, however, if capital controls are used, they should be 
market-based instead of quantitative, temporary and targeted to short-term flows, and only on 




 8.4  Capital controls in the IMF: towards the new constitutionalism of 
pragmatic neoliberalism? 
  8.4.1 The IMF and capital controls after the crisis 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the outbreak of the global economic crisis and the capital flow volatility in 
the years during and after the crisis triggered a renewed interest in capital controls in EMDCs. The 
IMF did not at all have anything to say to EMDCs that (re-)introduced these (moderate) controls. 
Several observers have noted that the IMF’s interest in controls was a reaction to this 
“rehabilitation” of controls by EMDCs (see Grabel & Chang, 2010; Mohan, 2012, p. 23). Chwieroth 
(2014, pp. 458-459) has written that “organisational insecurity imperatives” meant that some IMF 
officials wanted “to convince emerging markets that the organisation was taking their preferences 
seriously”. The IMF started doing research on capital flows and capital controls in 2010 and 
continued this research in 2011 and 2012 (IMF, 2010c, 2011b, 2012c; on the internal process driving 
reform within the IMF see Chwieroth, 2014). While capital flow management measures (CFMs), as 
the IMF calls capital controls now, were “a quiet undertaking” before the crisis, the Fund now 
became “fairly vocal” about its new views (Gallagher, 2012b). In November 2012, this culminated in 
the final official “institutional view” on “the liberalization and management of capital flows” (IMF, 
2012e), based on the preceding research by the staff, which was meant to present a 
“comprehensive, flexible, and balanced approach for the management of capital flows” and which 
discusses controls on both inflows and outflows. 
Does this new IMF framework matter? As has been contended in the past (Cooper, 1998, p. 11): “A 
cynic could argue that whether or not the IMF embraces capital-account convertibility as a formal 
objective will make no difference whatsoever.” Ilene Grabel (2012, p. 60) has pointed out that “the 
Fund’s position has become increasingly irrelevant as developing countries now enjoy the policy 
space to introduce and adjust capital controls without waiting for the institution.” It is highly 
doubtful whether the IMF can be a central actor in deciding the capital account policies of countries 
such as the BICs in the (near to medium-term) future.  
On the other hand, one could argue that the IMF’s position is important for many smaller and less 
powerful EMDCs (see e.g. Wade & Veneroso, 1998, p. 38). This is commensurate with Gill’s position 
that the pressures and constraints that the new constitutionalism produces “vary according to the 
size, economic strength, form of state and civil society and prevailing national and regional 
institutional capabilities, and the degree of integration into global capital and money markets” (Gill, 
2008, p. 142). In this line of reasoning, Grabel (2012, p. 66) has also proclaimed: “Whether the IMF 
seizes this opportunity and how it comes to interpret this possible new charge is of critical 
importance to advocates of national policy space for capital controls (and other measures).” It can be 
argued that small developing countries will be more prone to obeying new constitutionalist 
frameworks than large emerging markets. 
The second reason why the IMF’s institutional view is important, is because it is symbolic for the 
changing mainstream position with regard to capital controls. As can be derived from Chapter 3, the 
IMF Articles of Agreement more or less echoed the Keynesian consensus after the Second World 
War. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Fund’s informal view in favour of the full free movement of 
capital reflected the hegemony of the neoliberal project. Consequently: “The IMF’s position on 
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capital controls is thus not only very important per se but is also one of the crucial litmus tests for 
assessing ideational changes in global financial governance at large” (Moschella, 2014, p. 2). 
The specifics of the framework thus far developed can be summarized in five central principles (see 
Dierckx, 2011 for a more detailed analysis of the inflows framework).xi First, in line with the view 
before the global economic crisis, the staff still considers full capital mobility to be advantageous to 
the world economy as a whole and to individual countries in particular.xii These benefits include 
greater efficiency, financial sector competitiveness, facilitating investment, consumption smoothing 
and macroeconomic discipline (IMF, 2012e). For countries that still apply comprehensive capital 
controls, such as China and India, the IMF argues that further (extensive) liberalization would 
certainly be beneficial (IMF, 2012e). While it is indicated that “recent research suggests that there is 
no certainty that full liberalization is an appropriate objective for all countries at all times”, the last 
stage of the liberalization of capital flows still “eliminates all remaining controls” (IMF, 2012c). It is 
obvious that “the IMF still thinks that in an ideal world there would be free movement of capital” 
(Elliott, 2012), that “capital freedom still shows an enduring appeal among some staff” (Chwieroth, 
2014, p. 461), and that full capital account liberalization is still a long-term objective (see also IMF, 
2010c). 
However, second, “the limitations of market efficiency and rationality also feature in staff reports” 
(Chwieroth, 2014, p. 461). It is recognized that liberalization in general, and inflow surges in 
particular, can carry considerable risks, and that markets may be prone to herding behaviour. There 
are both financial stability and macroeconomic risks. In particular, capital inflow surges can lead to 
asset price bubbles, rapid exchange rate appreciation, credit booms, inflation and sudden 
stops/reversals of capital flows (IMF, 2012e).xiii While this was already acknowledged before the 
global economic crisis, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis. For instance, the institutional view 
admits that capital outflows are not always driven by domestic factors and can also be driven by 
international factors (IMF, 2012e). According to Gabor (2012, p. 728), this “recognises the demise of 
the old conceptual apparatus that posits the optimality of free capital flows”. As such, the pre-crisis 
position that a “planned, timed and sequenced” approach to liberalization is appropriate has been 
strengthened, and it is argued that liberalization is more beneficial to countries that have reached 
certain “thresholds”, in particular certain levels of institutional and financial development (IMF, 
2012e). Therefore, sound and stable macroeconomic policies, a developed financial sector, a flexible 
exchange rate and greater trade openness are crucial. 
Third, the IMF position still holds that most of the time the apparent risks do not imply that capital 
controls are the “right” answer. Indeed, “rather than favouring closed capital accounts, these 
experiences highlight the need for policymakers to remain vigilant to the risks” (IMF, 2012e). A key 
role to deal with the challenges presented by capital flows should be played by macroeconomic 
policies.xiv While in the final institutional view it is stated that the temporary re-imposition of controls 
“is consistent with an overall strategy of capital flow liberalization” (IMF, 2012e), in an earlier paper it 
was also noted that “liberalization should not be seen as a “two-way street” (IMF, 2012c). Further, 
the effectiveness of controls on both inflows and outflows is questioned. Thus: “Even when CFMs are 
desirable, their likely effectiveness remains a key consideration” (IMF, 2012e).xv In November 2009, 
then Managing Director Strauss-Kahn said that “the problem [with controls] is that most of the time 
it does not work” (see Guha, 2009). The costs of capital controls are also assumed to be very high, 
including the possibility of financial repression, corruption and high enforcement costs, reducing 
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discipline, impeding financial development, creating an inefficient allocation of capital, and limiting 
the available financing resources (IMF, 2012e).xvi 
Fourth, in some instances capital controls can be useful and legitimate, but they should only be used 
as a last resort and in very limited circumstances.xvii Controls on inflows may only be used when the 
exchange rate is not undervalued, when reserves are more than adequate or sterilization costs very 
high, when the economy is overheating so that expansionary monetary policy is not advisable, and 
when fiscal policy is profoundly tightened (IMF, 2011b). With regard to outflows, they “should 
usually be handled primarily with macroeconomic, structural, and financial policies” (IMF, 2012e). 
Controls can only be used “in crisis situations, or when a crisis may be imminent”, especially to 
prevent a free fall of the exchange rate or a depletion of international reserves. In sum, “to manage 
the macroeconomic and financial stability risks associated with inflow surges or disruptive outflows, 
a key role needs to be played by macroeconomic policies, including monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate management, as well as by sound financial supervision and regulation and strong institutions” 
(IMF, 2012e). In sum, “the recognition of the role of capital account management is qualified by a 
number of statements that effectively downplay the role that these measures can have” (Batista, 
2014). 
Fifth, while a staff position note states that “there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to capital control 
design” and that “the design of capital controls needs to be tailored to country circumstances” (Ostry 
et al., 2011), the IMF also reveals a clear preferences for certain controls over others. If they are 
used, they should be “limited and temporary” (IMF, 2012e). Controls on inflows should be 
temporaryxviii, preferably non-residency basedxix, market-basedxx, country-specific and designed to 
target the specific risk (IMF, 2011b, 2012e). Macroprudential measures are to be preferred over 
controls. Controls on outflows can also be usedxxi, but they should likewise be temporary, and they 
should be “lifted as soon as certain conditions are met”. While it is recognized that controls should 
be comprehensive to avoid evasion (IMF, 2012e), it has been stated earlier that often market-based 
measures will be sufficient (IMF, 2012c).xxii 
 
  8.4.2 Postneoliberalism or pragmatic neoliberalism? 
When assessing the IMF’s institutional view, two perspectives are possible. In the first perspective, 
the Fund’s framework finally departs from the neoliberal ideology, as it now accepts certain capital 
controls. There are certainly elements in the IMF’s framework that are at odds with this neoliberal 
ideology, although it does not represent a radical departure.xxiii However, from the perspective 
adopted in this dissertation which views neoliberalism as a hegemonic class project, it is clear that 
the IMF’s institutional view does not deviate significantly from its earlier neoliberal position. 
First, the novelty of the IMF’s institutional view should not be overstated. As Chwieroth (2014, p. 
446) puts it, the institutional view combines “new greater acceptance of controls with an older 
emphasis on their negative consequences and on the desirability of free movement of capital”. The 
basic assumptions remain the same as before the global economic crisis (Moschella, 2014, p. 10). In 
general, the IMF still considers full capital mobility the best option for both the global economy and 
for individual countries. The gradual shift in emphasis on the risks of open capital liberalization, that 
had taken place after the Asian crisisxxiv, has certainly continued and been strengthened. However, 
219 
 
“this is not as big a change as it may seem” (Batista, 2014). The proposed policies to deal with the 
diagnosed risks have not changed substantially. Prudential and macroeconomic instruments are 
preferred over controls. As one IMF official has explained, the Fund is “accepting” controls, it is not 
“recommending” them (see IMF, 2011c). Although it is a significant novelty that the IMF legitimates 
capital controls, it is clear that legitimate controls according to the Fund’s view would still be rather 
exceptional.xxv Moreover, they should still be temporary, preferably non-residency-based and 
market-based, country-specific and targeted to the specific risk. In sum: “Although the differences 
between the pre- and post-crisis intellectual stances may at first seem dramatic, a closer look at the 
Fund’s ideational shift in the aftermath of the global financial crisis reveals several elements of 
continuity with pre-crisis thinking” (Moschella, 2014, p. 9). 
Second, several Keynesian-oriented economists have criticized the Fund’s institutional view for being 
flawed, for not going far enough in accepting capital controls, and for being insufficient to protect 
EMDCs from the risks associated with volatile capital flows (Akyüz, 2012, pp. 91-92; Chowla, 2011; 
Fritz & Prates, 2013; Gabor, 2012, p. 728; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2011; Ocampo, 
Griffith-Jones & Gallagher, 2011; Stiglitz, 2011; UNCTAD, 2013b). The three main criticisms are that 
capital controls should not only be a measure of last resort, that they should be a permanent policy 
tool instead of just a temporary measure, and that quantity-based controls can be more effective 
than price-based controls. This criticism has also been mirrored by civil society organizations (e.g. 
Chowla, 2011; O’Farrell, 2011). 
Third, the IMF always strongly emphasizes that capital controls should definitely not be used to 
diverge from orthodox economic policy (Ostry et al., 2010; IMF, 2012e). The framework on inflows 
makes clear that “measures that affect inflows merit greater scrutiny because they can potentially be 
used to substitute for appropriate macroeconomic policies” (IMF, 2011b). In the 2012 paper, it is 
stated that controls “should always be part of a broader policy package that also includes 
macroeconomic, financial sector, and structural adjustment” (IMF, 2012c). It can thus be argued that 
in the Fund’s view, capital controls would only be legitimate for neoliberal poster children. Where 
capital controls are not endangering the neoliberal project, they are accepted; where they could be 
used to put in place less orthodox economic policies, they are rejected.xxvi This is consistent with 
Susanne Soederberg’s (2004, p. 43) critique: “In this sense, capital controls are only to be used as a 
means to reach the larger end, namely, the proper (neoliberal) management of financial 
liberalization.” 
Another indication that the IMF does not accept deviations from the neoliberal project is the IMF’s 
emphasis that “policy credibility” must always be kept in mind when using controls, to “avoid 
damaging market perceptions” (IMF, 2012e). It is emphasized that a credible exit strategy from 
capital controls is crucial to preserve policy credibility (Ghosh et al., 2009), that capital controls risk 
affecting investor confidence for a considerable time (IMF, 2011b, 2012c; 2012e), and that the 
benefits of controls should be “weighed against the risk that such an approach may create an 
adverse market reaction” (IMF, 2011b). Capital controls should mostly be temporary and limited “so 
as not to (...) adversely affect investor confidence” (IMF, 2012e). While this might be logical from the 
staff’s point of view, it indicates that the Fund accepts the power of global financial capital as an 
“objective reality” which cannot be resisted. As such, the Fund depoliticizes and mystifies this power 
of global financial capital, and hence reinforces this power. 
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Fourth, the IMF does definitely not want controls to be a widespread phenomenon. It is stated that 
“it is important to be cognizant of the multilateral risks if CFMs where to be broadly and 
indiscriminately adopted, for example through a process of imitation or diffusion” (IMF, 2011b; see 
also IMF, 2012e). These “risks” are more explicitly clarified in a staff position note (Ostry et al., 2010): 
“In addition, controls imposed by some countries may lead other countries to adopt them also: 
widespread adoption of controls could have a chilling longer-term impact on financial integration and 
globalization, with significant output and welfare losses.” The Fund does certainly not see capital 
controls as a possible permanent feature of the international monetary system, in the way Keynes 
and White did in the 1940s. 
Finally, the capital controls that would be allowed under the institutional view do not represent a 
challenge to the power of global financial capital or transnationally-oriented productive capital. 
Financial capital would in general still be free to chase the highest returns on stock exchanges, bond 
markets and derivatives markets all over the world. The Fund even recommends financial deepening 
as a means to soften the risks of capital account liberalization, which from a critical approach could 
be seen to lead to financialization and growing power for financial capital. Although there can be 
prudential limits on foreign exchange positions, restrictions on the activities of foreign banks are not 
compatible with the IMF’s framework. Limitations on FDI and investment by multinational 
corporations seem off-limits even more. The only measure that would (partially) harm the interests 
of transnationally-oriented capital is the imposition of strict controls on outflows. However, two 
caveats are important. First, that controls are only allowed in crisis situations implies that the 
structural power of capital will not be limited during “normal” times. Second, it remains to be seen in 
which cases controls on outflows would be defined as “legitimate”. It seems unlikely that the Fund 
would allow a “proliferation” of controls on outflows in crisis situations. In sum, the IMF’s 
institutional view leaves the structural power of transnationally-oriented capital intact. 
To sum up, while the approach certainly implies a more pragmatic standpoint on capital controls that 
deviates to a significant degree from the IMF’s earlier view, the current approach remains within 
neoliberal limits. Moreover, “there is a lingering overall bias against capital flow measures, especially 
capital controls” (Batista, 2014). The relatively limited controls that would be allowed under the 
framework are certainly not a threat to the power of transnationally-oriented financial and 
productive capital. As such, the IMF’s institutional view is better referred to as an illustration of 
pragmatic neoliberalism than of postneoliberalism.  
 
  8.4.3 A renewed effort to constitutionalize the free movement of capital? 
As the current IMF framework does not deviate from neoliberalism, this chapter argues that it can be 
seen as a more subtle, and more flexible form of the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism after the 
earlier attempt to constitutionalize the free movement of capital within the IMF Articles of 
Agreement failed. It contains several characteristics which were outlined in the first section of this 
chapter. First, it might be seen as an attempt to restrain the use of capital controls by emerging 
markets and it gives the IMF staff the power to evaluate national policies on capital flows. As such, it 
locks in neoliberal policies, in this case the free movement of capital. This in effect subordinates 




Second, whereas Parker (2008) associates new constitutionalism with hard law, this case 
demonstrates that the demarcation line between hard law and soft law can be rather blurry. The 
institutional view was endorsed by the IMF Executive Board as an official IMF policy framework (IMF, 
2012b), and can thus be considered a binding hard law. However, the implications are not 
unambiguous. On the one hand, it is stated explicitly that the institutional view does not create any 
legal obligations for member states nor does it alter the Fund’s jurisdiction (IMF, 2012e; see also IMF, 
2011b, 2012c).xxvii Moreover, members that maintain “illegitimate” capital controls cannot be 
excluded from IMF resources. 
On the other hand, the framework was developed as a way to outline the “global rules of the game” 
(IMF 2010c, 2011b). In a 2010 paper, it was stated explicitly that the IMF should have the mandate 
“to identify actions that members should take or refrain from” in designing capital account policies 
(IMF, 2010c).xxviii In general, the institutional view will be used for policy advice, bilateral surveillance 
and multilateral surveillance (IMF, 2012e; see also Siegel, 2013, pp. 72-73). While states will usually 
not be obliged to follow these recommendations, it could create obligations in some cases.xxix In this 
context, it is also remarkable that Nicolas Ayzaguirre, director of the IMF’s Western Hemisphere 
Department, declared that the IMF has the mandate to preserve the stability of the international 
monetary system, and that the Fund could use this mandate to suppress the proliferation of capital 
controls (IMF, 2011c). Paulo Nogueira Batista, Brazil’s Executive Director at the IMFxxx, saw the 
framework “as an attempt to prepare the terrain for more interference by the fund in the policies of 
emerging-market countries” (in Talley & Reddy, 2011). In any case, Gill (1998, pp. 25-26, 2008, p. 
139) described surveillance mechanisms of international organizations as an important aspect of the 
new constitutionalism.xxxi 
A third aspect is that this should not be seen as a “conspiracy theory” position. The Fund threats 
capital controls as a technical matter, not as a political issue. Olivier Blanchard, Director of the 
Research Department of the IMF, wrote on his blog that “while the issue of capital controls is fraught 
with ideological overtones, it is fundamentally a technical one, indeed a highly technical one” 
(Blanchard, 2011). In this way economic policy is depoliticized, so that it can be put in the hands of 
technocrats and specialized economists, far removed from democratic decisions.xxxii However, this 
draws attention away from the increased structural power of capital that results from capital account 
liberalization. In the words of Susanne Soederberg (2004, p. 61): “Largely due to its appearance as a 
pluralistic multilateral lending institution and its exclusive emphasis on the economic dimensions of 
capital controls, the IMF is not only able to reproduce the ‘common sense’ assumptions that free 
capital mobility is a natural phenomenon driven by the external forces of globalization, but also its 
ability to cloud the fact that the Fund’s judgement call is primarily political in nature.” Thus, due to its 
neoliberal bias and technocratic values, the Fund encourages open capital accounts as apolitical 
“good economic policy”, while it is actually engaging in a class-based project that favours 
internationally mobile capital. 
Fourth, the project to constitutionalise the free movement of capital in the IMF is especially 
supported by Western governments, and there was “considerable resistance to change and 
intellectual flexibility (...) from advanced country chairs, especially the US and European chairs” 
(Batista, 2014).xxxiii For instance, while France may have been one of the countries in favour of a more 
flexible approach to capital controls, it also made great efforts to give the IMF more power in the 
assessment of which controls are legitimate in which circumstances. In January 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy 
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proposed the development of “a code of conduct” by the G20, and the broadening of the IMF’s role 
in the “surveillance” of international capital transactions (AFP, 2011). Sarkozy also wanted to make 
sure that a multiplication of unilateral measures would not lead to a new financial protectionism (see 
Batista, 2012, p. 99; Leparmentier & Thibault, 2011).xxxiv He also said that that the code of conduct 
should “define the conditions under which restrictions on capital movements are legitimate, 
effective and appropriate to a given situation” (Sarkozy, 2011). Moreover, he stated that France was 
in favour of a modification of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement “to broaden its supervision mandate”. 
Statements by advanced countries’ officials have repeated this, or have said that capital account 
policies should be included in the Fund’s surveillance (Bernstein, 2011; Borg, 2013; Geens, 2013; 
Geithner, 2011a; Johnsen, 2011; Matolcsy, 2011; Noonan, 2013; Schäuble, 2013; Swan, 2012).xxxv 
Moreover, advanced countries have been broadly supportive of the approach that the IMF 
developed. Many have explicitly endorsed the institutional view in their IMFC statements (Borg, 
2013; Fekter, 2013; Geens, 2013; Grilli, 2013; Lew, 2013; Noonan, 2013; Schäuble, 2013; Widmer-
Schlumpf, 2013). According to Swedish finance minister Borg (2013), the institutional view was even 
“an important milestone”. Some acknowledged that capital controls can play a role in certain 
circumstances. However, most advanced countries also emphasized that other measures are 
preferable, that controls should be temporary, market-based and last resort only, and that they 
cannot be used to substitute for the necessary reforms (see de Jager, 2011; Geithner, 2011a; Grilli, 
2013; Johnsen, 2011; Lagarde, 2010; Lew, 2013; Matolcsy, 2011; Osborne, 2011; Rostowski, 2011; 
Schäuble, 2011a, 2011b; Tremonti, 2011; Widmer-Schlumpf, 2011, 2012, 2013).xxxvi The benefits of 
capital mobility were also underlined. As German finance minister Schäuble (2011a) said: “Free 
movement should remain the ultimate objective and countries, through individual and cooperative 
efforts, should work to put in place the preconditions for successful capital account liberalization.” 
Finally, it was noted above that the IMF’s approach can be defined as pragmatic neoliberalism. 
Hence, because it comprises to a certain extent elements that appear as a departure from 
neoliberalism, the pragmatic neoliberal approach contains efforts to incorporate and co-opt 
resistance. The fact that the Fund endorses controls, although, as explained above, in limited and 
extraordinary circumstances, has made some analysts talk about a turnaround in the Fund’s view 
(Harding, 2011a; Talley & Reddy, 2011), “a small revolution” (Pisani-Ferry, 2011) or even “the end of 
an era in global finance” (Rodrik, 2010). According to Chwieroth (2014, p. 462), the combination of 
the acceptance of capital controls with the preservation of the long-term goal of the full free 
movement of capital was meant to avert opposition from actors in favour of capital freedom, in 
particular the US, and at the same time appealing  to EMDCs that are less ideologically inclined to full 
capital mobility. However, these efforts to incorporate oppositional political forces have not 
prevented the emergence of resistance. 
 
  8.4.4 The opposition of EMDCs 
While the advanced countries statements in the International Monetary and Financial Committee 
(IMFC) are broadly supportive of the framework, at the same time emphasizing that capital controls 
should remain exceptional, some EMDCs have been very critical from the very beginning of the 
process. Further, contrary to advanced countries, none of the EMDCs has endorsed the IMF’s 
institutional view. The main reason, besides the lack of focus on “push countries”, has been that they 
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consider the framework as an attempt to limit the use of capital controls.xxxvii As such, they 
categorically contest the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism in the domain of capital controls. 
One of their motivations was that the IMF framework was too orthodox in content, and that capital 
controls should not only be used as a last resort but should be a “normal” policy tool (Batista, 2012, 
p. 97; Interview 12; Mantega, 2012b; Mohan, 2012, p. 25; Mukherjee, 2012). As Brazil’s finance 
minister Guido Mantega (2012a) has stated: “Experience has shown that the free flow of capital is 
not necessarily the preferable option in all circumstances.” After the institutional view was finalized, 
he said: “The IMF has to be supportive of this approach [of capital controls as an ordinary 
instrument], not just tolerate it reluctantly, as in its ‘institutional view’ document” (Mantega, 2013). 
However, interviewees in China, Brazil and India said that the IMF’s thinking was very much in line 
with the Chinese/Brazilian/Indian position and policies (Interview 2 & 7 on China; Interview 15 on 
Brazil; Interview 28 & 32 on India).xxxviii Especially in India, officials felt that there had been a 
convergence between the West and EMDCs, and that the West has moved towards the approach 
applied and advocated by India since 1990 (Interview 23 & 32). The second motivation is therefore 
even more important: many EMDCS explicitly argued against the constraining of policy space by an 
international institution in general and the IMF in particular (Interview 12, 15, 28 & 33). As one 
interviewee (Interview 15) said: “We don’t know how the next crisis is going to be. We need to have 
a space of manoeuver to deal with it.” Even though Brazilian policymakers are against controls on 
outflows, for instance, the interviewee argued that they should keep the option open. 
The most important opponent of the framework in this regard has been Brazil. At the IMFC meeting 
on April 16, 2011, explicitly referring to John Maynard Keynes’ views on capital controls, Brazil’s 
finance minister Guido Mantega made a clear statement (Mantega, 2011): “We oppose any 
guidelines, frameworks or ‘codes of conduct’ that attempt to constrain, directly or indirectly, policy 
responses of countries facing surges in volatile capital inflows. Governments must have flexibility and 
discretion to adopt policies that they consider appropriate, including macroeconomic, prudential 
measures and capital controls.” Brazil’s Executive Director at the IMF, Paulo Noguero Batista, 
declared (Batista, 2012, p. 98): “Under the pretext of allowing capital account regulations in some 
limited circumstances, the Fund may be seeking to extend its jurisdiction to the capital account.” 
Clearly then, Brazil interprets the framework as an instrument to restrain the policy autonomy of 
member states. 
At the April 2012 Spring Meeting of the IMFC, Mantega therefore reiterated his opposition to the 
IMF’s approach, and urged the Fund to rethink its approach (Mantega, 2012b). Batista has also 
voiced opposition to the IMF’s approach on several occasions, saying that Brazil opposes any 
attempts to restrict the policy space of the member countries (see e.g. Rastello, 2011; Batista, 2012). 
He has also argued “that it would be highly inappropriate and politically unsustainable to attempt to 
use the Fund’s skewed voting power, which gives undue weight to advanced countries, to impose 
their agenda on developing countries that are not willing to face any restrictions on the liberty to 
manage the capital account” (Batista, 2012, p. 100). Finally, the day the IMF’s institutional view was 
released, Batista said in a statement: “Our chair does not consider itself part of this ‘institutional 
view’” (see Rastello, 2012). Interviewees confirmed that Brazil is against any frameworks constraining 
policy space in whatsoever way (Interview 12 & 15).  
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While Brazil is clearly in the forefront in the opposition to the new constitutional approach to capital 
controls, it is not alone in its contestation. India has been a second pillar of the resistance to the 
IMF’s approach (see e.g. Batista, 2014; Bretton Woods Project, 2011a). In 2010, then RBI governor 
Subbarao (2010b) said: “It would be preferable for the IMF to play only an advisory (and not 
jurisdictional) role on capital account issues as our collective understanding is not yet complete and 
differences in views/perceptions/experiences need to be accommodated.” India’s former finance 
minister Pranab Mukherjee called for flexibility during an IMF session on the reform of the 
international monetary system in May 2011 (Ghoshal, 2011). At the 2012 Spring Meeting of the 
IMFC, he stated that countries must have flexibility and discretion in their capital account policies, 
“without a sense of stigma attached to particular instruments” (Mukherjee, 2012).  
China has been less vocal in its opposition to the IMF framework, but it has still defended the use of 
capital controls. For instance, in April 2010 Zhou Xiaochuan stated that EMDCs “need to strengthen 
monitoring and management of cross-border capital flows to reduce the risk of a sudden reversal” 
(Zhou, 2010). This was repeated at other IMFC meeting (see Yi, 2011). After the institutional view 
was released, Zhou (2013b) reiterated the position that “policy space needs to be rebuilt, while 
macroprudential and capital flow management measures should be readily deployed against 
excessive credit growth and volatile capital inflows”. This demonstrates that China sees capital 
controls as a mainstream tool instead of as a tool of last resort. The BRICS as a whole have also 
emphasized “the risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows being faced by the emerging 
economies” in their summit communiqués (BRICS, 2012), and according to the South African Trade 
minister Rob Davies, the BRICS are “wary” of the IMF’s framework (in Seria, 2011). 
Further resistance to the new constitutionalism has come from two constituencies composed of 
EMDCs.xxxix In his April 2011 IMFC statement, Mohammed Laksaci, governor of the Banque d’Algerie, 
said that the IMF’s framework should not be part of surveillance, and that countries should maintain 
policy flexibility (Laksaci, 2011).xl He repeated that the IMF’s ongoing research and work on capital 
controls “should not compromise members’ ability to adopt policies and tools which they deem 
appropriate to their specific circumstances” in his 2012 IMFC Spring Meeting statement (Laksaci, 
2012). At the same meeting, the Minister of State for Financial Affairs of the United Arab Emirates 
also called for policy flexibility and said that the states in his constituency oppose “modifications of 
member obligations with respect to capital flows” and “constraints on countries’ ability to manage 
volatile flows” (Al-Tayer, 2012).xli The criticism of the IMF’s new constitutionalist approach has also 
been expressed in G-24 communiqués (G-24, 2011a, 2011b).xlii The G-24 emphasized that this 
approach “should not result directly or indirectly in new obligations on members” (G-24, 2012). 
Moreover, it was underlined that capital controls should be seen as an integral part of the toolkit.  
This resistance to new constitutionalism from EMDCs has already resulted in small, but significant 
accomplishments. First, while staff papers often emphasised that controls should only be used as a 
last resort and be preferably market-based, this disappeared in the IMF’s final institutional view (IMF, 
2012e). Second, while the “G20 Coherent Conclusions for the Management of Capital Flows Drawing 
on Country Experiences” are still strongly in favour of open capital accounts, they also conclude: 
“There is no one-size-fits-all approach or rigid definition of conditions for the use of capital flows 
management measures” (G20, 2011).xliii Third, that the staff has, even though restricted, legitimized 
the use of controls on capital outflows in its final institutional view, despite its former resolute 
rejection of controls on outflows (Soederberg, 2004), indicates that it may have felt more restrained 
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by the opposition of EMDCs to the 2011 framework on inflows. Finally, while early research after the 
crisis examining Country IV Reports found that capital controls were not yet accepted most of the 
time when officials assessed (see Dierckx, 2011; Weisbrot et al., 2009), later studies have found that 
the staff has become more supportive in these reports, especially from 2010 onwards (see Gallagher 
& Tian, 2014; see also Chwieroth, 2014, p. 463). This also points to the flexibility of the staff, which 
may be partly because of their need not to lose legitimacy in the developing world after EMCDs’ 
rejection of the institutional view. 
Despite these accomplishments, for now, “the policy will go ahead despite the acrimony” (Bretton 
Woods Project, 2011b). The institutional view has been accepted by the Executive Board, and it will 
be difficult to replace the framework by a more flexible approach, as this requires a majority in the 
Executive Board. 
 
 8.5  Conclusion: the future of neoliberalism and the new constitutionalism 
This chapter has engaged with the concept of the “new constitutionalism” as developed by Stephen 
Gill. It has argued that this is a valuable concept to describe and understand the legal anchoring of 
neoliberal policies into laws and constitutions that are difficult to change or abolish. This restricts 
democratic decision-making in the interests of Western-led transnationally-oriented capital. 
The institutionalization of the free movement of capital at the IMF forms an exemplary and 
important case to study the new constitutionalism after the crisis. While the Fund has taken a more 
pragmatic stance, its “institutional view” on capital controls remains broadly within neoliberal limits. 
As controls are allowed only in extraordinary circumstances for countries that are already neoliberal 
poster children, this does not seem to threaten the interests of transnationally-oriented financial 
capital in a substantial way. However, the attempt to constitutionalize the free movement of capital 
is contested by EMDCs, with Brazil taking the lead. They do not contest the desirability of free capital 
flows, but do not want to give up their policy autonomy either. Because of the power asymmetry at 
the IMF, both in terms of voting power and ideological power, advanced countries have so far been 
quite able to press forward their approach, but contestation by EMDCs has led to some minor 
victories.  
What general lessons can be drawn from the study presented in this chapter? I would argue that 
there are three. First, while neoliberalism has been ideologically damaged through the global crisis, 
this does not yet spell the end of neoliberalism as a hegemonic project. Key features of neoliberalism 
such as the free movement of capital remain alive and kicking. This also means that neoliberal 
policies may still be increasingly institutionalized. As such, for anti-neoliberal social forces it is both 
intellectually and politically necessary to engage with the new constitutionalism, in order to create a 
global institutional environment that is more open to postneoliberal policies. 
Second, Gill (2008, p. 165) states that the main political struggle within capitalism has been between 
those that want to extend and lock in the rights of capital and those that want to democratize, 
socialize and politically control capital. Yet, I would suggest that in this case it is a struggle between 
those that want to lock in the rights of transnationally-oriented financial capital under the dominance 
of Western and particularly US capital, and those that reject this dominance, without necessarily 
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envisaging more democratic control over capital (neither in the authoritarian Chinese regime, nor in 
the Brazilian or Indian liberal democracy). As demonstrated in previous chapters, all rising powers 
still seem to agree on the final goal of full international capital mobility and of gradually liberalizing 
their capital accounts. Nonetheless, while their motives may not be inherently “progressive”, the 
contestation of the new constitutionalism in general and of the absolute free movement of capital in 
particular may result in decreased structural power for transnationally-oriented financial capital. 
Finally, while emerging markets may come to play a bigger role in the global political economy, 
Western social forces, ideas and institutions are still crucial in the neoliberal project, as the case of 
the free movement of capital at the IMF demonstrates. The material, ideological and institutional 
power of a declining US and European Union should not be underestimated. If anti-neoliberal social 
forces in the Western heartland fail in their opposition to neoliberalism, we should not expect 
progressive social forces in emerging markets to be able to build a global postneoliberal world order. 
Opposition to neoliberalism in the West remains essential. 
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 9.1 Main findings of the dissertation 
  9.1.1 Summary of the dissertation 
This dissertation has aimed to offer an answer to the question whether China, Brazil and India will 
challenge the Western-promoted neoliberal norm of the free movement of capital across borders. 
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, sketched in Chapter 3, it was argued in Chapter 4 that capital 
account liberalization has been an essential aspect of the neoliberal project. This class project was 
meant to restore profitability in the developed world (and beyond), and discipline the working class 
in advanced countries and nationalist projects in the Third World. The transnationalization of both 
productive and financial capital, as well as the financialization of capital in general, have been crucial 
in this project. They have changed the power relations between capital and labour by giving capital 
an exit option, and they have made state managers (even) more prepared to give in to the demands 
of transnationally-oriented capital. Consequently, capital account liberalization has also played an 
essential role, and the issue of capital account policies provides an important indication of the 
position of the BICs with regard to the US-led, Western-based neoliberal world order in general. 
To answer the general research question, this dissertation first analysed the domestic capital account 
policies of the BICs, in relation to their domestic accumulation regimes and constellations of social 
forces. In Chapter 5, it was argued that capital controls have played a key role in China’s investment- 
and export-led accumulation regime, and in allowing China’s state class to retain a substantial 
measure of control over the domestic economy. However, after the crisis, technocrats and a fraction 
of the state class aiming to challenge the US dollar through the internationalization of the renminbi, 
have been able to advance capital account liberalization substantially, with the support of wealthy 
Chinese and foreign financial (as well as productive) capital. While full capital account convertibility is 
an official goal of the Chinese government, it is unclear whether China’s state class will be willing to 
give up completely on capital controls, given that they have been a crucial instrument to maintain 
financial stability, to manage macroeconomic policies, and to sustain China’s accumulation regime. 
Chapter 6 examined Brazil’s capital account policies. It was argued that Brazil quite forcefully went 
through a process of neoliberalization in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, with the 1994 Real 
Plan being an important milestone for the neoliberal project in Brazil. Capital account liberalization 
was a crucial part of this process, and it has entrenched the power of transnationally-oriented 
financial capital. The Workers’ Party of Lula and Dilma has not fundamentally challenged this 
neoliberal project after it came to power in 2003. Although some neo-developmentalist policies were 
introduced after 2005-2006 under pressure from productive capital and organized labour, the 
orthodox macroeconomic framework and open capital account remained in place. Some moderate 
capital controls implemented between 2009 and 2013, meant to counter excessive exchange rate 
appreciation, also did not fundamentally reduce the power of transnationally-oriented financial 
capital. The chapter contended that, although the neo-developmentalist neoliberalism of the PT has 
improved some social (and economic) indicators in comparison to previous governments, the 
adherence to neoliberalism fundamentally limits economic and social progress. Both the orthodox 
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macroeconomic policies and the vulnerability to capital’s exit option imply that the PT will be unable 
to extend and deepen the (modest) gains that it has achieved for the working and lower classes. 
In chapter 7, India’s capital account policies were scrutinized. It was outlined how India embarked on 
a process of gradual, cautious capital account liberalization from 1991 onwards, as a part of broader 
neoliberal reforms. While these reforms have brought about rapid economic growth, India’s 
accumulation regime has neither been sustainable nor equitable. However, the crisis and its 
aftermath did not derange the historic bloc of Indian industrial capital, foreign TNCs and investors, 
the urban middle class and a large part of the Indian bureaucracy. Neither did it upset the prevailing 
consensus on further gradual capital account liberalization. While it is doubtful whether India’s pre-
crisis accumulation regime can be sustained, it is not clear what kind of regime could replace it. In 
any case, it seems that India is already subject to capital flow volatility, and that transnationally-
oriented financial capital has substantial power to influence India’s future accumulation regime. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 the influence of the BICs on the international regulation of capital controls was 
examined, in particular the IMF’s institutional view, which was developed after the global economic 
crisis and finished in December 2012. It was argued that the BICs did not fundamentally disagree with 
the IMF’s tenets, namely that the full free movement of capital is in general beneficial to individual 
countries and the world economy as a whole. However, EMDCs in general did oppose any restrictions 
on the ability to use capital controls, with Brazil taking the lead, supported by India, China and other 
countries. In this sense, the BICs have resisted the West’s attempts to institutionalize full capital 
mobility as a global norm, or what was called the “new constitutionalism” of neoliberalism. To sum 
up, while they did not contest the free movement of capital an sich, they did contest its 
institutionalization as a global norm.  
 
  9.1.2 A challenge to the neoliberal norm of the free movement of capital? 
What can be concluded with regard to the BICs’ capital account policies and the prevailing 
perspectives on the free movement of capital? A first conclusion is that all three countries have been 
increasingly liberalizing their capital account over the past decades. Brazil has liberalized the most, 
and is now almost completely open to in- and outflows. India has a complex web of controls for 
various capital flows, but there is a relative and growing freedom for cross-border in- and outflows 
for corporations, institutional investors and individuals. China, except for FDI flows, still has more 
restrictions in place. Yet it had also liberalized before the global economic crisis (especially with 
regard to inflows), and liberalization has been accelerated after the crisis. Liberalization in the BICs 
has gone together with growing financial openness and financial integration with the rest of the 
world. It thus seems that all three countries under consideration have been, to various degrees 
(Brazil the most, China the least) and at a differential pace (Brazil the quickest, China and India more 
gradually), moving towards the neoliberal norm of full capital mobility during the past decades. 
Variegated neoliberalization, as identified in Chapter 4, has thus clearly occurred in the BICs. While 
some new regulations have been introduced, especially in Brazil and India, the global economic crisis 
and its aftermath have not resulted in a substantial closure of the capital account. 
Second, China, Brazil and India want to move towards the full free movement of capital, and see it as 
a final goal. There is a rather broad-based consensus on this within policymaking circles. As one 
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interviewee stated (Interview 27): “If you ask them if full capital mobility should be a long-term goal, 
all of the BRICs will say yes. They are very much embedded into this neoliberal thinking process and 
definitely not challenging this.” The BICs have thus not only moved towards freer capital flows in 
terms of policies. They have also (often wholeheartedly) embraced and internalized the free 
movement of capital as a norm, and a strong process of socialization has taken place. There is no 
difference in this regard between the Workers’ Party in Brazil, the Congress Party and BJP in India 
and the Chinese state class organized in the CCP. 
The third finding is that the social forces trying to politicize the debate on international capital 
mobility or backing more substantial capital controls are very rare. The common factor in all BICs is 
transnationally-oriented – often foreign – financial capital, which opposes capital controls and 
strongly insists on further (and full) capital freedom. Next to this common factor, there are 
differences between the three countries examined in this dissertation. Insofar the positions of 
dominant social forces can be discerned in China, it seems that while wealthy Chinese and 
technocrats are in favour of more liberalization, neither SOEs nor SOBs strongly question the 
objective of liberalization. In Brazil, trade unions and domestic productive capital have supported 
moderate capital controls to counter exchange rate appreciation, but nor industrial capital nor trade 
unions have called for broader, more stringent restrictions. Brazilian financial capital has joined 
foreign financial capital in its opposition to controls. In India, domestic industrial capital supports the 
bureaucracy’s views on gradual liberalization. While some leftist groups, such as trade unions and 
far-left-wing political parties or academics, have tried to politicize the debate in Brazil and India (and 
to a lesser extent in  China), they are often not strong enough, or they have more urgent priorities. 
These three findings seem to support the conclusion that the BICs do not represent a fundamental 
challenge to the Western, neoliberal norm of the full free movement of capital. The BICs are close to 
the second situation identified in Chapter 1, namely (1) a considerably liberalized capital account, (2) 
a large coalition in favour of an open capital account, and (3) an acceptance of full capital mobility as 
a global norm. If the issue of cross-border capital flows is indicative of the BICs’ position towards the 
neoliberal world order in general, then they are unlikely to radically contest the main tenets of this 
world order. However, the conclusion that China, Brazil and India do not form a challenge to the 
norm of full capital mobility, should be qualified by the two following findings of this dissertation. 
A fourth finding is that, even though they have liberalized substantially, and even though they see 
the full free movement of capital as the end-goal, the BICs have deviated, and still deviate to various 
extents, from the Western norm of full capital mobility. China and India still have a substantial 
degree of controls on certain flows such as outflows by resident individuals, debt inflows and, to a 
lesser degree, portfolio inflows and outflows. Brazil has after the crisis temporarily re-introduced 
controls on portfolio (equity and debt) inflows, supplemented by controls on loans and derivatives 
(amongst others to avoid evasion). Capital controls in the BICs have served financial stability, 
monetary autonomy and macroeconomic management purposes. 
This indicates that Chinese, Brazilian and India policymakers (as well as some influential social forces 
such as domestic industrial capital) are quite pragmatic and treat the free flow of capital as a flexible 
instead of a dogmatic norm. In this regard, even if the BICs will move towards full capital mobility, 
there might still be temporary and/or counter-cyclical capital controls, and monitoring and 
regulations with regard to large-scale speculative capital flows. Moreover, even though they want to 
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fully liberalize, this doesn’t mean they also will liberalize. State managers are concerned about 
financial stability (as financial instability could cause social and political instability). This could force 
policymakers to hold on to certain controls, especially in an uncertain, volatile and fragile 
international economic context. 
The fact that they have not completely liberalized also functions as a legitimizing factor for capital 
controls in other countries. Whether it is China’s approach with stringent controls combined with 
strong economic growth, India’s caution and gradualism, or Brazil’s moderate contra-cyclical 
approach, they all refute the idea that there is no alternative to full liberalization. They have also 
demonstrated that controls can be reasonably to strongly effective when they are comprehensive 
and supported by administrative experience. This may have a certain demonstration effect and serve 
as an example to be followed, although it is unlikely to do so if policymakers in the BICs do not 
“defend” and/or “promote” their capital controls internationally. 
A fifth finding is that even though the BICs do not contest the norm of the full free movement of 
capital, they do contest restrictions on their policy space, in this case on their ability to use capital 
controls. Because pragmatism is more important than dogmatism, policymakers do not want to give 
up their autonomy to maintain or re-introduce capital controls in the future if they would deem this 
necessary. The discussions on the IMF’s institutional view on capital controls, developed after the 
global economic crisis, confirm this finding. While the BICs have not really contested the view that 
full capital mobility is desirable, they have opposed restraints on their policy space. This inclination to 
maintain the autonomy to (re-)impose capital controls deviates from the Western idea, which is to 
institutionalize the free movement of capital in internationally binding laws and regulations. 
Maintaining policy space is a common concern for China, Brazil and India, as well as other EMDCs. In 
this regard, by making sure countries are able to implement capital controls without international 
regulations constraining them, the BICs do contest the institutionalization of full capital mobility as a 
legal norm, even though they do not fundamentally disagree with the perspective that the full free 
movement of capital is desirable and preferable. 
The fourth and fifth finding of this dissertation indicate that although the BICs are unlikely to 
fundamentally contest the US-led, Western-based neoliberal word order, they are in favour of more 
flexibility, pragmatism and domestic policy space. They do not want to be bound by rigid 
international laws and regulations. If they would strengthen this position and be able to achieve 
more policy autonomy for EMDCs both in the domain of capital controls and other policy issues, this 
could result in a more heterogeneous world order. However, it must also be noted that in the 
absence of a broader challenge to the power of transnationally-oriented (financial) capital, it will only 
be large EMDCs with a strong domestic economy that will be able to use this policy space. 
This brings us to the sixth and final finding of this dissertation, namely that that transnationally-
oriented financial capital already has a substantial and growing presence in, and influence on, Brazil 
and India. Both countries do not seem to promote an alternative to subjecting themselves to the 
power of transnationally-oriented capital. An additional problem for Brazil and India is that, even if 
they wanted to, they are unable to challenge the power of global financial capital. Because of their 
economic vulnerabilities, and in particular current account deficits, they are dependent on (short-
term) capital inflows. Large swings in capital flows, currency fluctuations and speculative capital 
movements thus force Brazil and India to take into account the position and potential reaction of 
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global financial capital. This power of transnationally-oriented capital, the important position in the 
respective accumulation regimes, and its exit option, create limitations to alternative projects, 
whether it is the neo-developmentalist model in Brazil, or the allegedly pro-poor economic growth in 
India. 
China is clearly different in this regard, as transnationally-oriented financial capital does not have the 
structural power in China that it has developed in Brazil and India. Due to its current account 
surpluses, its foreign exchange reserves, and its less open financial system, China has been far less 
subjected to the whims of transnationally-oriented financial capital. In a way, although liberalization 
has recently resulted in more volatility and speculation, capital controls in China have thus also had a 
transformative impact and affected power relations to the detriment of global financial capital, 
contrary to the controls in Brazil and India. However, it should also be noted that these 
transformative restrictions have not been used to create a more progressive domestic order, as the 
working class and the population in general have not been the main beneficiaries of China’s 
accumulation regime in (at least) the past two decades. 
 
 9.2 Suggestions for further research 
This dissertation is a first attempt to bring together several themes, in particular capital account 
policies, constellations of social forces, ideas on capital controls, and rising powers. As such, there are 
many issues, some which have been touched upon in this dissertation, that could be further explored 
and examined. With regard to the financial sector, an interesting theme which has been touched 
upon more superficially in this dissertation concerns the issue of SOBs. It is clear that the large role 
played by SOBs in both China, Brazil and India deviates more strongly from neoliberal norms than the 
BICs’ capital account policies regarding short-term capital flows. However, it has also been noted that 
these SOBs have been transforming, with the purpose of profitability becoming a stronger priority. 
More research could analyse whether these SOBs differ from (Western) private banks in, amongst 
other things, their lending priorities, social and environmental impact, important objectives and risk-
taking. Other interesting issues with regard to the BICs perspectives on international capital mobility 
and the power of transnationally-oriented capital include their position on the implementation of a 
global Tobin Tax as well as financial transactions taxes; their positions on safeguarding policy space 
within BITs and FTAs, and the issue of investor-state-dispute settlement (ISDS) which allows TNCs 
investing in a certain state to sue that state in private international tribunals for a range of issues (see 
Eberhardt & Olivert, 2012; van Harten, 2005); and the evolution of the New Development Bank and 
the contingent reserve arrangement (CRA) which are planned to be introduced in the following years. 
Another stimulating exercise would be to examine to what extent there are linkages between elites 
within the BICs and the West. There have been studies on linkages between elites in global forums 
and networks (see e.g. Carroll, 2008; Carroll, Fennema & Heemskerk, 2010; Carroll & Sapinski, 2010; 
Gill, 1992; van der Pijl, Holman & Raviv, 2011). Research could for example focus on the composition 
of the World Economic Forum (WEF), and whether the power shift to BICs and other EMDCs is also 
reflected in the WEF. Studies could also look into the pathways of organic intellectuals in the BICs, 
and whether/how they are connected with Western intellectuals, academic and other institutions, or 
international organizations.  
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Another interesting research area concerns the role and visions of trade unions in the BICs. The trade 
unions in these three countries have a very different position in their respective countries, from the 
ACFTU as a party organ in China, over the CUT which is incorporated– but therefore also demobilized 
and neutralized – into Brazil’s neo-developmentalist neoliberal historic bloc, to the Indian trade 
unions which represent only a small fraction of India’s population, and some of which are still radical 
anti-capitalist organizations. More insight into the strategies deployed by these labour movements, 
and their successes and failures, would also be relevant for trade unions elsewhere. A comparison of 
their positions on trade, investment and capital account liberalization (as well as other issues), and a 
more detailed account of how they have (not) influenced their countries’ policies on these issues, 
would likewise be interesting. Further, it would be thought-provoking if there are differences on the 
issue of capital account policies between unions in advanced countries and unions in the Global 
South (as has been argued on the issue of free trade, see Bieler, 2013). 
 
 9.3 A counter-hegemonic project: what role for capital controls? 
While it is not my intention to tell “the left” what to do to get out of the structural crisis it is in, this 
dissertation has of course some relevant implications for the future of the left. This final section 
considers the role that capital controls could potentially play in advancing a left-wing project. A first 
question that should be posed is: what does the left need to become stronger? In general, four 
elements are needed to produce an important political project (see also Cahill, 2011, p. 479): (1) a 
historic bloc of social forces (2) with good ideas that could become hegemonic, (3) institutions in 
which these ideas can be institutionalized; (4) the power to translate these ideas into policies and 
institutions. In other words, as already indicated in Chapter 4, the “end of neoliberalism” requires 
more than just the de-legitimization of neoliberal ideas; it also requires social forces opposing it 
through large-scale mobilizations and political battles (see Cahill, 2011, p. 490; Crouch, 2009, p. 395; 
Hall, 2012, p. 75; Harvey, 2009; Massey, 2012b, p. 81; Michl, 2011, p. 125; Saull, 2012, p. 335). 
These mobilizations by counter-hegemonic social forces need to transform power relations and 
challenge the power of transnationally-oriented financial capital: “Whether called socialism or not, 
today’s revived demands for social justice and genuine democracy could only be realized through 
such a fundamental shift of political power, entailing fundamental changes in state as well as class 
structures” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 340). It is in this power shift that transformative capital 
controls could play a role. Elsewhere I have argued that, similar to Rodrik’s political trilemma (see 
1.3.1), there is a “leftist trilemma” (see Dierckx, 2014b). This trilemma states that (1) if capital is 
internationally mobile and (2) if trade unions and social movements are mainly national in nature, 
then (3) the capitalist class will always have a relative power advantage so that a leftist project will be 




Figure 9.1: The leftist trilemma 
 
As can be derived from the trilemma, there are two possibilities to deal with the impasse of the left 
(see also DeMartino, 1999; Harmes, 2006, 2012): (1) either leftist social forces are scaled up, to 
demand anti-capital (profit-lowering) policies at the supranational level, or (2) capital can be scaled 
down, to make sure that capital cannot flee ant-capital (profit-lowering) policies at the national level. 
While many authors have pled for the first option, the transnationalization of labour and social 
movements (see e.g. Bieler, Lindberg & Sauerborn, 2010, p. 257; Harvey, 2008, p. 39; Palley, 2007; 
Radice, 2000, p. 15; Rupert, 1998, p. 432; Swyngedouw, 2004, pp. 73-74), the de-transnationalization 
or de-globalization of capital has received far less attention. But a two-pronged strategy – scaling up 
labour while scaling down capital – has the potential to be more effective than a sole focus on the 
transnationalization of the labour movement.  To sum up, “the strategic formula is to build durably 
and relatively democratic mass movements informed by internationalism, combined with demands 
upon the national state to ‘lock capital down’” (Bond, 2007, p. 47). 
This scaling down of capital entails the (re-)introduction of substantial and stringent controls over the 
international movement of capital (and to a lesser extent goods). By limiting the transnationalization 
of capital, the relative – both material and ideological – power of capital would decrease because its 
exit option would become less credible (see Crotty & Epstein, 1996). While this would not imply that 
capital would suddenly be powerless, it would put capital and labour on a more equal footing. 
Moreover, capital controls could be a first step in the realization of “greater democratic control over 
the production and utilization of the surplus” (Harvey, 2008, p. 37). 
Indeed, this would not only involve capital (and trade) controls, but also controls over domestic 
investment (Panitch & Gindin, 2009, p. 29). Major decisions on capital flows and investment should 
be democratically made, and not be left to individual wealthy investors and multinational 
corporations. A more radical version of what Keynes called the “socialization of investment”i, 
whereby decisions on investment are made by public bodies instead of private individuals and firms, 
should be put on the agenda (see also Cahill, 2011, p. 492). 
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A first instrument to achieve this socialization of investment concerns the banking sector, or the 
financial sector more generally. Several authors have argued that transforming the financial sector 
into a public utility should be a priority for the left (Blackburn, 2011, p. 56; Marois, 2013; Panitch, 
1994, p. 90; Panitch & Gindin, 2012, p. 340; Saad-Filho, 2010, pp. 265-266; see also Wade, 2008, p. 
48; UNCTAD, 2013b). SOBs would play a central role in such a system, and the structure and 
functions of these SOBs would be radically reorganized. Instead of (short-term) profitability and 
speculation, their purpose would be to facilitate socially and ecologically sound investments in the 
public good. Instead of being controlled by technocrats or managers, they would have to be 
democratically managed through innovative decision-making structures. While this might sound 
radical, it is less radical than allowing more future systemic financial crises and regressive bailouts. 
A further reason to nationalize is that banks would have to play an important role in the 
implementation of capital controls, as they have done in the past (see OECD, 2002). Therefore, 
banking systems would probably have to be de-globalized, as foreign banks have often been vehicles 
for more capital mobility and a lower effectiveness of capital controls (see Prasad & Rajan, 2008, p. 
165; Williamson, 1999). Moreover, it is clear that private banks with the aim of profit maximization 
would also represent an obstacle to effective capital controls. As Glyn (1986, p. 48) already noted 
almost thirty years ago: “It is hard to see how such [technically effective] controls could be 
successfully implemented without the nationalization of the major UK financial institutions and the 
support of those who work in them.” 
Besides the creation of a public-utility financial system, other instruments to socialize investment 
should also be explored. This includes a renewal of public ownership, which has been strangely 
absent in recent debates on the left (Cumbers, 2012, p. 3). While public ownership has in the past 
mostly been used to stabilize capitalist economies, it could also be used to move beyond it.ii Co-
operative firms could likewise play a role. 
Finally, higher public investment, financed by higher taxation of TNCs and wealthy individuals, could 
also be an important mechanism (see also Winters, 1994, p. 450). The left has an important weapon 
in this regard. While profit shares and inequality have risen, investment has been rather sluggish, and 
has in any case not at all been particularly high (see Baker, 2013; Blyth, 2013, p. 748; Hart-Landsberg, 
2014; Harvey, 2009; Milberg, 2008, p. 435; Milberg & Winkler, 2010, p. 286; Stockhammer, 2008, p. 
184, 2010). High profits thus do not lead to high investment – nor to jobs and lower unemployment 
(Bivens & Weller, 2006; Wade, 2010, p. 55). The contradiction between the profitability imperative 
and social needs has become stronger after the crisis. This is demonstrated by the growing levels of 
cash that large TNCs are sitting on instead of investing them in productive activities (see Crooks, 
2014; Sakoui, 2014; UNCTAD, 2012), while at the same time there are huge public, social and 
environmental needs. In sum, as UNCTAD (2013b) has stated, “the presumed transmission of higher 
profits to higher gross fixed capital formation has not materialized.” 
As can be derived from this short overview, the (re-)politicization of the free flow of capital and the 
re-introduction of capital controls are only the start, not the ending. Their potential should not be 
overestimated, especially when they are not combined with stronger left-wing mobilizations, social 
movements, trade unions and social protest. But even if capital controls could play only a small role, 
this would be very helpful. After all, the challenges and hurdles for the left are great and many. As 
Warren Buffett has stated (in Stein, 2006): “There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich 
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class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.” This, however, should not be seen as a discouraging 
observation, but as a realistic view that avoids illusions, and as an urgent call to arms (metaphorically 
of course). To paraphrase Antonio Gramsci, while we can be pessimist because of intelligence, it is 
our duty to remain optimist because of will. 
 
                                                          
i
 Keynes envisaged that between 65% and 75% of investment would be directly influenced by (semi)public 
bodies, with other motives than profitability (Seccareccia, 1995, p. 48). 
ii
 See the book by Cumbers (2013) for an overview of how public ownership could/should be organized, and the 
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